

THE
CHRISTIAN REMEMBRANCER.

JANUARY, 1854.

ART. I.—1. *Census of Great Britain, 1851. Population Tables.*
2. *Results of the Census of Great Britain in 1851.* By EDWARD
CHESHIRE. London: J. W. Parker.

THE opening of the present century was characterised by a panic fear amongst the political economists. A series of bad seasons, raising corn to six guineas a quarter, with now and then a further advance—till, in 1801, wheat reached 180s., and the quartern loaf was for a month as high as 1s. 10½d.—were, it must be owned, no unreasonable causes for depression, and very naturally turned the current of public thought into gloomy channels. In the time of adversity there is no remembrance of prosperity; want and famine grew to be considered necessary conditions of our being; not so much evils to be delivered from, as to adapt ourselves to. Men began to have hungry eyes, to grudge new sharers in such short commons; and the cry arose that the world was becoming too populous. New terms were invented, suited to the magnitude of the evil: and the ‘superfecundity’ of our race,—our English race especially—was enlarged upon with morbid anxiety, and a dismal pleasure in proving the imminence of the danger. It was pronounced that, at our present rate of increase, there would soon not be standing room. England’s geographical area was measured out, and the arithmetician discovered that its twelve millions of millions of square inches would, in five hundred years, at an unlimited rate of increase, have twelve millions of millions of families to provide for. And while the human race thus increased in a ‘geometric ratio,’ it was discovered—from reasons best known to these calculators—that the produce of the earth could only increase in an arithmetical ratio. We need not say that the produce, marshalled forth as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, made a poor figure in the race against the rapid advance of the consumers, represented by 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512. With such ocular demonstrations, it needed but a limited acquaintance with numbers to fore-

see hideous famine, and every horror humanity can be subject to, as the necessary concomitants of such a disproportion between supply and demand. Indeed, these calamities could hardly be otherwise than welcome to imaginations haunted by an intolerable apprehension of want of breathing space. War, pestilence, and famine, were positive reliefs in the inevitable predicament; they were accepted as a natural law—the drains by which the wealthy, thinking, and otherwise respectable classes, were to maintain their ground. As for the labouring classes, the vast bulk of mankind, there was no rational hope of their deliverance from a perpetual pressure against the limits of subsistence,—famine always near, want a condition of their being, with only such temporary remission from this horrible struggle as a raging epidemic, or a desolating war, or an absolute famine could bring,—but temporary resources, all of them, to check the hordes the prolific future would pour in to fill the vacancy. The destroying angel must always stand on this awful ‘limit,’ his sword drawn in his hand, sweeping away the helpless crowds which the blind impulses of human nature would for ever thrust up against it. Such were the apprehensions a few years’ scarcity, and the flagrant evils of our then Poor-Law system, could raise in the minds of intelligent, if we cannot call them sensible men. That we have not misrepresented these fears, a few extracts will show. Our first is from Senior’s ‘Lectures on Population.’

‘We have seen that, as a general rule, additional labour, employed in the cultivation of land *within a given district*, produces a less proportionate return. And we have seen that such is the power of reproduction and duration of life in mankind, that the population of a given district is capable of doubling itself, at least every twenty-five years. It is clear, therefore, that the rate at which the production of food is capable of being increased, and that at which population, if unchecked, would increase, are totally different. Every addition made to the quantity of food produced, makes in general a further addition more difficult. Every addition to the existing population diffuses wider the means of still further addition. If neither evil, nor the fear of evil, checked the population of England, it would amount in a century to above two hundred millions. . . . It is clear, however, that long before the first century had elapsed, no excellence in our institutions, or salubrity of climate, or unremitting industry, could have saved us from being arrested in our progress by a constantly increasing want of subsistence. If all other moral and physical checks could be got rid of,—if we had neither wars nor libertinism,—if our habitations, and employments, and habits were all wholesome, and no fears of indigence or loss of station prevented or retarded our marriages, famine would soon exercise her prerogative of controlling, in the last resort, the multiplication of mankind.’—*Senior’s Lectures*, pp. 12, 13.

Malthus, vigorous and plain-spoken, and led on by his theory into a total disregard of the feelings, or, as he would hold them, weaknesses, of all whose ideas of humanity he outraged, thus complacently dwells on his favourable aspect of exterminating diseases:—

'The widening of these drains (palsy, apoplexy, gout, &c. &c.) was necessary to carry off the population, which still remained redundant, notwithstanding the increased operation of the preventive check and the part which was annually disposed of, and enabled to subsist by the increase of agriculture.

'Dr. Haygarth, in the sketch of his benevolent plan for the extermination of the casual small-pox, draws a frightful picture of the mortality which has been occasioned by this distemper, attributes to this the slow progress of population, and makes some curious calculations on the favourable effects which would be produced in this respect by its extermination. His conclusions, however, I fear, would not follow his premises. I am far from doubting, that millions and millions of human beings have been destroyed by small-pox. But were its devastations, as Dr. Haygarth supposes, many thousand degrees greater than the plague, I should still doubt whether the average population of the earth had been diminished by them. The small-pox is certainly one of the channels—and a very broad one—which nature has opened for the last thousand years, to keep down the population to the level of the means of subsistence; but had this been closed, others would have become wider, or new ones would have been formed. In ancient times, the mortality from war and the plague was incomparably greater than in modern. On the gradual diminution of the stream of mortality, the generation and almost universal prevalence of the small-pox is a great and striking instance of one of those changes in the channels of mortality which ought to awaken our attention, and animate us to patient and persevering investigation. For my own part, I feel not the slightest doubt, that if the introduction of the cow-pox should extirpate the small-pox, and yet the number of marriages continue the same, we shall find a very perceptible difference in the increased mortality of some other diseases. Nothing could prevent this but a sudden start in our agriculture; and should this take place, which I fear we have not much reason to expect, it will not be owing to the number of children saved from death by the cow-pox inoculation, but to the alarms occasioned among the people of property by the late scarcities, and to the increased gains of farmers, which have been so absurdly reprobated. I am strongly, however, inclined to believe, that the number of marriages will not in this case remain the same; but that the gradual light which may be expected to be thrown on this interesting topic of human inquiry will teach us how to make the extinction of a mortal disorder a real blessing to us, a real improvement in the general health and happiness of society.'—*Malthus's Principles of Population*, vol. ii. p. 290, 4th edition.

In this passage the philosopher allows himself to hope that men will grow wiser, and not marry at the rate they have done; but that this was no permanent state of feeling with him, but rather the contrary persuasion, that this fatal tendency of human beings must produce inevitably the evils we have already touched upon, is shown in a passage in his correspondence with our first-quoted economist, Mr. Senior.

'As a voluntary retardation of their own increase, in the mass of the people, cannot be effected without restraint and self-denial, to which there is certainly a much less tendency than to marriage, the practical result is such as might be expected; namely, that although this restraint and self-denial may prevent more misery and vice at one period than at another; though they are often more efficient in civilized and populous countries, than in ignorant and thinly peopled countries; and though we may hope that they will become still more efficient as knowledge advances; yet, as

far as we can judge from history, there never has been a period of any considerable length, when premature mortality and vice, specifically arising from the pressure of population against food, has not prevailed to a considerable extent; nor, admitting the possibility, or even the probability, of those evils being diminished, is there any rational prospect of a near approach to their entire removal.'—*Correspondence with Mr. Senior*, p. 86.

The pressure of certain acknowledged evils, rising at one period to a crisis, may probably, we have said, have induced this train of thought in cold and speculative intellects; but when once entertained, it is very certain that the subject and the view altogether grew to be a very favourite one with these theorists, who, inured to the occupation of making the whole train of human calamity fit neatly into a system, and adopting an abstract and technical phraseology, as if purposely to exclude human feeling in the discussion of the highest human interests, lost all sense, in their studies, of the reality of the evils, the vice and misery, they so glibly discussed, and betrayed, one and all, a very decided unwillingness to admit the possibility of a brighter side to the question. With some minds, the discovery of a *cause* for certain evils is much the same final act, and produces the same sense of satisfaction, as the finding a remedy does to more practical heads and hearts. Malthus and his followers were not, indeed, without a remedy, but it was one, they were well aware, not suited to human nature, nor ever likely to be acted upon. Such as it was, however, they were as jealous of its exclusive power, as though they believed it the true panacea for every evil of life. 'We must on no account do anything which tends directly to encourage marriage,' said they. 'The poor must be taught that the greatest part of their sufferings proceeds from imprudence in this respect;' that 'their only mode of bettering their condition is by withholding the supplies of labour, which they, being possessors of this commodity, have alone the power to do;' 'that this is the principal and most permanent cause of poverty;' going on to prove that even industry itself would not avail anything if all men were industrious; that no man has a right to marry, with only the means of maintaining two children, when the average shows he may have three or four; that such a man falling into want, however steady and otherwise praiseworthy his conduct may have been, is no fit object for national help, but a criminal in his country's eyes. As no abstract can do justice to the firmness of Malthus's views on this point, we will give his own words. After proposing the total abolition of the Poor-Laws, and suggesting that the clergyman of each parish should always, after publishing the banns, read a short address on the duty of every man to support his own children, he goes on:—

'After the public notice (the above clerical exhortation) which I have proposed, had been given, and the system of Poor-Laws had ceased with

regard to the rising generation, if any man chose to marry, without a prospect of being able to support a family, he should have the most perfect liberty to do so. Though to marry in this case is, in my opinion, clearly an immoral act; yet it is not one which society can justly take upon itself to prevent or punish; because the punishment provided for it by the laws of nature falls directly and most severely upon the individual who commits the act, and through him, only remotely and feebly, on the society. When nature will govern and punish for us, it is a very miserable ambition to wish to snatch the rod from her hands, and draw upon ourselves the odium of executioner. To the punishment, therefore, of nature he should be left—the punishment of want. He has erred in the face of a most clear and precise warning, and can have no just reason to complain of any person but himself, when he feels the consequences of his error. All parish assistance should be denied him; and if the hand of private charity be stretched forth for his relief, the interests of humanity imperiously require that it should be administered sparingly. He should be taught to know, that the laws of nature, which are the laws of God, had doomed him and his family to suffer for disobeying their repeated admonitions: that he had no claim or *right* on society for the smallest portion of food beyond that which his labour would fairly purchase, and that if he and his family were saved from suffering the extremities of hunger, he would owe it to the pity of some kind benefactor, to whom, therefore, he ought to be bound by the strongest ties of gratitude. . . . It may appear to be hard that a mother and her children, who had been guilty of no particular crime themselves, should suffer for the ill conduct of the father; but this is one of the invariable laws of nature; knowing this, we should think twice upon the subject, and be very sure of the ground on which we go, before we presume *systematically* to counteract it.—*Malthus*, vol. ii. p. 321.

In spite of the plausible terms of this argument, we need not enter, at this day, into its real immorality and injustice, throwing as it does the burden of the 'preventive check' upon the poor, to whom celibacy is an immeasurably greater hardship than to the rich, and for whom we may even say that, as a class, it is a manifestly unfit state of life, and compelling the labourer's conscience to be guided, not by his strength to labour, nor his willingness to labour, nor even his actual labour, but solely by the value of that labour in the labour-market. Such as it was, the argument required that it should be the only 'check' against the threatened evils; and all other remedies, however evident, were dismissed with little ceremony. Our rapidly increasing commerce was regarded with a jealous eye, suggesting as it did the idea of exchanging our manufactures for the food of other countries. 'If our commerce continue increasing for a few years,' he says, 'and our commercial population with it, we shall be laid so bare to the shafts of fortune, that nothing but a miracle can save us from being sunk.' The increasing powers of agriculture were but temporary, inefficient reliefs. The importation of corn adequate at all times to the demand is pronounced 'scarcely possible,' and the question of emigration itself gains scarcely more attention. The economist even turns sentimental when this 'drain' is offered to his attention, and having condemned his labourer to celibacy and a cheerless hearth, he

pleads the love of country, of parents, kindred, friends, and companions, as real reasons why he should not attempt to improve his condition elsewhere. But even should the subject of so much regard think otherwise, the resource is both temporary and inadequate.

‘Every resource, however, from emigration, if used effectually, as this would be, must be of short duration. There is scarcely a state in Europe, except, perhaps, Russia, the inhabitants of which do not often endeavour to better their condition by removing to other countries. As these states, therefore, have nearly all rather a redundant than deficient population, in proportion to their progress, they cannot be supposed to afford any effectual resources to emigration to each other. Let us suppose for a moment that, in this more enlightened part of the globe, the internal economy of each state was so admirably regulated, that no checks existed to population, and that the different governments provided every facility for emigration. Taking the population of Europe, excluding Russia, at a hundred millions, and allowing a greater increase of produce than is probable, and even possible, in the mother countries, the redundancy of parent-stock in a single century would be eleven hundred millions, which, added to the natural increase of the colonies during the same time, would more than double what has been supposed to be the present population of the whole earth. Can we imagine that in the uncultivated parts of Asia, Africa, or America, the greatest exertions and the best directed endeavours could, in so short a period, prepare a quantity of land sufficient for the support of such a population? If any sanguine person should feel a doubt upon the subject, let him add twenty-five or fifty years more, and every doubt must be erased in overwhelming conviction.

‘It is evident, therefore, that the reason why the resource of emigration has so long continued to be held out as a remedy to redundant population is because, from the natural unwillingness of people to desert their native country, and the difficulty of clearing and cultivating fresh soil, it never is or can be adequately adopted. If this remedy were indeed really effectual, and had power so far to relieve the disorders of vice and misery in old states as to place them in the condition of the most prosperous new colonies, we should soon see the phial exhausted, and when the disorders returned with increased virulence, every hope from this quarter would be for ever closed.

‘It is clear, therefore, that with any view of making room for an unrestricted increase of population, emigration is perfectly inadequate; but as a partial and temporary expedient, and with a view to the more general cultivation of the earth, and the wider spread of civilization, it seems to be both useful and proper.’—*Malthus*, vol. ii. p. 71.

Such were the arguments used by one philosopher, and held unanswerable by many others, fifty years ago. Why, (even by their own showing,) because the world would be full of people some hundreds or thousands of years hence, persons suited to one another, and loving one another, should not marry meanwhile, is not explained: nor why we are bound to consider the future so much in a matter in which the future might be very well left to take care of itself.

Looking back upon the warmth and zeal with which these opinions were entertained, we see the force of local circumstances to influence minds which think themselves most speculative and capable of abstraction. These reasoners may be

said to have discarded faith for sense and reason, and arguing, as all in this temper must, from a limited field of inquiry and with limited powers, the present and the near entirely obscured the full bearings of the subject from their minds.

There are few things which a clever man may not undertake to prove with such a show of reason and logic, that common sense and instinct will find it hard to maintain their ground in the controversy. The only thing for a plain man to do in such cases is to consider how the theory first arose in the arguer's mind. If we see in him a strong leaning to it because it is his *own* conception, or because it falls in with his principles, or because it suits his interests, or because his argument requires it, we may very well disregard a great deal of reasoning we have not wit or practice to refute. If all the people who could not answer Malthus had remained single in obedience to his dictum, the English nation might still have been restricted to this island's shores, struggling for a bare subsistence from its sole produce, the victims of 'preventive checks,' with only half our numbers, and those inadequately supplied. But nature and observation found opposing arguments more influential in conduct, though offering a poor resistance on paper. We remember the reply with which a working-woman summarily discarded the Malthusian dissuasion from matrimony, as entailing the expense and burden of a family, when such arguments were rife in the world,—'Them as is'nt' (she argued) 'done but do, 'and them as is done;' which, less tersely rendered, means—'those who are single only just get a living, and those that are married always get that.' Reasoning potent then and always, and, it must be owned, answering very much to our experience, though none can feel more strongly than we do the evil and consequent miseries of rash and thoughtless marriages.

It is in no spirit of boasting, nor as expressing any confidence in the permanence of a prosperity even now threatened in more than one quarter, that we have chosen to preface our notice of the recent Census by the contrast these gloomy theories offer to the actual facts which have from time to time been brought to light, and never more strikingly than in these lately issued papers: and to show how formal statements and interminable arrays of figures may vindicate the goodness of Providence and the permanence of its laws against all the forebodings and threatenings of faithless alarmists. We know not what the future may have in store for us, nor what reverses the years to come may hide from us. But we see that the command to increase and multiply and replenish the earth has been obeyed, in spite of the fears of political economists; that nature and reason have safely despised their paper difficulties; that there have been thousands and myriads of happy homes where they

would have prescribed cheerless solitude, and innumerable families have been maintained where they prophesied want and misery; that millions of heirs to a glorious immortality have been born where their theories required an empty void; that rich wastes have been peopled where they foresaw only failure and distress; that the world's resources have opened out indefinitely where they expected only a limited and short-lived supply;—in a word, that liberty and just laws, and industry and skill, and the genius of a powerful race, and our excellent institutions, and our salubrious climate, have produced the consequences apprehended by these reasoners, of an increase in population unknown before in the history of the world, but that hitherto the earth's resources have kept pace, and more than kept pace with the increase,—and so far their ill prophecies have signally failed; that never has there been a people at once so increasing and so prosperous. The maxims of Divine Providence still hold good,—still 'in all labour there is profit,'—the thought of the diligent still tends to plenty; still the earth is for *all*; the valleys still laugh with corn; God's thousand hills have still their countless flocks, and men gladly go forth, leaving their own people and their fathers' house, to cultivate and to tend them. Still we may greet the bridegroom with the Christian marriage song, and all its train of blessings,—'Oh, well is thee, and happy shalt thou be,' for the earth has still room enough and to spare for wife and children, and countless virtuous homes.

In fifty years the population of Great Britain has doubled itself, and, if we take into the account those vast numbers who have left its shores, has trebled itself within that period, and yet these multitudes—not shutting our eyes to the present so-called scarcity—are more prosperous, better supplied with the necessities of life, with food and clothing, than when all these fears of 'superfecundity' were first entertained, and England contained ten millions instead of twenty millions of souls.

The subject of statistics has never been regarded with much general favour. Persons who delight in numbers, and who have a faculty for reducing all subjects to a matter of figures, viewing every question of morals and politics through their medium, are regarded very much as a distinct peculiar race, who must expect no sympathy from the world at large in the pleasures and difficulties, the discoveries and perplexities of their art. It must be owned that all forms and combinations of numbers fall dead on the common ear; that there are multitudes who never take them into their minds at all—who derive no ideas from hundreds and thousands and millions—who, being told certain great numerical facts one day, are found the next totally oblivious, and who cannot remember with

any approach to accuracy any fact wherein numbers are concerned, whether it be the date of an historical event, the remoteness of celestial bodies, the distances on the earth's surface, the numbers of its inhabitants,—who recoil, in self-defence, from any questioning on such subjects—who could not trust themselves to hazard an answer, lest they should prove preposterously and ludicrously mistaken—who, having been told perhaps a hundred times the population of London, may yet be a million wrong in their estimate, if so rash as to make one. All this every one's experience, either of himself or others, must show to be true enough; and hitherto the statisticians have gone on announcing their numbers, and their hearers forgetting them, as though each had acknowledged the fitness of such a division of labour. But there is in the present day a strong desire to popularize science. There is an increasing yearning for sympathy in all intellectual exertions; fields of thought hitherto held barren of general interest are being daily reclaimed, and forced upon public attention; and statisticians themselves are emulous, though little hopeful of a more favourable acceptance of their numerical discoveries. There is something almost pathetic in the appeal for public interest with which the papers before us inaugurate the thousands upon thousands of pages of figures which they present to an apathetic world as the results of the census. Feeling that these pages do hide wonderful facts, important truths, great moral lessons, they would fain engage the world's attention to them; recalling the enormous amount of thought and organized labour which have been expended in their compilation, they long that men should realize and value their useful toils. But experience teaches them how little of this kind of reward may be looked for. It is thus, in the language of his craft, believing figures the most trustworthy vehicle for knowledge, and instinctively measuring all by this scale, that Mr. Cheshire expresses the modesty of his hopes, in the preface to his pamphlet, detailing some of the principal features of the census papers.

'The labour of condensing so voluminous and elaborate a publication into a *hundredth* part of its original bulk has been considerable; but the Author will be adequately rewarded if *one in a thousand* of the British population, herein enumerated, care to possess, in a concise form, some of the most interesting details concerning their *own* country which ever emanated from a Government Department.

'The popular impression that a census consists of an accumulation of numbers only, is most erroneous. A census comprises information of deep and varied interest, but unfortunately the magnitude of the undertaking necessitates a publication of corresponding proportions; hence the more interesting details, and many very important results, lie buried in such a mass of statistics, that it is extremely doubtful whether one person in a

million ever takes the trouble to become acquainted with the contents of a census.'—*Cheshire*, Preface.

And again he thus pleads for the intelligence, as well as industry, which must have been brought into exercise to produce so remarkable a result.

'Public opinion allots to the Registrar-General very prosaic duties. Persons in general consider it a very simple matter to record the births, marriages, and deaths, as they occur; to draw up an annual report concerning them; and once in every ten years to count the people. It is true, in the latter case, they understand that to number the heads of the British population involves a certain amount of trouble, but they imagine that the task could be easily accomplished by a subdivision of labour, and that when a series of operations in simple addition had been performed, the result was completed. Those, however, whose investigations lead them to consult the elaborate and voluminous reports which issue from the General Register and Census Offices, form a widely-different opinion of the ability displayed, and of the laborious operations carried forward, in those important departments of the State.'—*Ibid.* Introd. p. 9.

And this is very true. In reading the Report, and also in turning over for ourselves the folios of various thickness which constitute the result of these labours, we are astonished at the variety and accuracy of the information gathered together. When the *whole* results are given, for which a concluding publication is promised, it will seem as if all that could be said of our aggregate population may be found therein. Indeed it is almost alarming to each individual unit to find in how many relations he has been the subject of state inquiries, and how far his privacy has been invaded. Lodged, if not buried, within piles of figures, tracing himself from one table to another, each reader sees himself the object of vigilant scrutiny; his sex, his age, his present locality, his birthplace, his house, his occupation, the sources of his subsistence, the number and sex of his servants, his condition as married, single, or widower, parent, or childless, householder, or less responsible inmate; his freedom from or subjection to personal infirmities; his creed, his education, his civil and political rights, everything about him but his inmost heart and soul have been penetrated into, and made subject of calculation, the ground-work of theories and matter for legislation. Nor are these pages wanting in another likeness to the grave to which, for their secrecy and tenacity, we may well compare them. In them all are equal. The circumstances of all have been equal matter of interest and curiosity; the duke and the pauper occupy the same room on the paper; no doubt the Queen herself has helped to fill up a householder's schedule, and taken up no more space than the humblest of her subjects. We gladly avail ourselves of Mr. Cheshire's condensed history of the means used for taking the census, drawn from the official Report.

'The inquiries undertaken at the census of 1851 were of a far more extensive character than those pursued at any previous enumeration, for it was resolved to exhibit not only the statistics of parishes, and of parliamentary and municipal boroughs, but also of such other large towns in England and Scotland as appeared sufficiently important for separate mention, and of all the ecclesiastical districts and new ecclesiastical parishes which, during the last forty years, had been created in England and Wales. In addition, also, to the inquiry concerning the occupation, age, and birth-place of the population, it was determined to ascertain various relationships, such as husband, wife, son, daughter,—the civil condition, as married, unmarried, widower, or widow,—and the number of blind, or deaf and dumb. Moreover, the design was formed of collecting statistics as to the accommodation afforded by the various churches and other places of public worship throughout the country, and the number of persons generally frequenting them; also as to existing educational establishments, and the actual number of scholars under instruction. It was, however, subsequently considered doubtful whether the Census Act rendered it compulsory upon parties to afford information upon these points; this inquiry was, therefore, pursued as a purely voluntary investigation.

'The local machinery by which the objects thus contemplated were to be attained differed considerably in England and Scotland. In England and Wales the *Registration Districts*, which, for the most part, are contemporaneous with the *Unions*, were made available for enumerating the population. Of these districts there were 624, each having a superintendent registrar; and these were divided into 2,190 sub-districts, each having a local registrar of births and deaths. Under the supervision of their 624 superintendents, the 2,190 registrars were directed to form their sub-districts into *Enumeration Districts*, according to certain instructions. The number of such enumeration districts in England and Wales was 30,610, each district being the portion assigned to one enumerator, who was required to complete his enumeration in one day.'—*Cheshire*, p. 10.

We need not describe the schedules, which our readers will remember filling up with more or less alacrity; some jealous of what seemed unconstitutional prying into private affairs, others amused with this new form of self-portraiture, and responding with minuteness to the nation's curiosity; but they may be interested to know that the total weight of these schedules was forty tons, and their number 7,000,000. The time, the 31st of March, was chosen as being in the season when there is the least displacement of the population.

'In the winter season of the year people are in the greatest numbers at home; while in summer, in the hay, the corn, and the hop harvest, many of the labouring, and all the vagrant classes of the nation, wander about and sleep in fields, in barns, and in sheds, or under trees and tents. The Irish have for many years crossed the sea in large numbers before harvest, and afterwards returned home. Business, fairs, festivals, the sessions, assizes, fashion, watering-places, railways, and great works of every kind, displace the people; and it is impossible to take the census at any period of the year when some of these disturbing causes are not in operation; but it was considered, on the whole, that no better day in 1851 could be fixed on, to avoid their interference, than the last day of March; which was also the month in which the first census of Great Britain was taken.'—*Census Report*, p. xxiv.

No one present on that night was to be omitted, and no person absent was to be included, except policemen and others on night duty, miners and potters, and whoever else habitually worked in the night; travellers were enumerated at the hotels at which they might stop on the following morning. Bargemen, tramps, and gipsies were numbered in their boats, tents, and encampments, to the great annoyance of some of them; one tribe of gipsies taking a great deal of fruitless trouble to escape the general scrutiny. Houses, as well as inhabitants, were reckoned up, and an exact account taken of all that were uninhabited or building.

When the enumerators had transcribed the householders' schedules into the enumeration book with which each was supplied, and completed the various summaries and estimates, for which one week was allowed, they forwarded them, together with the voluntary returns relating to schools, churches, &c., to the respective registrars; and here the enumerators' labours ended. The census returns were now in the hands of 3,220 registrars, or dividers of districts. The business of these registrars was to give a careful and systematic examination and revision of the documents laid before them, and then to prepare a summary to be transmitted with the enumeration books themselves to the superintendent registrar for a further revision. A fortnight was allowed for this work, at the end of which the functions of the registrars ceased. The summaries and enumeration books were now in the hands of 624 superintendent-registrars, who, after further investigation, transmitted them to the Census Office, not exempt even then from a final scrutiny before the commencement of the abstract, which reduces the nearly 40,000 enumeration books into three thick portentous folios, the marrow of which Mr. Cheshire has endeavoured to condense into a shilling pamphlet. The efforts by which the Report endeavours to make us comprehend the numbers and vast aggregates with which it has to deal, and which it would fain press on the imagination of its readers, are in exact accordance with the whole tenour of the volumes. Counting has given us this prodigious amount of details; counting must make us realize them. Multitude and space have hitherto defied, or else suffered from, exact measurement; the poet hopes to excite us by the indefinite and the vague. Not so the statistician, who clings to his art, and has faith in no other. It is thus Mr. Cheshire makes us see the army of enumerators.

'An idea may be formed of the extent of this army of enumerators, and of the labour of engaging their services on the same day, when it is mentioned that it would take seven hours and three quarters for the whole body, in single file, to pass a given point, at *quick* march; and it would

take upwards of thirteen hours and a half to count them at the rate of one a second. The army recently encamped at Chobham (9,000), converted for the nonce into enumerators, would not have sufficed to enumerate a *fourth* of the population of Great Britain.—*Cheshire*, p. 11.

And thus the Report, not without success, first announces the number of the people, and then would have us pause, and count them up for ourselves, and finally range them in their sexes and professions, to pass in review before the mind's eye.

'The number of people in Great Britain, including the islands in the British Seas, on March 31st, 1851, was 20,959,477; and the men in the Army, Navy, Merchant Service, and East India Company's Service, abroad, on the passage out, or round the coasts, belonging to Great Britain, amounted on the same day to 162,490. The population of Great Britain may therefore be set down at *Twenty-one millions, one hundred and twenty-one thousand, nine hundred and sixty-seven* (21,121,967).

'The number of people in England and Wales was 17,927,609, namely, 16,921,888 in England, and 1,005,721 in Wales; the number of people in Scotland was 2,888,742: 143,126 inhabited the Isle of Man, Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney, and other small islands in the British Seas; and 162,490 were at sea, or serving abroad in the army.

'It is difficult to form any just conception of these large numbers, for men are rarely seen in large masses, and when seen their numbers are seldom known. It is only by collecting, as in other cases of measuring, the units into masses, these masses into other masses, and thus ascending progressively to an unit comprehending all others, that the mind attains any adequate notion of such a multitude as a million of men. Thus from a file of *ten persons*, which the eye takes in at one view, the mind readily conceives ten such groups or a *hundred*, and again ascending to ten hundred or a *thousand*; to ten thousand or a *myriad*; to ten myriads or a *hundred thousand*; and to ten hundred thousand or a *million*—arrives at a conception of the *Twenty-one millions* of people which Great Britain contained within its shores on the night of March 30th, 1851. Another way of arriving at this conception is by considering the numbers in relation to space; as 4,840 persons might stand without crowding on the 4,840 square yards in an acre; 3,097,600 persons would cover a square mile (equal 640 acres); and the twenty-one millions of people in Great Britain, allowing a square yard to each person, would therefore cover seven square miles.

'The building of the Great Exhibition in London enclosed eighteen acres, and 50,000 or 60,000 persons often entered it daily; on the 9th of October, 93,224 persons filled its floor and galleries, and could almost be surveyed by the eye at one time. Of 100,000 persons a general notion can be formed by all those who witnessed this spectacle at the Crystal Palace; it is a number greater than were ever, at one time, in a building covering eighteen acres, but somewhat less than the greatest number (109,915) that ever entered it on one day, October 7th. The population then of Great Britain, including men, women, and children, exceeds 211 *hundred thousands*; and at the rate of a hundred thousand a day, could have passed through the building in 211 days; the English, as they are 169 hundred thousand—in 169 days; the Welsh, 10 hundred thousand, in ten days; the Scotch, 29 hundred thousand, in twenty-nine days; the 143,126 Islanders in the British Seas, in less than one and a-half day; the 162,490 soldiers and seamen absent from the country when the census was taken, in less than two days. The population of Great Britain in 1801 amounted in round numbers to 109 *hundred thousands*; and 102 of the 211 *hundred thousands* in 1851, or as many as could pass through such a

place in 102 days, would represent the increase of the people of Great Britain in half a century.

'In the course of the analysis of this mass of people, it has been already stated that they will be subdivided into males and females: and it will be seen that at home there are 102 hundred thousand men and boys, 107 hundred thousand women and girls; and that the females exceed the males in the great and imaginary procession by five hundred thousand. They will then be arranged in the order of age; the few aged persons of 90, followed by those of 85, 80, 75, 70, in quinquennial sections down to 20, 15, 10, 5, and children in their mothers' arms. Again, they will be classed in sections as bachelors, spinsters, husbands, wives, widowers, widows. And, first classed according to place of residence, they will be subsequently grouped under the counties and countries in which they were born. Their final arrangement will be in Professions, or groups engaged in similar occupations; princes, peers, commoners, officers of Government, and municipal authorities; soldiers, seamen, clergymen, lawyers, physicians and surgeons; authors, artists, scientific men, teachers; merchants bankers, brokers, and shopkeepers; carriers by railways, roads, canals, rivers, seas; landlords, farmers, agricultural labourers, woodmen, gardeners, fishermen, grooms and huntsmen; the numerous classes engaged in art and mechanical productions—makers of arms, machines, carriages, ships, houses: the thousands working and dealing in Animal matters—furs, hair, wool, silk; in matters derived from the Vegetable Kingdom—vegetable food, drinks, stimulants; wood, hemp, flax, cotton, paper: the workers and dealers in Minerals—the colliers, quarriers, potters, glass-workers, jewellers, smiths in gold, silver, copper, tin and zinc—plumbers, braziers, iron-miners, and an endless throng of workers in iron and steel. There will also be the thousands of labourers without any definite occupation; scholars, and children at home of undetermined occupation. And finally, will follow paupers, prisoners, lunatics, and vagrants, who form a fraction of the population. It will then be evident from this survey—which will extend over the thousands in more than a thousand different professions, subdivided into innumerable bands—that as the greatest Exhibition of modern times only displayed a small part of the produce of their labours, so the visitors only represented a fraction of the multitudinous population of these islands, which the Census Enumerators found so variously occupied on the sea, on rivers, on the coasts, in the valleys, on the hills; in cities, towns, villages, and solitary houses over all the face of the cultivated land.'—*Census Report*, pp. xxv.—xxvii.

Does not every reader, we would ask, having his fancy tasked to conceive a multitude, feel a sense of disappointment, on hearing that the whole British population could stand in a space of seven square miles? that gazing from the brow of a hill in clear weather, this little mirror of the human eye could hold and reflect them all, at a glance, within its narrow bound. Our imagination has been taught to picture greater crowds than these, and passes on to that multitude, *whom no man can number*, composed of all nations, and to that more terrible and still vaster assemblage—that great census of the human family, and that one numbering-day, when all the tribes of the earth shall be reckoned once for all, when angels shall be the enumerators, and none shall escape the scrutiny. But it is admitted, that 'to mass quantity is to conceal bulk,' which Mr. Cheshire

illustrates by the fact, that the whole vast yields of California and Australia, melted down into a solid mass of gold, would only fill a tolerable-sized room. So he proposes a method of imaging forth our population more likely to impress our fancy.

'Now, if all the people of Great Britain had to pass through London in procession, four abreast, and every facility was afforded for their free and uninterrupted passage, during twelve hours daily, Sundays excepted, it would take nearly three *months* for the whole population of Great Britain to file through, at *quick* march, *four* deep. To count them singly, at the rate of one a second, would take a year and a half, assuming that the same number of hours daily were occupied, and that Sundays also were excepted.'

—*Cheshire*, p. 17.

This exception of *Sundays* in the visionary reckoning, seems to give it a reality almost alarming, as if the task was already set us, with its long working-days of labour, and brief Sabbaths of repose. But passing from these efforts to bring the general mind to embrace the magnitude and vast importance of the subject of population, it will be well to proceed at once to the various topics which the Report treats of, and which turns the mere barren counting of numbers into a most valuable source of information on all the principal points connected with the present state and future prospects of our nation. We need not dwell upon 'the objects of the census and the machinery employed,' and the 'number of the people' has already been given, together with the outline of the proposed plan for the second, and as yet unpublished part of the census. The first great division of this vast aggregate brings out the uniform excess of females over males in the living population, along with the excess of male *births* over female. The probable reasons for this difference are reserved for future discussion; the facts are these:—

'The number of the male population of Great Britain was 10,386,048—of the female population 10,735,919: the females exceeded the males by 349,871; and the males at home were 10,223,558; consequently the females exceeded by 512,361 the males *in* Great Britain. To every 100,000 females the males were 96,741; including 1,538 males abroad, the exclusion of whom leaves 95,203 males at home. The excess of females over males was nearly the same, proportionally, in 1801 and 1851: thus, in 1801, to every 100,000 males there were 103,353 females; in 1851 the females were 103,369 to the same number of males. The proportion in both periods was nearly 30 males to 31 females. The excess of females over males at each Census is thus shown:—

Years.	Excess of Females over Males.
1801	180,027
1811	201,598
1821	210,537
1831	297,246
1841	348,950
1851	349,871

'To 100,000 males at home, in 1851, the females were 105,012; or there were twenty males at home to twenty-one females.

'Of the children born alive in England and Wales during the thirteen years, 1839-51, 3,634,235 were males, and 3,465,629 females; consequently 104,865 boys were born to every 100,000 girls born; while to every 100,000 females living, there were 96,741 males living. How much the change in the proportions, and the subsequent disparity of the numbers in the two sexes, is due to emigration, or to a difference in degree of the dangers and diseases to which they are respectively exposed, will be most advantageously discussed, when the numbers of males and females living at different periods of life are compared.

'The disparity in the proportions of the sexes at home is greatest in Scotland—110 Females to 100 Males; least in England and Wales—104 Females to 100 Males.'—*Census Report*, pp. xxvii. xxviii.

These figures have been arranged by Mr. Cheshire into the following table:—

'TABLE I.—Population of Great Britain in 1851.

	Males.	Females.	Total.
England	8,281,734	8,640,154	16,921,888
Scotland	1,375,479	1,513,263	2,888,742
Wales	499,491	506,230	1,005,721
Islands in the British Seas	66,854	76,272	143,126
Army, Navy, and Merchant Sea- men, at Sea or Abroad . . . }	162,490	—	162,490
Total	10,386,048	10,735,919	21,121,967

The uniformity of this difference is shown in a second table—

'TABLE II.—Population of Great Britain as enumerated at each Census, from 1801 to 1851, inclusive.

Years.	Males.	Females.	Total.
1801	5,368,703	5,548,730	10,917,433
1811	6,111,261	6,312,859	12,424,120
1821	7,096,053	7,306,590	14,402,643
1831	8,133,446	8,430,692	16,564,138
1841	9,232,418	9,581,368	18,813,786
1851	10,386,048	10,735,919	21,121,967

We have pronounced statistics as generally an in attractive science; yet they often seem to bear a curious relation to the most popular of all propensities—gossip. It is the scale and magnitude of the inquiries which constitute the difference. What any isolated family may have for dinner is a mean subject of curiosity—to know the precise fare of thousands is the business and duty of statesmen; how such a lady of our acquaintance flirts and trifles is whispered cautiously, and with some sense of shame—what Queen Elizabeth said and did to her lovers, and what she meant by her wayward treatment of them, has occupied grave historical

heads from her day to ours; and thus to count up the old maids of a single coterie might be considered an unworthy matter for investigation; but when these valuable females may be reckoned by myriads, the precise amount is the just subject for minute analysis and urgent—even impatient—inquiry. We have already been shown them as vestals heading the vast imaginary procession of 20,000,000. The Report computes that the surplus ladies of Great Britain would fill the Crystal Palace five times over. Pursuing this idea, Mr. Cheshire anxiously looks forward to the publication of the second part of the Census, when it shall be known definitely ‘how many of these were spinsters.’ For us, we accept the fact as a confirmation of our long-established conviction, that the world could not do without a class it has so flippantly undervalued, and that a body of single women of mature age is indispensable to the well-being of society.

It will have been seen, that the annual rate of increase in the population has varied in each decennial period; the greatest rate of increase having been between the years 1811 and 1821, when there was little emigration, and the mortality in England was lower than it has ever been before or since, down to the two last decennaries (1841—1851), when the public health has suffered from epidemics and influenza, cholera, and other diseases; while emigration from the *United Kingdom* has proceeded at an accelerated rate, from 274,000 in 1821-31, to 718,000 in 1831-41, and 1,693,000 in 1841-51.—*Report*, p. xxx.

The Report leaves this part of the subject with an interesting inquiry, containing a moral for us all, into the number of survivors from previous censuses, going on to show us our own chances of living through future similar computations.

‘Before quitting this subject, it may be interesting, and will in some cases be useful, to give an approximative estimate of the numbers surviving in 1851 out of the population enumerated at the previous censuses. By the English Life Table it is shown that the half of a generation of men of all ages passes away in *thirty years*, and that more than three in every four of their number die in half a century. The English population, owing to its rapid increase, contains an excessive number of children and young people, and will live longer than a generation normally constituted. The subjoined numbers are on this account probably less than the survivors of the living in previous censuses; but taking emigration and all other movements of the population into account, it is not likely that of the 21,121,967 in Great Britain in 1851, more than 2,542,289 were in the country in 1801; or much more than half the number (10,729,607) in 1831; seven persons in eight of the living have entered the kingdom within fifty years, *one in two* within twenty years.’ . . .

‘At the present rates of mortality, a few of the present generation (21,121,967) will live a century, and survive the year 1951; and, if the population were normally constituted in respect to age, about 4,918,568 would live fifty years (to A.D. 1901), and 10,433,762 would live thirty years. The probable number of survivors can be given more exactly when the ages of the living are abstracted.’—*Census Report*, p. xxx.

The rate at which the population of Great Britain increased from 1801 to 1851, is such, that if it continue to prevail uniformly, the population will double itself every fifty-two years.

We now pass on to what is called the 'Law of Population,' by which term we may understand the various elements which affect the increase of population.

"The numbers, and consequently the increase or decrease, of people in a civilized country, depend upon the age of marriage and the age of the parents when their children are born—the numbers who marry, the fertility of the marriages—the duration of life—the activity of the migration flowing into or out of the country. These acts more or less influence each other, and in the present state of statistical observation, the precise effect of a change in any one of them involving others cannot be determined. It will be sufficient to indicate the effect of a change in each element, while the others remain constant."—*Ibid.* p. xxxi.

If the duration of life, or mean lifetime, increases, then the population necessarily increases with it. 'Thus, if the mean lifetime of a population is thirty years, then if the births are 100,000 a-year, and remain uniform, the population will be thirty times 100,000, or 3,000,000. But if, the births remaining the same, the lifetime be gradually extended to forty years, then the population will become 4,000,000; or if the lifetime extend to fifty years, then the population, from the extension of life alone, will rise from three to five millions.' The deaths upon this hypothesis will be equal to the births, and the same in number when the population is *five*, as when it is *four* or *three* millions. It is probable that the mean lifetime has increased under certain favourable circumstances.

The next element of the 'law' we have spoken of, is the age of parents when children are born; and early marriages must necessarily vastly increase population, by shortening the interval between generations, so long as the evils incident to imprudent marriages do not occur to cut off the new comers.

* In ordinary times, a large proportion of the marriageable women of every country are unmarried, and the most direct action on the population is produced by their entering the married state. Thus in the South Eastern Division, comprising Surrey, Kent, Sussex, Hants, and Berks, the number of women of the age of 20 and under the age of 45, amounted, at the last census, to 290,209; of whom 169,806 were wives, and 120,403 were spinsters or widows. 49,997 births were registered in the same counties during the year 1850, or 10 children were born in 1850 to every 58 women living in 1801. Of the children, 46,705 were born in wedlock, 3,292 were born out of wedlock; consequently, 36 wives bore in the year *ten* children, and of 366 unmarried women of the same age (20-45) *ten* also gave birth to children (see Table VIII. p. xxxii.) A change in the matrimonial condition of a large proportion of the 120,403 unmarried women, out of 290,209 women at the child-bearing age, would have an immediate effect on the numbers of the population; and, if continued, by increasing the

rate of birth to the living through successive generations, would operate on population like a rise in the rate of interest on the increase of capital.'—*Ibid.* p. xxxi.

The effects of migration upon population are evident enough. The immigration of Irish, a stream now flowing mainly in another direction, has greatly contributed to swell our numbers. Our own emigration to foreign shores has immensely increased their population, of which the United States form a leading example. Since 1821, 2,685,747 persons emigrated from us, who, if simply added to our population, make the survivors and descendants of the races within the British isles in 1821, now 30,410,595.

'Finally, the numbers of the population are increased by an abundance of the necessities of life; and reduced by famines, epidemics, and public calamities, affecting the food, industry, and life of the nation. The pestilences of the middle ages—the famine, the influenza, and the cholera of modern times—are examples of one class of these agencies; the security and freedom which England has latterly enjoyed, are examples of the beneficial effect of another class of influences, not only on the happiness of the people, but also on the numbers which the country can sustain at home, and can send abroad to cultivate, possess, and inherit other lands.

'All these causes, affecting the increase of the population of Great Britain, and the precise extent to which each operates, will ultimately be known by means of a continuous series of such observations as have been commenced at this census.'—*Ibid.* p. xxxii.

From considering the nation as individuals, the Report next proceeds to regard it as 'aggregations of individuals in communities;' in other words, 'families.' And here it becomes necessary to define what the term 'family' really means,—a most comfortable word for loose common use, but perplexing to the constructors of acts of parliament,—and it is explained to be the *social unit* of which parishes, towns, counties, and the nation are composed. In its essential sense, a 'family,' though most complete as composed of husband, as householder, wife, children, servants, visitors, &c., may shrink into a single woman occupying a small cottage. Mr. Rickman, a great authority in these matters, dwells on the difficulty of determining the relation of lodgers under the roof of householders, and says that the enumerators of past censuses were instructed 'that those who use the same kitchen and board together are to be treated as one family.' But the niceties of this question even the Report itself cannot absolutely decide upon; and the Census of 1851 preferred to use the word occupier or occupiers, which stands for the term families in the previous censuses. In 1801, the number of families in Great Britain was 2,260,802; in 1851 it was 4,312,388. It is so much in the order of nature that a family should live in a separate house, that house and family are synonymous in some languages, though nowhere

might it seem so much so as in England, where the distribution of families in separate houses is most universal.¹ The Report quotes a passage from Dr. Carus, a German writer on England, in commendation of this custom.

"I cannot take leave of the subject without a remark on English dwelling-houses, which stand in close connexion with that long-cherished principle of separation and retirement, lying at the very foundation of the national character. It appears to me to be this principle which has given to the people that fixity of national character, and strict adherence to the historical usages of their country, by which they are so much distinguished; and up to the present moment, the Englishman still perseveres in striving after a certain individuality and personal independence, a certain separation of himself from others, which constitutes the foundation of his freedom. This, too, was completely an ancient German tendency, which led our remote ancestors to prefer the rudest and most inconvenient, but isolated homesteads, to the more convenient and refined method of life in aggregation; it is this that gives the Englishman that proud feeling of personal independence, which is stereotyped in the phrase, '*Every man's house is his castle*.' This is a feeling which cannot be entertained, and an expression which cannot be used in Germany or France, where ten or fifteen families often live together in the same large house.

"The expression, however, receives a true value, when, by the mere closing of the house-door, the family is able, to a certain extent, to cut itself off from all communication with the outward world, even in the midst of great cities. In English towns or villages, therefore, one always meets either with small detached houses, merely suited to one family, or apparently large buildings extending to the length of half a street, sometimes adorned like palaces on the exterior, but separated by partition walls internally, and thus divided into a great number of small high houses, for the most part three windows broad, within which, and on the various stories, the rooms are divided according to the wants or convenience of the family; in short, therefore, it may be properly said, that the English divide their edifices perpendicularly into houses—whilst we Germans divide them horizontally into floors. In England, every man is master of his hall, stairs, and chambers—whilst we are obliged to use the two first in common with others, and are scarcely able to secure ourselves the privacy of our own chamber, if we are not fortunate enough to be able to obtain a secure and convenient house for ourselves alone."—*Ibid.* pp. xxxv. xxxvi.

¹ In London, at the present time, there is a bold attempt to innovate in this particular. Let any of our readers, who have not yet seen the change in that once uninviting locality, make his way to Victoria Street, Westminster, and admire the vast and imposing range of buildings, in various stages of progress and completion, which occupy one side of the wide thoroughfare. These are designed to supply what 'The Builder' calls a long-felt desideratum—complete residences in flats, after the Parisian plan. Each house consists of six shops, on each side of and entirely distinct from a handsome door-way, and wide stone staircase, which leads to eight suites of apartments, occupying four stories, and each containing every requisite for a family dwelling. The highest of these family residences must be reached by more than a hundred steps—recalling the weary ascent so many of us have trod, after a day's travelling or sight-seeing, up to the *quatrième* of some huge foreign hotel. All of them, even the most attainable, seem incapable of the ideas of house and home, however useful for temporary habitation, and convenient in many of their arrangements. As a *system*, we could not see such buildings spread without regret; but in a vast city like London, expedients of all sorts may be allowable, or even necessary, to bring the overgrown population within convenient reach of their daily occupations.

On which the Report enlarges with proper national feeling on our superiority on this point to the nations of the Continent:—

‘The possession of an entire house is, it is true, strongly desired by every Englishman; for it throws a sharp, well-defined circle round his family and hearth—the shrine of his sorrows, joys, and meditations. This feeling, as it is natural, is universal, but it is stronger in England than it is on the Continent; for although, there, the great bulk of the population in the country is in separate dwellings, while in many English towns several families are in the same house, the crowding, to which Dr. Carus refers, of the middle and higher classes, who sleep in flats, stratum over stratum, is carried to an inconceivably greater excess in the capitals, and the other cities of the Continent, than it is in England. The department of the Seine, for instance, in 1835-6, contained 50,467 houses, and 1,106,891 persons, or 22 persons to a house; so that there must be four or five families in Paris to a house; whilst London, in 1851, contained 2,362,236 persons, 533,580 occupiers, in 305,933 houses; and consequently nearly eight persons to one house; or, more exactly, 77 persons, forming 17 families, to 10 houses. It will be shown that, in a certain number of English towns, 15, 20, and 24 families are in 10 houses, on an average; but these cases are exceptional, and the general rule is, that each family in England has a house.

‘The towns and cities of the two northern English counties and of Scotland, however, are built in the continental style; and the families of the middle classes, as well as of the poor, live in large flats, which constitute separate tenements within the same party-walls.’—*Ibid.* p. xxxvi.

The following calculations on the average number of persons to a family, persons to a house, and families to a house, as seen in Scotland, are curious:—

‘Where a house is occupied by a family, the head of the family is a householder; but as this term is scarcely applicable to the holders of apartments, it has given place to *occupier* in some recent Acts of Parliament. That family and occupier have, however, been used in nearly the same sense, at the enumerations of the population, is evident, on comparing the number of families in 1801-31, and the occupiers of 1851, with the population. Thus it is seen, in Great Britain, that the average number of persons to a family in the Censuses 1801-31, was 4.6; 4.7; 4.8; and 4.8: while the number of persons to an occupier in 1851 was 4.8. There is a slight irregularity in 1831, but as a general rule, the proportion of persons to a family has gradually increased since 1801, as is apparent in the annexed Table (XIII). The average numbers in a family in *England and Wales* were, 4.7; 4.7; 4.8; 4.8; in 1801-31, and 4.8 in 1851.

‘The average number of persons to a house in Great Britain, at each census, from 1801 to 1831, was 5.6; 5.7; 5.8; 5.7; and in 1851, the proportion was the same (5.7) as in 1831. The number of persons to a house in *England and Wales* was less in 1841 and 1851, than in the previous censuses. In Scotland, the number of persons to a family has steadily increased, from 4.4 in 1801, to 4.8 in 1851; the difference in 1851 between the numbers to a family, in England and Scotland, is inconsiderable. The average number of persons to a house has also increased in Scotland, from 5.5 to 7.8; and while the number of persons to a house in Scotland in 1801 was less than in England, it was in 1851—perhaps from an increase in the number of large houses—considerably more.—See Tables XIII. and XIV.’—*Ibid.* p. xxxvi.

In England and Wales the number of families to a house has declined in the last fifty years from 120 families to 113 families in 100 houses; a fact which a very little thought must enable us to realize as a great improvement in the habits and condition of the people. A great deal of space is given in the Report to the variations in different districts of the rule of a family and a house. It is an important subject, as all must feel who are acquainted with the *necessity*, we may almost say, of a separate dwelling in ordinary cases for every labouring family,—and are aware of the dirt, discomfort, quarrels, dissensions, and even worse evils, which follow upon crowded lodging and too close contact. We will give Mr. Cheshire's condensation of the facts elicited by the census on this head:—

'The number of families to a house varied considerably in different counties, and it is difficult to account for all the anomalies which they present. In Essex, Suffolk, and Norfolk, few houses contained more than one family. Plymouth and the adjacent districts had more than two families, together averaging ten persons, to a house. In Worcestershire, Warwickshire, Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Shropshire, and Staffordshire, a large proportion of the people lived in separate houses, with the exception of Bristol, Clifton, Gloucester, Hereford, and Birmingham. In the counties of Leicester, Rutland, Lincoln, Nottingham, Derby, and Yorkshire, nearly all the families lived in separate houses, the city of York and Hull being scarcely exceptional cases to the rule. In Lancashire and Cheshire, more than 300,000 out of 472,907 families lived in separate houses. Liverpool, Bolton, Manchester, and Salford, were the chief places where two or more families in many cases occupied the same house. In the northern division of England, comprising Cumberland, Northumberland, Durham, and Westmoreland, the proportional number of families and persons to a house increased.

'In Wales, the system of isolated dwellings generally prevailed, with some few exceptions.'—*Cheshire*, p. 23.

In spite of our little faith in the aptitude of the greater proportion of mankind to retain facts dependent upon numbers, it is necessary in this question to subject our readers to a considerable amount of this kind of detail. Out of these arrays of figures many curious and interesting facts may be deduced, but it is indispensable to learn the facts in the way the statisticians choose to give us them.

Thus from the following maze, as it may seem, of figures can be elicited an epitome of the changes and chances of our mortal life: we see in it the proportions in which the gifts of nature and fortune are dispensed, and how great are the external inequalities of our condition. We have glimpses of every shade of prosperity and privation, of labour and leisure, of solitude and society, of gratified affections and broken hopes, from the solitary hearth or the lonely barn, to the parental home crowded with children, friends and dependants. What innumerable changes and reverses,—what extremes of social position,—what hopes

and fears, joys and sorrows, lie buried underneath the facts which form the groundwork of this classification!

‘ In order to throw some light, by classification, on the constituent parts of families, the returns of the 14 subdistricts, before referred to, in different parts of the kingdom, have been analyzed; and the results are annexed in a tabular form (*see* Table XVII. p. xlii.). 41,916 heads of families were husbands-and-wives; 10,854 widowers or widows; 14,399 bachelors or spinsters; in 440 and a few more cases the head of the family was absent from home. 36,719 (more than half) of the heads of families had children living with them—they were parents; 7,375 (nearly 1-10th) had servants—they were masters and mistresses; 4,070 (1-17th) had with them visitors—they were hosts; 8,543 had relatives with them; 1,020 (1-67th) had apprentices or assistants in their respective trades—they were masters. Of the 67,609 families, only 3,503 (5.2 per cent.) consisted of husband, wife, children, servants; whilst 4,874 consisted of man, wife, and servants, which Aristotle characterizes as the constituents of a family. The heads in 24,180 instances had neither children, relatives, visitors, servants, nor trade assistants; like some corporations they may be characterized as “sole.” Thus of 41,916 married couples, 8,610 were “sole.” 29,969 had children residing with them, either alone or in other combinations; namely, 21,413 had children alone—that is, without servants, trade assistants, visitors, or relatives; 3,132 had children, and other relatives (alone); 2,269 had children and servants; 1,421 had children and visitors; 149 had children and trade assistants; 550 had children, relatives, and servants; 245 had children, relatives, and visitors; 360 had children, visitors, and servants; 33 had children, relatives, and trade assistants; 65 had children, visitors, trade assistants; 166 had children, servants, trade assistants; 69 had children, relatives, visitors, servants; 50 had children, relatives, servants, trade assistants; 34 had children, visitors, servants, trade assistants; 5 had children, relatives, visitors, trade assistants. Only 8 families consisted of husband and wife, children, relatives, visitors, servants, trade assistants. Of 41,916 natural families (comprising husband and wife) nearly 21 per cent. (1 in 5) consisted of the husband and wife sole, 71 per cent. of the husband and wife, with their children in various combinations; 8 per cent. of the husband and wife, with servants and others. Of 10,854 families, at the head of each of which was a widower or widow, 3,264 were heads sole, 6,405 had children in various combinations, 1,185 servants, and other connexions; the proportions of the three classes were 30, 59, and 11 per cent. respectively. Of 14,399 designated families having a bachelor or a spinster at their head, 12,306 were sole (lodgers generally); 238 had children residing with them, born out of wedlock, and 1,855 had servants, relatives, or visitors with them.

* * * * *

‘ The average number of members in a family depends to a considerable extent on the fact, whether (1) single lodgers are or are not taken as families; (2) on the number of children at home; and (3) on the number of servants. The number of children at home in families is seen (Table XVIII.) to vary considerably; the greatest number of children at home in one family was 12, in these subdistricts. Of the 41,916 families having man and wife at their head, 11,947 had no children at home; 8,570 had each *one* child at home; 7,376 had each *two* children at home; 5,611 had each *three* children at home; 14 had each 10 children; and 5 had each 11 children. The total number of children at home was 82,145; the number of their parents was 84,046; consequently the number of children to a family was on an average nearly 2 (or exactly 1.95.); and the average

number of *persons* to a natural family 4, (or $2 + 1.95 = 3.95$). 30,076 families had *one or more* children at home; or 2.73 *children* on an average to each family; and adding the two parents, 4.73 *persons* to each family. The natural family of the widower or widow was smaller; it was on an average composed of the widower or widow, and 1.28 children; 2.28 persons. If those cases only are taken in which one child, at the least, resides with the parent, the family will on an average amount to 3.17 persons. The total number of widowers and widows in the 14 subdistricts was 14,374; so that 3,520 are included in the combinations, such as relative, and are reckoned as subordinate constituents of other families; 10,854 being themselves occupiers of houses and heads of families.'

'Finally, there is the population sleeping in barns, in tents, and in the open air; comprising, with some honest, some unfortunate people out of employment or temporarily employed, gipsies, beggars, strollers, vagabonds, vagrants, outcasts, criminals. The enumeration of the houseless population, unsettled in families, is necessarily imperfect; and the actual number must exceed the 18,249 returned, namely, 9,972 in barns, and 8,277 in the open air.'—*Ibid.* pp. xli.—xliv.

A table of the public institutions in Great Britain will conclude this portion of the subject. It again furnishes in a short compass abundant matter for thought and reflection. The excess of female over male lunatics,—the excess of male over female prisoners, proving crime to be four times as prevalent among men as among women,—the remarkable equality of sexes in workhouses,—are all points of great interest, though rather beside the immediate question.

'TABLE V.—*Public Institutions in Great Britain in 1851.*

Class of Institution.	Number.	Persons Inhabiting them.		
		Males.	Females.	Total.
Barracks	174	44,833	9,100	53,933
Workhouses	746	65,786	65,796	131,582
Prisons	257	24,593	6,366	30,959
Lunatic Asylums	149	9,753	11,251	21,004
Hospitals for the Sick	118	5,893	5,754	11,647
Asylums and other Charitable Institutions	573	27,183	19,548	46,731
Total	2,017	178,041	117,815	295,856

'Of the 295,856 persons in the aggregate occupying these 2,017 institutions, 260,340 were inmates, and 35,516 officers and servants; consequently, there were about seven inmates to one officer or servant.'—*Cheshire*, p. 24.

The constitution of families having been indicated, the Report proceeds to show the distribution of families in houses all over the country. The location of families is irregular, subject to modes of occupation, manner of life, the nature of

the soil, the configuration of the country, and the course of the rivers. But amidst these causes for difference two general laws are seen in universal operation, one leading to the equable diffusion of the population, the other to its condensation round centres. Thus we have the village, with its little group of houses, its green, its church, and its school, the centre of detached farms and cottages. These villages are arranged round other centres,—market-towns, where the men can assemble weekly, and return home in a day. By the same law, these centres at greater distances range round other centres, where the heads of the chief families can readily congregate at stated times: and, finally, the large towns stand in the same relation to the capital, which naturally finds its place in the centre of the kingdom, and is sufficient in itself, except when state or commercial emergencies bring it into communication with foreign cities. The present census brings out the remarkable fact, that the *town* and *country* population of Great Britain are equal—an unprecedented rate of distribution, which the commercial prosperity of the last fifty years has gradually tended to produce.

‘Great Britain has *eight hundred and fifteen* towns of various magnitudes, either market towns, county towns, or cities; *five hundred and eighty* in England and Wales, *two hundred and twenty-five* in Scotland, and *ten* in the Channel Islands. To 21 of the preceding “villages” there is on an average a town, which stands in the midst of 110 square miles of country, equivalent to a square of $10\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the side, a circle having a radius of nearly 6 miles; so that the population of the country around is, on an average, about 4 miles from the centre.

‘The population amounted to 10,556,288 in the 815 towns; which stand on 3,164 miles of area. An average town of 12,953 inhabitants, stands on an area of nearly 4 square miles; equivalent to a square of 2 miles to the side, a circle of $1\frac{1}{10}$ th mile radius, and the population is less than three quarters of a mile from the centre.

‘The population in the rest of Great Britain was 10,403,189; consequently if, for the sake of distinction, the detached houses, the villages, and small towns without markets, are called—country; at the present time the *town* and *country* populations of Great Britain differ so little in numbers, that they may be considered equal; for by the abstracts 10,556,288 people live in the towns, and 10,403,189 in the country. In the towns there were 5.2 *persons to an acre*, in the country 5.3 *acres to a person*. The density in the country was 120 persons—in the towns 3,337 persons—to a square mile.

‘The average population to each town in Scotland was 6,654, to each town in England and Wales, 15,501; the Scottish is therefore much smaller than the English town. The average ground area of the English town is $4\frac{2}{10}$ th miles, which form the centre of an area of 101 square miles. The exact numbers are given in Tables XXIII. and XXIV.; but a simpler notion of the average distribution of the population of England is obtained by conceiving the area of 58,320 square miles divided into 583 squares, each containing 25 square figures of 4 square miles; a market town in the central square containing 15,501 inhabitants, and the 24 similar squares arranged symmetrically around it in villages containing churches and

chapels, and houses holding in the aggregate 16,000 inhabitants. Now, imagine the figures to be of every variety of form as well as size, and a clear idea is obtained of the way that the ground of the island has been taken up, and is occupied by the population.

'The English towns are at the distance on an average of $10\frac{2}{10}$ th miles from the centre of one to the centre of the other; the Scotch towns are $12\frac{7}{10}$ th miles apart, and each Scotch town contains on an average less than half the population of the English towns.

'The 815 towns are grouped around 87 county-towns—52 in England, 32 in Scotland, and 3 chief towns, equivalent to county-towns, in the Islands of the British Seas. Each of the central county-towns was surrounded on an average by eight or nine other towns, extending over an average area of 1,067 square miles, equivalent to a square of 33 miles to the side; a circle of 18 miles radius: and without allowing for the extreme distance of the Islands in the British Seas, they were 35 miles apart. The population of the county-towns of Great Britain and the chief towns of the Channel Islands amounted to about 626,547 in 1801, and to 1,391,538 in 1851; in England and Wales the population of the county-towns was about 473,239 in 1801, and 1,076,670 in 1851.'—*Census Report*, pp. xlv. xlvii.

A certain number of these towns have acquired an adventurous but extraordinary importance and magnitude through causes to which others are not subject. They have been created and are sustained by special circumstances, either as watering places, or for other purposes of resort, as sea-ports, or seats of mining or manufacturing enterprise. The towns have increased most rapidly in which straw plait, cotton, pottery, and iron are manufactured.

This tendency to group into masses, so evidently attractive to the statistician, is thus commented on by Mr. Cheshire, who makes one of his characteristic demands on our fancy, if by any means we may realize numbers:—

'Great Britain contained in 1851 *seventy* towns of 20,000 inhabitants and upwards, amounting in the aggregate to 34 per cent. of the total population of the country; whereas, in 1801, the population of such towns amounted to 23 per cent. only of the enumerated population, thus showing, in a marked degree, the increasing tendency of the people to concentrate themselves in masses. London extends over an area of 78,029 acres, or 122 square miles, and the number of its inhabitants, rapidly increasing, was two millions three hundred and sixty-two thousands two hundred and thirty-six (2,362,236) on the day of the last census. A conception of this vast mass of people may be formed by the fact that, if the metropolis was surrounded by a wall, having a north gate, a south gate, an east gate, and a west gate, and each of the four gates was of a sufficient width to allow a column of persons to pass out freely *four* abreast, and a peremptory necessity required the immediate evacuation of the city, it could not be accomplished under *four-and-twenty* hours, by the expiration of which time the head of *each* of the four columns would have advanced a no less distance than *seventy-five* miles from their respective gates, all the people being in *close file, four deep*.'—*Cheshire*, p. 26.

Pursuing the question of the density and proximity of the population, the Report endeavours to assist our powers of con-

ception by a series of diagrams,—circles of equal circumference, divided into hexagons of various sizes. Each six-sided figure represents the average amount of ground to a person, whereby the eye can see the close proximity we stand in to one another in the present day, compared to the vast amount of standing room in 1570, a space gradually diminishing from that date to this. From this we learn that in 1801 the people of England were on an average 153 yards asunder; in 1851, only 108 yards asunder. The mean distance between their houses in 1801 was 362 yards; in 1851, only 252 yards. In London the average proximity in 1801 was 21 yards; in 1851, only 14 yards. The extremes of density and separateness in the 624 districts of England and Wales are 185,751 persons to a square mile, and 18 to a square mile.

The conveniences of proximity, its effects on the intercourse of society, on the circulation of intelligence, and the general interests of civilization, need not be dwelt upon. Nor, with such safety-valves as America and Australia, need we give way to the nervous apprehensions of over-crowding which affected the politicians of fifty years ago, when each person had twice our present standing-room.

From these ideas of elbowing and crowding, it is curious to pass on to the notice of the numerous scattered islands which form part of the kingdom, and of their scanty populations. Five hundred islands have been numbered, but of these the census need take note of only one hundred and seventy-five, the rest being uninhabited. Without abandoning its formal details the Report assumes a poetical tone in treating of these romantic additions to our territories. It bestows attention on their solitudes, recapitulates their picturesque names, turns back to their history, dwells on their ecclesiastical greatness. Remote Iona, with its ruins and crosses, has honour done to it as the retreat of ancient piety and learning. A table of islands, ranged in order of populousness, varying from the peopled Channel Islands to the '1' of Inchcolm, transports us far away from towns and manufactures. Here the population least progresses, and many of these isles must be examples to Malthus' heart's content of a population dutifully submitting to his 'limits,' and kept by various 'checks' within his imaginary boundary of supply. Take S. Kilda, with its precarious harvests, its stationary population, and its infant deaths.

'S. Kilda is in the parish of Harris; and, away 70 miles from the mainland of the western Hebrides, it rises 1,500 feet above the waves. Rocks and inaccessible precipices surround it, except at one point on the north side, where there is a rocky bay; and another on the south-east side, where there is a landing-place which leads up to the village of S. Kilda, a quarter of a mile from the sea, on the sloping base of a steep hill. This is the

only inhabited place in S. Kilda and three other islands of the group, which are the resort of the sea-fowls, that, with fish and small patches of land, furnish employment and food for the inhabitants. The population has not before been stated, and has probably never before 1851 been officially enumerated. It was found to consist of 32 families, in 32 houses, and of 110 persons; of whom 48 were males, 62 were females. The 33 Gillies, 23 McDonalds, 20 McQuiens, 13 Fergusons, 9 McCrimons, 9 McKinnons, 2 Morrisons, and 1 McCleod, were all born on the island, except one woman, aged 35, a McDonald's wife, who was imported from Sutherland. The number of men between the ages of 20 and 60 is 25, and the number of women of the same age is one more, or 26; of the children under 20 there are 22 males, 30 females; one old man is above the age of 70, 6 women are more than 60 years of age, one has attained the age of 79.

'There are 19 married couples on the island; 2 widowers, 8 widows, 5 unmarried men, 5 unmarried women of the age of 20 and under 46. The men are all called "Farmers and Birdcatchers" in the Schedule: each "Farmer" occupying about 3 acres of land. Eight females are described as "Weaveress" in "wool." The mildness of the air covers the island with verdure; but the crops of bere and oats are often destroyed by terrific storms. The proprietor sends a yearly supply of meal to the island; without which the minister of Harris states that they would often be in want, notwithstanding the little crop, the sea-fowl eggs, and all the resources of the place. He refers to a tradition "that the population of the island has been stationary for 200 years;" sometimes falling below and sometimes exceeding 100 souls. "The great majority of the infants die of what they call the 'eight days' illness." Several children were born in the last 12 months, but only 2 are living; and there have been 2 deaths during the last year." This differs from other information: for it is stated in the "Gazetteer of Scotland" that the number of adults in the island was at one time reduced to 4 by small-pox; and cholera in the first epidemic was fatal in this remote region. The dwellings of the poor people, who breathe the purest air of the sea and sky out of doors—in S. Kilda and in all the Western Isles—are left, through their ignorance, dirtier than the dens of wild animals. There is a manse and a church; but no medical man—no clergyman—resident in the island.'—*Census Report*, pp. liv. lv.

Contrast this mortality with that of our largest and least healthy towns, and it is made clear how little the salubrity of a situation can do if men's habits indoors, and in the immediate neighbourhood of their dwellings, are impure. Because the inhabitants are more dirty than those of Manchester, though the one lies in smoke,—every white garment streaked with it, every face grimed,—and the other has the purest sky and air, yet the mortality of the healthful island is beyond all comparison the greatest. Indeed, these documents throughout prove how mistaken is the general notion of the ultra salubrity of country over town, and show how much depends on men themselves; and that in our climate all atmospheres are wholesome where due attention to cleanliness is observed, and none escape contagion where local impurities are suffered to exist and accumulate. It is important, now that half our population live in towns, that this should be made clear. Many of the prejudices

against towns, on the score of health, should now be obsolete ones. In many a manufacturing town the children, the object of so much sentimental compassion, are rosier, plumper, more vigorous, than in the ill-drained adjacent villages. That it was not always so we know, but it is fitting that the zeal and patriotism of commerce on this question should be acknowledged by public opinion, and the results of strenuous, though still inadequate exertions, owned. Compare the descriptions of Manchester towards the end of last century and its present state—though that is open enough to improvement—and we shall see how much has been done since that time for the health, comfort, and moral welfare of the population. ‘The inventions and improvements,’ says Dr. Aikin, writing about 1795, ‘of machines to shorten labour, have had surprising influence to extend our trade, and also to call in hands from all parts, especially children, for the cotton-mills. It is the wise plan of Providence that in this life there shall be no good without its attendant inconvenience. There are many which are too obvious in these cotton-mills and similar factories, which counteract that increase of population usually consequent on the improved facility of labour. In these, children of very tender age are employed, many of them collected from the workhouses in London and Westminster, and transported in crowds as apprentices to masters resident many hundred miles distant, where they serve unknown, unprotected and forgotten by those to whose care nature or the laws had consigned them. These children are usually too long confined to work in close rooms, often during the whole night. The air they breathe, from the oil, &c., employed in the machinery, and other circumstances, is injurious; little attention is paid to their cleanliness, and frequent changes from a warm and dense to a cold and thin atmosphere, are predisposing causes to sickness and debility, and particularly to the epidemic fever which is so generally to be met with in these factories. It is also much to be questioned, if society does not receive detriment from the manner in which children are thus employed during their early years. They are not generally strong to labour, or capable of pursuing any other branch of business when the term of their apprenticeship expires. The females are wholly uninstructed in sewing, knitting, and other domestic affairs, requisite to make them notable and frugal wives and mothers. This is a very great misfortune to them and the public, as is sadly proved by a comparison with the families of labourers in husbandry and those of manufacturers in general. In the former we meet with neatness, cleanliness, and comfort; in the latter, with filth, rags, and poverty, although their wages may be

'nearly double to those of the husbandman. It must be added, 'that the want of early religious instruction and example, and 'the numerous and indiscriminate association in these buildings, 'are very unfavourable to their future conduct in life.' Much of this evil, it cannot be denied, continues still, but it is so far modified and corrected, that neither in health nor yet in morals do our manufacturing towns present the unfavourable contrast they once did to our rural population. Witness, on the sanitary part of the question, the evidence of Mr. Porter on this very subject:—

'It has been supposed that the general healthiness and duration of life among the people must be diminished by their being brought together in masses, and in particular it has been objected to the factory system of this country, that by this means it has added to the sum of human misery. To combat this opinion, it will be sufficient at present to bring forward the case of Manchester, where the increase of population has been great beyond all precedent, owing to the growth of its manufacturing industry.

'The population of the townships of Manchester and Salford, at each of the decennary enumerations, was found to be as follows:—

1821 ...	94,876		
1811 ...	115,874,	increase 22 per cent.	
1821 ...	161,635	"	39½ "
1831 ...	237,832	"	47 "
1841 ...	353,390	"	48½ "

The increase during the whole period of forty years being 258,514, or 272 per cent. upon the population of 1801. Much of this increase has arisen from continual immigration to a town of such growing manufacturing prosperity. The degree in which the natural condition of the population has been thereby affected, will be seen from the following figures, which exhibit the proportions living at different ages in Manchester and Salford, compared with the proportions in all England at the Census in 1841:—

	Manchester and Salford.	England.
Under 5 years	1,328	1,323
5 and under 10 years ...	1,070	1,195
10 " 15 "	1,007	1,087
15 " 20 "	1,004	996
20 " 30 "	2,059	1,787
30 " 40 "	1,549	1,295
40 " 50 "	996	963
50 " 60 "	545	642
60 " 70 "	306	436
70 " 80 "	113	213
80 " 90 "	21	58
90 and upwards	2	5
	<hr/> 10,000	<hr/> 10,000

The mortality of these townships in the middle of the last century, as stated from the parish registers, was 1 in 25; in 1770, 1 in 28. In 1811, when the population had already very greatly increased, the rate of mortality had sunk considerably, and in the ten years ending with 1830 was not more than 1 in 49; a low rate, if we take into the account the fact

that, in manufacturing towns, children are brought together in a much greater proportion than the average of the kingdom.'—*Porter's Progress of the Nation*, pp. 26, 27.

On the subject of territorial subdivisions, the Report plunges into an antiquarian disquisition, giving the history of every form of division to which, from earliest times, the country has been subjected. No doubt the variety of subdivisions—ecclesiastical, military, and civil; fiscal and judicial; ancient and modern; municipal and parliamentary—presents many obstacles and difficulties in such a task as it records; but whether these obstacles are important enough to make it desirable to sweep away any of our ancient landmarks, is another question. The Report recommends a uniform system of territorial divisions. How far this would affect our present ecclesiastical divisions is not stated, or whether the object is only to define them more clearly, or materially to alter them. Though many anomalies and real practical evils may be freely acknowledged, we should watch the latter disposition with extreme jealousy, lest time-honoured boundaries, still possessing strong hold on the affections of the people, should be disturbed for the mere convenience of statisticians. The Report gives the following testimony to the willingness of the Clergy to aid their inquiries:—

'The task of obtaining accurately the population of these districts has been one of very great difficulty. Designed exclusively for spiritual purposes, their boundaries are quite ignored by the general public, and rarely known by any secular officers; while, in many cases, even the clergy themselves, unprovided with maps or plans, are uncertain as to the limits of their respective cures. Formed too, in many cases, without reference to any existing boundaries—often by imaginary lines which the progress of building speedily obliterates—and liable, as circumstances alter, to repeated reconstruction—it is sometimes almost impossible, with any confidence, to ascertain the real present limits of these districts. No labour, however, has been spared in order to overcome these obstacles and secure a trustworthy statement. The registrars, when apportioning their districts among the enumerators, were directed to procure as much information upon the boundaries of these new parishes, &c., as the incumbent might be able and willing to supply; and very important aid was, in this manner, readily afforded. Subsequently, the accounts of population which resulted from these inquiries were forwarded from the Census Office to the various incumbents for their inspection and revision; and very much of whatever accuracy distinguishes the present return is attributable to the courteous criticism which this correspondence procured from the clergy throughout the country. Still, in some few instances, after every effort had been made to obtain correct intelligence, it was found impossible to frame a statement which should be entirely satisfactory, and it has, therefore, been deemed advisable, in such cases, to insert merely the name of the district, without giving any particulars of population, rather than publish any unauthentic and unreliable account.'—*Census Report*, p. lxxii.

The following table of the rate of increase of population is interesting, as showing at a glance the counties where the chief

increase has been. To understand the causes of these differences a very slight knowledge of the principal objects of our manufactures and commerce is sufficient.

POPULATION of each COUNTY in ENGLAND and WALES, as enumerated at each Census from 1801 to 1851, inclusive; also Increase of Population per cent. in the half century.

COUNTIES.	Years.						Increase of Population per cent. in 50 Years.
	1801.	1811.	1821.	1831.	1841.	1851.	
ENGLAND.							
Bedford	63,393	70,213	84,052	95,483	107,936	124,478	96
Berks	116,480	119,430	132,639	146,234	161,759	170,065	54
Buckingham	108,132	118,065	135,133	146,977	156,439	163,723	51
Cambridge	89,346	101,109	122,387	143,555	164,459	185,405	107
Chester	192,305	227,031	270,098	334,391	395,660	455,725	137
Cornwall	192,281	220,525	261,045	301,306	342,159	355,558	84
Cumberland	117,230	133,665	156,124	169,262	178,038	195,492	66
Derby	161,567	185,487	213,651	237,170	272,202	296,084	83
Devon	340,308	382,778	438,417	493,908	532,959	567,098	66
Dorset	114,452	124,718	144,930	159,385	175,054	184,207	61
Durham	149,384	165,293	193,511	239,256	307,963	390,997	160
Essex	227,682	252,473	289,424	317,507	344,979	369,318	62
Gloucester	250,723	285,955	336,190	387,398	431,495	458,805	82
Hereford	88,436	93,526	102,669	110,617	113,272	115,489	31
Hertford	97,393	111,225	129,731	142,844	156,660	167,298	72
Huntingdon	37,568	42,208	48,946	53,192	58,549	64,183	71
Kent	308,667	371,701	427,224	479,558	549,353	615,766	98
Lancaster	673,486	828,499	1,052,948	1,336,854	1,607,054	2,031,236	201
Leicester	130,082	150,559	174,571	197,003	215,867	230,308	77
Lincoln	208,625	237,634	285,058	317,465	362,602	407,222	95
Middlesex	818,129	953,774	1,145,057	1,358,330	1,576,636	1,886,576	130
Monmouth	45,568	62,105	75,801	98,126	134,368	157,418	244
Norfolk	273,479	291,947	344,368	390,054	412,664	442,714	62
Northampton	131,525	141,353	163,097	179,336	199,228	212,380	61
Northumberland	168,078	183,269	212,589	236,959	266,020	303,568	79
Nottingham	140,350	162,964	186,873	225,327	249,910	270,427	93
Oxford	111,977	120,376	138,224	153,526	163,127	170,439	52
Rutland	16,300	16,380	18,467	19,385	21,302	22,983	41
Salop	169,248	184,973	198,311	213,518	225,820	229,341	36
Somerset	273,577	302,836	355,789	403,795	435,599	443,916	62
Southampton	219,290	246,514	282,897	313,976	354,682	405,370	83
Stafford	242,693	294,540	345,972	409,480	509,472	608,716	151
Suffolk	214,404	273,963	271,541	296,317	315,073	337,215	57
Surrey	268,233	323,851	399,417	486,434	584,036	683,082	154
Sussex	159,471	190,343	233,328	272,644	300,075	336,844	111
Warwick	206,798	228,906	274,482	336,645	401,703	475,013	130
Westmoreland	40,805	45,922	51,359	55,041	56,554	58,287	43
Wills	183,820	191,853	219,574	237,244	256,280	254,221	38
Worcester	146,441	168,982	194,074	222,655	248,460	276,926	89
York (East Riding)	111,192	133,975	154,643	168,891	194,936	220,983	97
York (City)	16,846	19,099	21,711	26,260	28,842	36,303	116
York (North Riding)	158,927	170,127	188,178	192,206	204,701	215,214	35
York (West Riding)	572,168	662,875	809,363	984,609	1,163,580	1,325,495	132
WALES.							
Anglesey	33,806	37,045	45,063	48,325	50,891	57,327	68
Brecon	32,325	37,735	43,826	47,763	55,603	61,474	90
Cardigan	42,956	50,260	57,784	64,780	68,766	70,796	65
Carmarthen	67,317	77,217	90,239	100,740	106,326	110,632	64
Carnarvon	41,521	49,655	58,099	66,818	81,093	87,570	111
Denbigh	60,299	64,249	76,428	82,665	88,478	92,583	54
Flint	39,469	45,937	53,893	60,244	66,919	68,156	72
Glamorgan	70,879	85,067	102,073	126,612	171,188	231,549	223
Merioneth	29,506	30,854	34,382	35,315	39,332	38,843	32
Montgomery	48,184	52,184	60,245	66,844	69,607	67,335	40
Pembroke	56,280	60,615	73,788	81,425	88,044	94,140	66
Radnor	19,135	20,417	22,533	24,743	25,458	24,716	29

Another test of the different rate of increase in towns without one leading branch of manufactures, and others which possess one, is to borrow from the tables the relative populations of some of our chief commercial towns at the opening of this century to the present time, and contrast them with others taken at random from the same, or neighbouring districts.

	1801.	1851.
Bradford (Parish) ¹	29,794	149,543
Halifax	63,434	149,257
Leeds	53,162	172,270
Huddersfield	14,848	46,130
Sheffield (Parish)	45,755	135,310
Hull	22,161	50,670
Liverpool	77,653	258,236
Wigan	25,552	63,287
Bolton-le-Moors	29,826	87,280
Bury	22,300	70,143
Manchester (Parish)	112,300	452,158
Ditto (Township)	70,409	186,986
Prestwich	31,065	94,470
Middleton	7,991	16,796
Rochdale	39,757	98,013
Preston	14,300	72,136
Macclesfield	8,743	29,648
Stockport	27,698	91,423

After contemplating these doublings and quadruplings, take the soberer progress, sometimes no progress at all, of a list of market towns in the North Riding of Yorkshire.

	1801.	1851.
Over Silton	241	285
Leake	1,105	1,273
Kirby Sigston	285	282
North Otterington	492	667
Ainderby Steeple	587	845
Danby Wiske	427	554
Great Langton	163	271
Bedale	2,259	2,892
Burneston	1,302	1,635
Kirklington	409	553
Well	1,047	1,044
Thornton Watlass	407	421
Masham	2,430	2,695
East Witton	682	610
Coverham	1,006	1,221
Spennithorne	655	796
Hankswell	300	326

¹ Parish includes a wider range than the Parliamentary or Municipal limits. The parish estimate best shows the manufacturing increase; thus, the population of Bradford within the Parliamentary limits is 103,778, and of Halifax, 33,582.

These great folios consist, as we have said, of population papers, lists of names, and the figures belonging to them; but a running comment of notes down each page accounting for anomalies, or anything out of the usual course of increase in different places, throws considerable light on the real condition of each district; and the state of activity or depression of its inhabitants. Every decrease between the present and the last Census has to be accounted for in some way or other, and we can trace from the causes given, vastly greater energy in one race of the population than another. Perhaps in the people of Yorkshire this energy and vigilant care of their proper interests is most apparent: for instance, it is well known that agricultural wages are at least a third higher in Yorkshire than in Norfolk, Wiltshire, or Somersetshire; and that agricultural labourers in that county are, by comparison, in a most prosperous and well-fed condition; yet decrease of population is often attributed to agricultural 'depression' and migration to the towns. Emigration, too, is very frequent, and an air of bustle, movement, and change distinguishes every page. The mining districts, on the contrary, seem unfavourable to emigration, and the word does not occur in the notes on Durham, Cumberland, Northumberland, nor Westmoreland. Again, in Suffolk and Norfolk, where, especially in the latter county, the wages are at a universally low rate, there is little mention of emigration, except in the Hundreds bordering on the sea. This may be accounted for from want of energy in the people, and the known discouragement of emigration by the farmers, who apprehend a consequent rise in wages. In these counties, and again in Somersetshire and Wiltshire, we often read of cottages pulled down, or manufactures abandoned. Things are evidently not so flourishing as in the north; we can trace privation, depression, and want of spirit down many a column. But in these two last counties noted for their low wages, the idea of emigration has evidently taken root, and gained ground; their proximity to some great sea-ports being, of course, a stimulus.

Wherever early marriages have caused an increase of population, it is noted down as a peculiarity of that hamlet or village, while in some neighbouring parish we can trace a wiser system, for imprudent marriages seem often to be a mania confined to some narrow district, as if one instance had set the example to others.

Mr. Cheshire's concluding table gives the amount of emigration from Great Britain, from 1843 to 1852 inclusive, from which we gather that the number of emigrants sailing from the United Kingdom in 1852 was, on an average, upwards of a *thousand a day*.

Emigration from Great Britain and Ireland in each Year from 1843 to 1852, inclusive, and the destination of the Emigrants.

Years.	Destination of Emigrants.				
	British North America.	United States.	Australia and New Zealand.	All other Places.	Total.
1843.....	23,518	28,335	3,478	1,881	57,212
1844.....	22,924	43,660	2,229	1,873	70,686
1845.....	31,803	58,538	830	2,330	93,501
1846.....	43,439	82,239	2,347	1,826	129,851
1847.....	109,680	142,154	4,949	1,487	258,270
1848.....	31,065	188,233	23,904	4,887	248,089
1849.....	41,367	219,450	32,191	6,490	299,498
1850.....	32,961	223,078	16,037	8,773	280,849
1851.....	42,605	267,357	21,532	4,472	335,966
1852.....	32,876	244,261	87,881	3,749	368,764

In the Report's 'concluding remarks on the general results of the inquiry,' it touches upon the close relation that exists in England, as opposed to the Continent, between the town and country population. A slight acquaintance with foreign countries shows the truth of the remark quoted from Mr. Laing, that in them the town and city population are much more apart and separate from the country people than with us. There the little fortified towns, with their walls and gates, stand as sharp and distinct as they did five hundred years ago—'each city or town like a distinct island, or small nation, with its own ways of living, ideas, laws, and interests;' while the country population stands aloof, equally distinct in customs and costume, a people wholly separate from the towns, and comparatively little affected by their influences, either for good or evil. Upon our superiority in this respect the Report dwells as follows:—

"One of the moral effects of the increase of the people is an increase of their mental activity; as the aggregation in towns brings them oftener into combination and collision. The population of the towns is not so completely separated in England as it is in some other countries, from the population of the surrounding country: for the walls, gates, and castles which were destroyed in the civil wars, have never been rebuilt; and the population has outgrown the ancient limits; while stone lines of demarcation have never been drawn around the new centres of population. Tolls have been collected since a very early period in the market-places; but the system of *octroi*—involving the examination, by customs' officers, of every article entering within the precincts of the town—has never existed. The freemen in some of the towns enjoyed, anciently, exclusive privileges of trading; but the freedom could always be acquired by the payment of fines; and by the great measure of Municipal Reform (1835), every town has been thrown open to settlers from every quarter. At the same time, too, that the populations of the towns and of the country have become so equally balanced in number—*ten millions* against *ten millions*—the union between them has become, by the circumstance that has led to the increase of the towns, more intimate than it was before; for they are now connected together by innumerable relationships, as well as by the associations

of trade. It will be seen in the final publication, that a large proportion of the population in the market-towns, the county-towns, the manufacturing towns, and the metropolis, was born in the country; and that in England, town and country are bound together, not only by the intercourse of commerce and the interchange of intelligence, but by a thousand ties of blood and affection.

'The town and the country populations are now so intimately blended that the same administrative arrangements easily apply to the whole kingdom.'—*Census Report*, pp. lxxxiii. lxxxiv.

One most interesting topic remains to be elucidated by the forthcoming promised papers, which are to contain the voluntary returns respecting schools, churches, dissenting places of worship, and the amounts of their congregations, &c., together with the number of new churches, chapels, and meeting-houses built to supply the 'increasing demand' for religious instruction and general education. As far as numbers can tell anything on such matters, these will undertake to show the 'spiritual condition as well as educational institutions of the people of Great Britain; approximately, however, for, we understand, the Clergy found it both inconvenient and otherwise unseemly to venture on the numbers of attendants at Church.

We have now touched upon the various subjects of the present Census tables. Contradicting the forebodings of narrow-minded and faithless politicians, they show the country in an unexampled state of populousness and prosperity. Such words cannot be said without fear; but we must acknowledge blessings, and be thankful for them, though we own them to be immeasurably beyond the nation's deserts, and in their nature fluctuating and temporary. Though our national greatness decline from to-day, we must still witness to the gracious care of God's good Providence, who has blessed the industry of this great people hitherto, and failed in none of His promises. Nor, should the nation's prospects again darken for a season, must the evil time be used, as it once was, for an argument that legislation should have interfered to check the impetus of commerce which the present half-century has witnessed and profited from. Legislation has, strictly speaking, only to do with the present—that alone is its field; acting for it, however, not on seeming expediency, but on the eternal principles of truth and equity. If on such principles—if through just laws fairly administered—the nation grows populous and wealthy, whatever the future may have in store for us, legislation has done its part well. To turn the stream of national industry, to interfere with the order of nature, are works which it will not desire to meddle with. These are dreams for the closet, which any intelligent intercourse with actual things will dispel. But we need not pursue the moral of these remarkable documents. While they seem to

tell so much, and that so truly, we are aware that many of the most potent influences at work upon the national character and prospects elude the grasp of the statistician and defy the measurements of numbers, and that these might tell a far different tale than that of England's prosperity. Such sobering reflections will not have escaped the reader, though it has been beyond our plan to give them prominence here, where our only design has been to put him in possession of some of the facts brought to light by the recent Census, satisfied that they will be esteemed of interest and importance enough in themselves to dispense with elaborate comment or philosophical inquiry.

- ART. II.—1. *Theologia Moralis S. Alphonsi de Liguorio, Fundatoris Congregationis SS. Redemptoris ac olim Episcopi S. Agathe Gothorum*. Editio novissima; curavit P. MICH. HEILIG, Congr. SS. Redempt. Presbyter et Professor Theol. Moralis. Parisiis, 1845.
2. *Homo Apostolicus, sive Praxis et Instructio Confessariorum*. Auctore illustrissimo et reverendissimo D. Alphonso de Liguorio, Editio nova. Moguntiae, 1842.
3. *Compendium Theologiæ Moralis S. Alphonsi Mariæ de Liguorio, Auctore D. Neyraguet, Presbytero Diœcesis Ruthenensis Missionario*. Liburni, 1851.
4. *A Treatise of Equivocation: wherein is largely discussed the question whether a Catholicke, or any other person, before a Magistrate, being demaunded uppon his oath whether a Prieste were in such a place, may (notwithstanding his perfect knowledge to the contrary), without perjury, and securely in conscience answer, No, with this secret meaning reserved in his mynde, That he was not there, so that any man is bounde to detect it*. Edited by DAVID JARDINE, Esq. London, 1851.
5. *Cases of Conscience, or Lessons in Morals*. Sixth Edition. London, 1853.

PERHAPS there is scarcely anything which has had such weight in inducing a certain class of minds to pass from the communion of the Church of England to that of Rome, as a supposed holiness, and a high standard of piety, which the latter has been imagined to possess. The late Mr. Pugin's vision has floated through many a mind; 'Pleasant meadows, happy peasants, all holy monks, all holy priests, holy everybody—such unity and such charity, where every man was a Catholic.' How this opinion originated we will not linger to point out. Doubtless it arose from many sources which flowed together into one stream. The depth of religious fervency found in Roman Catholic books of prayer was compared with the sober expressions in the writings of our own Divines. The devotion apparent in the conduct of the worshippers of S. Peter's, S. Ouen, Milan, and Seville, during the time of the Easter ceremonies, at which they were alone visited, was contrasted with the frigidity of our own too often verger-governed cathedrals. Many of our writers, struggling against errors of an opposite nature, did not wait to point

out those to which their readers were not then exposed, and in drawing attention to the evils of the nineteenth century, they cared not to paint more than the bright features of the fifteenth. But, above all, 'the forward and delusive faculty' of Imagination came into play. People took to idealizing. They built themselves fairy palaces, and drew themselves fairy pictures of what the Church *must* be. Prophet and apostle were called up as witnesses, and an ideal holiness and unity were made necessary conditions of the Catholic Church. Then the eyes were turned from within to the strange scene of turmoil without, which this world of ours, and the Church militant in it, always present. The consequence was a cold shiver, and a conviction, grounded on the feelings, if not on the understanding, that this, at least, was no adequate realization of the glories depicted within. But yet the enchanted palace was not to be shivered so easily. The realization must be somewhere. True, it was not here, and therefore it must be looked for at some further spot—a spot sufficiently far removed for the mist to cover all inequalities in the appearance, and to give means of still dreaming on securely and cherishing a belief in the actual existence of the Ideal. And so, though England was fallen, yet Rome must be perfect.

This could not last long. History, and the testimony of living writers, spoke too unmistakeably. Mr. Gladstone's Letters to Lord Aberdeen cleared off a world of mist from Italy, and there were others who did the same good service for Spain and France. But even so the dream would not be cast out. The ideal, it had to be acknowledged, was not realized even there—but that might be the result of counteracting circumstances. It was the King of Naples, or the Grand Duke of Tuscany, or the Court of Spain, or the French Revolution. But still none of the evils must be traced to the Church, and the Church's own teaching and practice. She must still be, in herself, the great Perfection to which weary mortals may ever have recourse, to learn truth from her unstammering lips, and duty from her unchanging code of morals.

That the existence of such a living teacher—an ever-abiding oracle, ready to give the same responses to all comers—preaching the one true faith, and laying down one uniform system of pure and high-toned morality, is a captivating dream, cannot be denied; and if Rome is, in a special manner, such a living teacher, then the controversy between us and her is brought into very narrow compass. But we need not say that there are here two assumptions of no slight importance. Our present object shall be to examine what truth there is in the notion that Rome's

teaching does even aim at a high standard of practice: and as morality is the necessary antecedent of piety, our investigation shall be into the tone and nature of that morality which is authoritatively inculcated by the Church of Rome.

No fairer exponent of Roman teaching can be had than S. Alfonso Maria de' Liguori, as the following facts will show. In 1787 he died. In 1803 the Sacred Congregation of Rites decreed, 'that in all the writings of Alfonso de' Liguori, edited and inedited, there was not a word that could be justly found fault with.' Pius VII. ratified the decree, and proceeded, in less than thirty years after Liguori's death, to his beatification. Monsignor Artico, Bishop of Asti, and Prince Prelate of the Papal Household, published a letter declaring 'that the examination of Liguori's work had been conducted with particular severity, that his System of Morality had been more than twenty times discussed by the Sacred Congregation, and that all had agreed *voce concordi, unanimi consensu, unâ voce, unâ mente.*' In 1831 Cardinal de Rohan-Chabot, Archbishop of Besançon, propounded the following questions for the oracular response (*oraculum requirit*) of the Sacred Penitentiary:— '1. Whether a professor of sacred theology may with safety follow and profess the opinions which the Blessed Alfonso de' Liguori professes in his Moral Theology? 2. Whether a Confessor should be disturbed for following all the opinions of the Blessed Alfonso de' Liguori in the confessional, simply on the grounds that the Holy Apostolic See had declared that it found nothing in his works worthy of censure?' The answer given to the first question was in the affirmative. Liguori's opinions might be followed and professed with safety. The answer to the second was in the negative. No such Confessor was to be disturbed in his course. This decision was formally signed and dated as issuing from the Sacred Penitentiary on the 5th of July, 1831. Immediately the Cardinal Archbishop wrote to his Clergy requiring 'that the judgment of Rome should be fully adhered to, and that the opinions of the Blessed Alfonso de' Liguori should be followed and reduced to practice, all doubt whatever being thrown aside.' Pope Gregory XVI. confirmed the decree in a few weeks, and in 1839 Alfonso exchanged his title of *Blessed* for that of *Saint*. His life, full of adulation, has lately been published in England with Cardinal Wiseman's approbation; and it was but last year that his *Glories of Mary* were 'cordially recommended to the faithful' by 'Nicholas Card. Wiseman, Archbishop of Westminster. Given at Westminster on the Feast of Saint Alphonsus de' Liguori, 1852.'

Thus we have a Roman Bishop, who has been beatified and canonized, whose works, together with all the opinions in them, have been commended by Cardinals, approved by the Sacred Congregation, and ratified by Popes. Nor has this taken place long ago. Liguori is Rome's last saint, and his teaching is, on Rome's own showing, the latest authoritative exponent of her moral system, put into the hands of her confessors and directors with her special approbation and sanction.

No more need be said to prove that if Liguori's teaching is lax, if it falls short of a high standard, if it is subversive of the plain principles of morality, Rome's teaching is so too. Our present purpose is not to exhibit the most revolting features of his books: the laws of decency would forbid that. Abstaining from all quotations which would have to be veiled under a dead language, we shall confine ourselves almost wholly to the examination of a single question, What is Rome's theory of truthfulness and of lying? This lies at the very foundation of morals. Our first extract will contain her doctrine of Amphibology.

'We must distinguish between Amphibology or Equivocation, and Mental Restriction. Amphibology can be in three fashions: 1. When a word has two senses, as the word *volo* means both *to wish* and *to fly*. 2. When a sentence bears two main meanings, as *this book is Peter's*, may mean that the book belongs to Peter, or, that Peter is the author of it. 3. When words have two senses, one more common than the other, or one literal, the other metaphorical. . . . Thus, if a man is asked about something which it is to his interest to conceal, he can answer, *No, I say*; that is, *I say the word, no*. Cardenas doubts about this, but, saving his better counsel, he seems to do so without reason, for the word *I say* really has two senses; it means *to utter* [make use of a word] and *to assert*. We here employ it in the sense of *utter*.'—4. 2. 151.

Simple examples of these three forms of equivocation would be the following:—1. 'While we were making these arrangements *the heir* was present,' meaning *the air* was present. 2. The old, 'Aio te *Æacida Romanos vincere posse*,' or, 'Mr. H. is a man about town,' meaning, that he is frequently in London. 3. 'Is the grass green?' If you reply 'It is not,' you have told a lie; if you answer 'No, I say,' you have used an equivocation, because you mean that you are employing the word *No*.

'Well then,' continues S. Alfonso, 'it is certain, and held by all doctors alike, that for a good reason it is allowable to use equivocation in these ways which have been explained, and to confirm it with an oath. So say Lessius, Cardenas, and the Salamanca Doctors. The reason is, that thus we do not deceive our neighbour, but, on good reason, allow him to deceive himself; and again, we are not bound to speak according to the understanding of others if there is good reason; and any honest object, such as keeping our goods spiritual or temporal, is a good reason.

'But now, if you have *not* a good reason, is it a mortal sin to swear amphibologically, or with non-pure mental restriction? Viva says so, as well as Toletus, Anglès, Armilla, Navarrus; so does Busembaum, together, as he declares, with Layman, Sanchez, and "the common opinion." But he has no right to claim Sanchez, and to call his own opinion the "common" one, for Sanchez follows the contrary, and so do Lugo, Cajetan, the Salamanca Doctors, with Soto, Valdez, Prato, Hurtado, Candido, Leandro, and Lessius; and even Busembaum thinks it "probable." This, then, is the "more probable" opinion, and the reason of it is, that in oaths of this kind there are already present truth and justice; good judgment or discrimination is all that is wanting, and the absence of that is only venial. Nor is there anything in what Viva says, that a man swearing in this way calls on God to witness to what is false, for in fact he calls upon Him to witness what is true, *according to his own meaning*, although for good reason he allows the other to be deceived by reason of his carelessness or inadvertence. This must not, however, be done in a trial, or in contracts. It is an inference from the opinion given above, that for swearing in this way, in all cases except trials or contracts, it is not necessary to have a reason of any importance in itself, but any reasonable cause is sufficient, such as to free oneself from a man's troublesome questions which he has no right to ask. Note here, however, first, that you must have a better reason for equivocating with an oath than without it; and secondly, that in proportion as the words give the more occasion for a mistake, the better the reason must be; whence they say, that when words give scarcely any reason for a mistake, like words which are simply equivocal and bear two meanings, one equally well with the other, the very lightest reason is an excuse.

'Mental Restriction is of two kinds, one purely mental, which cannot be discovered in any manner by others; the other, not purely mental, which can become known from circumstances connected with it. Purely mental restriction is never allowable, nor an oath with it, as is shown by the three propositions condemned by Innocent XI. . . . On the contrary, it is allowable to use non-pure mental restriction, even with an oath, if it can be discovered by circumstances. This is proved from John vii. 8, where Christ said, "I go not up to this feast," and yet Scripture says that He afterwards went up. He understood "I go not up *openly* (as the Disciples inquired) *but secretly*." . . . This opinion is held in common by Gonet, Layman, Paludanus, Adrian, Soto, Wigandt, Cardenas, La Croix, Holzmänn, Sporer, Viva, and the Salamanca Doctors; Collet also has the same opinion, with Vanroy and Boudart, saying, that even the overstrict theologians declare that non-pure mental restrictions are not unlawful, arguing from S. Augustine, who, in his *Book against Lying*, c. 10, says, "Although every one who tells a lie may wish to conceal the truth, yet not every one who wishes to conceal what is true tells a lie." Even the extremely rigid Contensonius agrees, for in explaining the passage in John about Christ's going up to the feast, he says that Christ used somewhat obscure words, which a man of thought might easily interpret and discover the meaning. S. Thomas favours this view by saying, "that to be silent about the truth, and to express falsehood, are different things." He says, too, "It is not lawful to tell a lie for the purpose of freeing another from any kind of danger; it is lawful, however, to hide the truth prudently under some dissimulation, as S. Augustine says in his *Book against Lying*." The reason of this opinion is, that if it were not allowable to use non-pure mental restriction, there would be no way of lawfully concealing a secret which a man could not discover without loss or inconvenience, and this would be as harmful to intercourse between man and man as lying. The condemnation

passed by the pontiff on mental restriction is rightly to be understood of restriction purely and strictly taken, for that alone ought to be called true mental restriction which takes place solely in the mind, and there remains concealed, and can by no means be discovered from outward circumstances.'—4. 2. 151, 152.

We have thus stated the principles of Amphibology or Equivocation, and of Mental Restriction, in Liguori's own words. It will be seen that there are three sorts of equivocation, all of which are allowable, even with the addition of a solemn oath. Accordingly, a man may swear that *the heir* was present, meaning that *the air* was present. He may swear that another person is *a man about town*, meaning that he frequently goes to London. To the question, Is the grass green? he may answer with an oath, '*I say, no*,' meaning, not to deny the fact, but to affirm that he was using the word *No*. Mental restriction, since the days of Innocent XI., is of two sorts, pure, and non-pure. Pure mental restriction is that which, in the nature of things (*ullo modo*) is undiscoverable; non-pure mental restriction is that which, in the nature of things, is discoverable, but which, nevertheless, the person with whom we are dealing does not discover. An example of the first would be the secret insertion of a negative into an affirmative oath, *without any external sign*: an example of the second would be the secret insertion of a negative *in a whisper not observed by the other party*. Thus, 'I swear that I will do it,' with the mental insertion of 'not,' meaning 'I swear that I will not do it,' would be pure mental restriction; and, as such, has been condemned by Pope Innocent, and is disallowed by Liguori. But, 'I swear that I will do it,' with the insertion of 'not' *under the cover of a cough*, or with the addition of a 'perhaps' *in an unobserved whisper*, would be non-pure mental restriction, and such an oath might, according to Rome's moral teaching, be taken by a man who had no intention of fulfilling what the other party considered that he had bound himself to perform. We will presently proceed to point out the very grave effects which, on Liguori's own showing, the admission of these and like principles have on all security and good faith in dealings between man and man; on the security of oaths, of vows, of promises, of evidence; on truthfulness in general. But first we must make a few remarks suggested by the passage which has been quoted.

Three technical expressions are used, the special meaning of which it may be well to recal to our readers' minds. These are 'mortal sin,' 'probable and more probable opinions,' 'common opinion.'

For an act to be sin at all, it must fulfil three conditions. It must be voluntary, it must be free, and its wickedness must be

recognised. Those acts which fulfil these conditions are then arbitrarily divided, according to Roman teaching, into mortal and venial sins. For a sin to be mortal, it is required that the consent of the will should be perfect, that the recognition of the intellect should be full and deliberate, and that the *materia*, or thing about which the sin is, should be of a certain 'gravity.' A mortal sin puts a man out of the grace of God, a venial sin does not, but only diminishes the man's own fervour, and is so light a thing that it need never be confessed. What sins are mortal, and what venial, is left to the decision of the casuists. We will not here pause to point out the irreconcilable differences between doctors of greater and less rigidity on so vital a point as this. We may say, however, in passing, in order to show how totally impossible it is that the arbitrary division into mortal and venial can be really maintained, that after pages of patient calculation Liguori is reduced to the conclusion that a theft of 4*s.* by the same individual, and in identically the same state of mind, from a merchant of great opulence, and from a very rich nobleman, is a mortal sin in the first case, and a venial sin in the last; that is, that the first, 'on account of its own grave importance, destroys favour and friendship with God, and deserves eternal punishment;' that the other, 'on account of its insignificant importance, does not take away favour and friendship, though it diminishes our fervour of charity, and deserves temporal punishment;' that the one 'takes away the principle of spiritual life,' the other is not worth confessing. Again, we find that the sin committed by a nobleman's son in stealing 10*l.* from his father, is a venial sin, but that once to omit attending mass on Sunday is mortal.

Pascal will explain to us the doctrine of Probable Opinions in his own inimitable manner:—

" 'The generality of our authors,' said the monk, 'and, among others, our four-and-twenty elders, thus explain it: 'An opinion is called probable when it is founded upon reasons of some consideration. Hence it may sometimes happen that a single very grave Doctor may render an opinion probable.' . . . Hear Sanchez, one of the most famous of our Fathers: 'You may doubt, perhaps, whether the authority of a single good and learned Doctor renders an opinion probable. I answer that it does; and this is confirmed by Angelus, Sylvester, Navarre, Emanuel Sa, &c.' . . . You don't understand it! No doubt Doctors are often of different sentiments, but what signifies that? Each renders his own opinion probable and safe. We all know well enough that they are far from being of the same mind; what is more, they scarcely ever agree. There are very few questions indeed in which you do not find the one saying Yes, and the other saying No. Still, in all these cases, each of the contrary opinions is probable. And hence Diana says: 'Ponce and Sanchez hold opposite views of it; but as they are both learned men, each renders his own opinion probable.'"

"But father," I remarked, "a person must be sadly embarrassed in choosing between them!" "Not at all," he rejoined; "he has only to follow the opinion which suits him best." "What if the other is more probable?" "It does not signify." "And if the other is safer?" "It does not signify," repeated the monk; "this is made quite plain by Emanuel Sa of our Society, in his Aphorisms: 'A person may do what he considers allowable according to a probable opinion, though the contrary may be the safer one. The opinion of a single grave doctor is all that is requisite.'" "And if an opinion be at once the less probable and the less safe, is it allowable to follow it," I asked, "even in the way of rejecting one which we believe to be more probable and more safe?" "Once more I say, Yes," replied the monk. "Hear what Filiutius, that great Jesuit of Rome, says: 'It is allowable to follow the less probable opinion, even though it be the less safe one. That is the common judgment of modern authors.' Is not that quite clear?"

"Well, reverend father," said I, "you have given us sinners enough room, at all events! Thanks to your probable opinions, we have liberty of conscience with a vengeance! But are your casuists allowed the same latitude in giving your responses?" "O yes," said he, "we answer just as we please; or rather, I should say, just as it may please those who ask our advice. Here are our rules." . . . "Well, seriously, father," I said, "your doctrine is an uncommonly agreeable one! Only think of being allowed to answer Yes or No, just as you please! It is impossible to prize such a privilege too highly. I see now the advantage of the conflicting opinions of your doctors. One of them is always ready to serve your purpose, and the other never gives you any annoyance. If you do not find your account on the one side, you fall back on the other, and always land in perfect safety." "That is quite true," he replied, "and, accordingly, we may always say with Diana, on finding that Father Bauny was on his side, while Father Lugo was against him: *Sepe premente Deo fert Deus alter opem.*"—Letter V.

In like manner Garnet, in the 'Treatise of Equivocation,' lays it down as certain 'that when both opinions are probable, 'a man may without sinne folow either, if it may be done without prejudice of our neighbour,' and 'that it is within the 'compass of probability, if it have two or three grave autours.'

A 'common opinion' is supposed to be that on which all or most doctors agree. We say *supposed*, because, except on points where neither obtuseness nor over-subtlety of intellect could fail of coming to the right conclusion, they never do agree; nor is even a respectable majority found on one side or the other. In other words, when their agreement might be of use, it never exists; so irreconcilable are the differences between the strict and the lax schools. No one can read a dozen pages of Liguori without finding that, whatever may be said of Rome's dogmatic precepts, his dream of anything like certainty in her moral teaching has passed away for ever. This doctor is opposed to that doctor, while the third and fourth agree with neither of them, nor with themselves, and the inquirer at the oracle finds, to his dismay, that he is left with a mass of opinions of all shades of

difference, out of which he may take his choice, or his director may choose for him.

We cannot pass over the inferences drawn from the quotations made in the passage which we have extracted without some criticism. These quotations are made from our Lord's words, as related in the Gospels, from S. Augustine, and from Thomas Aquinas. From the first two an inference is drawn that non-pure mental restriction is allowable, and the third is given as favourable to the same view. Let us see if such an inference can fairly be drawn from the words.

'I go not up to this feast,' said our Lord, understanding, adds Liguori, by non-pure mental restriction, 'openly, but I do go up secretly.' An appeal to the words of Him who was and is the Truth, for the purpose of showing that He used towards His brethren a form of expression the effect of which would inevitably be to deceive them, is grating to our moral feelings. If any other hypothesis would satisfy the account in the Gospel narrative, we cannot doubt that it would be the part of reverence to accept it in place of this explanation. Not only, however, are there more natural explanations of the words, but they will not even bear this explanation. Let us turn to the original, and what do we find? *Ἐγὼ οὐπω ἀναβαίνω εἰς τὴν ἑορτὴν ταύτην, ὅτι ὁ καιρὸς ὃ ἐμὸς οὐπω πεπλήρωται.* 'Go ye up to the feast. I am not yet going up to this feast, because my time is not yet fully come.' Accordingly, when it *was* fully come, he went up, and *τῆς ἑορτῆς μεσοῦσης*, when the feast was about half over, began to teach. But it may be said that the reading *οὐπω ἀναβαίνω* is not found in all the MSS. True, in the Codex Vaticanus, the Codex Bezae, and the Codex Cyprius, the reading is *οὐκ ἀναβαίνω*. But the authority of these three Codices, important as the first two are, cannot be equal, or nearly equal to that of all the rest; and further, if the reading were *οὐκ* instead of *οὐπω*, the sense would remain identically the same. To get any other meaning out of the words, the tense of *ἀναβαίνω* must be changed (for as it stands it cannot avow any intention or purpose of not going up, but merely a present act), and the second *οὐπω* must also be got rid of, for which there is not a shadow of an excuse in a single MS. 'My time,' says our Lord (*ὃ ἐμὸς* is used as distinguishing it from that of his brethren who were urging him to go and manifest himself at once) 'is not yet fully come; therefore I am not yet going up [*οὐπω*], or, I am not at present going up [*οὐκ*] to this feast.' The *οὐκ ἀναβαίνω* of the three MSS. combined with the *οὐπω πεπλήρωται*, equally with the general reading *οὐπω*, overthrows the unworthy hypothesis

that our Blessed Lord was using non-pure mental restriction.¹ S. Augustine, in a sermon on the passage, rejects by anticipation the Liguorian interpretation with indignation and horror. He would sooner believe that Christ was deceived Himself than that He was deceiving others; '*falli enim pertinet ad infirmitatem, mentiri ad iniquitatem.*' But the plain words of Scripture, he continues, show that He was neither deceived nor deceiving. And this he says with the reading '*non ascendo*' before him, and unconscious that the true reading was probably *nondum*, which would of course have strengthened his argument.² Even if it had been necessary to understand 'not openly but secretly,' what need could there have been of supposing that our Lord was *taking in* His brethren? Even in that case, it would have been more natural to conceive that they understood His meaning, and thus, again, there would be no case of non-pure mental restriction. At any rate, if it had been mental restriction at all, it would not have been *non-pure* but *pure* mental restriction; for the difference between the two we have seen to consist in this,

¹ This case is thus put in the 'Treatise of Equivocation:—'The words are to be expounded thus; "I will not go upp yet," or, "to this feast," or, "I will not go with you," or, "manifestly as the Messiah, but in secrett;" which is an evident defence of our cause, for the use of such propositions which have somewhat reserved or understoode in the mynde for their verification . . .

'First we must examine whether in the speech of our Saviour, "*Ego autem non ascendo ad diem festum hunc,*" the word *ascendo* have the force of the present tense or the future; for albeit in some texts it be *ascendam*, yet the best Vulgate edition and all the Greeke have the present tense. Yet, notwithstanding, I say that it hath the force of a future; as if our Saviour had sayed, "*Non ascendam,*" I will not go upp . . . This is a thinge well knowne to the grammarians, who have a certaine figure which they call Enallage, one kynd wherof is Enallage temporum, when one tense is putt for another, whereof we may read in Lynacre and Emanuel's grammar, and such as have written on figures at large . . .

'Secondly, we must determine whether our Saviour sayd, "*Non ascendo,*" or "*nondum ascendo;*" for if he sayed, "*I go not upp yet to this feast,* there is then not so great strength in this argument by the force of the words themselves as would otherwise be. Although it be very probable that our Saviour spoke in sort that his brethren understoode that he would not go at all at that feast, insonmuch that we may very well take those words, "*Nondum ascendo ad diem festum hunc,*" that he would not go at all at this tyme. And so the argument may still be of force, for he sayed he would not go, and yet afterward he went . . . So that we probably defend that our Saviour used such words (although he sayed *nondum*) as made them understand that he would not come to that feast, and yet went after, which, if it be so, it skylleth not whether we read *non* or *nondum*. But letting this passe, I saye that albeit in all the Greeke cōpyes now extant it be *ὀφρα*, *nondum*, and so did S. Chrysostome and Eutimius reade, yet did S. Cirill, a Greeke authour, read negatively *non*. Also all the Latyn ffathers reade *non*, and therefore the very Heretickes themselves oughte to admitte this readinge, at the least so far forth as to seeke out some sufficient and trewe exposition therof; and all Catholickes are bounde to admitte *non*, because so it is in the Vulgate edition. Then doth it remaine that our Saviour Christe, sayinge that he would not go and going after, did reserve some secret words to make a perfect explication of his trew meaninge.'—Pp. 37—41.

² S. Aug. Sermon. 133, vol. v. p. 739.

that the last takes place solely in the mind, and can by no means be discovered from outward circumstances; which would have been the case in the present instance: while the first can become known from the circumstances connected with it; which would *not* have been the case in the present instance. Either, then, our Lord's words have nothing to do with mental restriction, which we have shown to be undoubtedly the case, or if they have, they go to justify not *non-pure*, but *pure* mental restriction, which, however, Liguori declares to be never allowable, and Pope Innocent XI. has condemned.

The other quotations may be, for the present, at least, more summarily dismissed. S. Augustine writes, 'Although every one who tells a lie may wish to conceal what is true, yet not every one who wishes to conceal what is true tells a lie.' Most assuredly; for they either speak the truth against their wishes, or they are silent; they do *not* employ non-pure mental restriction, whereby they would tell a lie and pass off a juggle on themselves to boot, vainly persuading themselves that in some way or other the self-juggle made amends for the lie. When such a sentence as the above is brought forward for the purpose of inferring from S. Augustine's authority that non-pure mental reservation is justifiable, we cannot be surprised that the following statement of Thomas Aquinas is tortured into being 'favourable' to the same conclusion:—'To be silent about the truth, and to express falsehood, are different things.' The doctrine of non-pure mental restriction may be fathered on Augustine and Aquinas in virtue of these quotations with as much truth as they might be attributed to any other writer who has happened to make use of the words truth and falsehood in the same sentence. But our author is not remarkable for the pertinency or accuracy of his quotations. In his 'Glories of Mary' he has made innumerable extracts from early writers, 'not only,' as he says, 'for use, but also that they may show the high idea that the saints had of the power and mercy of Mary, and the great confidence they had in her patronage.' A critic is obliged to warn his simpler co-religionists that they must not use the book in controversy, for, 'to name but one, and that not the chief cause of this unfitness, it is only necessary to mention that S. Alphonsus did not scruple to make most important additions to the passages which he quoted from the Fathers; and this, though perfectly allowable in a book of meditations' (*Populus vult decipi et decipitur*), 'of course destroys its value as a work of authority in matters of controversy'—because, we presume, a moderately informed opponent might be inconvenient.

What lies at the foundation of the theory of Amphibology is clearly a confusion between moral and material falsehood. The

enunciation of a material truth is an assertion concerning a fact, which assertion is objectively true. For example, if I affirm that the sun stands still, I affirm a material truth; if I assert that it moves, I affirm a material falsehood. These affirmations have, of themselves, and as such, no moral character. If I had no intention to deceive in stating that the sun moved, as in common conversation I frequently do—much more if it was my conviction that it did move, as would have been the case before the discoveries of philosophers—I should not have been guilty of any moral obliquity, or be justly charged with moral falsehood. Moral truthfulness, on the other hand, consists in speaking out the honest convictions of the heart. I am guilty of moral falsehood when I say anything with intent to deceive my neighbour. Thus if I assert either that the sun moves or that the sun stands still, with some ulterior object of my own, and with a purpose of deceiving the person to whom I am speaking, I am equally culpable in a moral point of view. It appears, then, that the material truth or falsehood of the thing asserted has no effect whatever upon the moral truthfulness or want of truthfulness of the person who makes the assertion. The moral character of the act, as of all other acts, depends upon the deliberate purpose of the agent. Wherever there is an attempt to deceive, whether by a material truth or by a material falsehood, there is moral falsehood.

But the theory of Amphibology confounds this vital distinction. Its essence consists in being a moral falsehood conveyed by means of a material truth. Romish theologians would try to persuade us that the latter compensates for the former, whereas we have seen that it does not annihilate or remove one grain of its native deformity. That this is what lies at the bottom of systematized equivocation or amphibology will appear at once from the following instances, which we choose at random from Liguori. In his *Homo Apostolicus* he puts the case of a man who has spoken ill of his neighbour, which ill is true, but yet which the speaker ought not to have divulged. What is he to do? ‘I am accustomed,’ says Liguori, ‘to recommend people to equivocate, and say, “*I said it out of my own head,*” for all words do come out of the mind, for which the head is taken.’ It is a *material truth* that all words do come out of the mouth, or mind, or head, and therefore Liguori thought that the *moral untruth* which he puts into the speaker’s mouth was annulled. It is difficult for anything to be more grotesque than this, and yet perhaps the other suggestion given in the same case goes beyond it. It is this: S. John, in a place not specified, says

¹ Hom. Ap. Tr. xi. 18.

that all sin is deceitfulness and a lie: the speaker has done wrong in saying what he has said: therefore he has committed a sin: therefore he has told a lie: therefore he should say, *I made a mistake—I have told a lie.* Thus he is taught to say that the truth which he had spoken was a lie, thereby, of course, telling a lie, while at the same time he lays the flattering unction to his soul that he has been guiltless of any kind of falsehood. Again, the nature of the principle of equivocation is illustrated by the case of a servant saying *Not at home.* Cardenas says that he must put his foot upon a stone, and say that his master is not *here*, i.e. on the stone. Liguori, however, prefers his saying 'He is not *here*,' meaning at the door, or in the window, or in sight.' Everybody knows that conventional sayings, such as that under discussion, bear conventional meanings, and are known to bear conventional meanings, and therefore involve no deceit and no moral falsehood. Liguori thinks that because the phrase *Not at home* is materially false, the person who uses it is guilty of a moral falsehood. To escape this evil he suggests an equivocation, which makes the expression materially true, but implies an attempt at deceiving, and involves moral falsehood. So pitifully confused is this model-instructor of confessors and directors on this vital point.

The principle of non-pure mental restriction is the same. In illustration of this we will give an instance, not indeed found in Liguori, but accepted by Roman controversialists as a faithful exponent of their views, and justified as such. As S. Francis of Assisi was one day walking, he was passed by a person whom he recognised. Hardly was this person out of sight, when there came by others in search of him, and asked S. Francis if he had passed by. The saint did not wish to say Yes. His conscience forbade him to say No. What was he to do? He threw his arms into the air, brought his hands together, and in so doing pointed with his finger down his sleeve. Then he answered with a safe conscience, 'He has not passed *this way*.' It was quite true: he had not passed down the saint's sleeve. But was S. Francis therefore guiltless of a moral falsehood because he had contrived to convey that moral falsehood by means of a material truth? Yes, say Rome's casuists, because he used *non-pure* mental reservation. Had he not pointed down his sleeve, it would have been a case of *pure* mental reservation: but the adroit movement of the finger altogether withdrew the act from this class of sins, and placed it among justifiable and right acts. S. Francis' soul would, according to their system, have become 'spiritually dead,' had it not been for

¹ Theol. Moral. 4. 2. 165.

the finger: he would have been 'deprived of God's grace,' had it not been for the finger: he would have 'earned eternal punishment,' had it not been for the finger. But the finger was a talisman. It is a matter of doubt, however, whether it was his sleeve or his ear into which he pointed. 'So it is recorded 'of S. Frauncis,' says the *Treatise of Equivocation*, 'that beyng asked of one who was sought for to death, whether he came 'not that way, he aunswered, putting his hand into his sleeve, 'or, as some say, into his eare, "He came not this waye."'¹

We believe we have now sufficiently illustrated the principles of Equivocation and Mental Restriction, and shall proceed to their application, under the guidance of S. Alfonso. We have already said that they would subvert all confidence and security in dealing between man and man, and cause utter distrust of all pledges. We will now ask a few questions, to which Liguori shall give the answers, or at least the proofs of the answers. What confidence can we put in assertions? in oaths? in vows? in evidence? Can promises be trusted? Can secrets be secure? In short, can we be justified in believing that acts and words will be in accordance with each other?

We will begin with the question relating to assertions.

'A man who has come from a place falsely thought infected, may say that he has not come from it, namely, (aside) as being pestilential, because that is the meaning of those who guard. Nay, Toletus, Lessius, and a great number of others, quoted by Sporer, allow that he may say that he has not come from it, even though he has passed through an infected place, provided that he is sure that he has contracted no pestilence, because it may be understood (aside) that he has not come in such a way as that danger is to be feared from him. But in this last statement I do not altogether acquiesce.'—4. 2. 159.

The doctrine of probability has shown that Toletus, Lessius, or Sporer are quite sufficient authorities for a person to act with safety upon their opinion. In the *Treatise of Equivocation* a similar example is given, and there the assertion is represented as confirmed by oath:—

'A man cometh unto Coventry in tyme of a suspition of plague. At the gates the officers meete hym, and on his oath examine hym whether he come from London or no, where they thincke, certainly, the plague to be. This man, knowing for certain the plague not to be in London, or, at least, knowing for certain that the air is not there infectious, and that he only ridd through some secure place of London, not staying there, may safely swear that he came not from London, answering to their final intention in their demand, that is, whether he came so from London that he may endanger their citye of the plague, although their immediate intention was

¹ *Treatise of Equivocation*, p. 50. A marginal reference is given to Simeon Metaphrastes apud Surium, tom. iii. Parsons refers to the same story in his *Treatise tending towards Mitigation*.

to know whether he came from London or no. This man, the very light of nature would clear from perjury.'—P. 30.

'Three ways are assigned by doctors whereby a man may restore another's character when he has made public a crime of his which he has committed. . . . The third is, for the speaker to assert "that he had said what was false, that he had made a mistake, that he was deceived, or that he had lied." And though Soto, Cajetan, Bannez, and Sylvius, say that this way must not be used, thinking that these are real lies, yet "probably" Lugo, Sanchez, Wigandt, Lessius, Roncaglia, Mazzotta, with the "common" opinion, as he says, and the Salamanca doctors, with Villalobos, Trulenchius, Ledesma, Serra, Tapia, Prado, Sayrus, Navarrus, think that the aforesaid words are not lies but real amphibologies; for, as S. Thomas says, "Some sins are called in Scripture falsehoods and lies, as in the fourth Psalm, 'Why do ye love vanity and seek after a lie?' And there is the same in Jeremiah viii. 10, 'From the prophet to the priest they all perform a lie,' i.e. sins. In like manner, then, a man who has sinned, [or done wrong, which the individual in question has, by divulging a truth when he ought not to have divulged it,] can well say 'that he has told a lie,' or 'made a mistake.'" So in the case which we have put, we may well, nay, if there is need, we are bound, to make use of such ambiguous words.'—*Theol. Mor.* 4. 6. 992.

'We are not bound, says Cardenas, with Lessius, to answer to the meaning of the man who asks the question, if there is good reason.'—4. 2. 165.

'If a man has received a loan, and afterwards repaid it, he may say that he has not received the loan, understanding aside, so as to have to pay it.'—4. 2. 159.

'Whenever a man is bound to hide another man's disgrace, he may lawfully say, I do not know, namely, (aside) I have no knowledge which is of use for answering: or, I do not know it as a thing which I can declare.'—4. 2. 153.

'If a guest is asked if his dinner is good when really it is bad, he may answer that it is good, namely, (aside) for mortification.'—4. 2. 160.

Utinam his nugis!—We call attention to the following case, and the reasoning upon which it is founded:—

'May an unfaithful wife declare to her husband that she has not committed adultery, meaning (aside) so as to have to tell him? She may equivocally assert that she has not broken the marriage, for it still exists. And if she has sacramentally confessed her adultery, she may answer, "I am innocent of this crime;" because it has already been taken away by confession. So Cardenas, who remarks, however, that she may not make that affirmation with an oath, because, for asserting anything, probability of the fact is sufficient, but for swearing, certainty is required. But it is replied that moral certainty is enough for swearing, as we said above with the Salamanca doctors, Lessius, Suarez, Sanchez, and the common opinion. And this moral certainty of the remission of the sin can be had whenever a person has received the sacrament of penance in a good moral disposition. But for the question in hand, the Salamanca doctors say, with Soto, that a woman cannot deny her adultery, because it would be *pure* mental restriction. Cardenas, however, admits that in danger of death it is allowable for her to use a metaphor which is common in Scripture, where adultery is taken for idolatry, as in Ezek. xxiii. 37, "That they have committed adultery . . . and with their idols have they committed adultery." Nay, if the crime is really hidden, "probably," with Busembaum, Lessius, Trulenchius, Sanchez, Soto, Sayrus, and Peter of

Aragon, the woman may deny with an oath, and say, "I have not committed it," in the same way as a culprit can say to the judge who does not legitimately interrogate him, "I have not committed the crime," understanding (aside) that he has not so committed it as to be bound to declare it to him.—4. 2. 162.

It thus appears that four answers are allowed to the unfaithful wife:—1. That she has not broken the marriage. 2. I am innocent of this crime. 3. I have not committed adultery, meaning (aside) I have not been guilty of idolatry. 4. I have not done it (aside) so as to tell you. It will be seen that the first three replies are equivocations, increasing in the intensity of their folly and iniquity, and that the last, without the aside, which only makes matters worse, is a downright lie. The equivocation in the first reply is on the word *broken*. The second embodies a principle which we know is of but too universal application in Ireland. The equivocation lies in the word *crime*, as meaning both the act and the guilt of the act. And so, in Ireland, men lift up their heads to heaven and swear that they are as innocent as babes unborn, whilst their hand is still red with their neighbour's blood. They have been absolved—the guilt has been washed away—they are innocent *of the guilt of the murder*, in their own estimation, and therefore *of the murder* according to their equivocating logic. The third reply unites in a novel combination, a subtle ingenuity, exerted in discovering the argument, brutish folly in thinking that any one could deceive either himself or any one else by it, profanity in appealing to Holy Scripture for such a purpose, cemented together into a compound of hypocritical mendacity. The fourth reply, putting aside the damaging understood clause, is, as we have said, a straightforward untruth; and we could more easily make allowance for a woman who under such circumstances succumbed to her temptations and told a plain lie, than for one who, equally telling the lie, attempted also to pass off a sophism upon herself by any of the first three methods, and so destroy her sense of the sin of untruthfulness, of which her previous sin had driven her to be guilty.

So much for the value to be put on assertions. Can promises be trusted? Let Liguori speak:—

'We must mark here as certain that no promise binds, although it has been accepted by the other party, if afterwards it becomes impossible, or very harmful, or unlawful, or inexpedient, and, generally speaking, whenever any notable change of circumstances takes place, so that if it had been foreseen, the promise would not have been made; because a promise is always supposed to be made under such a tacit condition.'—4. 5. 720.

'Three opinions are given, all sufficiently "probable."... The third says that a simple promise does not bind except *sub levi*, because it only binds of good faith, and they prove it from S. Thomas, who teaches that a promise binds

only in the way of honour, and not in the way of civil law; that is, in the way of justice, as the Salamanca doctors explain.'—*Ibid.*

'The whole of the obligation commonly depends on the intention of the person making the promise. On this point Sa notices that scarcely any one who makes a promise intends to bind himself, or to give another the right of exacting, unless he adds an oath or makes an instrument, but generally only intends to declare his purpose.'—*Ibid.*

'In case a man has seduced a maiden on false promise of marriage, is he bound to keep the promise, if he is much superior to the woman in birth, and she was aware of the disparity? Palao, Pontius, Croix, Layman, Navarrus, Vasquez, &c. hold that simple inequality is not enough to free the man from his promise of marriage, but that the girl must, besides, have been able to have seen the deceit by other circumstances, for men do very often marry women beneath themselves in rank: but with great 'probability' he is excused by Busembaum, Lugo, Sanchez, S. Antoninus, Navarrus, Sylvester, Angelus, Armendarius, and very many others, on the grounds that disparity of state is of itself a reason for prudently doubting the truth of the promise; and if the woman did not doubt, as she ought, that is an accident, and to be imputed to her own carelessness. . . . And in these cases a man is not bound to marriage, although he has confirmed his promise with an oath, as is said by Lugo, Sanchez, S. Antoninus, Sylvester, Cajetan, Soto, Navarrus, and very many others. The reason of this is that an oath does not bind except according to the intention of the promiser.

'But how great ought the disparity to be, to free a man from the marriage? Lessius requires him to be of far higher birth; as that *he* should be the son of an Earl and *she* the daughter of an artisan. But Sanchez, with S. Antoninus and Navarrus, says that a much smaller inequality is sufficient, as that a noble should have to marry a farmer's daughter, or that the man should be considerably the richer of the two, as Sanchez adds with Navarrus, Lopez, Antony of Cordova, Veracruz, and Lessius. For thus speaks Navarrus in his Manual: "He is bound to fulfil his promises, except they should be very unequal in birth, power, or riches; say, that he should be noble and she a farmer's or artisan's daughter." S. Antoninus teaches likewise that he must keep his promise, except their condition in life should be very different; say, that the woman should be a plebeian and the man a noble and powerful.

'But in case the girl is totally ignorant of any disparity, is the seducer then bound to the marriage? Lessius and Busembaum say so 'probably,' because then the woman could not in any way discover the deception, but still it is 'very probably' denied by Lugo, Viva, the Salamanca doctors, Cornejo, Sanchez, Antony of Cordova, Moneta, Peter, Ledesma, and Veracruz. The grounds are that the seducer is only bound to what is equal to the injury offered: but the injury offered consists in his not fulfilling what the woman asked: so to repair the injury the man is not bound to give more than the woman asked. Now the woman, not knowing the man's condition in life, only asked that one of the same condition with herself or a little superior should marry her: if therefore a man of much better condition should marry her, he would be giving more than is equal to the injury done, by giving what she neither asked nor intended to ask: and so he is not bound to marry her, but he does quite enough if he repairs the harm done by giving her a dowry or looking after her marriage.

'The same is the case, according to Sanchez, S. Antoninus, and the Salamanca doctors, if there is fear of great offence or quarrels between the relatives of the contracting parties. In a case where a man's family would feel disgraced by the marriage on account of the disparity of state, I think him to be not the least bound to marry the maiden whom he has seduced,

whether his promise was true or whether it was false: for if he promised falsely, we have just proved that he is not bound to the marriage, no, nor to compensation: and if he promised truly, not even so is he bound to marry her, because the promise is *ipso facto* null by being about an unlawful thing, such as a marriage which would be a disgrace to the family. . . . A promise cannot be valid except it be about a lawful thing, for justice cannot bind to what is unlawful; and so a promise of entering upon a marriage which would disgrace the family is not valid, because it is about a thing which is not lawful.'—4. 5. 644.

The moral blindness and logical acumen with which we are here brought to the Q. E. D. is charming. It is the philosophy of sin. We hope that aristocratical parents will, for their sons' sake, duly appreciate these novel 'privileges of the nobility.' For ourselves we are well content that the right of seducing maidens on promise of marriage, and then refusing to keep the promise, should remain a privilege of the nobles of those countries alone where Rome's religion is professed and Rome's teachers have sway. Next, for promises of secrecy:—

'When you have made a promise without expressly binding yourself to keep the secret to your own detriment, it is certain that you may reveal it, since no one is thought to bind himself to a secret to his grave inconvenience. So say Layman, Roncaglia, Sporer, and Holzmänn. But what is to be said if you have expressly promised not to reveal the secret, though it should cost you your life to keep it? Can you then reveal it if in peril of life? Sporer says so, and with sufficient probability, teaching that a man may, in that case, and is bound to do so, because no man is allowed to throw away his own life; and Layman attaches himself to the same view. Some doctors, however, say very probably, with Lugo, Molina, and Croix, that if you have made the promise, you have a sufficient obligation to keep the secret, even with danger of your life; for it is one thing to throw away life, another to neglect its preservation in order to keep promises.'—4. 6. 971.

Will the sanction of an oath help us? No, for we have already seen that there is nothing wrong in swearing with equivocation whenever we may use equivocation without swearing. Nay, Garnet went further, and solemnly affirmed that it was his opinion, that the speech by equivocation being saved from a lie, the same speech might be, without perjury, not only confirmed by oath, but by any other usual way, though it were by receiving the Sacrament, if just necessity so required.¹ Here are a few cases in which this principle is applied:—

'A penitent questioned by his confessor about a sin which he has confessed, can swear that he has not committed it, understanding aside, that he has not committed anything which has not been confessed. So say Cardenas, the Salamanca doctors, Sanchez, and Sporer. This must, however, be understood to hold in all cases except when the confessor is justly interrogating in order to learn the state of the penitent.'—4. 2. 157.

'If any man has been forced into a marriage, he can assert before a

¹ State Paper Office. Quoted in Preface to Treatise of Equivocation, and Lingard's History of England, Reign of James I. chap. i. A.D. 1606.

judge with an oath that he has not contracted the marriage, namely, freely, as was right.'—4. 2. 159.

'May a man, when asked to lend money, swear that he has none, when he has, understanding aside, that he has none so as to lend? The Salamanca doctors and Soto say No, on the ground that this mental restriction cannot be detected from circumstances. But this is only to be understood if the truth can in no way be detected; for if it could be conjectured from any circumstance, as the poverty or indigence of the lender, he may without difficulty understand I have not more than I want, so as to lend.'—4. 2. 163.

'May tradesmen swear that their goods cost them more than they did, understanding aside, "together with some other goods?" Some say they may; but the Salamanca doctors are right in denying it. Yet Croix and Gobat say that probably they may, when they do not understand the mere price of the thing, but count into it the expenses of carriage, store, &c.'—4. 2. 164.

'May men proceeding to their doctors' degree swear with equivocation that they have fulfilled some condition which they have not fulfilled, as that they have been engaged for so many years on a certain science, if they are equally fit with the other doctors to proceed? See Tamburini, who answers in the affirmative, and says that there is then a good reason for swearing, lest men who are really worthy should be rejected. But however this may be, it seems a matter more than 'probable' to me that men proceeding to their doctors' degrees in Naples do not commit perjury when, as is usual, they write with their own hands, "I declare with an oath that it is the first year, &c." when it really is not; because the words "I swear," or "I declare with an oath," (as we said above with the Salamanca doctors, Bonacina, Sanchez, and Suarez,) is not an oath in itself, unless it is preceded by a question about swearing, and this question at Naples is either not made at all, or is not made about the real oath, but only about the material writing, which, from common usage, does not seem to be counted as a true oath.'—4. 2. 166.

'Is it allowable to swear something false, adding in a low tone a true circumstance? Yes, answer Hurtado and Prado, with others quoted by the Salamanca doctors against Torre. They say that it is enough to make the words true, that there should be some external conformity with the conception of the mind, whether shown by gesture or by a whisper, and it is a matter of accident that the other does not hear. The Salamanca doctors explain it better. They say that it is allowable if the whisper can by any means be possibly perceived by the other, although its meaning is not caught, but not if it should in every respect remain concealed from him.'—4. 2. 168.²

¹ This example is thus enlarged in the 'Treatise of Equivocation,' 'One being 'convented in the Bishopp's courte because he refuse to take such a one to his wyfe as he had contracted with *per verba de præsenti*, having contracted with 'another privily before, so that he cannot be husband to her that claymeth him, 'may answer that he never contracted with her *per verba de præsenti*, understanding, that he did not so contract that it was a marriage.'—P. 81.

² Our readers will recollect Pascal's method of dealing with this doctrine:—'Indeed, father, is that not a lie and perjury too?' 'No,' said the father, 'Sanchez and Filiutius prove that it is not; "for," says the latter, "it is the intention that determines the quality of the action." And he suggests a still surer method for avoiding falsehood, which is this: after saying aloud, *I swear that I have not done that*, to add in a low voice, *to-day*; or after saying aloud, *I swear*, to interpose in a whisper *that I say*, and then continue aloud *that I have done that*. This, you perceive, is telling the truth.' 'I grant it,' said I, 'it might possibly, however, be found to be telling the truth in a low key, and falsehood in a loud one.'—Letter IX.

'Toletus says that a man commits a grave sin who uses equivocation when he offers to take an oath without being asked, because *then* he is bound to use words in their common acceptation, having no grounds for equivocating; but with 'greater probability,' and the 'most common opinion,' the Salamanca doctors say the contrary; namely, that, when there is good reason of necessity or expediency, a man may use amphibologies in swearing, even though he offers to swear without being asked.'—4. 2. 169.

This 'most common opinion of the doctors' overthrows the only defence under which, as we shall see presently, Romish apologists, when pressed with arguments, are able to attempt to shelter themselves, viz. that they are protecting themselves from the aggressor. Here we see that the whole authority of their own Moral Theologians is directly on the other side. The use of equivocal swearing is declared to be not only defensive but aggressive. The next extract cries out for the pen of Aristophanes to lash once more the modern sophists' form of the celebrated 'Ἡ γλῶσσ' ὁμώμοχ', ἥ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος.

'A man who has only outwardly taken an oath, without intending to swear, is not bound, except perhaps on account of the scandal, for he has not sworn, he has joked.'—4. 2. 171.

It was time, as Ranke has observed, for Jansenism to arise, when such sentiments as these could be published; and yet, in spite of the warning of Jansenism, Rome retains them in her codes of morals, awaiting, perhaps, a rougher hand than that of Port-Royal to undertake the work of reform.

'If a man makes a false promise and swears to it, what sin does he commit, and to what is he bound? *Distinguo*. A man may make a false promise with an oath in three ways: 1. Not intending to swear; 2. Not intending to bind himself; 3. Not intending to fulfil the promise.'—4. 2. 172.

Here is a precious 'distinction' to puzzle simple persons' brains: then it is worked out. The man who swears without the intention of swearing, does not commit perjury, but only a venial sin. The man who swears, intending to swear, and not intending to bind himself, also commits a venial sin, and is not bound to keep the oath. *Distinguendum* is a wand of power in the hands of the modern casuists, and works wonders.

'It is certain that it is no grave thing to fail in keeping a small part of what you have sworn; for example, if you have sworn not to drink wine, you commit no mortal sin by drinking a little, because the smallness of the *materia* is an excuse. . . . You may say the same of a man who takes away only a little from a sum which he had sworn to give to another.'—4. 2. 173.

It seems that we have improved upon the morality of the children of Jonadab the son of Rechab, and have developed wonderfully since the days of Ananias and Sapphira.

'You are under no obligation if you swear what is bad, or vain, or useless, or, as Cajetan says, indifferent, if it be not dignified by its end, or

circumstances connected with it; for an oath cannot be a bond of iniquity, or of vain and idle things to which God does not wish us to be bound. Bonacina and others, according to the common opinion.'—4. 2. 176.

We must recollect that the judge of what is bad, vain, idle, or indifferent, is the Director, and therefore that no oath of which he disapproves is to be kept.

'Is a man who promises his concubine with an oath not to know another woman bound to keep his promise? Diana says No; but the Salamanca doctors with greater probability say Yes.'—4. 2. 184.

'Is a man who has made a promissory oath to return to prison bound to keep his promise, with a probable fear of death, or very grave unjust wrong? The first opinion says No, because it is an action intrinsically bad to offer oneself to death. So say Navarrus, Manriquez, Vasquez, Pontius, Covarruvias, Tamburini, Reginald. The second opinion with much more probability is in the affirmative, because when the promise had been made, it would be a work of virtue to go back. So Toletus, Suarez, Lessius, and the Salamanca doctors, though they call the first opinion probable.'—4. 2. 186.

Poor Regulus! We used to admire his conduct, and to think that he had acted gloriously, as we read over and over Horace's spirit-stirring ode when we were at school; but it seems that, in the judgment of Navarrus, Manriquez, Vasquez, Pontius, Covarruvias, Tamburini, and Reginald, he was doing a thing wicked in itself,—and the doctors who maintain the contrary still think it not improbable. Pity that our minds were not imbued with Liguorian morality after the fashion which has been lately proposed in France. Let Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle bow before our modern moralists!

There is another sort of swearing, which we who are accustomed to the Third Commandment and to our Lord's discourses in the Gospels have been inclined to consider wrong;—but away with scruples: 'We must mark that generally men who angrily utter words, such as, *By God! By Christ! I will kill you!* commit no grave sin, as they are for the most part excused on the ground of ignorance or want of deliberation.'—4. 2. 146.

This is sickening work. We will pass over vows which are treated much in the same way as oaths. But at least it may be thought that, in solemn courts of justice, men will be allowed to give their evidence without this miserable dallying with their consciences and sense of truth: there, at least, they will not be justified in lying. Let us see.

'A witness or defendant, when not legitimately questioned by the judge, may swear that he does not know a crime which he really does know, understanding to himself that he does not know a crime about which he can be legitimately questioned, or that he does not know it so as to give evidence about it. So Cajetan, Sporer, Azorinus, Roncaglia, Sanchez, with Navarrus, Toletus, Valentia, &c. The same is the case if the witness, for some other reason, is not bound to give evidence; for example, if he is himself quite assured that the act committed is without guilt, as the Salamanca doctors and

Elbel say ; or if he knows the crime only as a secret, and no ill repute has previously got abroad. When, however, the witness or defendant is legitimately questioned by the judge, he must not use any equivocation, because he is bound to obey the rightful precept of his superior. This is the common opinion ; and the same must be said about an oath in onerous contracts, because otherwise injury would be done to another. Except in the case of a trial the crime be altogether concealed ; for then a witness may, *nay he is bound to say that the defendant has not committed it*, and so may the defendant if there is not half-full proof. So says Tamburini, with the common opinion, because then the judge does not question legitimately.'—4. 2. 154.

Can we any longer wonder at its being impossible to get evidence in Ireland, upon which to convict murderers ?

'But it is asked, if a defendant or contractor, who is not permitted the use of equivocation, has deceived by equivocally swearing, can he be absolved without declaring the truth ? Some say No, not without probability ; but with more probability Sanchez, the Salamanca doctors, and Philarchus say Yes, because by such an oath, which cannot be called perjury, he has not sinned against commutative justice, but against legal justice, and the obedience due to the judge, whose command to discover the truth is only transient, and only lasts as long as he is making the inquiry. Sanchez says the same, also, about a lying witness ; and so both of them may be absolved without their declaring the truth. They are, however, bound to make satisfaction in another way, if they can. If they cannot, the Salamanca doctors say that they are bound to discover the truth afresh in the court. But I should even excuse them, if they were altogether unable to make satisfaction either at present or at a future time.'—4. 2. 155.

Our readers will inquire what is the meaning of legitimate questioning on the part of the judge. In the next book Li-guori explains his meaning.

'It is certain that a witness is not bound to confess the truth to a judge, when he does not legitimately interrogate ; for then he may lawfully answer, even with an oath, that he does not know the crime (aside) so as to be bound to declare it to him. But it is asked, when does a judge question legitimately ? The reply is, when there is already half-full proof. . . . When there is this, the crime is no longer said to be secret, and therefore the judge has a right that the witness should declare the truth. So in common, Lessius, Navarrus, and others, with the Salamanca doctors, who observe that no witness is bound to answer in this way, unless repute of the guilt, or half-full evidence of it, or clear signs of it, be already proved and shown to him by the judge, unless, indeed, it is quite certain that the judge is a good man, and he declares that he is legitimately questioning. . . . A judge does not legitimately question, unless there has previously been notoriety, ill repute, or other half-full proof.'—5. 3. 266.

In the same spirit the Treatise of Equivocation explains 'the order of law, which order of law requires these five things :'

'First, that the party who examineth must be a lawfull superiour . . . Secondly, he must have authority over the person whom he examineth . . . Thirdly, the matter itself must be subject to the judge . . . Fourthly, he must procede according to a just law : for whereas a judge is, as Aristotle calls hym, a living law, as the law itself is a dumb judge ; even as the law when it is unjust is no law, so a judge, in the execution of an unjust law, is no judge. Fynally it is very necessary, for the due observation of order

of law, that the judge do not proceede against a man to examine hym or call hym into question, but in cases which are publick and manifest, or when great suspicions and presumptions or common reportes, do seem to condemn the partye; or sufficient testimony convince hym, for otherwise it were against the law of nature. For how can there be greater disturbance of commonwealth than to have honest men molested or called into question at any one's fancye? . . . In these cases, when order of law is not observed, a man is not only not bound to confesse anything of hymself, but he is also bound to confesse nothing at all, for it were to prejudice hymself without necessitye. And no man may prejudice his own fame, or goodes, or lyfe, without at the least a veniall synne, except he be bound thereunto by order of law.'—P. 68.

Liguori continues:—

'Even when legitimately and juridically interrogated, you are not bound to give evidence in the following cases. . . . 3. If notable harm will result to yourself or any belonging to you from your testimony. . . . 6. If the man probably did not commit sin in what he did, either owing to ignorance, or because he took something by way of compensation for a debt, and for doing so was charged with theft. For the judge's intention is to inquire about what is really a guilty action.'—*Theol. Mor.* 5. 3. 268.

'Bonacina says that if a witness has sworn to speak the truth, he is bound to speak it on the grounds of justice, because an obligation of justice arises from an oath and promise; but with greater probability Lessius contradicts him, because a witness swearing that he will speak the truth, does not intend to bind himself to declare it on the grounds of justice, but only by virtue of religious scruple.'—5. 3. 270.

'Is a witness bound to make restitution for the harm that has ensued, if he has concealed the truth when legitimately questioned by the judge? Yes, say the Salamanca doctors. . . . No, says Molina, &c. . . . But you will say that if a man has, by his lie, hindered another from obtaining a good to which the latter has a right, he is bound to make restitution, and that so the witness is bound to make restitution, because he has hindered his neighbour from getting his rights by saying that he did not know what he did know, which was a lie. But it is replied that this holds when the lie is the positive cause which produces the harm, not if it is only the negative cause. Now, a witness who says that he does not know some true thing which he does know, is only the negative cause of harm; for he puts no positive impediment in the way of the other man's getting his rights, he only does not remove an impediment in his way, which impediment is defect of proof. This impediment a witness may be bound to remove, from obedience and religious scruple, as we said, or even sometimes from charity, but not from justice, unless it has happened that he has entered into a special compact with that side that he will divulge the truth.'—5. 3. 270.

We are told a little further on, that a witness commits a crime in five ways, one of which is, If he discovers the truth which he ought to conceal. Who would not have expected the very converse of this proposition?—If he conceals the truth which he ought to discover? But what wonder that barefaced lying should be taught and justified, in courts where barefaced bribery is approved? Two extracts on this head, as it is not immediately connected with our subject, shall suffice.

'May a judge take money to despatch the cause of one man before another? Layman says that, looking to natural right, he does not dare to condemn it, because the new obligation which he undertakes is worth pay-

ment. The Salamanca doctors, however, more truly say the contrary, because a judge is bound on grounds of justice to be speedy in despatching the causes of all who have an equal right to despatch; unless he should take any extraordinary trouble which he was not bound by his office to take.'—5. 3. 196.

'Does a man commit a sin who offers bribes to a judge, or to his ministers? *Distingue*. If he give without good reason, he commits sin by co-operating in an unlawful receiving, but not if he gives with a reason, namely, to free himself from annoyance which he does not deserve: but he must take care that there is a probable risk of his otherwise suffering manifest injustice; for then it is not a case of corrupting another, but of taking care that his own rights are awarded to himself. So in common, Sanchez, Lugo, Molina, Antony of Cordova, Palao, and the Salamanca doctors, against Ledesma. Nor are the prohibitory laws any objection; for what the laws intend is to provide against men giving money, and so corrupting the judges by bribes, not to prevent them from getting a just sentence.'—5. 3. 212.

Is it strange that the courts of justice are what they are in Spain, in Rome, in Naples? Look at the case of witnesses. The distinction between legitimate and non-legitimate interrogation is enough to destroy all hopes of arriving at the truth. If a man is anxious to conceal the truth, he has only to say to himself that the judge is questioning illegitimately, and then he has no obligation to speak the truth. Even when that door is closed, and he acknowledges the legitimacy of the interrogation, he is still allowed to settle in his own mind whether the fact which he has witnessed was to the individual agent a sin; and if he determines that it was not, he may deny that it was done at all. Then, if he acknowledges that it is a sin, he must ask himself if any one else knows of it; and if it is known to himself alone, *he is bound to lie*, and say that he does *not* know it, or even *that the culprit has not done it*. And when, at last, he is bid to tell the truth, it is not on the grounds of the sacredness of truthfulness, but on the principle into which Rome resolves every duty—obedience to positive precept. Look again at the litigants; they may bribe almost at pleasure, but must take care (by a direction of the intention, we presume) to be not corrupting the judge, but only getting their own rights. And look at the judge; he may without scruple receive bribes for despatching causes, according to the laxer opinion (which, however, is quite sufficient to justify him in acting), in virtue of the new obligation into which he has entered—according to the stricter view, on account of any special trouble that he may take. Can degradation be lower? Can rottenness be more loathsome? And this is morality!

We feel that our readers have seen sufficient to be assured that Rome and her casuists have cut away every tie of obligation contracted by assertion, promises, vows, and oaths; that they have done away with all confidence that we could put in the word of their genuine disciples, under whatever sanctions

guaranteed; and that, so far as they are able, they reduce society to its elements, where every man's hand is against his neighbour, and each person looks out for a snare concealed behind the specious acts and words of every other.

The line of defence assumed by Roman doctors is uniformly the same. Each man has a right, they say, to act upon the defensive; he has a right to keep guard over the knowledge which he has, in the same way that he may defend his goods; and, as for there being any deceit in the matter—why, soldiers use stratagems in war, and opponents use feints in fencing.¹

We have already pointed out that the use of equivocation and mental restriction is allowed aggressively, as well as on the defensive, but we will pass that by, and examine this argument on its own grounds as chosen by our opponents. It will be seen that there are two things asserted. The first is, that we may keep guard over our knowledge, and not necessarily give it up to every one who asks questions of us. This is no doubt true, *provided that we use no unjustifiable means for doing so*, in the same way that we may defend our goods, not by every means good or bad, *but only by righteous means*. The second thing asserted is, that all kinds of equivocation and non-pure mental restriction are justifiable means, and this is argued for on the grounds that similar measures are taken in war, and its imitation, fencing.

But mark what this implies. No less than that we are living under the curse of Ishmael—that we are always at war with every one about us—that we are fencing—that we look upon our brother-Christians and countrymen as enemies, whom, as in the battle-field or in the gymnastic-room, (where such dealings are expected, and therefore free from culpability,) we may fairly take in by feints, and stratagems, and amphibologies. We are thankful to know that Englishmen do not regard one another in this light; but wherever this state of society does exist, there the natural consequence is lying. In several continental countries this is so. In Spain, for example, the mere fact of asking the simplest question does impose upon the speaker the character of an aggressor and assailant. We have jogged along the roads of Spain, talking amicably and frankly with a chance passenger. Presently, by way of conversation, we have asked a question,

¹ This is the traditional line of defence, handed down from times past to the present day. Thus in Parsons' *Treatise tending towards Mitigation* we find,—
'And here I ask Thomas Morton further what he will say to all the stratagems in war, for so much as there may be as well lying in facts as in words, according as our S. Thomas and other divines do hold? How will T. M. excuse their stratagems, that is to say, policies, deceits, and dissimulations of enemies in wars, from lies? Will he condemn all such stratagems as sinful? Why, then, do the Protestant captains and leaders use them?'—P. 290.

Donde se va? Immediately there has fallen a cloud of suspicion on the traveller's face: he has curtly replied with the name of some place far from his present direction, and then the conversation has ended; he has pushed on or dropped behind, and would have no more to say. Indeed, it is one of the arts of the guides, by which a good guide is known from an indifferent one, to be ready with a plausible lie in regard to the direction of his master's journey, when questions are asked at the *posadas*. The reason of this is, that men feel at war with one another. And so in Italy, lying is taught on the grounds that the inquirer must be dealt with by stratagem. The following anecdote is given in a note to the fourth chapter of *Cases of Conscience*:—

'The Abbate Bricconi was tutor to the son of an English Roman Catholic gentleman of the old school. One day in Rome, explaining the liberty of simulation, he said, "Suppose I am going to Naples, but do not wish it to be known where I am going, and my interrogator has no right to question me, I answer, I am going to Genoa." "*Ma Signor Abbate,*" said the noble English boy, but half a Papist, "*mi pare questo sarebbe una bugia.*" He was called an *impertinente*, and given a good penance.'—P. 77.

It may be that if Liguorian morality spread, (and let us recollect that it is the morality which is taught in every Romish confessional in England,) this happy state of war and fencing may be produced here, and then, having generated the evil, Rome's theologians will justify their morality by its existence. How thankful ought we not to be at the prospect of first being reduced from robust health to the diseased state of Naples and Spain, and then of being supplied with a cup of Liguori's mixture to make us better! By a new application of the Homœopathic system, immorality must be called in to cure the vice which it will itself have caused.

But to return to our text-book. At least it will be thought that sufficient care has been taken for allowing men to lie with a safe conscience, and to break faith without any troublesome scruples, by means of the Equivocations, Mental Restrictions, Conditions, Distinctions, Probable Opinions, and other scaffolding, which we have seen provided for them. But this is only the beginning. There may be tender consciences, over which the force of truth may yet hold some sway, and still further provision must be made for their necessities. Accordingly there remain Dispensations, Irritations, Commutations, Relaxations, Cessations, and Remissions. Now, at least, we are safe—now we are quite secure against having to keep our promises, to perform our vows, or to fulfil our oaths.

'In how many ways can the obligation of a vow be removed? In two ways:—1. Without the intervention of any one's authority, and that either by the change of matter, (as if the matter had been before good and became

bad, or indifferent, or an obstacle to a greater good, owing to a new circumstance, or prohibition, or absolutely or morally impossible,) or by the cessation of the condition on which it depended. 2. By the intervention of human authority, and that in three ways, by Irritation, Commutation, and Dispensation. This is the common opinion. Hence you may conclude, that, although it is by your own fault that the matter has become impossible, useless, &c., yet, since it has become so, the obligation ceases, and it is enough to be sorry for your fault.'—4. 3. 225.

'Dispensation is the absolute doing away with the obligation of a vow, and is made in the name of God. Good reason is required for its validity, such as,—1. The good of the Church, or the common welfare of the republic, and even of a family, or the greater advantage of the man who has vowed. 2. A notable difficulty in observing the vow. 3. Imperfection of act, or levity, or easiness from which the vow proceeded.'—4. 3. 250.

'A sufficient cause for dispensation is danger of transgression on account of the particular indisposition of the person who has made the vow, or on account of the common frailty of man. Great difficulty in the execution is also a sufficient reason, not only if the difficulty was unforeseen, as Sanchez, Palao, and Suarez say, but also if it was foreseen, as the Salamanca doctors think with Leander and Tamburini.... It is a sufficient reason, too, if the man under the vow is troubled with great scruples. Besides, even if there is no danger of transgression, and no great difficulty in the execution, still it is a sufficient reason if the vow was made immaturity, with too great facility, with imperfect consideration, or without perfect liberty.'—4. 2. 252.

'Those who can dispense are the following:—1. The Pope, with respect to all the faithful. 2. A Bishop, with respect to those under him, but not a parish priest. 3. Regular Prelates, who are exempt, in respect to their monks and novices. . . . By privilege from the Pope, the confessors of the Mendicant Orders, subject to the permission and regulation of their superior.'—4. 2. 256.

'A Prelate seeing, and not contradicting when he easily can, seems to give a dispensation, says Sa.'—4. 2. 254.

'How can the obligation of oaths be taken away by means of irritation, dispensation, commutation, or remission? . . . If an oath cannot be kept without common damage, or be about a contract forbidden by law, in truth such oaths do not require relaxation, as they are null in themselves. But suppose they *are* valid, they can be relaxed by the Church, and under the name of the Church come not only the Pontiff, but also Bishops, Chapters while Sees are vacant, and others with Episcopal jurisdiction, and also confessors with a delegated faculty of dispensing in vows, for they can also relax oaths of this kind.'—4. 2. 192.

Illustrations always make us realize abstract propositions in a way which we otherwise find difficult. We will, therefore, take a supposed case, and see how these principles would work. Let us suppose that some hundred gentlemen have been admitted to certain privileges on the condition of binding themselves by oath to act in a particular way in connexion with a certain subject. Let us further suppose, by way of clearness, that such privileges were, sitting and legislating in the Houses of Parliament, and that the condition which they have sworn to observe was, that they should do nothing to the detriment of the Established Church of England and Ireland. Having pic-

tured such a case to ourselves, let us also suppose the same gentlemen, who have taken this imaginary oath, to be zealous and earnest persecutors of the said Established Church in parliament and out of parliament; let us suppose them to be straining every nerve for its overthrow and utter destruction. Let us go so far as to conceive by a stretch of imagination that such language as the following might be found in their mouths:—‘Enormous abuse,’—‘Incubus on the country,’—‘Hideous injustice,’—‘The levelling of which will alone give peace to Ireland,’—and other phrases of a similar nature. Having made these imaginary suppositions, let us further suppose that these gentlemen were called upon before the bar of their own consciences, or the outraged public opinion of their fellow-countrymen, to justify their actions and their words, and to show how they were in accordance with the solemn oaths which they had sworn. Would S. Alfonso de’ Liguori’s principles of Morality, sanctioned as they are in the fullest manner by an authority invested with the halo of infallibility, in which these gentlemen are bound to believe,—would the principles which we have been drawing out be such as they might shelter themselves under in their hour of trial? Let us draw up the curtain, and we may have the following scene:—

Judge, loquitur.—‘Gentlemen, you are charged with a want of good faith, and you must sit down under this imputation, unless you can free yourselves from it by appealing to the rules laid down in S. Alfonso’s “Moral Theology,” which I am bound to hold sacred and sufficient to justify you, provided you can show that your conduct has been in accordance with them.’

Culprit 1.—‘I used a word which would bear two meanings.’ Acquitted.—4. 151.

Culprit 2.—‘I used a sentence which would bear two meanings.’ Acquitted.—4. 151.

Culprit 3.—‘In replying to the question put to me, I used the formula, *I say, No*, and confirmed it with an oath, meaning that I swore that I was making use of the word *No*.’ Acquitted.—4. 151.

Culprit 4.—‘I used non-pure mental restriction.’—*Judge.* ‘Are you sure that it was not pure mental restriction, which is a thing not allowable?’ ‘Quite. Indeed, my well-known abhorrence of the Establishment would in itself be a sufficient circumstance from which a prudent man might gather that I did not intend what I swore, (4. 643;) but, to make sure, I whispered something which no one overheard so as to understand.’ (4. 168.) Acquitted.—4. 151.

Culprit 5.—‘I took no oath at all: I only swore externally, and therefore I took no oath, I joked. *Ἡ γλῶσσ’ ὁμώμοχ’, ἡ δὲ φῆν ἀνώματος.*’ Acquitted.—4. 171.

Culprit 6.—‘I took no oath: I only said *I swear*, and this was no oath because no question preceded it.’ Acquitted.—4. 166.

Culprit 7.—‘I took no oath: I only said, *I declare with an oath*, and that is no oath, for the same reason.’ Acquitted.—4. 166.

Culprit 8.—‘I took no oath: for from common usage the material
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writing or speaking does not seem to be counted a true oath.' Acquitted.—4. 166.

Culprit 9.—'I did swear, though falsely: but I had a good reason for it, lest I, a worthy person, should be rejected.' Acquitted.—4. 166.

Culprit 10.—'I swore without the intention of swearing, and that is only a venial sin.' Acquitted.—4. 172.

Culprit 11.—'I swore intending to swear, but not intending to bind myself, and that is only a venial sin.' Acquitted.—4. 172.

Culprit 12.—'I conscientiously object to the oath, and therefore am under no obligation from it. An oath cannot be the bond of iniquity.' Acquitted.—4. 176.

Culprit 13.—'I consider it a useless oath, and therefore I am under no obligation from it. An oath cannot be a bond of vain and idle things to which God does not wish us to be bound.' Acquitted.—4. 176.

Culprit 14.—'I think it to be about an indifferent matter, and therefore I am not bound by it.' Acquitted.—4. 176.

Culprit 15.—'I am not bound by the oath, because the greater part of my colleagues do not act upon it.' Acquitted.—4. 180.

Culprit 16.—'I hold the oath to be obsolete, and therefore am free from the obligation of observing it.' Acquitted.—4. 180.

Culprit 17.—'I considered the object to which I swore good at the time, but now I think that circumstances have made it unlawful.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 18.—'I considered the object to which I swore good at the time, but I think that it has now become idle.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 19.—'I think that it has become a hindrance to a greater good.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 20.—'I consider that it is better that it should be omitted than fulfilled.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 21.—'I swore, but I have changed my oath into a work clearly better and more pleasing to God.'—*Judge.* 'But had you not sworn something to the good of others? God does not wish man defrauded.'—

Culprit. 'No, it was to the harm of others, not their good.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 22.—'I swore, but the state of the case has become notably changed, and therefore I am not bound to keep my oath.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 23.—'The end proposed by the oath was doubtless the advantage of religion and of the commonwealth; now I think that the observance of the oath has become useless for this end, and therefore I am not bound by it.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 24.—'I took the oath, but I can't keep it.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 25.—'Nature and the Doctors teach that every oath is taken under this condition, "Saving the rights of my Superior." The Pope being my Superior, I am bound to save his rights, and so far as the oath interferes with his rights it must give way.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 26.—'I should lose my character in Ireland if I kept it.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 27.—'I should lose my seat, and that would be grave damage.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 28.—'The oath was in illicit matter, and therefore, *ipso facto*, null.' Acquitted.—4. 644.

Culprit 29.—'The oath cannot be kept without common detriment.' Acquitted.—4. 192.

Culprit 30.—'I have received a dispensation.'—*Judge.* 'On what grounds was the dispensation granted?'—*Culprit.* 'On the grounds that the good

of the Church, and consequently of the commonwealth, was against my keeping the oath.' Acquitted.—4. 192.

Who shall bind Proteus? Who shall tie to truth and fair dealing men who can have recourse to Rome's casuistry as often as their consciences become uneasy?

But, for purposes of illustration, we need not have recourse to cases which may be considered imaginary. The 'Treatise of Equivocation,' which we have placed at the head of our article, supplies us with the same principles; and the events connected with it tell us how those principles were applied by their authors and defenders. This treatise, published from a MS. in the Bodleian two years ago, has scarcely attracted so much attention as it deserves, regarded as a literary and historical document, apart from its controversial bearings. It was well known that such a treatise had existed, and that it was the authorized manual, employed, not without provocation, by the missionary priests and others in England, during the latter part of the reign of Elizabeth. It had been produced by Sir Edward Coke, in the trial of Garnet and the other conspirators in 1604. 'And here,' says the authorized 'Report of the Proceedings,' 'was shown a book, written not long before the queen's death, at what time Thomas Winter was employed into Spain, entitled *A Treatise of Equivocation*, which book being seen and allowed by Garnet, the superior of the Jesuits, and Blackwell, the arch-priest of England, in the beginning thereof Garnet with his own hand put out these words in the title, of *Equivocation*, and made it thus, *A Treatise against Lying and Fraudulent Dissimulation*, whereas, in deed and truth, it makes for both; *Speciosaque nomina culpæ Imponis Garnette tuæ*. And in the end thereof Blackwell besprinkles it with his blessing, saying, "Tractatus iste valde doctus et vere pius et Catholicus est. Certe S. Scripturarum, Patrum, Doctorum, Scholasticorum, Canonistarum, et optimarum rationum præsiidiis planissimè firmat æquitatem æquivocationis. Ideoque dignissimus est qui typis propagetur ad consolationem afflictorum Catholicorum et omnium piorum instructionem." Morton, Bishop of Durham, wrote a systematic reply to it in 1606, in his *Full Satisfaction*. Dr. Robert Abbott, in his *Antilogia*, in 1613, and Henry Mason, in his *New Art of Lying*, in 1624, discussed its principles. Parsons, in his *Treatise tending to Mitigation*, in 1607, spoke of it as 'a certain Catholicke manuscript treatise, made in defence of Equivocation, and intercepted by them:' and Casaubon gave an account of it in his *Letter to Fronto Ducæus*. But where was the Treatise itself, which had once made such a stir in the world? Nobody knew, and it was generally

supposed to be lost. A hue and cry was raised for it by an anonymous inquirer in *Notes and Queries*; and, near the end of the year 1850, it was found in the Bodleian Library among the Laudian Miscellaneous MSS. The way in which it got there is curious. The occasion on which it was first made *publici juris* is thus recorded by Sir Edward Coke, in a manuscript note on the first leaf of the Treatise. 'This book, containing sixty-one pages, I found in a chamber in the Inner Temple, wherein Sir Thomas Tresham used to lie, and which he obtained for his two younger sons. This 5. of December, 1605. Edw. Coke. *Os quod mentitur occidit animam.*' After having been produced at the trial, as mentioned above, it was laid up in the State Paper Office. In 1612, it was borrowed from thence by Archbishop Abbott, and lent by him to his brother, the Regius Professor of Divinity in Oxford, who was at that time composing his *Antilogia versus Apologiam Andrew Endæmon-Joannis pro Henrico Garneto*. A memorandum of the State Paper Office, which has been accidentally preserved, notices that the Archbishop, in restoring the other papers which had been delivered to him, had omitted to send back the Treatise. Thus it came into Laud's possession, when he succeeded Abbott at Lambeth, and was by him given with other papers to the Bodleian Library.

The author of the work is unknown. Abbott, in the polite language of the controversy of his day, styled him quietly, 'Sacerdos quidam Sathanæ.' Casaubon says that it was written 'ab eruditiss Pontificiis in hoc regno.' It is corrected for the press by Garnet, approved by Blackwell, and defended by its apologists, not on the plea of the exigency of the times,—this is very noticeable,—not on the plea of the exigency of the times, but on account of the righteous nature of the doctrine which it propounds.

The object of the book is twofold: first, to justify Southwell in having instructed a witness that she might conscientiously affirm on oath, in a court of justice, that she had not seen him in Bellamy's house, although she had been in the constant habit of meeting him there, provided that, at the time of taking the oath *I have not seen him*, she said to herself, *so as to tell you of it*; and secondly, to provide an authorized system for evading the truth, without being guilty of what the Church of Rome considers to be a lie.

The first chapter lays down the principle, that an oath ought to fulfil three conditions to be a lawful oath: it must be sworn in truth, in justice, and judgment.¹ The premise seems far enough away from the conclusion which is to be reached; but the

¹ Jer. iv. 2.

space is very quickly bridged over. It is clear that, if an assertion is true, the same assertion confirmed by an oath is likewise true: if, therefore, there is no deficiency of truth in the assertion, *I have not seen him*, with the aside, *so as to tell you*, when nevertheless I have seen him,—in that case, the oath confirming that assertion is not wanting in truth. The point, of course, is to prove that such an *assertion* is truthful. For this end propositions are divided into four kinds:—

* The first is a mental proposition, only conceived in the mynde, and not uttered by any external signification. . . The second is a vocal proposition, as when I utter these words with my mouth. The third is a written proposition, as if I should set down the same in wryting. The last of all is a mixt proposition, when we mingle some of these propositions, or parts of them, together; as in our purpose when, being demanded whether John at Style be in such place, I, knowing that he is there indeed, do say nevertheless, “I know not,” reserving or understanding within myself these other words, “to the end for to tell you.” Here is a mixt proposition containing all this—“I know not to the end for to tell you.” And yet part of it is expressed, part reserved in the mynde. Now, unto all these propositions it is common that then they are trewe when they are conformable to the thing itself; that is, when they so affirm or deny as the matter itself in very deed doth stand. Whereof we inferre that this last sort of proposition, which partly consisteth in voyce, and partly is reserved in the mynde, is then to be adjudged trewe, not when that part only which is expressed, or the other only which is reserved, is trewe, but when both together do contain a truth.—P. 8.

We will not pause to point out the puerile confusion here exhibited between material truth and moral truthfulness. Our object is rather to show the contents of the book, than to undertake so superfluous a task as that of refuting it. The third chapter consists of a ‘metaphysical consideration,’ proving that such mixed propositions are true propositions, and that ‘their veritye is not to be judged according to that which is uttered in words severally, but according to the words and some other thing understood or reserved.’ The fourth is an appeal to authority. David used mixed propositions; for he said that the wicked should not rise again in the judgment, which is ‘a false and heretical proposition,’ unless he reserved something in his mind. Our Saviour used them; for He said that whatsoever He had heard from his Father, He had made known to His disciples; and that whatsoever two faithful persons should ask, it should be done; and that He was not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel; and that Jairus’ daughter was not dead, but asleep; and that His disciples could not go where He was going; and that the Son knew not the day of judgment; and that He was not going up to the feast. S. Paul used them; for he said that no man had seen or could see God; and yet ‘Moses, as most holy fathers do affirme, and our blessed Ladye,

'as most schoolmen hold, and S. Paul hymself before that time, 'saw the very essence of God.'

This is quite enough for the first purpose which the Treatise was to serve; and so, in the three last chapters, we are brought triumphantly to the conclusion, that such an oath as that which Southwell taught Miss Bellamy to take, is wanting neither in truth, nor in justice, nor in judgment. It is not wanting in truth; for 'an oath of an equivocal proposition is a trewe oath, 'because of the truth of the proposition alone—because of the 'doctrine of the fathers—because it skylleth not that the pro- 'position is conceived as false—because in every oath there is 'understood this condition, that I will do so far as it is lawful— 'and because, in not meaning to perform the oath in the imme- 'diate sense of the judge, I have no contrary meaning to the 'principal meaning and intention which he hath, *or should have.*' It is not wanting in justice; for 'when the partye which is ex- 'amined is asked that particular question, *Was he there?* what 'hyndereth that he may not say *No?* Not his oath; for that 'falleth not upon that question, being an unlawful question. 'Then it is only the lye; and being hurtful to nobodye, the 'most that these canonistes can make of it is but an officious 'lye, which is but a small veniall synne, and rather to be in- 'curred than the other, of prejudicing so highly our neighbour. 'And yet, if he did equivocate, meaning *No, to tell you*, then 'was it no lye at all, and it was but an equivocation not sworn; 'for the oath, as I said, did not nor could fall upon that question: 'so that it is an equivocation very far from perjury.' It is not wanting in judgment,—that is, it may be taken without rash- ness or indiscretion; for 'so long as there is, in the sense of that which I swear, veritye and justice,'—which has just been proved,—'I may without all rashness swear in this manner, so 'ofte as, having the fear of God before my eyes, I probably 'repute that either my own just profit, or of my neighbour, or 'the honour of God, doth so require.' The conclusion is as follows:—

'So that all allow this speech, *I will answere whatsoever I knowe*, meaning, *for to tell you*. If they will not admit that limitation, then, according to Bannez, they are bound to understand it, notwithstanding, in all his answeres. But, for further direction of the partye examined, if the oath be ministered generally, let hym admit the oath with this intention, that he will answere directly and truly, and (if so they urge hym) without all equivocation, so far as he is assured, without all doubt or scruple that he may or is bound. And if they make hym swear that he hath no private intention, or secret meaning, let hym swear it also with that very same secret understanding, that he hath no such meaning—to tell them. And with this general meaning at the beginning, when he took the oath, let hym not doubt but he shall be safe from all perjury, although he answer truly to nothing, because in these cases he is bound to answer directly to nothing. Yet, for

to save himself from lying, (which, notwithstanding, were but a very veniall synne in these matters, and of far less account than, perhaps, many other synnes which he hourly committeth,) let hym use some reasonable kynds of equivocation, as he may easily learn, of the wiser sort; that is, let hym speake some words which may satisfye the hearers, and, with some other words which he conceiveth, may make a trewe sense. And let hym assure hymself, that by no way he can sinne more heinously in these matters than to disclose that which is indeed, whether he have sworn it or no. But if he had no intention of equivocation, at the first when he took the oath, yet let hym persuade hymself, nevertheless, that he is not bound by his oath to do anything which becometh not an honest man; and so, if he equivocate in the particular question, he synneth not at all. If he tell plain lyes, without any true sense reserved, those do not so much offend God with their falsitye, as He is wont to reward such fidelitey, as we read in the midwives of Egypt, and in that honest harlot, if so we may call her. Rahab, to whom God hymself showed special favours. Fynally, if he be urged to swear the truth of some particular matter, let hym intend to tell the truth—so far as he is bound. If to do any particular unlawful matter, if it be such a thing as may be well interpreted, and not to tend to any scandal or dishonour of God, let hym swear it with equivocation, but not meaning to do it. If it be scandalous, or manifestly contrary to Christian duty, he must needs refuse it, as hath been declared before.—P. 103.

Thus Southwell's good faith is vindicated, as well as 'the practice which was common in all Christian courts, and in all politicke governments, before these accusers or their great-grandfather Luther was born, when the world was governed with as great piety, justice, and learning, as these scrupulous persons will ever establish in this realm, though they use never so great diligence.' The Treatise would not, however, be complete in its character of a manual, if it contained no more than this. There are other ways, besides this method of mental restriction, (here called equivocation,) 'whereby, without a lye, a trewth may be covered;' and these must be enumerated. The first of these answers to Liguori's first form of Amphibology, 'where a word hath many significations, and we understand it in one sense which is trewe, although the hearer conceive the other which is false. . . . The like whereunto were, if one should be asked whether such a stranger lodgeth in my house, and I should answer, "He lyeth not at my house," meaning that he doth not tell a lye there, although he lodge there.'¹ To the second we have no objection to make, if it is used discreetly, 'when unto one question may be given many answers; we may yeelde one, and conceale the other.' The third corresponds with Liguori's second form of Amphibology, where 'the whole sentence which we pronounce, or some word thereof, or the manner of poynting and dividing the sentences, may be

¹ P. 49. A similar case is given in p. 29. 'If I be asked whether such a one be in my house, who is there indeed, I may answer in Latin, *Non est hic*, meaning that he eateth not there, for so doth *est* signifye.'

'ambiguous, and we may speak it in one sense trewe for our advantage.' Thus, 'it was not reprehensible, in one which had just cause, to say his father's name was Peter or Paul,' because the Apostles are the spiritual fathers of the worlde;' and, 'so if one should say to a theife, *Juro tibi numeraturum me 200 aureos*, the word *tibi* may be joyned with *juro*, or with *numeraturum*. In like manner a man may cunningly alter the pronounciation, as if, according to the Italian manner of pronounciation, a man should say *tibi uro* for *tibi juro*, which two examples Bellarmine bringeth in his Dictates, 2. 2. q. 89. ar. 7. dub. 2., as also before (adds Garnet) q. 69. ar. 2. dub. 2.'

'To these three ways of concealing a trewth by words, if we add the other of which we spoke before,—that is, when we utter certain words which of themselves may engender a false conceit in the mynde of the hearers, and yet, with somewhat which we understand and reserve in our myndes, maketh a trewe proposition,¹—then shall we have four ways how to conceal a trewth without making a lye.'—P. 52.

And what effect had these doctrines on the moral conduct of their promulgators and recipients? Take the case of Garnet himself. Casaubon recounts how he acted upon his principles at the time of his own trial. During his imprisonment, he had been in the constant habit of holding communication with Hall or Oldcorne, who was confined in an adjoining chamber. The words which passed between them were overheard, and many facts were in this method elicited. After a time, Garnet was charged before the Lords of the Council with having held these conferences. He put a bold face on the matter; and, although warned not to equivocate, denied it upon his soul, 'reiterating his denial,' as the Earl of Salisbury said, 'with so many detestable execrations, as it wounded the hearts of the Lords to hear.' It was told him that Oldcorne had confessed the fact, upon which the wretched man 'cried the Lords' pardon, and said he had offended, *if equivocation did not help him*.' Again, take the case of Francis Tresham, to whom this identical Treatise which is now in the Bodleian belonged. During his examination, he had admitted Garnet's complicity in the mission of Winter to Spain. A few hours before his death he wrote a paper, and signed it with his name, declaring that he had made his previous statement only to avoid ill-usage; and 'that, upon his salvation, it was more

¹ Other examples of this mental reservation, besides those already given, are the following:—'*Non feci*, I did not,' understanding '*ut dicam tibi*, that I may or ought to tell you;' or, 'I did it not, yesterday.' '*Non habeo*, I have it not,' understanding, 'for to give you.' '*Dabo*, I will give you an hundred pounds,' understanding, 'if I fynd it in Cheapside.' P. 31.

'than he knew that Garnet was privy to the sending of Thomas 'Winter into Spain;' and 'that he had not seen Garnet for sixteen years before, nor never had letter nor message from him.' This was wholly false, as all but Liguorians and their predecessors count falsehood. Garnet acknowledged his constant intercourse with him; and on being asked by Lord Salisbury 'what interpretation he made of the testamental protestation of 'Tresham,' replied, 'It may be, my Lord, he meant to equivocate.' 'This,' says Sir Edward Coke, in a letter to Lord Salisbury, 'is the fruit of equivocation, the book whereof we 'found in Tresham's desk—to affirm manifest falsehoods upon 'his salvation, *in ipso articulo mortis*. It is true that no man 'may judge in this case, for *intra pontem et fontem*, he might 'find grace; but it is the most fearful example that I ever 'knew.'¹

The exhumation of this Treatise gives an opportunity of examining an interesting question,—how far the Theory of Truthfulness, taught by Rome at the beginning of the seventeenth century, is the same as that which she teaches in the nineteenth. Our extracts from S. Alfonso de' Liguori will have shown that, in spirit, they are identically the same. In form they differ, but only to this extent. There is a greater boldness and shamelessness two centuries ago; a greater consciousness that all the world is not prepared to accept such principles in their nakedness now. There is a *naïveté* and a heartiness then, which is exchanged for doggedness of assertion now. But more than this. In the interval between the publication of the 'Treatise of Equivocation' and the 'Theologia Moralis,' there lived Innocent XI. Innocent XI. of the house of Odescalchi, was a Pope meek and mild in manner, but firm and high in purpose. In his opposition to Louis XIVth's encroachments on the spiritual power, he found himself fighting side by side with the Bishop of Pamiers and others of the Jansenist party. A man of uncompromising and inflexible integrity in his private life, he naturally leant towards the Jansenist codes of morality, and had little sympathy with the system which, twenty years before he had been raised to the pontificate, Pascal had held up to scorn and indignation. Accordingly he made short work with many a darling proposition, which had been enshrined in such books as are represented by Herman Busembaum's *Marrow of Moral Theology*, and other works of 'the Society.' Regardless of the long line of logical argument on which they rested, regardless of the ingenuity and authority of their supporters, Innocent acted

¹ State Paper Office, Criminal Trials, vol. ii. p. 102. Quoted in preface to 'Treatise of Equivocation.'

on the instincts of a human heart, and unsparingly condemned propositions as soon as they touched upon practice, without venturing—or deigning—to grapple with the subtle train of dialectic on which they were speculatively founded. Accordingly, on the subject of Mental Reservation, we find the three following propositions ‘condemned by Innocent XI.:’—

‘I. If anyone, either alone or in the presence of others, either asked or of his free will, either for amusement or for any other reason, swears that he has not done something which he really has done, meaning in his own mind something else which he did not do, or another way from that in which it was done, or any other added circumstance which is true, he in fact tells no lie, and is not perjured.

‘II. There is good reason for a man’s using these amphibologies, as often as it is necessary or useful, to protect himself, or his honour, or his property, or in order to perform any kind of virtuous act, so that the concealment of the truth is then counted expedient and desirable.

‘III. Whoever has been promoted to a magistracy or public office by means of a recommendation, or by bribery, may take the oath required by the king’s mandate, with mental restriction, without respecting the intention with which it is exacted, because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime.’¹

It must have been a hard thing for the under-workers to bear, when the master-builder came in and struck down the crowning-stone, for the support of which they had erected their work. However, *ingenium res adversæ nudare solent*. ‘Il Papa bianco’ is no match for ‘Il Papa nero;’ and Jansenism has always been worsted in its conflicts with Jesuitism. The Moral-Theologians set to work, and it soon appeared that Innocent XI. might have spared his pains: he only gave one triumph more to casuistical ingenuity.

Given the problem, how to retain a certain practice, and at the same time to pay outward respect to a Papal decree forbidding it, the method to be adopted is the following:—Take the thing condemned, and divide it into two species, distinguished from each other by a distinction without a difference: assume that the Papal condemnation applies to either one of these species, but not to the other: range everything which you wish to do under the uncondemned head, whatever you have no temptation towards under the other: the result will be the conclusion desired. Thus, the Pope condemned Mental Restriction: immediately Mental Restriction is divided into two kinds,—Pure Mental Restriction, and Non-pure Mental Restriction. There is no moral difference between them; but the Papal condemnation is declared to be confined to the former, and so the old practice goes on as securely and merrily as ever. Morally speaking, the present system, dogmatically enunciated, differs

¹ Quoted in Theol. Mor. 4. 152.

in no essential point from that of Garnet, Tresham, and Blackwell.¹

Very different is the doctrine of S. Augustine, to whose authority, as well as to the example of our Lord, we have seen that S. Alfonso had the hardihood to appeal. We will now offer our readers a specimen of the teaching of the great Doctor of Hippo on this point. It may be that Liguori will have done his cause little good by appealing to the uncompromising Moralist of the Early Church. He may, perhaps, serve to point out that Rome admits of development in morals as well as in doctrine: that as what was once rejected as false is accepted as true after the decree of a Pope; so what was rejected as immorality by S. Augustine has been made moral by the decision of the casuists. 'How do you manage,' asks Pascal, 'when the Fathers of the Church happen to differ from any of your casuists?' 'The Fathers,' is the reply, 'were good enough for the morality of their own times, but they lived too far back for that of the present age, which is no longer regulated by them but by the modern casuists. . . . At their advent S. Augustine, S. Chrysostom, S. Ambrose, S. Jerome, and all the rest, so far as morals are concerned, disappeared from the stage.'

The treatise of S. Augustine, to which reference was made is that which he wrote against Lying. We will now shortly draw out the principles there laid down. We shall feel like a man who has left behind him the fogs and malaria of a reeking morass, and risen to the healthy atmosphere of mountain scenery. S. Augustine has written two books on the subject of Lying, and has many passages on the same subject interspersed amidst his voluminous writings. It is observable that he no-

¹ This general method of dealing with condemnations is well illustrated in the case of clerical hunting. The steps are as follows:—1. Clerical hunting is forbidden in general terms. 2. The Doctors understand in common, that this prohibition applies only to clamorous hunting, which takes place with a noise. 3. Neither does it apply to all clamorous hunting with a noise, but only to frequent clamorous hunting with a noise. 4. Neither does it apply to all frequent clamorous hunting with a noise, but only to frequent clamorous hunting with a noise, which is scandalous or very expensive. 5. Sporer, Molina, Cajetan, and Sa, say that merely for hunting, without any adjunct, a clergyman is not easily to be condemned of mortal sin. 6. Layman, Lessius, Sa, Valentia, &c. think that such hunting may be altogether blameless, if it is rare and moderate, or from necessity or for exercise. 7. A modern author, who has written a book called "Instructions for New Confessors," says that non-clamorous hunting for the sake of honest recreation is perfectly allowable, and that, canonically, clamorous hunting is not, according to the more common opinion, a mortal sin, except with the adjuncts of contempt or contumacy. Monks are forbidden clamorous hunting more strictly. They are only allowed, without grave sin, to go out two or three times a-year, in case they can do so without giving scandal, or making a great noise.' (Theol. Mor. 4. 606. Hom. Ap. 10. 72.)

where makes a distinction between lying and equivocating. Equivocating is in his estimation lying, and the same definition includes Amphibology and Mendacity. 'The double heart' is, according to his teaching, the source of the accursed thing, and any man 'who has one thing in his mind, and enunciates another by words or any sorts of signs,' is guilty of the sin. Word-jugglery is a thing unknown to him, for the sage of Hippo was too wise to be deceived himself, and too honest to deceive others by such a transparent fallacy as that which lies at the bottom of the justification of equivocation. What is the use of a word? To represent to others a conception existing in our mind. If, then, the word which we use represents to the person to whom we speak, not the conception which we have in our mind, but something else, the assertion involved in the proposition containing that word is really two assertions. Thus, in the case given above, 'the heir (air) was present,' is of course two assertions, one materially true, the other materially false: again, the proposition, 'The moon is light,' contains two assertions, one materially true, viz. 'the moon is not obscured,' the other materially false, viz. 'the moon is deficient in weight,' and so every proposition with an ambiguous word contains really two assertions. Now the fact of these assertions being *materially* both true, or both false, or, as is generally the case, one true and the other false, is not of the slightest value with regard to the moral act of the person speaking. If we persist in making use of a proposition thus containing two assertions, one of which is true, viz. that which the words signify according to our acceptation, and the other false, viz. that which we know the words signify in our neighbour's acceptation, we are simply and absolutely guilty of moral falsehood. It is not to be wondered at, then, that in S. Augustine's writings no distinction is drawn between equivocating and lying, because equivocating and lying are morally identical.

The following passage will show how clearly his philosophic mind saw that moral truthfulness in the speaker did not depend upon the material truth or falsehood of the thing spoken. It is not directly upon equivocation, but upon a kindred kind of lying:—

'A man is deceived when he thinks what he says to be true, and it is really false: a man lies, when he thinks something to be false and says it as though true, *whether it be really true or false*. Mark the addition which I have made. Whether it be really true or false, yet, if a man thinks it false and asserts it as true, he lies, *for he is aiming to deceive*. What good is it to him, that it is true? He thinks it false, and says it as though it were true. True it is *in itself*, what he says, *in itself* it is true: *to him* it is false. What he is conscious of and what he speaks are not the same: he thinks within himself that one thing is true, and utters another as though

it were true. *His heart is double, not single, he does not bring out what he has there.* The double heart has long since been reproved, "Deceitful lips . . . dissemble in their double heart." Ps. xii. 2. What is deceit? When one thing is pretended and another done. Deceitful lips are when the heart is not single.'—*Serm.* 133, vol. v. p. 739.

In his books *De Mendacio* and *Contra Mendacium*, S. Augustine enumerates eight sorts of lying. Every one he rejects uncompromisingly. He denies that we may at any time be guilty of moral falsehood under whatever temptation we may be. The sin of the tongue in violating veracity is as great, he says, as the sin of the hand in theft or in murder, or, at least, we are no more justified in committing the former than the latter. He discusses all the examples of apparent falsehood in the Old and New Testaments, to which those who had a theory of lying appealed in his days as they do now, and concludes that 'for the examples which are brought forward out of the Holy Scriptures, either they are not falsehoods, but are supposed to be such by not being understood; or, if they are falsehoods, they are not proposed as objects of imitation.' He does not shrink from meeting difficult cases. He puts the very same case which we have before had with respect to S. Francis of Assisi. The bright thought of pointing down his sleeve had not, however, then arisen, and not even S. Augustine's sagacity could suggest it. Leaving that ingenious device to be recommended by saints of a more modern date, he solves the question in this fashion. Suppose that a man flies to a spot for refuge, and you see where he conceals himself; you are questioned about him: are you to lie? Your answer should be, 'I will not betray, and I will not lie.' But the question may be put in such a form that mere silence, or saying that you would not tell, might betray him, and you could avert his danger by a falsehood. Your answer should be, 'I know where he is, but I will never show the place;' for if you refuse to answer whether or no he is in a certain place, you will rouse certain suspicion with respect to that place; but by prefacing your answer by a confession of your knowledge of his whereabouts, you may turn away the attention of the inquirer from any particular spot, and make him press you to discover the object of his search; and if for your fidelity and humanity you have to endure suffering, your conduct will be not only free from blame but praiseworthy. This is the substance of his solution of the difficulty.¹

Now we can perfectly conceive the possibility of a case arising in which the two virtues of veracity and charity might so clash as to make it, at least, pardonable to deflect somewhat

¹ *De Mendacio*, cap. 13.

from the rigid observance of the former. S. Augustine does not admit such a possibility. 'You must not destroy your own soul,' he replies, 'for any supposed good of your neighbour, spiritual or temporal.' And yet it is to S. Augustine that Liguori refers in justification of his Equivocation and non-pure Mental Reservation, which, according to S. Augustine's definition, are merely forms of expressing a Lie.

In the same spirit S. Augustine is quoted in the Breviary as addressing the Blessed Virgin with the title of 'The only Hope of Sinners,' although the Sermon in which such words occur is known by every one of moderate attainments to be spurious, and is excluded from S. Augustine's works by the Benedictine editors. The value of truth, for truth's sake, is a thing apparently unappreciated and inappreciable by the Romish theological mind, in so far as it is Romish or distinct from Catholic. In one passage in this very treatise S. Augustine seems to have had before his eyes, by a prescient anticipation, the race of Salamanca doctors, Bonacinas, Escobars, and Liguoris. 'And there are among them learned men,' he cries, 'who actually lay down rules and fix limits when a man ought, and when he ought not, to commit perjury! O fountains of tears, where are ye? Where shall we go? Where shall we hide ourselves from the wrath of Truth, if we not only do not guard against lies, but dare over and above to teach perjury?' And here is a warning which may not be amiss at present in England.

'This, again, is a most miserable thing: even those who are just become our converts don't know how to believe us; for, on their suspecting that we are lying to them about the Catholic dogmas too, so as to be concealing something or other which we think true, you would be sure to say, "I acted in that way, then, in order to catch you;" but what will you answer when the other says, "And how am I to tell that you are not doing the same now in order not to be caught by me?" Will any one be persuaded that a man who will lie in order to catch another, will not lie in order not to be caught himself? See you not the tendency of this pestilential thing? It tends to make every one a justifiable object of suspicion to every one else, us to them, they to us, brother to brother. And so while the Faith is taught by falsehood, the result is rather that we have no faith in any one.'—*Cont. Mend.* cap. 4.

In short, we are reduced to that pleasant state of war and fencing on the plea of which Rome defends her Equivocation and non-pure Mental Reservation.

Thus we see that there is some difference between the *Theory of Truthfulness* held by Modern Rome and that held by the Ancient Church. We must now compare the teaching of England's Moral Theologians on the same point. Bishop Sanderson, whose works we are glad to learn are about to be reissued from the

University Press, has left behind him Lectures delivered in Oxford on the Obligation of Conscience, and on the Obligation of Oaths. We will make a few extracts from the latter of these works, in order to show the difference in principle between the teaching of a manly straightforward English mind, nurtured in the University of Oxford, in the bosom of England's Church, and that of a warped, however devout, Italian conscience, such as Liguori's, whom Rome has honoured with her beatification and canonization.

'An oath,' says Bishop Sanderson, 'is a religious act in which God is called to witness for the confirmation of some matter in doubt.' The main division of oaths is into assertory and promissory; the first having respect to what is present or past, the second to what is future. We take our extracts from an old translation of the year 1655, which professes to have been made by the special command of the late King Charles I. and revised by the royal hand.

'Whosoever sweareth, obligeth himself *ipso facto*, to manifest truth in that which he is about to say, whether it be in a matter past or present, by an assertory, or, in a future matter, by a promissory oath. And hitherto this obligation is alike common to both kinds, so that if in either of them the words of the party swearing do not agree with his mind, he becometh guilty of the breach of his duty, and thence also, by a necessary consequence, obnoxious unto punishment. But in the promissory oath, besides this obligation, which falls upon the conscience of the party swearing, and is common to it and the assertory *quatenus juramentum*, there is another further obligation proper and peculiar to it, *quatenus promissorium*, which falls upon the matter of the oath; by virtue whereof the promissory party swearing is bound not only in present to intend to do that which he sweareth, *that his words may agree with his mind*, but also to endeavour, for the future, as much as in him lieth, to fulfil that which he hath sworn, *that his deeds may agree with his words*; that is, he obligeth himself not only barely to promise that which he really intendeth, but also further obligeth himself to perform all that which he hath promised by oath.'—P. 30.

Again:—

'Whosoever bindeth himself to the performance of anything by so sacred a bond, is wholly bound by the religion of his oath, both in his mind seriously to intend, and as far as lieth in his power willingly to endeavour that he may faithfully perform whatsoever he hath promised, *without fraud, double-dealing, or simulation*. . . . As to the guilt of perjury, especially at the bar of conscience, it matters not much which way an oath be broken, openly or covertly, *that being a symptom of a profane, this, of a deceitful heart*; both which, *except fraud be worthy of a greater hatred*, are equally abominable unto the most holy God, who loveth the single in heart and truth in the inward man. . . . Men rest secure, absolving themselves from all guilt and fear of perjury, and think they have excellently well provided for themselves and their consciences, if, during the act of swearing, they can make any shift to defend themselves, either, as the Jesuits do, with some equivocation or mental reservation, or by forcing upon the words some subtle and unnatural interpretation; or if, after they have sworn, they can find some loophole or artificial evasion, whereby such art may be used with the oath that,

the words remaining, the sense may be eluded with some sophism, and the strength utterly lost. The ancient Christians did not acknowledge this kind of theology, nor the sounder heathens this moral philosophy. Far otherwise Augustine said, "They are perjured who, preserving the words, deceive the expectation of those to whom they have sworn."—Pp. 37, 40.

Further:—

'Be it so, that a form of speech appears not by the words themselves, nor by the common estimation of men to be an oath; nevertheless, if a man using such a form, either through mistake think himself to have sworn or through some deceitful intention would be thought to have sworn, that form, though it be not really and in itself an oath, will have nevertheless, as to that man, the full obligations of an oath to all effects; and if he violate his faith so given, he is guilty at the bar of conscience, not only of falsehood, but of perjury. . . . Deceitfulness in the will doth not excuse from obligations, because it is most just that an impious and fraudulent man should fall into the pit which he digged for his neighbour, and that his feet should be caught in the snare which he set for another.'—P. 176.

These extracts will show the spirit of Bishop Sanderson's Treatise on Oaths.

We will now request our readers to recal to mind Liguori's doctrine of Amphibology. There are three kinds of equivocation, it will be remembered; equivocation by means of an ambiguous word—equivocation by means of a double-edged sentence—equivocation by means of such a phrase as *I say, No*. All these kinds of equivocation are justifiable and right when employed for a good reason, and all of them may be used with the sanction of an oath. Now let us compare the Bishop of the English Church with Rome's Bishop:—

'The second case is of an oath when the words, according to their common signification, are clear enough, but the party swearing, having no will to bind himself in that sense, intendeth another, whereof the words by reason of some ambiguity are not altogether incapable, and industriously concealeth his meaning in such sort as that the auditors understand one thing, he another. This is that *verbal equivocation* which, amongst some other casuists and scholastics, the Jesuits especially maintain and practise. . . . As if a Jesuit apprehended should swear that he was a *smith*, meaning that his name was *Smith*, or an apprentice, commanded to tell where his master is, should swear that he *died* a month ago, meaning that he then *dyed* stockings. . . . The Jesuits so vigorously defend this equivocation, that J. Molanus, Professor at Louvain, justifieth the murder of John Huss, perpetrated against the public faith engaged unto him for his safe-conduct, for this reason, that the conduct undertook for *his safe coming*, not for the safety of *his return*. And now let Jesuits confidently complain of the great injuries done them, whilst we say that they hold faith not to be kept with heretics; for if this be to keep faith, they need not much trouble themselves, with whomsoever it is contracted, whether it ought to be kept or broken. . . . Our result is, that the party swearing after this manner both sinneth in his equivocal oath, and is, notwithstanding that tacit equivocation, bound in conscience unto the performance of his promise in that sense which the words yield of themselves, and are, without constraint, apt to beget upon the minds of others. Unless he act accordingly, he is not guiltless of perjury.'—P. 192.

That he may not appear only to make assertions, or to declaim, he adds his reasons:—

'First, an oath, as we have laid down, ought to be most simply and effectually understood, unto which simplicity this artifice of industrious ambiguity is repugnant. 2. It is a great profanation of the name of God to invoke Him, as witness and searcher of hearts, to attest the truth of words which agree not with the heart of the party swearing; for what were this, if not, as far as lieth in man's power, to make God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived, an impostor and patron of base dissimulation? 3. Equivocation is contrary to the very institution and nature of an oath, whose chief use is to be *an end of strife and controversy*, and to give as certain security in uncertain things as human nature is able to afford, it being *expediendarum litium maximum remedium*. But that certainty which we seek in an oath is lost in equivocation, for what certainty can there be in his answer whose meaning is uncertainty? Nor are controversies thus ended, but aggravated. 4. The party so swearing deludeth his neighbour and knowingly deceiveth, contrary to the precept, *Ne jurat in dolo*, and to the ancient form, *Si sciens fallo*.'—P. 195.

Rome's canonized Bishop teaches, as we have seen, that non-pure mental reservation is allowable in assertions and in oaths. Contrast England's Bishop:—

'The third case allied to this is that of Mental Reservation, which the Jesuits defend with the same reasons, and define with the same qualifications, as verbal equivocation. For as, in that, by wresting the words pronounced into another sense, so, in this, by some addition not pronounced but conceived in the mind, the party swearing eludeth the interrogatory. So they say a Priest, if he be examined by an heretical magistrate whether he be a Priest, may answer that he is no Priest, meaning, of Bacchus, or Apollo. And an adulterous wife, if she be questioned of adultery by her jealous husband, may swear unto him that she committed not adultery; meaning, not to the end to tell him. The like they hold in promissory oaths; that a traveller, to save his life, may swear to give money to a thief, though he never intend it, provided that when he sware, "I will give thee so much," he understood, *if I owe it thee, or if thou demand it before the magistrate*. But as this mental reservation is built on the same sand with verbal equivocation, so is it destroyed at the same dash; for it rooteth all faith and assurance out of men, makes God an impostor, is deceitful unto our neighbour, perverteth the use and end of oaths, setteth open a great gate to all kinds of lies and perjuries, and is so much worse than equivocation as more difficult to be prevented. For equivocation foreseen or suspected may be prevented by such diligent explication of the words as may leave no loophole of ambiguity. But no human art or providence, if men will be juggling, can prevent this reservation. Jesuits and Priests, reserving unto themselves the liberty to reserve anything, are not afraid, with a serious brow, to take our oath of allegiance, though penned with such accuracy of words as leaveth no hold for cavil nor way of escape. Yet that very clause where, in express words, they promise that they will faithfully observe all that has gone before *according unto the tenour of the words pronounced by them, and according to the plain and natural sense and true intent of these words, without any equivocation or mental reservation whatsoever*, they understand at the same time with this reservation—*to wit, that I will tell you*.'—P. 198.

The two methods of dealing with a promissory oath made to a robber, are characteristic of the two theologians. 'You need

not pay,' says Liguori, 'if you have used an equivocation in making your promise; but if you have forgotten to do so (*si oblitus uti æquivocatione jurasti*), you must.'¹ 'You must pay,' says Sanderson, 'because you have made a contract, and derived benefit from it, and called God to witness to your good faith.'

A few more contrasts will be worth selecting:—

'Titius, who promised to marry Berta when she was rich, is not bound to stand to his oath when she has fallen into poverty; having sworn to her when in good health, he is not bound to her when she has fallen into infirmity; having sworn to her in good repute, he is not bound to her in ill repute: . . . for the promise does not hold in that case.' 'In case Caius should swear to take the widow of Titius to wife, believing her, though poor, to be rich, he must take her; this error rendereth not the oath invalid, and the like is to be said of oaths of the like kind.'—*Theol. Mor.* 4. 180. *Obl. of Oaths*, p. 134.

We need not say that the first case is Liguori's, the second Sanderson's. Cardinal Cajetan and Bishop Liguori declare, as we have seen, that there is no obligation to keep an oath which has been made about an indifferent thing. Bishop Sanderson teaches that it is wrong to take such an oath, but that when it has been taken it is binding. He gives his reasons, the chief of which is, that whether a thing is weighty or trivial makes no difference with respect to truth and falsehood; and in spite of the opinion of the Romish casuists, which he supposes to have been held mainly for the purpose of supporting the distinction of mortal and venial sins, 'a leaven with which they have foully corrupted the whole lump of moral theology,' concludes that 'he ought not so to have sworn, but, having sworn, he ought to fulfil his oath.'

It is no grave sin, teaches Liguori, to use such expressions as *By God! By Christ! I will kill you!* These principles are carried out in practice. The *Mon Dieu* of the Frenchman, the *Jesus* of the Spaniard, are proverbial; the Italian expletives are not less common, though not so much confined to one species. When remonstrated with, the swearers are always ready with the excuse that they were speaking inconsiderately, and without deliberation; this is the very excuse given in Liguori's Moral Theology. Profane swearing is a habit to which Englishmen

¹ *Theol. Mor.* iv. 174. This is stricter than some teaching which has been propounded. Pascal gives us another step. 'Our doctors,' replied the Jesuit, 'have taught for the benefit of those who might not be expert in the use of these reservations, that no more is required of them, to avoid lying, than simply to say that they have not done what they have done, provided they have in general the intention of giving to their language the sense which an able man would give to it.'—Letter IX.

also, to our shame, are addicted; but mark the difference in the teaching of England's Moral Theology:—

'The cause whence such kinds of oaths are derived,' says Sanderson, 'is either a vicious habit, contracted by long and pernicious custom, which habit is the fruit and mark of a profane if not atheistical heart, or some exorbitant perturbation of the mind, as excessive anger, intemperate joy, with which, whilst the mind boils, the mouth foameth to the dishonour of God.' . . . 'Tearing the sacred and dreadful name of God with profane lips and oaths, both without fear and punishment; . . . but I would not be carried away with the tide of grief and indignation.' . . . 'A man, through some transportation of anger, love, or other passion of a perturbed mind, or through delight in sin and impious custom of swearing rashly and without judgment, besprinkleth his discourse with oaths. Which vice, in respect both of the heaviness and frequency of the sin, I could wish were more often and vehemently reprehended in sermons, as I see it was diligently and sharply done in his time by the most devout man John Chrysostom, lest, by the just judgment of God, "through oaths the earth mourns," and the Lord swear in his wrath that he will not hold them guiltless who so contemn his dreadful name that they fear not to invoke his most sacred Majesty as witness.'—Pp. 103, 130, 260.

One more contrast. We have seen that Liguori gives an almost unlimited power of getting rid of the obligation of oaths by means of Dispensations, Commutations, Irritations, Cessations, and Relaxations. Sanderson, allowing the fitness of Irritation, Cessation, and Relaxation, and admitting the propriety of Dispensation, *in the sense* of an exemption from a law by favour of the lawgiver, yet, *so far as oaths are concerned*, totally rejects both Dispensation and Commutation. To dispense with oaths, he argues, is impossible; *because* the obligation of an oath is of Divine natural law, and God has granted to none the power of dispensing with the law of nature, of which He alone is the Author—*because* the existence of a dispensing power destroys that security which is the chief end of oaths, 'for he unto whom the oath is made can have no assurance, if the promise of the party swearing may be dispensed with, that it should ever be fulfilled'—*because* the oath gives a right to the person to whom it is sworn, and therefore its dispensation must be either needless or unreasonable; 'needless and superfluous if it be done with his consent to whom the oath was made, if against it, unreasonable and unjust'—*because* obligation is entered into towards God as well as towards men; and even supposing the last could be taken away, 'yet would it be insupportable presumption that dust and ashes should arrogate unto itself authority to take away the obligation whereby man is bound to God as witness and revenger'—*because* human dispensation is a matter only of external judicature, whereas 'he that claimeth to dispense with oaths, assumeth unto himself Divine power, and seateth himself on the bench of internal judicature.'

'It is worthy of consideration,' he continues, 'first, that either the cause is manifestly just, why a thing promised by oath ought not to be performed (as if it be impossible, dishonest, or any way unlawful), and then the party swearing may of his own authority, nay, ought, without waiting for dispensation from the Pope, or any other, to retract the thing sworn; for when there is no obligation, the conscience is free and needeth no dispensation; or secondly, that no just cause appeareth why the oath should not be kept, and then it must be kept, and he who either asketh or granteth dispensation, sinneth, because the obligation, which neither can nor may be removed by human power, remaineth; or lastly, that the thing is doubtful, and it appeareth not, by reason of difficulties on both sides, whether the party swearing be bound to the performance of his promise, and then it will be profitable to consult with pious and prudent men, skilful in the Divine law, and to resolve with their advice what is most expedient. In which matter, seeing knowledge is more requisite than power, I understand not why the Pope should be fitter than another man, unless it were certain that the Pope excelled other men in prudence and piety.'—P. 239.

He does not hesitate in his conclusion:—

'Wherefore I conclude that neither pope, nor prince, nor synod, nor senate, nor ecclesiastical nor secular superior, hath any right to dispense with leagues, contracts, oaths, or to absolve any man from that bond wherein, before the dispensation granted, he was engaged.'—P. 241.

We have compared the systems of modern Rome, of primitive antiquity, and of reformed England, with respect to truth and falsehood, good faith and bad faith. There is one other authority to which we must refer, though only in a few words. Our review would not be complete without a glance at the *Theory of Truthfulness*, as laid down by the more than Moral Theologians, Moses, David, Solomon, the Prophets, and the Apostles. Thus speak Moses and Solomon:—

'If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word, he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.' 'When thou shalt vow a vow unto the Lord thy God thou shalt not slack to pay it, for the Lord thy God will surely require it of thee, and it would be sin in thee. But if thou shalt forbear to vow, it shall be no sin unto thee. That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt keep and perform, even a freewill offering, according as thou hast vowed unto the Lord thy God, which thou hast promised with thy mouth.' 'Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.' 'When thou vowest a vow unto God defer not to pay it, for he hath no pleasure in fools: pay that which thou hast vowed. Better is it that thou shouldst not vow than that thou shouldst vow and not pay.'—*Numb.* xxx. 2; *Deut.* xxiii. 21; *Exod.* xx. 7; *Ecc.* v. 4.

And so David:—

'Thou shalt destroy them that speak leasing. The Lord will abhor both the bloodthirsty and deceitful man.' 'For there is no faithfulness in their mouth.' 'Who shall dwell in thy holy hill? . . . He that sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not . . . he that hath clean hands and a pure heart, who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, nor sworn deceitfully.' Deliver my soul, O Lord, from lying lips and a deceitful tongue.'—*Ps.* v. 6, 9; xv. 4; cxx. 2.

Jeremiah depicts the state of war and fencing to which we may be reduced:—

‘ Oh that I had in the wilderness a lodging-place of wayfaring men ;
That I might leave my people and go from them !
For they be all adulterers, an assembly of treacherous men ;
And they bend their tongues, like bows, for lies ;
But they are not valiant for the truth upon the earth ;
For they proceed from evil to evil, and they know not me, saith the Lord.
Take ye heed every one of his neighbour, and trust ye not in any brother :
For every brother will utterly supplant, and every neighbour will walk with slanders.
And they will deceive every one his neighbour, and will not speak the truth :
They have taught their tongue to speak lies and weary themselves to commit iniquity.
Their tongue is as an arrow shot out : it speaketh deceit :
One speaketh peaceably to his neighbour with his mouth, but in his heart he layeth wait for him.’—*Jer.* ix. 2.
‘ These are the things that ye shall do :
Speak ye every man the truth to his neighbour :
Execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates :
And let none of you imagine evil in your hearts against another ;
And love no false oaths, for all these are things that I hate, saith the Lord.’—*Zech.* viii. 16.

Let us hear S. Paul:—

‘ Wherefore, putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbour.’—*Eph.* iv. 25.

And S. John the Divine:—

‘ But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone.’—*Rev.* xxi. 8.

It is not from want of other matter, as we stated at the beginning, that we have confined ourselves to one subject. Liguori is prolific in material. For example, we might have examined his Theory of Theft, according to which we find that no sin of theft can be mortal unless a certain quantity is stolen ; that to steal 3s. or 4s. from a very opulent merchant is a mortal sin, from a very rich nobleman venial—that a wife may support her previous children out of her husband’s goods against his will, and spend anything under the twentieth of his income on alms and gifts—that a nobleman in extreme distress may steal if he is ashamed to beg—that a servant may compensate himself by ‘ taking ’ if his salary is too small—that a rich man’s son may steal 12s. from his father at any time without grave sin—that a monk’s sin in stealing anything under 16s. from his monastery is only venial—and that a great nobleman’s son commits only a venial sin whenever he steals from his father anything under or equal to 10%.

We might have pointed out the omissions as well as the com-

missions with which the book is chargeable. We might have shown the doctrinal corruption interspersed and taken for granted throughout. We might have submitted to our readers' scorn such ludicrous sentiments as Azorius's and Bonacina's, that a mother may wish for her daughter's death if the latter is too ugly to get married.¹ We might have held up to the just indignation of all Christians, and all men, the detestable arguments (supported by the authority of Bonacina, the Salamanca doctors, Barbosa, Suarez, Hurtado, Henriquez, and the common voice of the casuists in opposition to Lopez and Farinaccius) to prove that the penalty of deprivation, annexed to the commission of a sin too heinous to be named, is not incurred by Romish Priests unless they are in the constant habit of the sin: *requiritur ut actus sodomice sit frequentatus sive usu continuatus, ut ait Navarrus; hoc enim importat verbum, exercentes, in Bullâ expressum*:² whence Liguori draws the conclusion that, so far as penalties are concerned, 'a man who commits the act once or twice is excused.'

But we have selected the one subject of truth and lying because it lies at the foundation of all morality. When once the virtue of veracity is undermined, the whole character is ruined, and nothing can be the consequence but blindness of the moral eye and confusion of moral sentiment. From this blindness and confusion arises an adoption of principles, and specific application of those principles, in which we can only hesitate whether the shocking or the grotesque is the most prevailing element; for that which is morally wicked is always intellectually ludicrous, if we are at liberty to look at it in the latter light.

Untruthfulness is a phenomenon which is found in a remarkable degree in all the southern nations of Europe, and, we fear it must be added, in Ireland, while the northern nations are in general comparatively free from it. Thoughtful minds have often sought for an adequate hypothesis by which to account for this phenomenon. We believe that our pages will have suggested one to some minds, and confirmed it to others. When S. Philumenism is put in the place of manly faith—when all duties are merged in the one duty called by the specious name of advancing religion—when men and women put the entire direction of their souls out of their own hands into the absolute control of others, in spite of the nature which God has given them—when those who have the control of the consciences of others are supplied (and supplied by an authority which they hold infallible) with a system of moral principles and rules in which truth is flagrantly violated, good faith sapped, and the

¹ Hom. Apost. iii. 53.

² Theol. Mor. iv. 471

obligation of oaths reduced to a trick of words, with which a hair-splitting sophist may play like counters—what can we expect but the very phenomenon which we find existing? The lock and the key answer to each other admirably.

English Romanists, we are aware, profess indignation when the charge of bad faith is brought against them. That they are saved, to a great degree, from the blight which has fallen on their co-religionists, by means of the counteracting influences amongst which they live, we readily allow. Still, even in England, things which we cannot forget have forced themselves to the light. The Gawthorn case, the Carré case, the De Col case, and many others, could, we venture to assert, have occurred only amongst Romanists. If, however, they are really anxious to prove their good faith in the face of their fellow-countrymen, let them exert themselves to get this work of S. Alfonso de' Liguori, with its lying *Theory of Truthfulness*, condemned by the rulers of their Church. Until this is done, we must be pardoned if we believe their word—because they are Christians—because they are men of honour—because they are Englishmen; not because they are—but in spite of their being—Romanists.

- ART. III.—1. *The Preacher and the King; or, Bourdaloue in the Court of Louis XIV., being an Account of the Pulpit Eloquence of that distinguished era. Translated from the French of L. Bungener; with an Introduction by the Rev. GEORGE POTTS, D.D., Pastor of the University Place Presbyterian Church, New York.* London: Trübner & Co. 1853.
2. *Sermons Choisis de Bossuet.* Paris: 1845.
3. *Sermons du Père Bourdaloue, de la Compagnie de Jésus.* À Liege. 1784.
4. *Sermons et Morceaux Choisis de Massillon.* Paris: 1848.

WE are informed in the Introduction to this work that it has attained a wide popularity among those who use the French language, having reached the thirteenth edition. In its translated form we hardly anticipate the same result, though few subjects could have been better adapted to command the attention and excite the interest of the English literary public. There is something too circuitous about the whole character of the book, its external history, as well as its internal construction, to attract confidence, or to gain the respect of truth-loving readers. Anything which claims to admit us into the society of the great French preachers, Bourdaloue and Bossuet, must be a tempting contribution to modern literature; but we require that the images thereby created in our minds shall be authentic, shall be founded on reality—and not only the picture of some third person's imagination, about whom we know or care little. Biographical notices of any kind appeal most strongly to our love of truth. We are most unwilling that the pictures of those whom we wish to admire or study, should be represented to us under suspicious forms or untrustworthy colours. In the case before us, the memory of these great men is handed down to us through a French Protestant, that is, through one naturally in a prejudiced position, and his work, again, is translated in America, and prefaced by an American Presbyterian. Why, under these circumstances, it is even printed in England, we know not, except to make its history still more circuitous. The internal construction of the book is far also from clearing up this want of authenticity. Dr. Potts says, that 'the slight thread of fiction by which the disquisitions are held together, instead of injuring the effect of the work, as a contribution to sacred literature, imparts a life-like air of reality to the whole.' The entire book, then, by its very design, is a fiction, an historical romance, in which the opinions and the actions of the persons represented are entirely at the mercy of the writer.

To make an historical romance at all correct in the portraiture of distinguished characters, is a talent which few possess; for it requires a singular power of entering into their whole minds, and personating their very selves. Even the greatest writers in this style have always been most careful to append their narrative to undoubted events of history, and to give, moreover, some kind of references by which the faithfulness of their personal descriptions may be tested. In the book before us we look in vain for these references, nor are the facts which ought to have been referred to, sufficiently well known to dispense with the act on the part of the writer. The result, then, is that we can place no credit whatever on the truth of any ideas which have been pictured to us in this pretended account of 'Bourdaloue in the Court of Louis XIV.' But then comes the question, What can have been the motive for which this book was written? It was not to undermine the reputation of theological opponents, for those opponents are described as the most powerful, the most sincere, the most amiable of their time, and the points on which objection is made to them are too trivial to constitute the design of the work. The great preachers are eulogised in the warmest language, and indeed the apparent object of the whole story is to draw the attention of modern preachers to their powers of eloquence. The design of the writer, we would rather take it, is suffered to come out in the prominence given to another than the pretended hero of the work. Claude, the Protestant controversialist, is the man whose sentiments are really given, while Bossuet maintains a reverential silence in his presence, and Bourdaloue trembles before his stern admonitions, and receives from his dictation a portion of the sermon he is to preach before the King. Neither Bossuet, indeed, nor Bourdaloue, are allowed to talk to us, or to present to us any vivid picture of themselves; and even when they do say anything it is more or less directly under the influence of Claude that they are acting. This is the obvious absurdity of the 'thread of fiction' which constitutes the book: two great, powerful-minded, and distinguished characters are introduced into an historical romance; the public are invited to a literary treat, in hearing about these men, and then it is discovered, after all, that they are but the tools and mouth-pieces of a third person, one of some mark in his way, but about whom we are not now concerned to hear, and who moreover, as here represented, does not approve himself to our notice by the long and prosy disquisitions which are supposed to be uttered by him.

The real object of the writer was clearly to obtrude the sentiments of his own hero into close connexion with the eloquence of those great preachers of whom France is so justly proud;

The French Pulpit,

and he uses an apparent liberality of tone in speaking of them, as the means of undermining the real boldness of their character as theologians. He gives no references to substantiate the most extraordinary personal combinations, and therefore we take the liberty of altogether disbelieving them, though we do not pretend to trace out the exact nature of any friendly communication that may have taken place. We have read the *Life of Bourdaloue*, and Claude's name does not occur in it, while Bossuet was only brought into contact with him as a controversialist. The Introduction explains thus the singular conferences which are to be described:—'Claude is introduced by our author into the current of his narrative, not so much for the purpose of dramatic effect as to afford a channel for some doctrines and strictures, which could not so well be put into the mouth of any of the other actors of the book.' No doubt the reason here alleged served the writer's part, but yet we do not consider it fair play to the memory of great men to exhibit them in false and absurd positions, in order that we may hear the doctrines or strictures of any other third person whatever. Claude no doubt was a worthy champion of Protestantism, a man of power and talent, and as such was spoken of in an honourable and fair manner by his opponent, Bossuet; but we do not believe that Bossuet ever listened to his disquisitions in the gardens of Versailles, or that Bourdaloue ever hid him behind the door of his study to hear an undignified conversation between himself and Father La Chaise.

The plot of the story rests on a certain peroration which Bourdaloue added to a sermon preached before the King at Versailles, on a Good Friday. We need not trouble our readers with all the absurd details in the history of this much-talked of peroration. It is enough to state that Bourdaloue on this occasion had as usual prepared the flattering remarks which he was accustomed to address to the King, even during the time that he was living in open adultery with Madame de Montespan. This state of affairs at Court is made the subject of conversation in a coterie of 'philosophers'—of a different type, however, from those who on the same spot made the title infamous—assembled in the gardens of Versailles. The confessor of Madame de Montespan happened at the same time to refuse her absolution, at which the King is enraged. Bossuet has conferences with the King, and endeavours to amend the scandal, by representing the necessity of Madame's departure from Versailles. He also visits Bourdaloue, whom he finds in what is said to have been the agony of learning his sermon by heart, and he discourses with him on the necessity of making certain alterations which might perhaps

move the King, and thus obtain a victory for morals and religion. This conference is interrupted by Claude, who had beforehand written to Bourdaloue, announcing his intention to call as an expression of his esteem. The Fénéçons, uncle and nephew, then also come in, and much talk follows to the hindrance of any alteration in Bourdaloue's sermon. At last all go, except Claude, who slips back, and takes Bossuet's place as adviser in the sermon. Bourdaloue reads him the whole sermon, and Claude then commences to dictate a new peroration. This time also the attempt was interrupted by the arrival of a third person, Father La Chaise. Then it is that Claude rushes into concealment behind the door, and hears much conversation from the intruder, of a kind to expose the office which he held—that of confessor to the King himself—to contempt and ridicule. At length the concealed Protestant bursts forth upon the talkers—the detected Confessor skulks away, and Claude finishes his dictation. Meanwhile Bossuet has a conference with the King, and Versailles is in a tumult. Madame de Montespan perceives that things are going wrong, writes notes to the King, and retires from the palace in a fit of disgust. The King is weak and vacillating, and refuses to hear the sermon of next day, suspecting that he is to be attacked in it. Meanwhile, on the morning itself of Good Friday, the usual number of ‘philosophers’ promenade the palace gardens. Bossuet is late, having been so occupied with the strange commotions; Claude takes his place, and expounds the fourteenth chapter of Isaiah, making it the type of a rebuke to kings. At length the whole Court, having a mysterious notion that something great was to happen, meets in the chapel; the King at the last moment is dragged unwillingly to his place, and Bourdaloue begins the sermon. He is nervous and frightened at the rebuke which is to terminate his discourse; his courage fails; he actually commences the flattering peroration, but stops short at the first words; and why does he stop? It is Claude who ominously glares at him from behind a pillar, and shames him into fulfilling his bargain: all goes off triumphantly, the King is vanquished before all his Court; the Queen sobs with a holy joy, and Bourdaloue perceives that he is a great man, but in borrowed plumes. His conscience smites him. According to custom, he is complimented by the King in the anteroom of the chapel-royal, but again Claude is behind the door, and the story ends by the introduction of Claude to the King as the true author of the peroration just recited.

All this absurd history of pretended scenes at Versailles, is not only fiction, but it is an historical falsehood on the memory of those names which are introduced. Little notice, indeed

need be taken of such foolish misrepresentations, if it was not that the study of the great French preachers would be, as we think, most useful to the sermon-writers of the present day, and of our own Church. M. Bungener, the French Protestant, and Dr. Potts, the American Presbyterian, both no doubt appreciate their value as models of style and fertile store-houses of original thought, and on this very account desire to direct attention to them; but if we are also to study them, it is well to clear their memory of any misrepresentations which it may serve the purpose of these sectarians to connect with them. Bourdaloue, these men would say, was eloquent, was a man to be esteemed and venerated, was a keen searcher into the motives of the human heart, was an accuser of the religious faults of his day, was charitable in his way of speaking, and therefore must have been somewhat lax in his convictions with respect to church government and discipline. He was indeed a severe witness against many tendencies and practices which are still associated with Romanism; but he had little in common with the Protestants of his day, or with American Presbyterians. He denounced formalism; but he so abounds in the exposition of sound doctrine, that, except on particular subjects, where we essentially differ from the Romish Church, we listen to his words, ever with an increasing confidence in their truth, and with an increasing conviction that the Reformed Church of all lands will find that she has a common ground with him, which sectarians will in vain seek for. But this book has not even the openness to say, why the writer admires Bourdaloue. He wishes to profit by his eloquence, and at the same time cavils at him for one particular fault, which he knows is the very reverse from the common tone of his sermons. The great charge against him is, that he flattered the King in his perorations; but no mention is at the same time made of passages in the body of the sermon, acceptable no doubt for their plain speaking on some tendencies in members of his own Church, but calculated by their severity and the closeness of their appeals, to make a flattering peroration a mere empty form, little able to erase the moral axioms which had preceded it. We are not defending this practice of ending a sermon with a laudation of the King, but it was one of those court fashions, which were part of the age, for which it is difficult indeed to find a reason consistent with a Christian preacher's duty, but which cannot be laid to the account of the individual preacher. We can hardly enter into the state of things which required it, but we can understand the force of custom, and the imperative calls of court etiquette. It is also clear, that the more obvious the necessity of flattering the King was felt to

be, the less real would the words used become. They stood apart from the sermon; all that had been preached was unbiassed by their tone, and, moreover, they occupied so short a space, that the importance given to this peroration of our romantic history is obviously unnatural. The writer in fact works the subject with exactly the same feeling that prompts an English Nonconformist to cavil at certain expressions in our Liturgy, as that of 'our most religious and gracious Queen.' Moreover, the extent of the flattery is exaggerated, by construing all the expressions as referring to the individual, and not to the kingly office. Some of Bourdaloue's perorations are in fact a description of what a king ought to be, and only imply as a matter of course, as if to avoid the discourtesy of a personal lecture, that the picture is fulfilled in the actual king before him. The misrepresentations of character in the story before us are so great, that we can hardly quote the sentiments therein contained with the respect which some of them would call for.

The general subject of preaching is meant by the author to be the substance of his work, and we propose to follow him on this ground, and like him bring forward Bourdaloue and the French preachers as magnificent instances of Christian oratory. But first we shall endeavour to freshen up the recollection of our readers, as to the history of the French preachers, by appealing to actual facts, as set forth in their lives, and not in romantic fiction.

Every art and science has had its Augustan age, and the seventeenth century was undoubtedly the age of preaching. In England we had divines in that century whose memory will long continue as bright examples of the Christian ministry; but England was sadly tossed about by internal commotions, and the Church enjoyed but little peace. In France, at this period, things were however far different,—all was peace and prosperity. The regal dignity of Louis XIV. calmed the very atmosphere of France, and allowed the arts of civilized life to flourish with an unusual exuberance. It is not our present purpose to mark how that exuberance outstepped the bounds of moderation, and produced a sinful and oppressive luxury, which undermined the whole balance of social relationships. But we only now survey France under Louis XIV., as the country which took the lead, by no small distance, in all the elegance and the refinements of life. There was much vice; yet it is but fair to the Court of France at that period to say, that it was not then so rampant and unchecked as it subsequently became. Religion was respected, and if not obeyed by all, (for when is it?) yet was allowed its place and its influence. The Court had its divines, who occupied a position very much to the

public credit, and many things—even that formal love of brilliant scenes, which was in everything apparent, conduced to an appreciation of eloquence, and made the Church's preaching a valued occupation of the passing hour.

But to foster, nay, to command, this taste, there arose certain great masters of the art, whose names have long survived their own time, and who justly merit a place by the side of the many others, who, in one branch or other of human powers, have done great works, have originated new schools of art, or developed fresh tastes in the public.

There was much to favour preaching in the Court of France during the reign of Louis XIV., and to give to its professors a favourable hearing. There was but little field for eloquence in the political assemblies of so arbitrary a government as that of Louis XIV., while the dissipations of the Court did not encourage that quiet appreciation of eloquence which solitary reading may afford. Again, there was a love of witnessing personal display, which, without accusing the preachers of the day of yielding to the motives of vanity, yet materially aided the attention of those who were the listeners. Our author thus pictures the audience which assembled on the Good Friday about which he writes:—

'The royal chapel of Versailles presented, in fact, a brilliant spectacle, particularly on the days of religious solemnities. The majesty of the cathedrals was not to be looked for there: the locality did not admit of that; in 1675, the present chapel was not yet built, and the former one was rather a vast saloon than a church. But the most curious and the most dazzling object, that which scarcely allowed a stranger time to bend his attention upon the magnificence of the decorations and the service, was the crowd assembled within these walls; the most fabulous assemblage of all the great names, all the great fortunes, and all that was most illustrious in France. Among all these people, mingled and crowded in the king's chapel, like the bourgeois of Paris in their parish churches,—there were very few who did not also possess their chapel, their chaplain, and their chateau; few who could not have enthroned themselves somewhere, if they had chosen, like kings; few who were not or could not have been the heroes of the solemn praises of some village Bourdaloue. But they willingly renounced all these parish church triumphs. They did not regret to exchange for some narrow and obscure lodging at the top of the palace, the vast saloons of the habitations of their fathers; and their lordly velvet in a provincial church, did not appear to them of half the value of the untapestried end of a bench in the chapel of Versailles.'—*The Preacher and the King*, pp. 285, 286.

With audiences such as these, and with a national love of dramatic scenery to gratify, we may perhaps picture to ourselves a preacher full of affectations, straining after oratorical effect, and adopting the vulgar arts which belong to popular preaching in our own day. The case, however, was far otherwise. Bossuet, Bourdaloue, and Massillon, were genuine and real preachers of Christian truth; they were above all low and secondary arts,

which are wont to supply the place of real genius. They captivated, not by *following* the powers and tastes of their listeners, but by *leading* them. They founded a combined school of preaching, which was the same kind of addition to Christian oratory, that the works of Titian, Rafaele and Correggio, were to painting. Indeed, their individual characters and style of writing have been illustrated by personal comparisons with these masters of Italian art. Titian represents the singular originality and richness of the courtier Bossuet. Rafaele is analogous to the fully-developed intellect, the marked professional character, the steady adherence to his work, and, in short, to the giant pre-eminence of Bourdaloue as a preacher; while Correggio, excelling from a certain inborn delicacy of mind, and an exquisite refinement of taste, represents on his part the eloquent Massillon. Bourdaloue again has been imagined to stand in the same position to Massillon, that the bold genius of Æschylus stood to the poetic finish of Sophocles. It is remarkable in the lives of these three men, how much the mention of one of them always brings in with it the others also; yet there was no rivalry. The most interesting parts of their respective memoirs are comparisons the one with the other. The glory of one is not diminished by the others, but rather set off to greater advantage. Voltaire, indeed, maliciously accused Bossuet of retiring before the fame of the rising Bourdaloue, preferring to rest on his fame already acquired, rather than challenge competition. It is, however, proved in the memoir of Bossuet, which precedes the selection of his works now before us, that the imputation is altogether erroneous. Bossuet was only five years senior to Bourdaloue, but was known at Court much younger, and so ran his course as preacher, was appointed Bishop of Condom, and then preceptor to the Dauphin, before Bourdaloue commenced. These duties on the part of Bossuet, made it necessary that he should relinquish the occupation of Court preacher, and he had already retired to his diocese, before Bourdaloue was known. When occasions however called him out, he proved to France that his powers were not diminished, and that he was not ashamed to exercise them by fear of comparison with any one else. What must strike the reader of their lives, is indeed just the reverse to the presumption of any jealousy. Each one seems to have occupied his own place, and adopted his own line, solely according to his natural taste and disposition. There was about each of them the true independence of genius and power, which is alike above either jealousy or imitation. Bossuet was a preacher and orator; but his mind being after the mould of a finished and acute scholar, and being also a profound logician,

he took the controversial line as peculiarly his own. Bourdaloue dived into Holy Writ and the learning of the Fathers from his early youth, made them all his own, and then with the earnestness of a mind devoted to one object, he undertook the difficult task of applying this great store of truth to the wants, the dispositions, and general circumstances of each individual Christian. Thus he was an overwhelming preacher, by the very same power which made him the great casuist of his day—the adviser and confessor of all around him, rich and poor, for more than thirty years. Massillon coming after the others, and always connected with their fame, yet has distinctive marks of genius that preserve to the full the independence of his intellect. Neither of the others is equal to him in a certain touching and graphic simplicity of style. But let us consult the writers of their respective memoirs; not indeed for the purpose of aiming at any general biographical notices; but in the endeavour to illustrate that school of preaching, which we connect with their names.

Bossuet was a native of Dijon, and was educated in a Jesuit College. He was early known for his talents, and in the year 1659, being then 32 years of age, he preached his first Lent sermons in Paris. From that time he preached at Court, till he was nominated to the Bishopric of Condom in 1669. After that he was but little in the pulpits of Paris, as would appear from passages in those few sermons which he did preach on certain great occasions. At the profession of Madame de la Vallière in 1675, he states ‘that in order to celebrate those ‘holy ceremonies, he breaks a silence of some years, and causes ‘a voice to be heard that those pulpits had ceased to know.’ Again, six years later, when specially called upon by Louis XIV. to complete a course of Lent sermons, which had been interrupted by the illness of the preacher, he says, in his exhortation, ‘I again take up the word after many years’ continued silence.’ Bossuet resigned the Bishopric of Condom, after a very brief tenure of two years, on his appointment to the preceptorship of the Dauphin, an office which, being incompatible with the care of a diocese, also prevented his frequent appearance in the pulpit. But the same office, which saved him from being often called upon, also gave him splendid opportunities for the rarer exercise of his oratory. Coming fresh and unexhausted by weekly sermon writing to his own province of oratory, what a field for his powers must those great occasions have been, when he preached the funeral orations of Madame Henriette, Duchess of Orleans, in 1670, of Marie Theresa, in 1683, of the Princess Palatine, in 1684, of the Chancellor le Tellier, in 1685, and of the great Condé, in 1687! Yet Bossuet was no mere elegant declaimer

of funeral orations to gratify a court audience; he was an ecclesiastic fighting the cause of his church against heresy and schism with the weapons of his intellect and learning, and after all those splendid orations, which we have enumerated, were long passed, it is interesting to find that in the year 1691 he preached for the benefit, not of the Court, but of his clergy, the magnificent sermon on the Unity of the Church. It is a striking proof of the richness of Bossuet's genius, that his eloquent sermons which so delighted the two Queens, Anne and Marie Theresa, of Austria, and thus brought him to the notice of Louis XIV., indeed, that all which were preached during the ten years that he was in Paris, previous to his appointment as Bishop of Condom, and which, therefore, were the cause of his promotion, were never written in a fair copy, but were only dashed on paper, full of corrections and erasures, and were never preached twice, or used at a subsequent period of his life. He could afford to let these MSS., the work of the most vigorous age of man, remain undisturbed in the depths of a confused mass of papers, unpublished, or even unknown to exist, whilst he, far from resting on his oars after his elevation to the highest rank of the church, went boldly on to establish, as it were, another reputation. Nor were these papers ever put together till after the death of his nephew and executor, the Bishop of Troyes, long before which time, and therefore, by other compositions, he had acquired an immortal fame in literature as well as religion. Cardinal Maury, the writer of the preliminary discourse to Bossuet's sermons, goes into raptures of enthusiasm, which in our dull country—whether the fault be in the preachers or the audience we say not—sound unusual as comments on sermon writing. Yet the cardinal's enthusiasm is natural and sincere; and it is also graphic. 'What has struck me' (we indulge here in a kind of running translation, full of curtailment, for the original would cover our pages far too rapidly,) 'in his sermons is the constant vigour which marks his style, and which, it appears to me, far surpasses the boasted elegance of modern writers. In the first sentence you see his genius in action. You meet with no trivial forms, no commentaries on the thoughts of others, no lengthiness, sterility, or redundancy. He does not walk; he runs, he flies; ever in some new path which his imagination opens to him: he throws himself at once towards his goal, and carries you with him.'

Bossuet's fame as a controversialist at one time quite caused him to be forgotten as a preacher. The cardinal, therefore, undertakes to bring out his excellence in this respect, in a manner which implies that, at the time he wrote, his beauties

were not fully recognised. He says, 'It is commonly thought that Massillon and Bourdaloue have placed limits to the difficult art of the pulpit, and that, having borne away the riches of oratory, they have left nothing for others, but the minor glory of gleaning in their traces. I have always suspected that this error would not be accredited, if the sermons of Bossuet had been read. Let us admire the productions of genius, but not have the rashness to set bounds to them by saying that none others can surpass those whom we already know. How many great beauties shall we find in Bossuet, which we shall vainly seek for in Massillon and Bourdaloue. Again, how many new beauties may one day distinguish an orator, even after Massillon, Bourdaloue, and Bossuet!' He then compares these three with each other, mentioning their respective characteristics. Thus it is that we cannot enter upon any notice of one, without including the others also. He considers that Massillon, endowed by nature with fine talents, full of the learning of the ancients, and embellished by an exquisite taste, wrote more often with his mind than his imagination; that he was more ornamental, but less brilliant than Bourdaloue; that his enchanting elocution could not conceal his inclination to imitate his great model, Cicero; that though he wrote with interest and charm, yet that, without any uneasiness for his glory, one may say that he sometimes abused the fertility of his style by too great refinement in working out an idea. 'Without this ravishing elegance of style,' he says, 'one would not read Massillon more than once; though with it his sermons are too soon over.' In contrast with this dependence on style rather than matter, he describes Bourdaloue as the great reasoner, always consistent, always nervous, preferring to passing impulses the solid proofs which time engraves more deeply upon the mind. He is pathetic where the matter needs it, but this, in his judgment, was only when the great truths of religion could acquire interest by this manner of stating them. He never allowed his touching passages to come back, as it were, on himself. He instructs others by forgetting himself. The Cardinal brings forward, as an example of Bourdaloue's style, the same Good Friday sermon, about which the 'Preacher and the King' is written, though only to add thereto a termination which was not his own. The first part of that sermon, in which he proves that the death of the Son of God was the great triumph of His power, is considered by Maury to be a perfect *chef d'œuvre* of eloquence, and that nothing can be put by the side of it. 'Bourdaloue,' he says, 'is still more valued at the third reading than at the first. The more one reads, the more one admires. I thank him that he has made no display

'of language; he wrote nothing for want of thought.' Bossuet he considers to have been born with more genius, to have been more brilliant in occasional passages of his sermons, to have been more poetic, more picturesque, but the other to have been more even, more complete, and more methodical. He then compares Bossuet to Homer among the classic writers, and to Isaiah among the prophets, and describes his preaching somewhat as follows:—'He endeavours to alarm, then gives them up to remorse. He combats with his audience, and fights to the death, as Madame de Sevigné described him. He took the range of Holy Scriptures, the Old Testament and the New, and explained them as one harmonious whole, not by quoting passages in a dry and barren manner, but by making the very thoughts and ideas of Scripture his own, and then setting them forth with all the freshness of an original picture. Did he wish to show a king disabused of the greatness of the world; he repeated the long groanings of David. If he wished to excite pity, he made his audience weep with him over the pathetic history of Jeremiah, and in his sympathy with Jeremiah, he seemed to be inspired with a new energy to depict the calamities of Zion. Little satisfied, however, with first emotions, he pursued the impression, and deeply penetrated all hearts with the interest he created.'

We do not follow Bossuet through his controversial writings. He is charged with haughtiness, with some infirmities of temper, and with such warmth in controversy, that he sometimes thought more of vanquishing his antagonist than of adhering to the true basis on which the question before him rested. Be this as it may, he was a noble and zealous defender of his Church, free from the scandals, secular and ecclesiastic, of his age, and a man of sublime genius. There are times when bishops of active genius and power, and of resolute zeal in their office, who really will fight for the Church, acquire in our estimation a marvellous dignity. Many causes militate against the frequent occurrence of this desired picture, but we value it all the more when so many bright and excellent qualities shine forth in history as raising up the lasting name of Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux, for such he became in 1681, after the education of the Dauphin was concluded. He died in 1704, within a month of Bourdaloue, who was five years his junior.

As a kind of appendix to the 'Preacher and the King,' there is a marvellous narrative, called 'Two Evenings at the Hotel de Rambouillet,' and supposed to be descriptive of the first occasion on which Bossuet became known for his talent of preaching to the fashionable world of Paris. This was published, it is stated in a note, as long ago as 1839, but no earlier

reference is given as any pretence of its authenticity: and as it is here inserted because it is thought that the readers of the 'Preacher and the King' would be pleased with it, we presume that the one is no more true than the other; for the lovers of this kind of romantic fiction, which deals so rashly with historic names, and the lovers of sober facts, are certainly distinct classes of readers. The narrative in question relates how that, for the amusement and criticism of an evening party, the young Bossuet erected a temporary pulpit in the saloon of the Hotel de Rambouillet, and actually preached a powerful and a serious discourse, in exactly the same manner that he might have acted charades. This may have been the case, or it may not; we do not pretend to have before us every event that enlivened the saloons of Paris in the 17th century, but as the story is certainly calculated to represent Bossuet in anything but a dignified position, we must claim better authority before we believe that there is any truth in it. Bossuet may have had a natural love of distinction, and his share of ambition; but a ludicrous exhibition of vanity and profaneness is not what we should look for as a commencement of a career which bears the mark of great power and the highest genius, and which claimed an unusual degree of veneration, not only from his own country but from members of our own Church also, as Nelson and Bishop Bull.

From the 'Eagle of Meaux,' an epithet significant of the brilliant genius of Bossuet, we shall now turn our attention to some points in the life and character of Bourdaloue, as set forth in the Preface to his Sermons, by Father Bretonneau.

Nothing so entirely overawes the more ordinary type of mankind, as the contemplation of a life wholly consistent, wholly devoted from the earliest period of youth to one great object and one steady career, especially where there is evidence that this consistency has its foundation in the very disposition of the mind for steadiness of work, and not in any self interest or reward kept always in view. Bourdaloue was a hard steady worker from boyhood. Moreover, he did not put before him any particular object of ambition as the motive of steadiness, but he worked from day to day, and left the issue to Providence. He was one of those men, of whom it is commonly said that they do not owe their success to genius. If a man really plods on through a long and steady life, he is accused of not being a genius. But there may be a cultivated genius as well as an ill-regulated brilliancy which often claims that little all to itself. Bourdaloue proves his genius as well as his reading in every sermon. There is the mass of learning which is the result of labour, and there is also the spark of genius which illumines it all with an individual clearness, and makes it all hang round

one great idea; which seems to command for the time, with a tenacious grasp of mind, the wisdom of heaven and earth to demonstrate its truth. Bourdaloue was born at Bourges in 1632. His father, a man of good family, had at one time exhibited considerable powers of oratory, but had not cultivated them for any practical purpose. At the age of fifteen the son was given up to the order of Jesus, full of promise and youthful talent. In the Jesuit college he remained no less than eighteen years in profound study, in teaching, and as Professor of philosophy and theology. He gained great distinction in the sciences, and at one time was about to follow them as the main object of his life, a fact which is important as showing that eminence in the pulpit was not any vainglorious object of ambition during his years of study. Various sermons which he preached, as Professor of Moral Philosophy, induced his superiors to confine his talents to the pulpit; and, submissive to their disposal, he henceforth became a preacher. He was known to the great Mademoiselle, who heard him at Eu, and impressed with a certain confidence in him, she summoned him to act as her Confessor in her last moments. After a few years in the provinces he was called, in 1669, to Paris, and there he commenced his Advent sermons before the King. His powers surpassed all hopes, and, far from being sought for only as a novelty, his reputation increased every year, and the more he was heard the more desire there was to hear him. He possessed every advantage physical and mental, that is required for an orator. A solid foundation of reasoning was joined with a lively imagination; and a facility in giving interest and originality to common truths, was combined with a singular power of making all he said to bear the impress of a strong and earnest faith in the spiritual life. His was not the beauty of style or art, but there is about his writing a body and a substance, together with a unity and steadiness of aim that made the simplest language to assume the power and the greatness of the highest oratory. 'He embodied the Fathers,' says his biographer, 'who seemed indeed to have spoken for him; so easily did their words flow from his mind.' Of Scripture writers he most often quoted Isaiah and S. Paul; while, of the early writers of the Church, he was most fond of Tertullian, S. Augustine, and S. Chrysostom. He spoke well without the least apparent wish to do so; his delivery was quick, and void of all affectation; but when he became elevated or pathetic, there was a certain majesty of tone, yet he was never extravagant. His voice was full and resounding, but sweet and harmonious. He inspired a singular confidence in all who heard him from the perfect knowledge he displayed of the human heart, a knowledge which he acquired

by deep searchings into himself. Though but one man, he seemed to be the whole world in himself. He preserved his reputation unchecked until death, and preached at the Court and in Paris for thirty-four years, during which time he was heard with equal delight by rich and by poor. His eloquence being natural and true, it pleased all tastes and all times. Touched with his preaching, many came to him to unburden their souls in confession, and to seek from him spiritual direction. He did not reject these; but, on the contrary, he thought nothing better than to cultivate what he had planted, and to bring to perfection in the confessional what he had excited in the pulpit. In the direction of consciences, his advice was solid, neither too rigorous nor too indulgent. He knew how to instruct every condition of life in its own duties, and was firm without regard to quality or rank. For four and six hours a day would he be employed in this most fatiguing work of the confessional, peculiarly restraining to one of his natural vivacity. He gave himself up to benefit all states and conditions of life,—the sick, the poor,—and entered into their smallest wants with interest and sympathy. The more his great fame deterred some from venturing to consult him, the more he courted them, and went to seek them that he might soften their misfortunes. To the dying his vigilance was doubled. ‘He did not waste their precious moments in vague and useless discourse, but truly and earnestly brought all his vast knowledge of the human heart to aid in preparing each soul to meet its Judge.’ Nor in thinking of others did he forget himself. Success did not dazzle him, but the more his fame increased the more was he on his guard. Wrapped up in his sacred calling, he acquired a genuine contempt for the world, without failing in any duty he owed to it. He was a punctual observer of the rules of his order, in prayers especially. At the foot of the altar, and in reciting the Divine Office, he called to mind those great ideas of religion which afterwards were heard from the pulpit. He was noted in all concerns of life for frankness, good faith, truthfulness, shrewdness, and penetration. His manner was reserved, but engaging, and he enjoyed a sweetness and modesty of temper which prompted him always to speak well of others and not of himself.

Towards the end of his life he resolved to quit Paris and live in holy retirement. For this purpose he addressed himself to the head of the Society, but was desired to reconsider his wish for another year, for old as he was, renowned and full of labour as his whole life had been, this man, to whom all Paris had looked with an extraordinary admiration for the period of a generation of men, was yet, as a member of the Society of Jesus, entirely at the disposal of his superiors; he had no

liberty of action, and was but part of a great system controlled by others. Eminence as a preacher could never raise him to ecclesiastical dignities forbidden to his order, nor did it even give him rule over that order itself. He had then again to supplicate for a peaceful end to all his labour. His letter is so touching that we translate the extract from it which Father Bretonneau lays before us:—

‘MY VERY REVEREND FATHER,—God inspires me and even urges me to have recourse to you as our father, and to supplicate you humbly but earnestly to grant me what I have been unable, in spite of all my efforts, to obtain from the reverend father of the province. It is fifty-two years since I joined his company, more for others than myself. A thousand things distract me and prevent me from labouring as I should wish for my own perfection, which yet is the only thing necessary. I wish to retire and lead from henceforth a more tranquil life. I say a more tranquil in order that it shall be more regular and more holy. I feel that my body becomes weak and drawing towards its end. I have finished my course, and God grant I may be able to add I have been faithful. I am at an age when I am no longer in a condition to preach; may it be permitted me to employ, only for God and myself, what remains of life, and to dispose myself by that means to die religiously. La Flèche, (or some other house that shall please the superiors; I do not ask for one in particular, provided I am removed from Paris,) shall be the place of my repose. There, forgetting the things of the world, I will review before God all the years of my life in the bitterness of my soul. This is the subject of all my prayers, &c.’

This letter had its desired effect. He was free to do what he judged right, and as soon as he received the answer from Rome he made preparations to depart. But the same superiors that had stopped him the first time delayed him again, whilst they remonstrated with the general Father. The issue of it was that Bourdaloue was to remain at Paris. ‘God willed that he should thus have all the merit of a religious sacrifice without putting it into execution, and that he should finish his own sanctification while labouring for others.’ This was not known till after his death, for it was no honour for himself, but it was God that he was seeking. He did not insist, but went back to his labours with renewed activity and ardour. This however, was not for long. On the 11th of May, 1704, being the feast of Pentecost, after saying mass with difficulty, he was seized with a malignant fever which he felt would be his death. ‘It is enough,’ said he, ‘I must now do what I have often advised others to do.’ The next day he confessed all his life and received the last Sacraments. He regarded himself as a criminal condemned to death by the judgment of heaven. ‘I have abused life,’ he said, ‘and I deserve that you shall take it from me, and with all my heart I submit to so just a chastisement.’ After performing various acts of religion, commending himself to God, and offering his death, in union with that of Christ as a victim to appease the anger of God, he then put in order his papers as if in perfect

health, and even gave some hope of amendment. He was not, however, flattered by this last spark of life; he felt that only a miracle could save, and he thought himself unworthy of this. In the evening he relapsed and became delirious. The next morning he expired in the seventy-second year of his age, dying in the exercise of his ministry with an interval of but two days.

No portrait of him was taken during his life; the shop-windows of Paris did not display the fashionable preacher in silken robe and self-complacent attitude. But after death it was thought that the features of so remarkable a man ought to be handed down to posterity, and therefore it is that his likeness is represented with closed eyes. The writer of the 'Preacher and the King' can hardly have been aware of this circumstance, for he speaks of Bourdaloue's eyes being closed as a habit in preaching, to assist a treacherous memory. This is an obvious assumption derived simply from his portrait. It is moreover absurd to represent so great a master of oratory as was Bourdaloue, labouring under the utter confusion of mind in the delivery of a sermon which this author of a 'slight thread of fiction' ascribes to him.

Massillon may conclude our biographical notice of the three great preachers of France, taking as our text the preface to that selection of his works placed at the head of our article. In thus passing from one character to the other, there is a pleasant variety, a refreshing change of sentiment, unalloyed by any depreciating comparisons. The difference between them was that of nature and of circumstances, over which neither had any control; it was not a difference which arouses in our minds the least moral preference. As Bourdaloue is grand and overawing from the solid foundation of true talent, of immense and consistent study, of extreme diligence and method in the composition of sermons; and lastly, of true and earnest piety which inspired their delivery with a crushing eloquence; so is Massillon equally powerful in his character and reputation, from a beauty of style, from a touching art of really gaining hold of the soul, and from a simple and devout phraseology; a beauty which the consideration of his whole career affords convincing proof was the true reflex of his inmost self, and not any external power of expression unconnected with the fountain of his real feelings. Massillon was born in Provence, in 1663, and was the son of a poor citizen. He was thus the origin of his own fortune, and confers honour upon his patrons who sought out merit and were not guided by influence in the exercise of their patronage. He entered the Oratory at seventeen, resolved to consecrate his labours to the

Church, and preferring the greater freedom of that order to the indissoluble ties of the great Jesuit. His superiors soon destined him for the pulpit, and he alone saw not the eminence before him. He shunned the first inroads of praise, and grieved over the sensation his own eloquence produced. It fell to him to preach the funeral orations of M. de Velleroy, Archbishop of Lyons, and of M. de Villars, Archbishop of Vienne. These were, indeed, but youthful essays; but he was so overwhelmed with applause, that, fearing the demon of pride, he went to the abbey of Septfonds, where the rules of La Trappe were followed. During his novitiate there a mandate was received from Cardinal de Noailles, which needed an answer. The Abbé himself, more pious than eloquent, deputed this task to the young Massillon. The Cardinal not fearing to offend the Abbé's pride by assuming that it was not his own writing, inquired who was the author, and having gained the information, recalled Massillon to the Oratory. Massillon excelled in eloquent appeals to the soul; he agitated and frightened his hearers, but did not overwhelm or depress them. His delivery was sweet, simple, touching, with a rich easy flow of language. That he was conscious of this power is evident from his answer to one who expressed his admiration of his language; 'The devil has already told me more eloquently than you.' His manner was quiet, his eyes cast down, and he used but little action. He did not excite his audience, but had a singular power of producing a profound silence. The Court early desired to hear him, and he preached before Louis XIV. who received him with the greatest favour. His first text before the gay French Court was, 'Happy they who mourn.' It is of him that it has been said under different versions of the same story, that he sent away from his preaching, not admirers of himself, but converted sinners. It is singular indeed that this practical commendation should have been peculiarly his, for he of all other preachers was the man, from the natural grace of his language, to suggest personal admiration. It was probably for this very reason that the refutation of any such weakness is especially mentioned to his honour. He suggested the idea, and therefore claimed its contradiction. Massillon, as is not unfrequently the case with men of such peculiar sweetness of temper, excited very great envy, and many prejudices against him were industriously circulated. The consequence of this was that for the last eleven years of Louis XIV.'s life he never preached at Versailles. Louis XIV. died in 1715, and Massillon commenced preaching in 1699; therefore only five years are left, during which his preaching was contemporaneous with Bourdaloue, for the raising his name to distinction and his

sermons at Court during that reign. It is said that, after Bourdaloue's death, he suffered from an extraordinary unwillingness on the part of the Parisian public to admit any other preacher into the place of one whom for so many years they had adored. The jealousy, however, between the Jesuits and Oratorians probably accounted for it. Two years after Louis XIV. died, he was appointed Bishop of Clermont, partly, it is said, that the business of a remote diocese might prevent him from preaching in Paris to the discomfiture of many inferior aspirants then rising up. It was in this interval that he again returned to Court, and that he preached his celebrated *Petit Carême* before the young king, then nine years of age. These sermons are on the relationships which should exist between a king and his subjects, and generally on the bearing of different orders of society, the one to the other. The Abbé de Fleury well illustrated the exquisite fitness of these sermons for the young king, and the close application of their counsel to the circumstances for which they were preached, by comparing Massillon, in their delivery, to the prophet Elisha, lying upon the child of the Shunammite woman, putting his mouth upon his mouth, his eyes upon his eyes, and his hands upon his hands.

Massillon, from the commencement of his episcopate, set a brilliant example in his zeal to perform the duties of a bishop. He carried out most strictly the law of residence. He no longer preached at Paris, but devoted all his powers to the well-being of his diocese, where his chief energies were exerted in works of love and self-sacrifice. He was profusely liberal in almsgiving, and was only restrained, by feelings of justice to his successor, from giving up every secular right and privilege of his office. He was content with the smallest allowance for personal expenses, and never betrayed one lingering thought of regret for a Parisian life. His delight was to assemble in his palace those who differed in opinion, that he might see, under the influence of his loving spirit, all asperities softened. Oratorians and Jesuits, most jealous of each other, he set down together at the chess-board, telling them, with a fatherly smile, never to be more serious in their opposition and contests. It is in Massillon's sweetness of life, in his diffusion of charity and good-will all around him, as if Christian love was the very atmosphere he breathed, that we have the surest proof of the sincerity of his eloquence. The sweetness and beauty of his words came from a heart that was in harmony with them. Like the other great preachers we have noticed, Massillon was a reformer of corruptions and abuses, or a declaimer against them. Bossuet strove hard in controversy for a reconciliation of Western Churches, and would have granted many con-

cessions, to receive the divided members of Christendom into one Church; and Massillon, by practical discipline in his diocese, put down many of those profane observances and disgraceful processions which had sprung up in the Gallican Church. He issued an order for their suppression, and a tumult was created, which none could quell till Massillon himself brought into good service that power of producing silence which was the attribute of his eloquence. He calmed the multitude, and gained his end. The people of his diocese adored him; they hailed him as he passed by them, with 'Long live our Father!' and, as if to prove how true this greeting was, they mourned his loss with many touching tokens of regret. He died in 1742, 'as a bishop should die, without money, and without debts.'

The biographical notice before us concludes with some interesting criticisms, of the same character that we met with in Bossuet's Memoirs, on the comparative merits of Bourdaloue and Massillon. Various analogous conjunctions of names are again brought forward, such as putting Massillon in the same relation to Bourdaloue as Cicero was in to Demosthenes, and Racine to Corneille,—but these are wisely rejected as useless parallels,—and a few impartial comments made on the different circumstances of each. 'When Bourdaloue appeared, the pulpit,' it is said, 'was still barbarous, vying with the theatre in buffoonery, and with the scholar in dryness. The Jesuit, therefore, as preceding Massillon, would naturally acquire the greater glory at the time, in establishing a more worthy style of preaching. He who first pulls up the thorns, gains the greatest celebrity.' Now, however, that we are far removed from the circumstances of their respective lives, there is no doubt that Massillon is the more general favourite, and that it is popularly considered the greatest glory of Bourdaloue that the preeminence of the other is disputed. 'Bourdaloue,' our writer says, 'is only read by preachers and by pious souls,' that is, for devotion and instruction, while all read Massillon. In point of quantity, the latter exceeded: but here it must be remembered that Bourdaloue stood a greater test than the others, inasmuch as he preached for a much greater length of time before the Court, which then was the acutest audience in France. He preached at the Court for thirty-four years, while Massillon was only very occasionally at Versailles, and left Paris altogether when in the prime of life. Voltaire, we are informed, took Massillon as his model of prose writing, and had on his table the *Petit Carême* by the side of *Athalie*, which was his favourite poem. Massillon, it is said, once failed in remembering his sermon, when preaching before Louis XIV. Making a short pause, the king said to him, 'It is well that you pause,

‘in order that we may dwell on the fine and useful things you ‘have told us.’ After this he was accustomed to read his sermons; and so much stress did he wisely lay on ease of delivery, that when asked which of his sermons he thought were best, he replied, ‘those which he knew best.’

Even with this short notice of the three great preachers, Bossuet, Bourdaloue, and Massillon—for our author takes no notice of him who was contemporaneous with the two first, we mean the celebrated Fléchier—we think it must be clear that they earned their name by most worthy and legitimate means, and that they fully deserve to be classed as a school of sermon-writing, which all ages would benefit themselves by studying. Studying we say; for let us protest against young divines translating and preaching these sermons as they stand. Much of their aroma is lost in translation: an English congregation is not the French Court; and, with all their excellences, they betray the artist and science of composition. English taste, as well as English needs, require something more plain, didactic, and personal. Besides, the lapse of a century, or a century and a half, makes a vast change in the requirements of the pulpit. Still, let these great preachers be studied. The brilliant genius of Bossuet, full of similes and figures—the real substance and method of Bourdaloue—with the finished oratory of Massillon, would be a course of study that could not fail to improve any one’s preaching, especially when the whole lives of these literary models are known to have been also most bright examples of different vocations in the Church of Christ. The principal object of study, for practical use, would, we feel sure, be Bourdaloue. He was the preacher by profession. His sermons are a perfect mine of fresh and beautiful ideas, and of grandly displayed theological truths. Take, for instance, his sermon on the Passion, before alluded to, where he proves the cross to have been the triumph of the power of the Son of God. In reading that sermon, there is nothing to prepare one for anything grand. He begins in a quiet, scholar-like manner; with great method and order, he lays out the plan of his sermon; he exhibits no marks of dashing off a brilliant piece, in a fit of enthusiasm: but, after reading for a short time, a vivid and a striking picture dawns upon one which can never be forgotten. The Cross, as it were, stands out before one’s mind, covered with high trophies of honour and glory, taken from every age of revelation, and every narrative that is told us in Scripture as past or to come. The prophets, in foretelling of the Cross, all contribute to the power of Him who died on it. His own foreknowledge, and His own willing submission to the pains of death, increase also, under this description, beyond all human

appreciation, that glory which could both create the highest wonder of divine truth, and also, at the same time, be the passive victim of its operation. Bossuet's style is eminently intellectual, but often rather too metaphysical for popular comprehension. He is a deep prober into self-deception, and seems to turn the human heart completely inside out, in portraying how crafty and insidious are the many forms of deception. Yet even these sermons are based on such a sound philosophy, and there are in them so many simple appeals to real goodness of heart, that the metaphysical parts are cleared up, and the whole rendered brilliant by a series of vivid pictures. In his sermon on the text, 'I delight in the law of God after the inward man,' the real depth of his philosophy is worthy of our own Bishop Butler, though clothed in more easy and attractive language. The law of God in the inward man is described as analogous, in the first instance, with the law which every other creature must have for its own guidance,—with this difference, however, that man's law is a ray of divine light, which he, having an intelligent spirit, may see, and by which he may freely direct himself. The mystery of illumination, which baptism is called, renews this inward law, and makes it to be within us a kind of mirror, into which we should ever be looking to see our true nature. He then describes the many ways in which people, on the one hand, deceiving themselves, before they will look into this mirror, dress themselves up in false colours; and, on the other hand, dreading their own deformity as seen by themselves, deface the mirror itself, and violently corrupt its purity as a clear reflection of the plain word of God.

Bourdaloue treats the subject of self-deception in another and characteristic manner. In his sermon on Christian and Pharisaic severity, he draws most wonderful pictures of false severity. He does not accomplish his end by brilliant similes or figures, but by a number of earnestly-stated reflections, and well-drawn descriptions of many kinds of severity, such as outward discipline, the frequent use of the confessional, fasting, the pride of a moral life, &c., in which many self-willed persons find a substitute for that noble devotion, which really offers up, in true severity, the secret inclinations of the heart, the inward pride of reason, and the love of self. The sermons of Bourdaloue are blamed for their many divisions and subdivisions, and for their exact and studied method. In him this was necessary, otherwise the prodigious variety of matter would have created only confusion of mind in the hearers. The sermons, again, are much longer than we are now accustomed to hear, and therefore would naturally require several breaks and changes to keep up attention. Subdivisions are intolerable when there is no subject

matter in the first instance to divide : but, used as they are by Bourdaloue, we think that they give a peculiar dignity to the opening of the sermon. What, moreover, are objected to by M. Bungener, as too refined subdivisions, are not such at all, but only different ways of conveying the ideas of his main divisions. As an extreme instance, he gives the following scheme of his sermon on final impenitence :—

‘ The first die in a state of actual impenitence ; the second, without any feeling of penitence ; the last, in the delusion of a false penitence. The first are the most criminal, the second the most unhappy ; the third are neither so criminal as the first, nor so unhappy as the second ; they are, however, unhappy because they are blinded, and criminal because they are sinners. I shall accordingly, call the impenitence of the first, a criminal impenitence,—that of the second, an unhappy impenitence,—that of the third, a disguised impenitence. And after having delineated these three characters, I shall add three reflections. An impenitent life conducts to criminal impenitence at death, by the way of inclination ; this is my first part. An impenitent life conducts to unhappy impenitence at death, by the way of punishment ; this is my second division. An impenitent life conducts to disguised impenitence at death, by the way of deception ; this is my third division.’—*Ibid.* pp. 57, 58.

Now first: this translation, though fair on the whole, is still expressed with peculiar bareness, and no judgment can be formed without reading the previous introduction to this briefly laid down plan. In the original sermon, this passage comes naturally enough, and does not astonish the reader with the same appearance of intricacy which it is here made to assume. Apart, however, from this question, it is evident that there are after all no subdivisions here given. He starts with three main divisions, and is anxious that a distinct idea should be impressed on the minds of his hearers, as to each of these three heads, which are to be brought before them. He therefore repeats that one idea in different words ; he does not however subdivide it. In his noble sermon on the Holy Trinity, he follows out the same method with a most happy effect. After giving out the text, ‘ In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,’ he opens in this striking yet simple manner, ‘ Behold, Christian, in three words the summary of our faith, the foundation of our religion, the mark of our profession, the most august of our mysteries.’ After a solemn exordium on the grandeur of the subject, he then, ‘ that he may speak usefully,’ lays down three propositions, *i. e.*, three ideas which are to be worked out in the three main parts of his sermon. First, that the profession of this faith is the most glorious act we can render to God ; second, that it is the most solid foundation of our hopes ; and, thirdly, that it is the bond of charity which ought to exist among the faithful. Here are three ideas, and

he then proceeds, not to subdivide them, but to explain them a second time, and to look at them from a different light. The first, he says, will show us what we do for God, the second what we do for ourselves, and the third what we ought to do for each other. He even does this again, describing the first as the greatest homage of faith, the second the greatest subject of confidence, and the third the most powerful motive to charity. In following out this sermon, we are no more involved in the subject of division, except to announce the opening of each of these parts. No subdivisions even then occur—but each idea is worked out in a plain and natural manner, and in this sermon especially, with the greatest beauty. Each of these parts would form a sermon of the length common among ourselves, and in this there would occur not a single formally stated division. Sermons on Trinity Sunday, in our own Church, are often dreaded as especially dull: but it is Bourdaloue's art to rise with the dignity of his subject, and to give a singular interest to what may be thought dogmatic statements. He associates the names of the Sacred Trinity with each most solemn period of life, and each act of our love to God. He shows these Names to be a very part of our Christian life, and with an awful pathos, pictures the last offices of the Church over the dying, when these Holy Names are then all in all.

The conclusion which M. Bungener draws from this alleged refinement of divisions, is as follows:—

‘It is accordingly not astonishing, that he has such difficulty in learning his sermons, such fear of losing a single word. Pages written in this way must be memorized like the Lord's Prayer. Let a single idea escape you, —all is lost; drop a single link, and you are at a loss where to take it up again. From this course proceeds the inexpressible anguish, which our illustrious friend never fails to experience until he reaches the last word of his sermon. His eyes almost always closed, his motions uneasy,—his sentences too fast or too slow,—his gestures often unsuited to his subject,—everything betrays the prodigious effort of memory which is an actual torture to himself, and to those who are so unfortunate as to perceive it. Moreover, he does not attempt to conceal it from himself; he submits to it, as the sailor to his oar, and the peasant to his plough. It is not until after he has preached the same discourse several times, that he begins to be confident, and himself to join a little in the pleasure which his words confer upon us.’—*Ibid.* pp. 58, 59.

We can only make one comment on this statement, which is, that we neither believe in the causes or the result here described, any more than we believe that he preached with his eyes shut, because his portrait was taken after his death.

Bourdaloue's style is one to inspire a fatherly confidence in his hearers. All his little apostrophes and reflections, his epithets of affection, his addresses to Sacred Persons, are all introduced with singular skill, or rather with the eloquence of

truth and sincerity. Intellectually also he inspires great confidence by his calm and clear announcements, at the opening of a sermon, of what he is about to do. We feel that there is power and substance in him, as he methodically informs you of his plan. Never also did he deceive this confidence. If you read an elaborate exordium, you will find every particular fully developed; the plan is no framework, destitute of contents that are worthy of or in proportion to itself. There is no appearance of its being the chief work in the sermon, but it plainly assumes the subordinate and proper place, of marshalling and arranging a great mass of thought previously conceived. One great strength which Bourdaloue enjoys in framing his eloquence, is his own deep reverence for the great truths of religion, and the ministrations of the Church. He speaks not as an individual, but as the humble enunciator of the views and counsels of the Christian Church. This gives him a dignity far more than personal, and inspires a confidence in his words, quite of a different, and that higher kind, from any affectations of art, however successful they might be. There is throughout his sermons a grand elevation, yet simplicity of tone, which keeps you nearer to the pathetic than you are quite aware of; till all at once—with the subject, and not with the preacher—you find yourself, by a wonderfully slight transition, in the very realms of poetry, though you imagined yourself but in an even flow of quiet prosaic teaching. As a collection of sermons, Bourdaloue's are as complete as any extant. The fifteen volumes before us go through every Sunday and holiday of the Christian year. There are several courses for Advent and Lent, and many occasional sermons for charitable institutions, besides many others on subjects not peculiar to any season or occasion.

What now can be said of the sermons of Massillon? In the first place, it may truly be said that his sermons are undoubtedly written in a style which will bear a more direct transfer to the English pulpit than either of the other two we have mentioned. As coming last, his language is a step more in advance towards the easy flow of modern writing. The fact also that so much more space is occupied by him in bringing out each idea, makes it more practicable with the majority of writers to feel at home in his style, than in one more strongly contrasted with their own, by greater profusion of thought. Massillon is much more generally known in England than the others; the touching gentleness of tone, especially on subjects that meet with popular favour, gives him a preeminence in modern taste which it would be hard to supplant. Take for instance his sermon on the widow's son of Nain, which he

divides into the two subjects of fearing death too much, and also too little, both leading us to put the thought of death from us. On subjects and reflections of this kind, Massillon is unequalled. There is, however, this difference between Massillon and the others. If you take Massillon at all, you must take his language verbatim; whereas from the others you derive ideas, which may reappear in any other dress. On the whole we should say that, however distorted some of M. Bungener's remarks about Bourdaloue may be, he is right in the following comparison of the respective claims of him and Massillon to the fame of posterity:—

'As to the reputation of Bourdaloue, whether as orator or writer,—the brilliancy which it has resumed in our days is one sign of the return of the public taste, and of literature in particular, to solid and serious things. Now, this could not be the case in regard to the reputation of Bourdaloue, without thereby casting more or less reflection on that of Massillon. The latter for a long time had the misfortune, we will not say of being too much praised, but of being too openly preferred to his illustrious rival; in proportion as people were just towards the one, they became severe towards the other. "The greatest glory of Bourdaloue," said D'Alembert, "is that the superiority of Massillon should be still a contested point." Massillon's greatest glory, we should say at the present time, is that he yet has the honour to be put on a footing with Bourdaloue. "*Oportet illum crescere, me autem minui*," said the Jesuit, when, old, and broken down, he beheld the first successes of the young and brilliant orator; and behold posterity reverses it. It is for you, Massillon, to decrease, and for you, Bourdaloue, to increase.

'Is this as it should be? We think so. Not that we approve of those people who cannot praise one man without undervaluing another; but in this case there is something more reasonable and better founded than the old mania for criticism, or rather the old mechanical necessity of the human heart.

'From continually hearing the style of Massillon commended, we have contracted the habit of considering him as nothing more than an able artificer in style. From this cause, his immense reputation in the eighteenth century, a period when style was everything; from this also, the loss of this reputation, which could not fail to take place in the nineteenth, when principles have resumed the precedence of form, and thought the precedence of style.'—*Ibid.* pp. 233, 234.

Of Massillon's sermons, then, we shall say but little more. Their finished beauty is undisputed as oratory, and they are far more known in this country than Bourdaloue's. We think, however, that it is the higher praise to be able to say, that Bourdaloue is read for real practical use by preachers, and also as a devotional writer, than that Massillon, after spending the last years of his life in polishing up his former writings, is read by all, the infidel Voltaire included. Each writer, however, has his place, as a study of oratory; and, after Bourdaloue, the graceful finish of Massillon will, if duly appreciated, add beauty to strength, and give to the student of sacred eloquence the

decorated capital that completes the classic proportion of his educational column.

But it maybe asked, Why commend to the attention of our own Church, at the present time, the preachers of the French Church, nearly two centuries ago? Would it not be better to refer at once to the primitive Fathers and our own standard divines, and then trust to good sermons being written from an earnest appreciation of abstract truth? Master minds, who are truly original in their style, may do this; but for the general improvement of English sermons,—we will not say pulpit oratory, for such a thing hardly exists,—we are sure that a model is wanted, of a more completely formed character than a general reference to the Fathers would supply. A sermon is a thing *sui generis*. It is not talk; it is not an essay; it is not a declamation; it is not a simple transfer of personal feelings from one man to others; it is not a bare howling of the animal voice, or a sedative of gentle elocution; it is not the speech of an advocate in a court of justice; neither is it at all to be compared with the oration of a statesman. It is not sufficient to begin sermon-writing with the simple intention of telling the congregation such and such things, which are thought would be useful; it is not enough to expound Scripture in general terms; it is not enough to lay down sternly the Church's laws; it is not enough to be pathetic in scenes of touching interest. A sermon requires a little of everything, dressed up with a certain degree of art and tact, and even, where attainable, dignity and elegance of style. The writing of anything, be it poetry, history, novel, essay, pamphlet, or article, presupposes a certain posture of the mind, suitable to that work and no other. No writing is only an abstract expression of thought, but is framed for a certain definite purpose, to make its appearance in a particular manner, and in certain proportions according to the space allotted. Thus it is that writers soon fall into their own line, and their own kind of work, with very little power of change, however great and original they may be in their special province. The historian will often write a dull letter, and two or three pages of his history will look much out of place in the columns of a newspaper; whilst, on the other hand, the brilliant and prolific inditer of *leaders* would be an indifferent hand at any work which occupied time and the steady retention of ideas through whole volumes of print. The mind must grasp the entire outline of an undertaking—must understand the distinctive form of its intended perfection—before it can write its component parts, or put any true energy into the very opening sentences. The same also must be said of oratory. The ideas that will pervade the mind of a speaker, and form, as it were, the atmosphere of his mind

for the time being, will always shape themselves into a form and general outline, which varies essentially according to the circumstances and nature of the speech. The habit of preparing for one kind of oration, and for one arena, often makes it difficult to prepare for another, or to put the same amount of talent into a change of scene. The mind works in certain grooves, and when habituated to one guage, loses its freedom of action, if placed in another. Those giant minds which can do everything well are superhuman and fabulous, and the nearest approaches to them generally share in the common misfortune of great size, in being also rather clumsy. Everything that a man does well is a distinct creation of his mind, and bears about it an individuality. There is no such thing as speaking or writing in the abstract, any more than there is carpentering in the abstract, apart from creating chairs or tables; and the facility which practice gives to any one branch of an art is a clear proof that a vivid realizing of the whole work on hand is necessary to any freedom of the mind in executing the parts of it during the process of construction.

A sermon, to be properly written, requires this distinctive idea of its ultimate use, to as great an extent as any other thing that has to be made. No skill in any other writing will of itself improve the effect of a sermon. Its own peculiar nature must be the only basis on which it is founded. There are many requirements also which conduce to making sermon-writing even more an art peculiar to itself than any other literary composition. There are so many different kinds of thought, such great variety of material, such quick transition of ideas, all pressing on to overwhelm the writer, that without also some special helps, he would be indeed perplexed. A sermon is, indeed, supposed to be written in the study, like any other literary composition, for of extempore sermons we are not speaking; it is also delivered as an oration. Here, then, is a mixture of two distinct powers, which applies to no one else but preachers. No other writing is now professedly meant for recitation, nor is any other orally delivered address so avowedly written beforehand. Then, again, it is a mixture of divine and human considerations; it has to do with unseen mysteries, and with the most palpable results of human conduct. The knowledge to be displayed is partly sacred revelation, and partly the observation of most sublunary things. In part it must be simple statement of truth; in part, the imagination of the preacher must enliven attention. We expect the advocacy of the most simple faith; but also there is room for profound reasoning. Sweet and bitter pictures of human life are to be described with feeling and earnestness; yet the world is to be upheld as a fleeting shadow, about which we should

think but little. The very manner of writing and the delivery must alternate between the most deliberate enunciation of doctrine, as charged from heaven with matter far above the reach of human pathos, and, on the other hand, all the tenderness of a spiritual father, in teaching his children by direct addresses to them. Again, all this is to be done, not, as in the case of most writing and speaking, for one class of intellect, but for a mixed congregation of old and young, educated and uneducated. Such are but a few of the peculiar difficulties of sermon-writing, which prove the work to be *sui generis*. There are many helps also to relieve this burden, such as the dignity of the office, which favourably disposes an audience to respectful attention, and the solemnity of the subjects discussed, which forbids too rude criticism, as well as ensures real matter for serious contemplation, however imperfectly illustrated by the individual preacher.

Sermon writing being thus an art differing from any other kind of literary work, it follows that there ought to be special aids in acquiring some accurate knowledge of what a sermon should be, and also in learning how to carry out this knowledge in actual composition and delivery. There is the more occasion for such assistance, from the obvious fact that the preaching of sermons cannot be left only to certain gifted individuals, who by genius can work their own way or else remain silent, as may be said of political oratory, but must be exercised by a very large class of average minds. Whatever the details of such assistance might be, it is certain that models of the art will be an essential part of it; models not so far removed from the ideas of our own time as to render them deficient in practical guidance. To inspire the great mass of clergy throughout our Church with anything like the spirit of Christian oratory, will need a living school of the art, which shall both supply models and also act as a stimulant; but whether we can aim at anything like an ecclesiastical order of the oratory in our Church, or must be content with the isolated endeavours of the clergy to raise the standard of preaching in themselves, it is in both cases equally certain that the study of the great French preachers may be of infinite service. They are the very types of what is popularly understood by a sermon, and they are types not only in general character and design, but in execution also. It is often rather presumed that the modern type of sermon is the offspring of ultra-protestantism, and is calculated to supplant a due observance of the Church ritual. But how can this be said with the Church of France, during the age of Louis XIV., before us? For sixty years, during the most palmy days both of the French court and of the supremacy of the Church of Rome in France, did the people of France listen to a succession of preachers

whose names are now unrivalled for pulpit oratory, and whose sermons afford to this day so excellent a model of the art that French Protestants themselves and American Presbyterians are feign to hold them up for imitation.

The external circumstances of a sermon remain very much the same as when these men preached. They overcame all the quaintness that had preceded their time, and at once assumed the style of a highly educated clergy preaching, not missionary sermons to heathen, but practical and instructive sermons suitable to the every day life of Christians, warning against the real temptations which belong to a civilized condition of society, and exposing weaknesses which are felt at once to be those stumbling-blocks in the way of religion, which are actual and real.

There is no coarseness and rudeness to startle perhaps once, but disgust if repeated; but there is penetration and a skilful laying bare of the secret intentions of the heart, which no ordinary cloak of deception can withstand. With what perfect good taste, yet severity, does Bourdaloue, for instance, in his sermon on 'offence' for the second Sunday in Advent, address the ladies of the Court, on the dangers they put in the way of the gay and thoughtless, by courting their admiration, perhaps with no thought of harm, but only to please their vanity; he pictures the manners of gay society, the habits and customs which may pass as among the ordinary routine of high life, but which, nevertheless, he shows to be too often the cover under which a vain love of admiration may stir up ill passions in others that will be an offence to them. This kind of subject in older writers would be dealt with too quaintly (to use the mildest expression) to form a model in our own time; but in the French preachers we have the searching exposure united with such language, which, though severe and dignified, is not offensive or ridiculous to modern ears.

Before, however, making any practical suggestions for the improvement of the art of preaching in our own Church, let us review the actual position in which this art now stands; and if we find it at a low ebb we may perhaps point out some reasons and causes which may suggest a remedy.

We are no great wanderers in search of preaching; and many of the best sermons are unknown to the world, going no further than the congregations to which they are regularly addressed; but still, judging from those which are published, and from such remarks on the subject as a criticising laity will sometimes indulge in, we cannot but think that the sermons of our day are but indifferent. This is not from want of power to write, or from want of concern in the matter, but partly from external circumstances,

which almost necessitate dryness of style, and partly from the want of any real and distinct notion of what a sermon should be, that practical notion we mean which is the result of methodical study. The general complaint is that sermons are dull, that there is no life, no eloquence in them, nothing to dwell on the memory, and that they are deficient in plain teaching. Preachers are accused of going over the heads of the poor, and aiming too exclusively at educated understandings; while at the same time those more educated hearers, far from appreciating the sacrifice of others in their behalf, go home saying that Mr. So-and-So is a good sort of man, but his sermons are very dry. Occasionally, however, we do meet with instances which cannot be set down among the common-place. Some of these are really good and impressive, and thus claim a meritorious distinction; but many more are conspicuous, not for anything better than simple dryness, but for ill-judged vulgar eccentricity, for self-conceit, nay, for false doctrine and heresy. A bold preacher generally means an arrogant, self-opinionated, ill-read man, whose boldness consists in defying the rules and feelings of his Church, or even the essential doctrines of religion. How seldom do we meet with a bold impressive sermon, that also bears the mark of the educated scholar, the well-read theologian, and the man of acute feelings and sensitive taste! Yet there are clergy of our Church, who are well-educated and well-read, and men of good taste in the affairs of life. There is material among us for a very good performance of any duties required from them as a class of educated men. We are therefore disposed to think that there is specific failing in their pulpit eloquence; and that they could do better if circumstances had brought out their real powers for this purpose. Why is it that sermons are so connected with sleep, and that drowsiness is the inevitable consequence of a few minutes' session under a pulpit? With eagerness do people follow after an orator where he is to be found;—with pleasure will they sacrifice their time and convenience to hear a good speech in a court of justice from some clever member of the bar, and amid crowd and heat the time flies away, so that at the end of an hour they seem only to have just got well into the subject, and are braced up for any further length which they may be called upon to hear;—with breathless silence will the House of Commons and a few lucky possessors of strangers' seats, be absorbed in a speech of hours' duration. The introduction of a budget has on two recent occasions occupied five or six hours, while not only a house crowded to suffocation has fairly shown its power of outlasting the physical endurance of the orator; but the very purlieux and lobbies have been filled, as if the mere proximity to

eloquence were of itself a pleasing sensation. But when the Sunday sermons arrive, how great the difference! In ten minutes there seems to have been enough of it. After that all is maze and confusion, between an ill-regulated manner of marking out his subject on the part of the preacher, increased by a droning mere reading delivery, and of a wandering sleepiness on the part of the listener. Should the whole exceed half-an-hour there is obvious impatience, as if an unjust punishment was being inflicted. We have heard that it is avowed by a celebrated statesman, one whose head has been severely tested by many labours, that he can get through all he has to do with patient endurance, except the hearing of sermons, which, nevertheless, he feels it his duty to submit to; nor, it may be right to remark, do we here refer to any kind of unpleasantness but that of being bored by unprofitable and unsatisfactory discourses. How few of our bishops can preach even respectably, with the exception of those who are worked to death to make up for the inability of others! There are popular preachers, run after by some, but, as we said before, there is an element of bad taste about most of the present day, which only the more proves what we would wish to substantiate, that there is great need in the education of our clergy of some means to train up, in good taste and in something like method, those who may have a natural power of language.

What are the causes, then, which, in a well-educated clergy like our own, depress that development of a good and true eloquence which might naturally be expected? Some of these causes may be unavoidable, and so far these results must be endured; but let us at any rate know them.

The much talked of perfection of the parochial system must, we fear, bear part of the blame. According to it the whole country is most usefully parcelled out into certain manageable districts, over which an Incumbent presides, whose province it is generally supposed to be twofold; firstly, to do certain work himself, or obtain the assistance of assistant clergy in the shape of Curates to do it for him; and, secondly, to watch with jealous eye against the intrusion of any one else within his boundary. No other functions are recognised in our Church, no other licences are given, but in connexion with the parochial system. The Incumbent then, once in his parish, remains the sole dispenser of all Christian ministrations for perhaps his whole life, among which ministrations the custom of the age requires that he shall preach two sermons every Sunday of a respectable given length, to the same congregation. Whether he has any vocation for eloquence or not, that makes no difference; he may have been presented to his living for considerations far

different from such as would promise oratory; but, however incapable, he is nevertheless bound to the inevitable law of certain fixed sermons. This extreme uniformity in the exactions from every clergyman, be his vocation what it may, is of itself depressing to the general standard. It follows from it that a sermon ceases to be a real address from priest to people, and is looked upon by church-going people as but a form to be gone through, utterly regardless of the idea that they are being told of something which they must therefore do. A clergyman who ventures for once to give plain advice, or who endeavours to rouse his people, discovers that his words are lost in the very multitude of his sermons, many of which perhaps have been preached, less perhaps because he was conscious of anything that he wished to say, than because he was obliged to mount the pulpit. The number of sermons to be preached often outsteps all power of composition, and suggests the reading of those which are neither original nor new. On the other hand, the congregation, from hearing sermons so methodically and frequently, lose their relish and appreciation for really stirring addresses, and even dislike the worry and excitement occasioned by them. Anything that is a departure from the quietness of the Sunday, that occasions talk or risks controversy, is thought an innovation on their peace, and a preacher is a fanatic who will not allow his congregation to slumber through his discourses. It thus follows that quiet clergymen, who are personal friends with their flock, who visit their houses, and dine with the respectable families, who are mixed up with them in many secular affairs, become so overlaid with a variety of quieting considerations, and are so void of foreign stimulus, that they are never able to command that freshness and vigour which are the requisite state of mind for a preacher to be useful and impressive. A clergyman's intercourse with his people, according to present custom, is only of that kind which rather weighs down his character as a preacher, and he has but little of that other kind of intercourse which admits him into the recesses of their hearts, and opens out a mutual confidence in spiritual affairs. He is good-naturedly received as a friend, and in that intercourse is led into the common familiarities of life, but he is not supposed to counteract the secular impressions by an inward knowledge of the hearts of his flock, and by the sobering effect on himself, which the sensation of being truly the physician to each individual soul would occasion. These remarks apply to the younger clergy in the first instance, but the style of preaching, being formed under the influence of these somewhat depressing causes, remains the same ever afterwards, and can never be shaken off. Here indeed is a great cause of the dulness we

allude to: that clergy begin to preach at once, with the same regularity that will be required of them all through their ministry. Thus the delivery of sermons is never, except in a few of the larger metropolitan or country-town churches, associated with a gradually-inspired confidence, either on the part of the congregation or of ecclesiastical superiors. The exclusiveness, again, with which all religious functions in each parish are isolated, as it were, from the rest of the Christian world, and by the absence of common ties, by which parts of the same Church may hold common cause with many brethren, is a means of preventing many mutual interchanges of Christian friendship, both in priest and people, which might stimulate and encourage both to their mutual advantage. It is hard to keep up a sound and useful course of sermons, when the preacher and people are both mixed up in the affairs of daily life which mark the limits of one small parish, when two sermons have to be preached every Sunday, and when there are no opportunities of infusing fresh life, by occasional changes on the part of each. Yet such is our present system. How it might be otherwise we shall presently suggest, and meanwhile go on with our review of hindering causes.

The services of our Church are too long, especially the morning accumulation, for the sermon to have any fair chance. The inseparable connexion also between all sermons and the ritual of the Church, which prohibits any preaching except as following morning or evening prayers; or, on the other hand, any prayers but when followed by a sermon, is a great bar to the formation of what otherwise might be attractive occasions for assembling people together; at which, with some degree of freedom, a clergyman might address them rather for the purpose of *bringing* them to the Church's prayers and ordinances, than only on the condition of their being already attendants. The arrangement of churches, where the pew system is carried, is also detrimental to the warmth of preachers, inasmuch as it scatters his flock far and wide, contrary to all instincts which bring listeners together in one compact body round the speaker who is addressing. There are also no opportunities of preaching to different classes by themselves. Each congregation is composed of the same elements, rich and poor, young and old. It might surely be useful if occasional separation could be brought by some natural process, wherein each consulted his own convenience, in order that practical advice might be given to every condition of life, without that irritation which is often the consequence of one class being too closely lectured in presence of others, or without the miserable expedient of *ragged churches*. In fact, what we are wishing to advocate amounts to this; that

churches and services may acquire a greater freedom, may be open to all occasions, and under a greater variety of circumstance than our present rigid laws of uniformity permit of.

A great practical deficiency, however, in our Church is the almost entire absence of any training in composition and delivery, having the pulpit especially in view. There are no schools of oratory at the Universities; no college of preachers under the sanction of ecclesiastical authority, like the different orders of Oratorians that have at various times and places adopted this work as their peculiar mission; and there are also no institutions in each diocese, having for their object the encouragement of sound Christian oratory, either by means of direct instruction, preparatory, and even subsequent to orders; or by means of supplying living examples and models; if such we might call good preachers, who, known also for their solid attainments and high character, might in many ways be a stimulus to the parochial clergy. We might swell out the list of impediments to eloquence much further, but we have said enough for practical purposes, and now we shall briefly suggest such remedies as seem to us not wholly visionary or impossible.

The feeling that some stimulus is required in the way of preaching is so general, that some have advocated out-of-door or street preaching. This is not the line we would take. If any clergymen feel that they can do real good by this plan, and if, in the execution of it, they can avoid any unpleasant contact with the police, and can preserve order, let them do it. This must be, however, on their own responsibility; and, for ourselves, we should prefer a systematized reformation of the present state of things, to such a foreign appendix. This climate is not suited to out-of-door preaching, at least for any great portion of the year; and as long as we have or can obtain churches, well covered in and proof against the elements, we see no reason for leaving them empty, whilst we stand outside in the wet and cold. The primeval use and intention of churches is to cover priest and people during the time of preaching, among other acts of religion; and the open air system is, to say the least of it, barbarous, as well as specifically inconvenient to delicate lungs. The policy of Churchmen should be to strive for a legitimate revival of the system which we inherit, and a real and energetic use of the whole machinery which is given to us. Where it appears inoperative, and clogged with difficulties, let us at any rate turn our attention to the task of obtaining greater freedom of action, and of cleansing away nuisances, before we leave it to itself, and establish ways and means of an external character.

To put new life into any system, or, indeed, to maintain its

efficiency at any time, it is of course, in the first place, essential to have a living government, with discretionary power to authorize arrangements. A mere statute-book Church, void of any such living and responsible authority, will inevitably fail in practical work. Let there be some power, then, to authorize, especially in large town churches and cathedrals, set preachings, with a few hymns and collects, as at the Universities, distinct from the present regular services. Let sermons be preached at times of the day which suit different classes of society, and different ages, so that occasionally, at any rate, each class may have counsel freely given to them, in plain terms, without the hindrance of others being present who might check the preacher's liberty. Let the several ordinances of the Church, as catechising, confirmation, preparation for communion,—or again, in more secular matters, the anniversaries of clubs and societies,—all be occasions of varying the monotony of our beaten track in sermon writing, by addressing those present on their distinctive duties or failings. Let the Bishop of each diocese, where practicable, preach in his churches occasionally, stirring up by his zeal both pastor and flock to renewed diligence and good-will. Let him also appoint the dean, canons of his cathedral, and others, to preach in the churches of his diocese, as ordered in the 'Constitution and Canons Ecclesiastical:' especially let this be done during the seasons of Lent and Advent. These seasons, well attended to as occasions for solemn preaching, would stimulate, twice a-year, the quiet monotony of parochial sermons. Let the naves of cathedrals be open to catch even passers-by in the streets of a city, as places where the voice of religion is to be heard, free and open to all who even casually would look in. Many who thus came even to 'scoff, might remain to pray.' How inaccessible is the preaching of our cathedrals, at present, to the poor and ignorant! Unconnected, however, with the ritual of the choir, we cannot but think that multitudes might be drawn in to hear words of persuasion from powerful, eloquent preachers, holding forth in the naves. Let the bodies, also, of large churches be used in the same manner, clearing away for the time the whole principle of appropriated seats. Let no prejudices exist either against a layman for hearing a sermon in another parish, or against the visit of an appointed preacher sent by the Bishop, with the Incumbent's consent, at the solemn seasons of the Church, into a parochial pulpit. In extreme cases, the rights of an Incumbent would preserve him from annoyance; and this is no more than is implied by the Canons, in ordering licensed preachers to be called in where the Curate of the parish is not so licensed; or than is yearly carried out in the Lent preachers appointed by the Bishop of London in his diocese. Many of these arrangements could only, perhaps, be carried

out in large towns; but, as it happens in them that some reformatory system is most needed, we might well be contented even if the example was not copied in rural districts, where the appointment, for instance, of Advent or Lent preachers would be a matter of difficulty and inconvenience.

But, to ensure good preachers, the Church must retain in her service men of power, of talent, of sound theological education, and of general high character. She must first educate them in the science of oratory; and having done so, she must not let all her high places and emoluments be disposed of for party and private ends, or for barter and simoniacal dealing: she must not do this, while all young men of talent and promise are brought up in other professions. She must so manage her worldly estate, that it may redound to her true efficiency. It might be aiming too high to have a Metropolitan College of Oratorians—men solely devoted to the work of preaching, and the study necessary for it; but the Training College for Orders, which we hope will soon be found in every diocese, should do much, under the direction of the Bishop and his officers, towards assisting in their studies those who, in a short time, will have to be preachers throughout the diocese. These institutions, if near the cathedral, might derive much advantage from that free use of the naves, which we have mentioned, for the purpose of attractive sermons. An example would thus remain in the recollection of the young student, which might long be a stimulus to his own exertions. At any rate the young ecclesiastic would not go to his parish, having had these things before him, without a strong sense of the necessity that lay on himself to use labour and care in the preparation of his sermons, and also to observe good taste and scholar-like habits, together with boldness and freedom, in their composition and delivery. To statesmen who have high patronage in their gift, we would strongly commend their duty of exercising it in such a way as may promote these ends. Bishops, deans, canons, and others, ought, by their office, to be the very men we have described,—public men, who can do their part before the world with zeal and ability. And if, to rise in political life, it is essential to possess powers of oratory, surely it is also needed, in ecclesiastical dignitaries, that at any rate a fair proportion should be so far eloquent, as to be impressive and sound Christian preachers. We are not without good hope for the future, from recent appointments in the Colonies, and with all due encouragement from statesmen, and from other members of the Church in their several vocations and ministries, we have that confidence in the powers and the earnestness of the main body of our rising clergy, that we look forward to another Augustan age of Christian oratory, to other Bossuets, to other Bourdaloues, and to other Massillons.

ART. IV.—*Some Account of the Council of Nicæa in connexion with the Life of Athanasius.* By JOHN KAYE, D.D., Lord Bishop of Lincoln. London: Rivingtons. 1853.

THE above work may be regarded as a legacy bequeathed to the Church by the learned and excellent prelate whose name it bears. The lamented death of the author has not only delayed its appearance, but has sent it into the world devoid of his own final revision. An Appendix, which the publishers had been led to expect would be found among his papers, has not appeared; and it is therefore concluded that Bishop Kaye had either abandoned his intention of forming one, or had not found leisure to carry it into effect. Prefixed to the whole is a short preface, which has been revised by his intimate and learned friend, the Rev. J. A. Jeremie, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge.

Bishop Kaye's work consists of three parts,—1st, that entitled, 'Account of the Council of Nicæa;' which, in fact, contains a history of the whole Arian heresy, from its rise to the death of Athanasius: 2dly, 'A digest of the four Orations of Athanasius against the Arians;' in which the author considers at length the arguments brought against the Christian and Catholic faith by those heretics, and their answer by S. Athanasius; and lastly, 'Some account of the tract *De Incarnatione Christi*;' an independent piece of that Father's, composed before the commencement of the schism.

We consider this work as a decided acquisition to the library of Theological students, that class for whom the author more immediately designed it. The great doctrine of which it treats, that of the Godhead of Jesus Christ our blessed Lord and Saviour, does in truth form the very foundation of the whole Christian faith, and is that on which the question of man's redemption must inevitably depend. Yet, vitally important as the subject is, we have scarcely any standard work on it, the mastery of which does not require more time and labour than most even of the Clergy, especially those in large towns, have to give. Bishop Bull's *Defensio*, of inestimable value as it is, deters the majority of readers by its length, and daunts them by its language. The style of Barrow is alone enough to repel any but the most resolute and persevering. Dr. Newman's elaborate and valuable work on the Arians

requires the reader to bring to its perusal a competent knowledge of the chief heathen schools of philosophy, added to an accurate and extensive acquaintance with the great doctrinal questions which had agitated the Church, previously to the time of Arius, and it is therefore of comparatively little benefit to the general student. It is besides, and has long been, unattainable, from its scarcity in the market. The translations from the works of S. Athanasius, in the Library of the Fathers, scarcely do more than prove that the doctrinal writings of that great champion of Christendom cannot be formally transferred from their own language without losing much, not only of their interest and spirit, but even of their primary force and significance.

Here, then, Bishop Kaye appears to us to step in with a very valuable work. In a volume, of which one, not the least, recommendation is, that it is not too lengthy or laborious, but is within at once the intellectual grasp and the pecuniary reach of every one who has a real desire to make himself acquainted with its subject, the author has depicted, with the utmost care, the history of the Church, during perhaps the most momentous period of her existence; and has represented, with the most scrupulous fidelity, the arguments both of Arius and his followers in support of their heresy, and of their great opponent, S. Athanasius, in its confutation. Bishop Kaye has approached his subject with his own clearness and acuteness; and to abundance of original learning he has added ample means, in the shape of references and foot notes, by which the reader may, if he please, further instruct himself. He shows throughout a keen appreciation of the true doctrine, in the enunciation of which, as we need scarcely say, he is to be most fully trusted. We cannot, indeed, avoid expressing a wish that we could discover in his pages something of that animation and fervour of which his subject is so preeminently worthy, and which Bishop Bull has shown it to be so capable of inspiring, when approached with a becoming sense of its deep importance. As it is, we fear that his style may tend to chill the feelings, and damp the interest of the reader. The author seems scarcely to have realized the full weight of his character and position. The lightest word of an aged and learned Bishop would come with incalculable weight on such a subject; and there are occasions on which even gentleness and forbearance are so greatly out of place, as almost to suffer change in their very nature. We would, however, say less on this point, because, in addition to the trite rule of '*De mortuis nil nisi bonum*,' the present work presents a favourable contrast, in this respect, to some of its author's earlier productions.

Bishop Kaye commences with a narration of the rise of the Arian heresy, in which he places before us the accounts of that event given respectively by Socrates and Sozomen; historians whose statements it has been too much the custom of theological writers to contrast, instead of attempting, as they might, to reconcile them with each other. The former lays the real blame of the whole dispute and division on Arius alone. He 'says that as Alexander was speaking one day, in the presence of the Presbytery and the other Clergy, somewhat too boldly on the great Mystery of the Unity in Trinity, Arius, imagining that he was introducing the doctrine of Sabellius, immediately contradicted him; and, actuated by a love of contention, proceeded to lay down a scheme of his own, in which, arguing from human things to Divine, he maintained, that if God the Father begat God the Son, it is plain that the latter had a beginning of existence, and that there was a time when He was not; from which it also results, that He had his existence from nothing.' Or, as Bishop Kaye forcibly says, 'In other words, He was a created being made out of things that were not.' Socrates goes on to say that the heresy soon spread through the whole of Egypt, Libya, and the Upper Thebes, and at length diffused itself over the rest of the provinces and cities; and that Alexander, finding how widely the evil had extended, thereupon, in much anger, called a council of many Bishops, in which Arius and his supporters were formally excommunicated.

The relation of Sozomen differs but slightly from this of Socrates. He tells us that Arius had been at first a zealous defender of the faith, but had, at the same time, upheld the innovations of the schismatical Meletius, on abandoning whom, he was ordained deacon by Peter, then Bishop of Alexandria, but was soon after excommunicated by that prelate, for condemning his rejection of the Meletian baptism. Having asked pardon for his offence, he was restored to communion and to the exercise of his office, by Achillas, and by him eventually promoted to the priesthood, Alexander himself holding him in high repute, until he presumed to teach those opinions of which no one had ever before heard. According to this historian, Alexander was accused by some of supineness for not interposing authoritatively on the first broaching of his heresy by Arius, and putting a stop to novelties which seemed to be opposed to the faith; but he himself thought it better, if possible, to obtain unanimity of opinion by persuasion, than to compel it by force. He therefore suffered the question to be freely debated by the Clergy; and when a first council could arrive at no decisive conclusion, he assembled a second, in which, after some hesitation, applauding, says Sozomen, now the one side and now the other,

he finally decided in favour of those who held that the Son was co-essential and co-eternal with the Father, and commanded Arius to receive the same doctrine. And on the heresiarch refusing to retract his former statements, he excommunicated him and such of the Clergy as supported him. It would seem that there is no real difference of statement in these two historians, and that their accounts may be easily harmonized; the apparent variation arising only from the fact that the account of Sozomen is more exact and ample than that of Socrates.

The immediate result of this necessary act on the part of Alexander was, that Arius forthwith proceeded to array his forces for a formal contest with his Bishop. He wrote to Eusebius, Bishop of Nicomedia, to whom he stated his belief that 'the Son was not ingenerate, nor in any respect a part of 'the Ingenerate, nor from any subject matter, but from things 'which were not. He subsisted by the will and counsel (of 'the Father) before all times and ages, Perfect God, Only 'begotten, Unchangeable; and He was not, before He was 'begotten, or created, or predestined, or founded.' Eusebius expressed his perfect approbation of this doctrine, saying, that what was made could not be before it was made, and must have a beginning of existence.¹ Alexander, on his part, sent to other Bishops and Metropolitans, to notify the heresy for which Arius had been condemned, and to caution them against receiving him into communion. Of the many letters which he wrote, that addressed to his namesake of Constantinople, and an encyclical epistle, have come down to us: in the former, 'he describes the Arians,' to use Bishop Kaye's words, 'as selecting those passages of Scripture which speak 'of the humiliation of Christ, and passing over those which 'declare His Godhead; thus insidiously instilling their opinions 'into the minds of those who frequented their assemblies. 'Ebion, he says, Artemas, and Paul of Samosata, were the fore-runners of Arius; but he derived his doctrine immediately 'from Lucian, who had adopted the cause of Paul, and had 'remained out of the communion of the Church during the incumbency of three successive Bishops of Antioch.' Alexander adds, that three Syrian Bishops, supposed by Valesius to be Eusebius of Cæsarea, Theodotus, and Paulinus, had espoused the cause of Arius, and confirmed him in his error.²

The exact order of events that followed, it is now scarcely possible to ascertain: it seems, however, certain that Arius soon after left Alexandria, and betook himself to Palestine, and

¹ Athanasius, *De Synodis*, § 17; Kaye, p. 7.

² And see Theodoret, *Hist. Book i. chap. 3.*

that from Nicomedia he wrote to Alexander, but in a strain which did not at all tend to heal the breach. He terms the Son 'a perfect creature of God, but not as one of the creatures; an offspring, but not as one of those who are generated.' He now also composed his 'Thalia,' which exhibits statements, if possible, still more shocking and detestable. A council was soon after summoned by Eusebius, Bishop of Nicomedia, and his partisans in Bithynia,¹ from which they wrote, as Sozomen says, 'to the Bishops in all places' to hold communion with him. In reply to this, a third council appears to have been held at Alexandria, in which Arius was a second time formally excommunicated by Alexander, with the concurrence of nearly one hundred Bishops, and in which, as would seem, the encyclical letter, of which Socrates gives a copy, was written. The chief substance of this letter is thus given by Bishop Kaye:—

'They affirmed that God was not always a Father: that there was a time when He was not a Father: that the Word of God did not always exist, but was made out of things which were not. The self-existing God having made Him who was not out of things which were not, there was consequently a time when He did not exist. The Son is a Being created and made; neither is He like in essence to the Father; nor the true Word of the Father by nature, nor His true Wisdom, but one of the things made and generated. The titles "Word and Wisdom" are improperly applied to Him, inasmuch as He Himself was made by the proper Word (or Reason) of God, and by the Wisdom in God, in which God made both Him and all things. He is, therefore, by nature liable to change, like all other rational creatures. The Word is also extraneous to and separate from the essence of God. Moreover, the Father is ineffable by the Son; for the Son neither perfectly nor accurately knows the Father, nor can perfectly see Him. The Son does not even know His own essence as it is; for He was made for our sakes, that God might use Him as an instrument in creating us: He would not have subsisted if God had not thought fit to create us. The Arians do not appear to have shrunk from the consequences of their opinions: for, when asked whether the Word of God might be perverted as the devil was, they answered in the affirmative, since He is by nature liable to change.

'We learn from the letter not only the tenets of Arius, but also the manner in which Alexander refuted them by appealing to Scripture.

'To the assertion that there was a time when the Word was not, Alexander opposed John i. 1: "In the beginning was the Word."

'To the assertion that the Son was one of the things made, the title of Only-Begotten, and the declaration of S. John i. 3, that all things were made by Him. He who was the Maker could not be on a level with the things which He made, nor could He who was the Only-Begotten be numbered with them.

'To the assertion that the Word of God was made from things that were not, Alexander opposed Psalms xlv. 1; cx. 3.

'To the assertion that the Son is unlike in essence to the Father, Colossians i. 15, where the Son is called the image; and Hebrews i. 3, where He is called the radiance of the glory of the Father; and John xiv. 9, where Christ says to Philip, "He who hath seen Me, hath seen the Father."

¹ Sozomen, i. 15; Fleury, book x. § 37.

'How,' Alexander asks, 'if the Son is the Word, or Reason, and Wisdom of God, can it be said that there was a time when He was not? for that were to say that God was then without the Word or Reason (*λόγος*), and without Wisdom. How can He be liable to variation or change, Who says of Himself, 'I am in the Father and the Father in me' (John xiv. 10); and 'I and the Father are One' (John x. 30); and of whom it is said by the Prophet, 'I am, and I change not?' Alexander refers also to Hebrews xiii. 8, 'Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.'

'To the assertion that the Son was made for us, Alexander opposes 1 Cor. viii. 6, where St. Paul says that all things are by Him; and to the assertion that He did not perfectly know the Father, the declaration of Christ himself (John x. 15): 'As the Father knoweth Me, even so know I the Father.' If the Son's knowledge of the Father is imperfect, so must also be the Father's knowledge of the Son; such is the impiety to which the assertions of Arius lead.'—Pp. 10—13.

In consequence, probably, of this letter, certain Bishops of Palestine finding Alexander firm in his rejection of the heresiarch, came together, and gave him and his adherents permission to assemble the people who were their followers in church (*ἐκκλησιάζειν*), on condition that they submitted to Alexander, and endeavoured to be restored to peace and communion with him. One of these Bishops was Eusebius of Cæsarea, the historian, of whom we now first hear as an active partisan of Arius.

Affairs remained in this position until Constantine, after the defeat of Licinius, A. D. 324, desiring the aid of the Bishops of the East, of which in the time of Constantine Egypt was reckoned a part, to put an end to the Donatist schism, and finding that they themselves were in a state of division, sent Hosius to Alexandria with a letter addressed jointly to Alexander and Arius, entreating them to terminate their differences, and restore to him his former peace. A council was held at Alexandria, but the efforts of Hosius met with no success, and he was compelled to return to Constantine at Nicomedia, without having been able to decide either the Arian or any of the minor questions which he had been despatched to settle.

Constantine now determined to refer the matter to a General Council; and in consequence, in the year 325, upwards of three hundred Bishops met from every country at the city of Nicæa in Bithynia. Bishop Kaye and other historians have given an account of the acts of the Council, and the deeds of the Emperor, and we shall therefore confine ourselves to the narration of such of their proceedings which have come down to us as have regard to the great doctrinal question then at issue. In these, S. Athanasius, then one of the Deacons of S. Alexander, bore the chief part. He, although only yet in his diaconate, was seated, as S. Gregory Nazianzen tells us, in the first place

of the assembly, and his chief opponents were Eusebius of Nicomedia, Theognis of Nice, and Maris of Chalcedon.¹

The Arians, as we are informed by S. Athanasius, 'were asked by the bishops with gentleness and humanity to give a reason for, and proofs of their assertions; but as soon as they began to speak they convicted themselves, for they contradicted each other, and were quickly reduced to silence, by which the turpitude of their heresy stood confessed. They were not ashamed to say that the Son was not in time before He was begotten, and even He was made from nothing (*ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*), and hence the Father was not always a father, but when the Son was created and made, then God was called his Father; for the Word is a creature and a work, and strange to, and unlike the Father in essence.'²

Now, too, they openly broached their doctrine, that Christ was not the true Wisdom and Word of God, saying, according to the same authority, 'The Son was not by nature the true Word of the Father, nor His only and true Wisdom; but, being a creature, and one of the things made, He is improperly called Word and Wisdom, for even He was created, like all things, by the Word which was in God; for the same reason, also, He is not very God.'³ Of the particular reasonings and discussions by which the Fathers of the Council refuted these monstrous and most wicked assertions we are unhappily ignorant, but the documents by which their authors attempted to support them were chiefly the following:—

1. A letter of Eusebius of Nicomedia, mentioned by S. Ambrose, who gives a short extract from it in his work *De Fide*, book iii. chap. 15, in which it is said, that 'if we call the Son of God true God, and uncreate, we confess Him to be of one substance with the Father' (*ὁμοούσιος*); an admission which, according to S. Ambrose, was the actual cause of the term *ὁμοούσιος* being introduced into the creed, namely, to use his own words, 'ut tanquam evaginato ab ipsis gladio, caput hæreseos amputarent.' From the close resemblance of the statements in this letter to the one which Eusebius addressed to Paulinus of Tyre previously to the Council, of which Theodoret has given a copy in the 6th chapter of the 1st book of his history, Fleury supposes that they may have been one and the same.

2. A document, if indeed it be not the letter last mentioned, offered by certain Arians, and referred to by Theodoret, *Hist. i. 7*, as *πιστέως διδασκαλία*, and, as it would appear, by Eustathius of Antioch, [quoted *ib. chap. 8*,] as *τὸ γράμμα τῆς Εὐσεβίου*

¹ And see Socrates, i. 8.

² S. Athanasius, *Nic. Def.* § 3.

³ S. Gregory, *Orat. 21*; cited by Tillemont, *History of the Council of Nice*, § 8.

βλασφημίας, both of whom state it to have been torn in pieces by the Council as soon as read.

A question of some moment is connected with this document, involving in a great degree the credit and orthodoxy of Eusebius of Cæsarea. Tillemont and Valesius think it to be the creed which that Bishop offered, as we know from his letter to the people of his See, to the Council, and which he says the Emperor received as orthodox, and exhorted all to assent to and subscribe, with the addition merely of the term 'of one substance.' If the above historians are correct, it is clear that Eusebius is guilty on the one hand of flagrant heresy, (for Eustathius says that 'its perversion caused immeasurable grief to the hearers, and irremediable shame to its author,') and, on the other hand, that in his account of its reception he has committed one of the most gross and palpable falsehoods recorded in history of a Christian Bishop.

Tillemont founds his opinion on the words of S. Athanasius, (§ 3, De Decret. Syn. Nic.) that the Council rejected the Eusebian statements, ἀνέλοντες ῥήματα, which however, as he half admits, do not bear him out in his opinion that Athanasius meant by these words to refer to the creed of Eusebius of Cæsarea, or that his creed was so destroyed.

Valesius, in his notes on Theodoret's seventh and eighth chapters, takes the γράμμα Εὐσεβίου of Eustathius to mean the Creed of Eusebius, as γράμμα is undoubtedly used by him soon after of the Creed of Nicæa, and from the accusation of Eusebius of Cæsarea by Eustathius [reported by Socrates, i. 23 (ad fin.)], of having depraved that creed, he concludes that the Eusebius mentioned by him in Theodoret was the Bishop of Cæsarea, rather than his namesake of Nicomedia.

But, 1st, although γράμμα may mean 'creed' in one instance, there is no necessity that it should do so in another; and, 2dly, it is plain that there is no such connexion between the two passages of Eustathius as Valesius contends for, and as would compel us to his conclusion. We should remember, too, that Eusebius denied the charge brought against him by Eustathius; which it is impossible to imagine that he could have done had he been publicly known as the author of doctrines so ignominiously repudiated by the Council: nor can we suppose that in this case Eustathius, who had suffered so much at his hands, and the hands of his party,¹ and was in consequence his determined enemy, would, by confining his accusation to Eusebius's perversion of the Nicene Creed, have lost the opportunity of striking what must have proved a fatal blow to his reputation.

¹ Theodoret, Hist. i. 21.

But, to put the matter beyond doubt, the creed of Eusebius is extant; and it is certain that the terms in which Eustathius describes the torn document are wholly inapplicable to it; 'there being nothing in that confession,' to use the words of Cave, 'that deserves so bad a character—nothing that savours either of heresy or blasphemy.' Indeed, we will say more even than this; we will put his creed side by side with that of the Council, and our readers will then see that the two are almost one and the same, the only material difference between them consisting of the addition of the words *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας* and *ὁμοούσιος* in the latter; and, therefore, that Eusebius's account of its reception is strictly true: from which it surely follows that the Fathers of the Council could not have stopped their ears against as blasphemous, and torn as heretical, a creed which so evidently formed the groundwork of their own.

CREED OF THE COUNCIL.

Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἓνα Θεόν, Πατέρα παντοκράτορα, πάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀορατῶν ποιητὴν καὶ εἰς ἓνα Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς μονογενῆ, τούτεστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρί. Δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, τὰ τε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν κατελθόντα, καὶ σαρκωθέντα, καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα παθόντα, καὶ ἀναστάντα τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἀνελθόντα εἰς τοὺς οὐράνους ἐρχόμενον κρίναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς. Καὶ εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. Τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῆναι οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ὅτε ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας φάσκοντας εἶναι ἢ τρεπτόν, ἢ ἀλλοιωτὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, τούτους ἀναθεματίζει ἡ ἀγία καθολικὴ καὶ ἀποστολικὴ ἐκκλησία.—*S. Athanas., de Decret. Syn. Nic. Appendix § 4; Socrates, i. 8; Theodoret i. 12.*

CREED OF EUSEBIUS.

Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἓνα Θεόν, Πατέρα παντοκράτορα, καὶ τῶν ἀπάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀορατῶν ποιητὴν καὶ εἰς ἓνα Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, Θεὸν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, ζωὴν ἐκ ζωῆς, Υἱὸν μονογενῆ, πρωτότοκον πάσης τῆς κτίσεως, πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων, ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς γεγεννημένον. δι' οὗ καὶ ἐγένετο πάντα τὸν διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν σαρκωθέντα καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτευσάμενον, καὶ παθόντα καὶ ἀναστάντα τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ, καὶ ἀνελθόντα πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα, καὶ ἥξοντα πάλιν ἐν δόξῃ κρίναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς. Πιστεύομεν καὶ εἰς ἓν Πνεῦμα ἅγιον, τούτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ ὑπάρχειν πιστεύοντες, Πατέρα ἀληθινῶς Πατέρα, καὶ Υἱὸν ἀληθινῶς υἱόν, Πνεῦμα τε ἅγιον ἀληθινῶς Πνεῦμα ἅγιον, καθὰ καὶ ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν ἀποστέλλων εἰς τὸ κήρυγμα τοὺς αὐτοῦ μαθητάς, εἶπε πορευθέντες μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, βαπτίζοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Πατρὸς, καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος. κ.τ.λ.—*Socrates, i. 8; Theodoret, i. 12; S. Athan. de Decret. Syn. Nic. Appendix § 3.*

In fact, the γράμμα Εὐσεβίου βλασφημίας of Eustathius may very well refer to the 'Epistola Eusebii Nicomediensis' of S. Ambrose; a supposition which is strengthened by the facts, that its description by the former exactly coincides with

¹ Theodoret, ap. Schulze, reads less correctly γεγεννημένον.

the extract from it of the latter; and, that that extract not only bears, as our readers will have seen, no manner of resemblance to anything found in the creed of Eusebius of Cæsarea, but in fact expresses a doctrine on the Son totally different from that contained in the latter formula. Certain it is that the document mentioned by S. Ambrose cannot have been a formal creed; for, as his Benedictine Editors see, he expressly terms it *Epistola*.¹

We will venture to offer another and a final reason for considering the torn document to have been the production of the Bishop of Nicomedia or his partisans. Eustathius, in the eighth chapter of Theodoret, already referred to, describes the party from which it proceeded as *οἱ ἀμφὶ τὸν Εὐσέβιον*, a mode of expression which seems to us to have been intended to convey to the mind of the reader the fact that the Eusebius there mentioned was not the Bishop of Cæsarea, but of Nicomedia; for it was the latter, and not the former, who proved their most active correspondent,² and most resolute champion.³ It was he who took the lead among them on all occasions, and from whom they were often named, (*e.g.* by S. Athanasius continually, and by S. Ambrose in the passage cited above, who calls him ‘*Auctor eorum*,’) whose position too as the Bishop of a city which, since the days of Diocletian, had been a royal residence, gave him more power to promote the heresy, and to annoy the Church, than was possessed by any other of the faction. To him also, through abuse of the influence which he possessed over the Emperor, is to be ascribed the renovation of the heresy after its condemnation at Nicæa, together with the ceaseless attempts of Arius to be restored to communion, and the endless insults and injuries heaped on the head of S. Athanasius, for no other crime than that of refusing, as was his plain duty as the heresiarch’s Bishop, to receive him. In a word, it was he, and not his namesake of Cæsarea, who was *the* Eusebius of the party, the mainstay of the cause, the state champion of the whole heresy.

We conclude, therefore, that the document torn by the

¹ The note of the Benedictines on this passage of S. Ambrose is sufficiently in favour of the view which we have here taken to induce us to make from it an extract of some length: ‘*Ambigitur inter eruditos quænam sit illa Euseb. Nic. Epistola, cujus mentio fit ab Ambrosio. Hermanus, lib. ii. vitæ Sti. Athii. cap. 8, post Cardinalem Baronium ad annum 325 putat eam esse cujus Theodoretus, lib. i. cap. 8, edit. Valesii commemorat. Valesius vero in eundem locum non de Epistola Nicomediensis, sed de libello fidei ab Euseb. Cæsar. patribus concilii oblato, hunc Theodoretum locum defendit, allatis in hanc rem quibusdam rationibus, quæ sane tanti non videntur ut ejus opinio omni careat difficultate. Verum quicquid sit, certum est Ambrosium non de formula seu libello fidei, sed de Epistola hoc loco loqui.*’—*De Fide*, iii. 15.

² Socrates, i. 15.

³ Socrates, i. 6; Sozomen, ii. 22.

Council was the letter of Eusebius of Nicomedia; or, if a creed, that it was one which emanated from the faction of which he was the head, and was not that of the Bishop of Cæsarea: and, in consequence, that whatever else the latter is to be charged with in this controversy, he was guiltless of the twofold offence of the glaring heresy of that torn document, and of stating publicly a falsehood equally detestable in itself, and insulting to the members of a great and venerable Council.

Before proceeding, we may be allowed to point out some other inaccuracies which certain of the historians have committed on the subject. Tillemont falls into an error in making the Benedictines, in their life of S. Athanasius, say that the torn document was the creed of Eusebius of Cæsarea. These learned authors having stated, on the authority of Theodoret and Eustathius, that Eusebius of Nicomedia offered a 'rescriptum,' which the Bishops forthwith destroyed, continue thus, 'Verum Ariani, conspecta Catholicorum et frugi hominum indignatione, mox Arium Eusebiumque cum sociis damnatum iri prospicientes, novam ineunt insidiarum viam, rogantesque silentium, ementito pacis concordiaque nomine, priores ipsi oblatum libellum, qui omnibus offensioni fuerat, damnant et proscribunt, aliumque mox libellum, omnium consilio adornatum, muniunt suffragiis suis. . . Hæc ex Theodoro, lib. i. 7. Qui eadem ipsa, c. 8, ex Eustathio confirmat. Hallucinantur porro, qui libellum, capite 7 memoratum, diversum esse putant ab alio de quo c. 8, nam idipsum utrobique narrari, nemini accuratius legenti, dubium. Hic ipse libellus extat in Epistola Eusebii Cæsariensis estque fidei formula.'

It is scarcely to be wondered at that Tillemont should have been misled as he was by these historians, for the grammatical meaning of their very confused statement is in fact that which he supposes. But unless they are to fall into a palpable self-contradiction by stating in the beginning of their section, from Theodoret and Eustathius, that the torn document was the rescript of Eusebius of Nicomedia; and at the end, from the same authorities, that it was the 'alius libellus' to which the Arians and the whole Council gave their assent; we must refer their paragraph commencing with the words 'Hæc ex Theodoro,' not to the sentence immediately preceding, to which it ought grammatically to belong, but to the commencement of the section; and understand the 'hic ipse libellus' following, not of the 'libellum cap. 7 memoratum,' to which it should properly refer, but to the 'alius libellum' mentioned previously: and conclude

¹ Vita St. Athanasii, § xiv. p. 8.

their meaning to be that the torn document was in truth the rescript of Eusebius of Nicomedia: and the 'alius libellus' was the 'fidei formula' which they seem to identify with the creed of Eusebius of Cæsarea found in his letter referred to. But in this case, they will be guilty of the fault, inexcusable in them as historians, of stating not merely as their own opinion, but as a positive fact, that Eusebius' creed was supported by the universal consent of the Council, when they have no authority whatever for so sweeping a statement.

Fleury, after mentioning the letter of Eusebius of Nicomedia, which he admits to have been torn, continues,—'The Arians likewise presented to the assembly a confession of faith which they had drawn up, but as soon as it was read they' (the Council) 'tore it, declaring it to be false and illegal, and a great clamour was raised against them, every body accusing them of betraying the truth.'

Fleury here commits a twofold mistake. First, he understands Theodoret and Eustathius to speak of two different documents; and secondly, he is in consequence obliged, against all ancient authority, to assert that two documents were torn instead of one. In the latter opinion he is followed by Tillemont, who says, 'Whilst they were debating what determination they should come to touching the faith, a letter of Eusebius, says S. Athanasius, was produced, which was a plain proof of his blasphemies. It was very probably the same letter as that of which S. Ambrose speaks. This letter being read in full Council confounded him who wrote it, and gave no less concern to the saints who heard it, and saw the destruction of those wretches, for it discovered all the party. The horror they had of it made them tear it publicly.' Soon after, relating the account given by Eusebius of the reception of his creed, he adds, 'Theodoret, without regarding the praise which Eusebius gives himself, assures us that as soon as it was read, it was torn in pieces.' Theodoret, we need not observe, says nothing of the kind. On the contrary, his 13th chapter consists of an attempt to confute the Arians from the writings of Eusebius. Valesius, in his notes on Theodoret, is clear, as are also the Benedictines, that Theodoret and Eustathius refer to one and the same document. The Benedictines in particular speak, as we have seen, very strongly on the subject.

The Creed of Eusebius of Cæsarea, which we have already cited in the Greek, is thus translated by Bishop Kaye:—

'We believe in One God, Father Almighty, Maker of all things, visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Word of God, God of God,

¹ Book xi. § 11.

Light of Light, Life of Life, the only-begotten Son, the first-begotten of every creature, begotten of the Father before all ages, by whom all things were made; who for our salvation was incarnate, and lived (*πολιτευσάμενον*) among men; who suffered, and rose again the third day, and ascended to the Father, and shall come again in glory to judge both the quick and the dead. We believe also in one Holy Ghost. Each of them we believe to be and to subsist—the Father truly Father, the Son truly Son, the Holy Ghost truly Holy Ghost; as our Lord, when he sent forth his Apostles to preach, said, "Go, make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." — Pp. 42, 43.

We will here observe by the way, that one of the terms of this creed has not escaped some severe, and evidently unjust censure. Suicer, in his '*Symbolum Nicæno-Constantinopolitanum*,' says that the term *πολιτευσάμενον*, as used by its author of our blessed Lord's stay upon earth, and which the Bishop translates 'lived,' may have been intended to convey a heterodox idea; inasmuch as S. Gregory Nazianzen uses it to express the doctrines of the Apollinarians, who held that Christ was not actually *made* man, as the Nicene Creed teaches in the word *ἐνανθρωπήσαντα*, but that He only appeared in the guise of man.¹ To say nothing of the palpable injustice of condemning one author for the ordinary use of a term, because of its extraordinary application by another after his time, Suicer, when bringing this charge against Eusebius, must surely have overlooked the fact that he had immediately before used the emphatic word *σαρκωθέντα*, which is actually the term adopted by the Council. If, however, his creed be free from heretical statements, we can by no means say as much of the letter in which he informed the people of Cæsarea of his motives for having signed the creed of the Council. This letter is suspected even by Bishop Kaye, whose censure is of the more weight from the fact that the singular mildness of his character induces him to be even too sparing of its use.

'The whole letter,' he says, 'is of an apologetic character, and implies a consciousness on the part of the writer, that his subscription to the Nicene Creed required explanation, as if there were expressions in it not in perfect agreement with his former teaching. He states, therefore, that the different expressions were carefully weighed and canvassed; and gives his reasons for assenting to the word *ὁμοούσιος*, and to the expression "begotten, not made," as well as for concurring in the anathema at the end. He had never, he says, himself used the expressions condemned; nor are they to be found in Scripture. I have noticed the very meagre account given by him of the proceedings of the Synod. The preference shown to the confession of faith finally adopted over his own, and a consciousness, that in subscribing, he had, in some measure, compromised his own opinions, may have contributed to indispose him to dwell on the subject.' — Pp. 40, 41.

¹ *Symbolum Nicæno-Constantinopolitanum*, p. 213.

The Bishop dismisses, indeed, to a note, a portion of this letter, given by Theodoret, and referred to by S. Athanasius; De Decret. Syn. Nic. § 3, and De Synodis § 13; but omitted by Socrates, and on that account thought to be spurious by Bishop Bull. It is as follows:—‘Moreover, we did not think it strange ‘to anathematize (the words) “before His Generation He was ‘not,” since it is admitted by all that He was the Son of God, ‘even before His birth according to the flesh. Indeed, our ‘most religious emperor then proved by argument that He was, ‘even according to His divine Generation, before all ages; for ‘even before He was begotten in fact, He was in the Father in ‘an unbegotten manner by power, the Father being always the ‘Father, as also always King and Saviour; and being all things ‘in power, and always existing in the same manner and in the ‘same way.’ Of course, if these words were really penned by him—and their repeated mention by S. Athanasius is a greater proof of the affirmative than their omission by Socrates is of the negative—his faith, so far, cannot be defended.

He says, moreover, that he agreed to the terms ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας and ὁμοούσιος, because they were not taken by the Council to signify that the Son was any part of the Father, ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχειν τοῦ Πατρὸς, but merely that He was from the Father. Giving Eusebius credit then for demurring to the term ὁμοούσιος, lest it should signify that the Son was ‘by division of substance, or by severance, or by any passion, or change, or alteration of the Father’s essence or power,’—all of which are foreign to the nature of the Unbegotten Father;—and supposing that if the Council took ὁμοούσιος in the sense he says it did, it was also to avoid the appearance of admitting any division of the one Indivisible Divine Essence: we yet cannot excuse his saying, like the Semi-Arians afterwards, that the term begotten signified merely that the Son of God bore no resemblance to creatures that were made,¹ whilst ποιηθέντα was common to the *other* creatures that were formed by Him:—and still less, if possible, can we admit his treatment of the Arian expressions ἦν πότε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν and ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, as mere terms which were to be dealt with as such, and rejected simply because they were not found in Scripture; an evasion which, by confining the anathema of the Council to the words alone, would evidently allow the doctrines which they symbolize to be held with, and in despite of it.

We must take leave to differ from Bishop Kaye on a point of

¹ Socrates reads γεννημένων.—Theodoret and the Benedictines in their edition of S. Athanasius, more correctly, γενομένων. The former, however, immediately after, for τὰ γενητὰ κρίματα of the Benedictines, has γεννητὰ, in which Socrates agrees with him.

some moral weight, and one which affects in no slight degree the chief term of the Creed of the Council. He has followed, without protest, the assertion of Eusebius, which may at least be taken to mean, if it do not necessarily imply, that the introduction of the term *ὁμοούσιος* originated with the emperor, whilst he adds decidedly that it was he who explained it to the Council;¹ no doubt desiring, as Valesius says, to shelter his own signature of the creed under the imperial authority. Now, we are expressly told that 'Constantine laid down no laws for the Bishops beforehand, but gave each of them free will to decide,'² and S. Athanasius says, as we shall shortly see, that the term was adopted by the Bishops after much discussion, as the only way of effectually meeting the sophistries of the Arians; he also gives an account of the preliminary questions, and of the manner in which it was determined to use the word; but without the slightest indication that the emperor had anything to do with its adoption,—if, indeed, he were at that time present in the council.

The next document to be noted as having been presented to the council by the Arians, is the *Thalia* of their leader, which he had composed when with Eusebius of Nicomedia.³ It contains such blasphemies as the following:—

'The Unoriginate made the Son an origin of things generated,
And advanced Him as a Son to Himself by adoption;
He has nothing proper to God in proper subsistence, [or substance—
hypostasis—"substantia"—Benedictines]
For He is not equal—no, nor one in substance with Him.'⁴

It will be matter of surprise to few to hear that the Fathers of the council stopped their ears when it was read.⁵

We now leave the Arians, and glance at the acts of the Catholic Bishops. S. Athanasius is here our chief and almost sole authority. He tells us—to condense his accounts in some degree—'that the Council at first defined the Son to be from God, not a creature, or a work, but the proper Son of the Father. On this the Eusebians took the expression "from God" to apply to Christ, in the same sense as that in which it applies to men, "One God, from Whom are all things." (1 Cor. viii. 6.) The council were then compelled to a more clear definition, and said He was from the Essence of God, for this appertains to no creature. And when the Bishops said that

¹ Having said that the Emperor directed the Council to receive his Creed, he continues: *ἐνὸς μόνου προσεγγραφέντος βήματος τοῦ ὁμοουσίου ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐρημήνευσε.*
—Letter to Cæsareans. Soc. i. 8; Theodoret i. 12.

² S. Ambrose, Epist. xxi. § 15.

³ S. Athanasius, De Synodis, § 15.

⁴ Oxford translation. S. Athanasius's Treatises, vol. viii. p. 95.

⁵ S. Athanasius, Ad. Afros, § 13.

‘the Word ought to be described as the true Power and Image of the Father; and that He was like the Father in all things, and unvarying and unchanged, and that He was always, and in Him without division the Eusebians endured it, not daring to contradict them for shame’s sake . . . but they were detected whispering, and signaling to one another with their eyes, that the expressions “like” and “always,” and the word “power” and “in him” are common to us and the Son, and we can have no hesitation in agreeing to them. For with regard to “like,” it is written of us, “Man is the image and glory of God,” (1 Cor. xi. 7;) and also “ever,” for it is written, “For we which live are alway,” (2 Cor. iv. 11;) and “in Him,” “In Him we live, and move, and have our being,” (Acts xvii. 28;) and “unchanged,” “Nothing shall separate us from the love of Christ,” (Rom. viii. 39;) and of “power,” that the caterpillar and locust are called “power” and “great power,” (Joel ii. 25;)’ and it is often written of all the people, as “All the power of the Lord came out of the land of Egypt,” (Exodus xii. 41.)’ And others are heavenly powers, for He says, “The Lord of powers is with us, the God of Jacob is our refuge.” (Psalm xli. 7, 8.)’ But the Bishops, seeing in this their hypocrisy . . . were compelled again to collect together the meaning of the Scriptures, and what they said before to repeat and write again more clearly, that “the Son was of one substance with the Father,” that they might signify that the Son was not only like the Father, but the same in likeness, and show that the Son’s likeness and immutability are different from the resemblance which is said to be in us, and which we attain from virtue on account of our observance of the commandments. And after they had thus written, they immediately added, “Those who say that the Son of God is from nothing, or is created, or changeable, or a work, or of another essence . . the Holy Catholic Church anathematises.”²

In fact, none of the subsequent branches of the worst Arians could go further than Arius himself had gone before the Council, or show more fearlessness in carrying out the principles of their heresy to their proper and legitimate results, however shocking and detestable,—for he had previously admitted to Alexander, when questioned in the Council at Alexandria, that the Word of God could be perverted as the devil was, because He is created, and therefore susceptible of change. An admission like this, from the mouth of the originator of the heresy, does more to show its true character than volumes penned by an opponent.

Septuagint Version.

² De Decret. Nic. § 19, &c.

The fate that befell the holders of opinions so monstrous and revolting, may be easily imagined. In a Council composed, as we learn from S. Athanasius and the best authorities, of upwards of three hundred Bishops,¹ (to say nothing of the exact specification of 318, with its mystical signification, in the coincidence with the number of Abraham's servants, Gen. xiv. 14, though that idea is as old as the Council itself;) seventeen alone, as Sozomen says,² or five according to Socrates,³ at first refused to sign the creed; and of these but two were found at last to persist in their resolution—Secundus of Ptolemais, and Theonas of Marmarica. Eusebius of Nicomedia, awed by the threats of the emperor, and seeing clearly that there was no alternative but subscription or banishment, subscribed with the rest. Philostorgius,⁴ the Arian historian, tells us that he and Maris of Chalcedon had, by the advice of Constantina, the sister of the emperor, furtively substituted *ὁμοιούσιος* for *ὁμοούσιος* in the copy of the creed which they signed, and thus pretended to assent to the Council. On this, Secundus said to him, 'You have signed to save yourself, and I trust in God that you will be banished before a year.' He was right, Eusebius's hypocrisy and falsehood did not save him; he was banished within three months from the time of the Council.⁵ Eusebius of Cæsarea had refused his signature on the first day, but affixed it on the second. 'He pretended,' to adopt the words of Tillemont, 'that the explication which the Council had given of the Consubstantiality, and the love of peace, made him sign it, without changing his opinion, the latter part of which point seems very true.'⁶

Arius himself met the most severe fate of all. The Synodical letter informs us that his definitions *ἦν πότε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, ἔξ*

¹ S. Athanasius, Ad. Afros, § 2, says 318; De Decret. Syn. Nic. § 3, more than 300; In Apol. § 23, 300; Soc. i. 8, says 318; so Theodoret, i. 7, 11; Soz. i. 17, says about 320; Eustathius, 270, ap. Theodoret, i. 8. See Tillemont, note 2, on the Council of Nice.

² Sozomen, i. 20.

³ Socrates, i. 8.

⁴ Philostorgius, i. 9; Theod. i. 7, 8. We can scarcely agree with Bishop Kaye in his assertion, page 45, note 4, that Philostorgius was an Homœusian; such, at least, is not the general opinion of writers, ancient or modern,—Nicetas, Photius, Gothofred, Cave, and others; all of whom rank him among the Anomœans: and it is certain that he blames Eusebius of Cæsarea for saying that God cannot be known or comprehended (i. 2), which an Homœusian would not have done; the idea that the Son was fully comprehensible having been held only by the very lowest Aëtian or Anomœan division of the heresy. The passage of Eusebius, to which Philostorgius makes allusion, seems to be that contained in the fifth section of the first book of his *Theologia Ecclesiastica*: 'Let all unspeakable argument about the Son of God be silenced, and to the Father alone be ascribed the knowledge of His generation from Himself; nor let any one proceed further in inquiring about a nature and essence that are ineffable.'

⁵ Philostorgius, i. 9, 10; Theodoret, i. 19, 20; Socrates, i. 8; Sozomen, i. 21.

⁶ Council of Nicæa, § 10.

οὐκ ὄντων, and others, were condemned.¹ And Sozomen adds, that his Thalia shared the same fate, and that he himself was prohibited from entering Alexandria.² Lastly, Constantine, in a letter to the Bishops and people of the Churches, caused Arius himself to be named after the heathen and arch enemy of the Christians, Porphyry; and his followers to be called Porphyrians. He also commanded that his books should be burnt under pain of death.³ The Council then proceeded to draw up its creed, which is that we still use, except that for the last division, which was afterwards added at the Council of Constantinople, there originally stood the words, 'But those who say that there was a time when He was not, and before His Generation He was not, and He was formed out of nothing, or that He was of another essence or hypostasis, or that the Son of God is created, or is changeable, or is mutable, the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church anathematizes.'⁴

The doctrinal questions necessary to be alluded to in a mention of the Creed, are three:—firstly, the history and meaning of the term *ὁμοούσιος*; secondly, the doctrines intended to be forbidden by the Council in their Anathema of the expression 'Before His Generation He was not;' and, thirdly, 'He is of another essence or *hypostasis*.'

1. We can only consider the history of the term *ὁμοούσιος* here, its doctrinal meaning we must reserve to a later part of our article; the only objection to this term, derivable from the prior history of the Church, is found in the supposed fact of its having been rejected by the Council held at Antioch in the year 265, against Paul, the heretical Bishop of that See. Granting—what, however, is by no means certain—that the Council did reject this term, it was so treated, as S. Athanasius tells us, from its true meaning having been misunderstood, in that it was supposed to involve the idea that the Divine Essence was material, and therefore in the Generation of the Son underwent division. The words of S. Athanasius are as follows,—'They who deposed the Samosatene, took One in substance in a bodily sense, because Paul had attempted sophistry, and said, "Unless Christ has of man become God, it follows that He is One in substance with the Father; and if so, of necessity there are three substances, one the previous substance, and the other two from it;" and therefore, guarding against this, they said, with good reason, that Christ was not One in substance.'⁵

¹ Socrates, i. 9.

² Socrates, i. 21.

³ Socrates, i. 9.

⁴ S. Athanasius, De Decret. Syn. Nic. § 4; Soc. i. 8; Theodoret, i. 12, who omits the word 'created.'

⁵ Oxford translation of S. Athanasius's Treatises, vol. viii. p. 143.

Dr. Newman thinks that Paul urged the Council with this dilemma, that the term was either to be taken in a material or in a spiritual sense: the former would make the Son a part of the Father, which was Manicheism; and the latter, as teaching that there was one only Individual, would of course involve the heresy of Sabellius; on which the Fathers of the Council, unable, as we learn from Eusebius, to reply to the sophistries of Paul, forbade the term. Be this as it may, Eusebius of Cæsarea himself acknowledges in his letter, that the word had been formerly used by some learned and illustrious Bishops and writers among the ancients, in their theological teaching about the Father and the Son.

2. The meaning of the Council in their anathema of the words 'Before His Generation He was not,' has been so thoroughly examined by Dr. Newman in his dissertation on the subject, in the first volume of the translation of S. Athanasius's Treatises against the Arians, that in truth nothing more remains to be said. It is well known that the Arians employed the Sonship of Christ to destroy his Godhead, arguing that if He were a Son, He must have had a beginning of existence, before which He was not; *i. e.* He must have been a creature; and their formula, 'before He was begotten He was not,' is, to use Dr. Newman's words, 'an argument *ex absurdo*, drawn from the force of the word Son, in behalf of the Arian doctrine; it being, as they would say, a truism, that, "whereas He was begotten, He was not *before* He was begotten," and the denial of it a contradiction in terms.' To this the Council replied, not by refuting the Arians, nor by explaining the manner of the Catholic doctrine of the Son's co-eternity, for this is ineffable; but by refusing to entertain a conclusion which is inapplicable to its subject. In like manner S. Athanasius and others urge that the argument by analogy, drawn from the generation of creatures, cannot apply to the Creator. S. Gregory Nazianzen, and S. Hilary, as Dr. Newman says, 'both decide that it is not true either that the Son, *was* before His Generation, or that He was *not*; in other words, that the question is unmeaning and irrelevant.'—(P. 276.) And there is this further meaning in the anathema of the Council, although it is not stated in words,—that it is not to be held, as the Arians did hold, that the Son was Generated only at the period immediately preceding that of the Creation. Thus the Council rejects both the Arian fact of the Son, as such, having had a beginning of existence, and the time of that beginning;—but they confine their opposition to the former assertion, because that alone, as being intrinsically the more important, was brought prominently

¹ S. Athanasius's Treatises, Oxford translation, vol. viii. p. 273.

forward by its authors. Grant them the question of fact, and that of time is of little moment, and follows of necessity.

3. The question of the *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* is also one of weight, because, if the Council meant to deny the latter word in the sense which it was ruled to bear in the Council of Alexandria, A.D. 362, as meaning Person, and therefore to teach that the Son has no Personality distinct from the Father, it was plainly guilty of Sabellianism. But this is both incredible and impossible. The word in question has borne two chief senses in theology; one before the Council of Alexandria, and the other after it. In the former it was occasionally used in a sense synonymous with *οὐσία*, and signified essence or substance; in the latter it has a signification equivalent to that of *πρόσωπον*, as used by the earlier theologians, and to this its use was henceforth confined. Now, as it never bore any other than these meanings, and as it is plain from the nature of the case, that the Council of Nice could not have used it in their anathema in the former, we have something more than a mere prior probability that it did use it in the latter.

This, Dr. Newman has in fact converted into something little short of positive certainty. In a dissertation previous to that on the words 'before His Generation He was not,' he has shown that the word *ὑπόστασις* was used by the Westerns to express substance or essence, as *οὐσία* by the Easterns; and that the Council, of which Hosius, a Western, was president, introduced it to convey to that branch of the Church the same idea as was suggested by *οὐσία* to the Easterns.

In taking leave of Nicæa and its creed, we will only observe further, that besides the *ὁμοούσιος*, which includes everything in itself, the Council in this anathema has taught the pure and perfect Godhead of the Son in every manner possible; insisting that He is from Eternity; that He is not from matter which was created, but from the one Essence or Substance of the Father; and, as a result of the Divinity which follows from such essential Oneness, He is not of His own nature subject to the infirmities of mere creatures.

As it is our object to offer an account rather of the doctrinal than of the merely historical phase of Arianism, we must be content with giving a brief outline of the latter, dwelling at length only on one or two of its more difficult and controverted passages.

The events of the twelve years between the Council of Nicæa and the death of Constantine may be thus briefly stated. Soon after the Council, Arius was recalled from banishment, and having, with Euzoïus, palmed off upon Constantine an heretical creed of their own composition as equivalent to that of the Nicene Confession of Faith, was permitted to return to

Alexandria, where, however, S. Athanasius refused to receive him. Eusebius of Nicomedia, and Theognis were also recalled, and restored to their Sees, having declared their willingness to adopt the creed of Nicæa. But the first use of their freedom thus obtained, was to deprive Eustathius, the aged and Catholic Bishop of Antioch, of his See by an infamous calumny, and they then proceeded in their attacks on the orthodox doctrine, and S. Athanasius himself, as its chief defender. In a packed Synod at Tyre, he was accused of the murder of Arsenius a Meletian Bishop; of violence to a female; and of sacrilege. But these charges were disproved by the appearance of Arsenius himself; by his pretended victim not knowing him when she saw him; and by the ascertained fact, that the Church he was said to have profaned did not exist, and that Ischyrras, its supposed priest, was an impostor: and their falseness being thus fully exposed, his enemies next sent a commission into Egypt, headed by Theognis, to seek there fresh matters of accusation against him. Though again failing—notwithstanding that in pursuance of their base design they scrupled not at atrocities equalled only in the worst days of Nero or Diocletian—they proceeded, on their return to Tyre, to deprive their enemy of his See, and shortly afterwards to admit Arius into [their] communion. Meanwhile S. Athanasius had left Tyre, and suddenly presenting himself before the emperor at Constantinople, induced the latter, on his solemn appeal, to command the Bishops to discontinue their sittings at Jerusalem, whither they had transferred them by his direction, and to proceed to Constantinople. But six only of the whole number ventured to appear, the Eusebii, Theognis, Patrophilus, Ursacius, and Valens; the rest, terrified at the consequence of their acts, and dreading to meet their victim before the emperor, returned to their Sees.

The Arians then brought an entirely new and most improbable charge against S. Athanasius, accusing him of having threatened to stop the exportation of corn from Alexandria to Constantinople; and the Emperor, either from jealousy of the supposed invasion of his jurisdiction, or, as S. Athanasius himself says, to protect him from the malice of his enemies, banished him to Treves, whilst Arius himself, being now rid of his opponent, came to Constantinople.

And now it was that the heresiarch is recorded to have committed that atrocious perjury which was so speedily and so signally avenged in his death. On coming before the Emperor, he offered a second Confession of Faith, declaring with an oath that he believed what he then professed; but Socrates tells us that he held concealed in his sleeve another paper, containing his real belief. The Emperor, as if suspecting perfidy, ex-

claimed, 'If thy faith be right, thou hast sworn well; but if otherwise, God will avenge thy perjury.' But being unable to prove the fraud, Constantine gave orders that Alexander (who was still Bishop of Constantinople) should admit Arius into communion on the following day, which was Sunday. The other events of that Saturday—the Bishop Alexander's solemn prayer in Church; *ἀρον* "Ἀρειον, that God would either remove him from the world, or take the instrument of those evils with which the Church was threatened; Arius's momentary triumph, and sudden and immediate death—have been told too often to need a lengthened repetition in these pages. We shall confine our remarks to the frequently mooted question, of the immediate cause of the death of the heresiarch. Gibbon says, that if we press the literal narrative of his death, we must make our option between a miracle or poison,¹ an assertion in which he has not been without followers. Bishop Kaye, however, confesses himself unable to see this necessity. 'There is 'nothing in the circumstances,' he says, 'which, if we make 'due allowance for exaggeration, may not be accounted for by 'natural causes. It was not a miraculous or preternatural interposition; but a most striking and awful event, occurring in 'the ordinary course of God's providential government.'—P. 79.

S. Athanasius relates the event as follows:—*ὁ... Ἀρειος ἰθάρρει τοὺς περὶ Εὐσέβιον, πολλά τε φλυαρῶν, εἰσῆλθεν εἰς καθέδρας ὡς διὰ χρεῖαν τῆς γαστρὸς, καὶ ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον πρηνὴς γενόμενος ἐδάκρυσε μέσος, καὶ πεσὼν ἐνθὺς ἀπέψυξεν, ἀμφοτέρων τε τῆς κοινωνίας καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἀπεστερήθη. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τέλος τοῦ Ἀρείου τοιοῦτον γέγονε.* From the fact of his having avowedly cited the words in which S. Peter described the death of Judas Iscariot, it would appear as if he were speaking as a rhetorician rather than as a historian; and besides, he derived his information, not from his own immediate knowledge, for he was not at Constantinople at the time, but from the report of his presbyter Macarius. The account, however, as he relates it, is physically impossible. Macarius was probably deceived by a rumour, to which neither he nor S. Athanasius were anatomists or pathologists enough to affix the true value.

But it is not so with the relation of the same event given by Socrates, who, we should remember, lived within a century of its occurrence, and penned his history in the city in which it happened. He tells us that 'a terror of conscience seized Arius, followed by a sudden looseness. On retiring, he was seized 'with faintness; the bowel with its contents came away; a 'vast quantity of blood, with the smaller intestines, the liver,

¹ Chap. xxi note o, in loc.

‘and spleen followed, and Arius instantly died.’ Allowing something, perhaps, for exaggeration, and a good deal for mistakes in the attendants, this account is by no means at variance with nature. Put into correct language, it would stand as follows:—Arius, either from the effects of strong mental emotion, or from physical causes, or from a combination of both, is seized with internal hæmorrhage, an effusion of blood, that is to say, into the alimentary canal, which compels him to retire; he suffers from violent relaxation, and from faintness, with profuse discharge of blood, accompanied, probably, with prolapsus of the lower bowel; and the death, which is the immediate result, is as natural as any of which we read in the daily bills of mortality. But the fiction, or rather the erroneous part of the narrative, now commences. This hæmorrhage, Socrates says, was followed by the discharge of the small intestines, the liver, and the spleen. Such an occurrence is impossible; but it is by no means impossible that the attendants may have believed, by a succession of very pardonable mistakes, such as, in fact, are still of daily occurrence, that they saw what is here stated; stringy mucus being mistaken by them for the small intestines, and masses of firm coagula, for liver and spleen. In short, the train of symptoms which are mentioned, and the sudden death in which they terminated, are by no means of uncommon occurrence; and if the report of Socrates be divested of its errors, (which very errors may be said to add to its intrinsic truthfulness,) this is just the case we have before us.

What, then, are we to conclude of this most remarkable catastrophe? As, on the one hand, we hold the death of Arius to have been a natural one, requiring the intervention neither of miracle nor of poison to account for it—the former, as caused by an infraction of the laws of nature, or the latter, as involving the wickedness of man;—so, on the other hand, when we call to mind the unmatched and complicated impieties of that heresiarch; the revolting profanity of his life and writings; his flagitious contempt of the Divine Name, in prostituting it, as he did, to the vilest purposes; his open insults on God’s Church and ministers; all crowned and consummated by that last great act of perjury; and all uniting to make his a singular case in the history of the Church, and to point it out as the one in which, perhaps above all others on record, we might expect the manifestation of some peculiar mark of Divine Vengeance: we may well be excused if, with becoming reverence and due fear, we do regard it, as it was regarded in the age in which it happened, and long after,¹ as a signal and most awful judgment

¹ Socrates says, that a century after its occurrence ‘passers-by still pointed the finger at the scene of it as a place accursed.’

from Heaven; an especial act of the wrath of God; vindicating His own outraged majesty, and at once, (by natural means, a guilty conscience acting on the body, directed especially by Him to this end,) cutting off the offender in the very hour of, as he imagined, his perfect triumph and most assured success.

Constantine died not long after Arius. One of the first acts of the Eusebians, on his demise, was to renew their accusations against S. Athanasius, who was now again in possession of his See, to the sons of Constantine, and Julius, Bishop of Rome. S. Athanasius thereupon held a council at Alexandria consisting of nearly one hundred bishops, the letter of which was sent to Julius as his defence. Julius proposed to the legates of the contending parties to hold a council at Rome, at which they might both meet; an invitation which S. Athanasius readily accepted. The events that followed, and their exact chronology, are involved in much obscurity, and form, in fact, the difficulty of the Athanasian history. The statement and dates of the greater number of historians,—Valesius, the Benedictines in their life of S. Athanasius, Cave, Fleury, and others, are as follows:—

In the year 340, S. Athanasius held the Council at Alexandria. He arrived at Rome soon after Easter of 341, and stayed there three years, being summoned in the fourth year by Constans to meet him at Milan. On the arrival of S. Athanasius, Julius sent two of his presbyters, by name Elpidius and Philoxenus, as legates to the Eusebians at Antioch, inviting them to meet S. Athanasius in council at Rome in the January of the following year, 342. Elpidius and Philoxenus left Rome in the beginning, says Valesius, or about the latter end of May, or according to the Benedictines early in June, of 341; the Eusebians detained the messengers of Julius till the time for holding the Council at Rome was passed, and then sent them away, refusing to come themselves. Elpidius and Philoxenus arrive in Rome with a letter for Julius, (given in substance by Sozomen, book iii. chap. 8,) in the course of the summer of 342. In the October or November of that year a council of fifty bishops was held in the church of Vito a presbyter, in which S. Athanasius was acquitted of all charge, and formally received the Communion of the Western Church. Julius now produced the letter of the Eusebians, (which, he says in his reply to them, he had kept by him for some time, hoping that they, or some of them, might yet come to Rome,) and he was requested by the Council to answer it: this he did, and his letter is found in S. Athanasius's Apology against

the Arians.¹ He mentions in it that S. Athanasius had now been eighteen months at Rome, which of course would be the case according to the dates here proposed.

This arrangement, however, simple as it is in itself, and consistent with the statements of Julius in his letter, and of S. Athanasius in his works, seems, at first sight, open to more than one objection. S. Athanasius says that he left Alexandria on the report of the intended invasion of his see by Gregory the Arian, (whom the members of the Church of Antioch ordained and sent to Alexandria in his place,) without waiting for his actual arrival; and it may be thought that as Gregory entered Alexandria at the latter end of the Lent of the year in which S. Athanasius came to Rome, there would not have been time, if that year were 341, for the Council to have ordained him at Antioch, and for him to have reached Alexandria so soon afterwards. But the Council was held at Antioch early in the year, and S. Athanasius says that Gregory did not arrive till quite towards Easter (which fell that year on April 19th)—*Τὰυτα δὲ ἐγγυῖετο ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἁγίᾳ Τεσσαρακοστῇ περὶ τὸ πάσχα.*² If, again, we put his arrival a year later, *i. e.* in 342, we have a still greater difficulty, we think, to contend with—for there is nothing in this case by which to account for the time that must have elapsed between his ordination and that event. It is plain, too, that the Arians, in so gross a case of usurpation, would be anxious to get their follower established in his sphere of action as soon as possible after they had appointed him to it; and lastly, if Julius answered the Council in 342, the same year in which S. Athanasius in this case came to Rome, there could not have been eighteen months for him to have spent in the city when that letter was written. And we may here glance at a point of little moment in itself, and which, except that Bishop Kaye has touched upon it, we should have passed without notice. The Bishop observes (page 92 and note 1), that Athanasius says himself, in his piece *Ad Solitarios*, that he left Rome at the first rumour of the entrance of Gregory, and before it actually took place. He is said by Sozomen (iii. 6), to have been in his church at Alexandria when the soldiers came, and to have escaped during the singing of a psalm. Some such arrangement as that suggested by the Benedictines in their life of S. Athanasius is no doubt the solution of the difficulty. They think that when Gregory first entered, and, among other outrages, burnt a church dedicated to Cyrinus, S. Athanasius was at Alexandria, and that being informed of this violence, he fled, remained some days concealed in the neighbourhood, and then sailed for Rome.

¹ Vol. i. Benedict. Edit.

² Encycl. ad Episc. tom. i. § 4, Benedict.

A more serious difficulty, perhaps, is how Julius, if he appointed the Council at Rome for January, could have written to the Eusebians, as he did at the *end* of the year, and evidently from a Council. Baronius, with a view to this difficulty, has supposed that two councils were held at Rome, the one of fifty bishops, at which S. Athanasius was received, and which he puts in the year 341, and another in the following year, in which Julius answered the Easterns. But Valesius has proved, from the words of S. Athanasius and Julius, whose accounts of the matter exactly agree, that there was only one, which we may easily suppose was adjourned from time to time, or it may have continued its sittings through the summer, as that of Antioch had done the previous year, if it despatched Gregory to Alexandria in Lent, and received the legates of Julius in the autumn, keeping them over the January following, and not till then sending them back to Julius; or, lastly, Julius may have written from the usual autumnal synod.

The final question connected with these events is, whether S. Athanasius visited Rome once only, or twice. Valesius, the Benedictines, Cave, Fleury, and others, are clear that he came to that city only once—leaving before the arrival of Gregory, and not returning again until after the Council of Sardica in 347. Baronius, Tillemont, Cabassutius, and others, oppose them, and adopt the other opinion. Baronius thinks that Athanasius arrived in Rome the first time in 340, and remained there eighteen months, *i. e.* towards the close of 341, or the beginning of 342—when he supposes him to have returned to Alexandria fortified with the acquittal of Julius and the Roman Council. He then places the invasion of Gregory in the Lent of 342, during or before which he makes S. Athanasius return to Rome the second time, just after the arrival of Elpidius and Philoxenus, and the second Council, which Julius then held, and in which he replied to the Easterns. But this arrangement, among other disadvantages, involves an inordinately long absence of the legates of Julius, whom Baronius despatches to Antioch in 340 and does not bring back to Rome till 342—an absence which, in addition to the above objection, is against the spirit of Julius's letter to the Easterns, as Valesius urges. Tillemont, by an arbitrary alteration of Julius's letter, follows an arrangement of his own. He also makes two journeys of S. Athanasius to Rome, but he dates the first in 339, and puts Athanasius's return to Alexandria in 340, in consequence of the rumours of what was doing at Antioch, which seems directly against S. Athanasius's own account of his movements, that he thereupon left Alexandria for Rome, instead of leaving Rome for Alexandria. The second journey he puts in the Lent of 341, and,

having sent the legates of Julius to the East in the year 340, he puts the Council at Rome in *June* of the former year, (to which he alters Julius's January,) and considers it to have sat till the autumn, Julius having written his answer to the Easterns not earlier than August or September. But as this arrangement would not allow S. Athanasius to have passed eighteen continuous months at Rome when the Council is held and the letter of Julius written, he is obliged to make them consist of broken periods, part in the first visit and part in the second, for which he has no authority of any kind.

These historians found their opinion on the words of Socrates, who says, (book ii. chap. 11,) that after Gregory had arrived at Alexandria, Athanasius immediately left that city and hastened to Rome, Gregory being installed into his place; and (chap. 15,) that he, with several other bishops, submitted his case to Julius, who restored each bishop to his See, on which they (with Athanasius, as it appears, among them,) returned to their dioceses. On this, he continues, a sedition was raised at Alexandria by the partisans of *George* the Arian bishop, and (chap. 17,) that Athanasius was accused to Constantius of having sold the corn which Constantine had granted to the poor of Alexandria, on which Constantius threatened to put him to death, and he concealed himself. Julius, hearing of this, invited him to come to Rome, after which, says this historian, Julius received, and replied to, the letters of the Easterns.

It is plain that little reliance can be placed on this account. George was not made Bishop of Alexandria by the Arians till the year 356, and it is therefore impossible that his followers could have molested S. Athanasius at this time. Valesius supposes that Socrates has repeated himself, in the chapter last mentioned, and that we are to understand him as there alluding to the same visit of S. Athanasius to Rome as that in chap. 11. If so, putting Julius's receipt of the letters of the Eusebians, and his reply to them, after this so-called second, but in truth first and only visit of S. Athanasius to Rome, there will be no substantial variation between the accounts of Socrates and of S. Athanasius, Julius, and the majority of modern historians, although of course the ground on which Baronius and Tillemont build their idea of the double visit of S. Athanasius to Rome will be cut from under them. Valesius, moreover, questions the possibility of S. Athanasius having returned to Alexandria without the letters of the Emperor. These he proves him to have had on his restoration to his See from his first exile at Treves, and after the Council of Sardica, but he says there is no trace of them at this time.

If so, as regards the dates of these events, we can only con-

clude with the Benedictines that S. Athanasius was not at Rome when the Eusebians sent their legates thither, A.D. 339, nor when the Council was held at Alexandria, and legates were despatched from it to Rome in 340, nor in the Lent of 341, when Gregory invaded Alexandria;—but that he arrived there in May 341, and in November of 342 Julius wrote to the Eusebians that he had been there eighteen months.¹ For the rest of the history we refer our readers to Bishop Kaye.

The death of Constantine introduces us to a different scene. Hitherto the efforts of the Arians had been directed against the Catholic bishops alone. Knowing the real mind of Constantine on the Council of Nicæa, they had not ventured formally to set up any other Creed than the one then published; but from the accession to the death of Constantius, scarcely a year passed in which some division of the Arians, now through court influence become the dominant party, did not meet to produce a fresh Creed. Bishop Kaye has given a partial enumeration of those which are yet extant; and as they form one of the most prominent features of the heresy, and as a comparison of them is of much use in its elucidation, we will complete his list, and lay before our readers such portions of each as bear reference to the doctrines of Arianism; omitting those which are not immediately to the point, or which treat of questions that were uncontroverted. They show, unanswerably, and out of the mouths of their own framers and upholders, that it is impossible to conceive any idea of a Redeemer between that of the true Nicene doctrine and of a mere Humanitarianism, to which latter idea all these documents of whatever class, carefully as they may strive to disguise or escape the fact, do most assuredly tend.

1. The first doctrinal statement of the party, though not formally a creed, is that contained in a letter written by Arius to Alexander, and contained in the Encyclical Epistle of that bishop, portions of which are as follows:—‘Christ was not always the Word of God, but was made from nothing; He is a creature and a work; He does not resemble the Father in essence, nor is He His true and natural Word or Wisdom, but, being one of His works and creatures, is called so improperly; He is foreign to, and diverse from the Essence of God, and He does not perfectly and accurately know the Father, nor is He able truly to see Him. He was created for our sakes, and would not have existed had not God pleased to create us.’²

2. The Creed that Arius with Euzoïus gave to Constantine

¹ §§ 8. 11. Vita S. Athanasii, p. xlii.

² Soc. i. 6.

in the year 331 ran as follows:—"We believe in . . . Jesus 'Christ the Son of God, who was *created* before all ages, God 'the Word, by whom all things were made in heaven and 'earth,' &c. Rufinus describes this Creed as 'Symbolum sensu 'quidem alienum a Nicæna fide, verbis tamen haudquaquam 'dissentientem.'¹ The one which he concealed in his sleeve, if, as Valesius thinks, it were different to this, has perished.

3. At the Council of Antioch, in 341, the party published four creeds, which are the first types of those Semi-Arian formulæ which were afterwards so rife. In the first, after disclaiming Arius as their master, they say merely: 'We believe 'in one Only-begotten Son of God, Who was before all ages, 'and was with the Father Who begot Him,' &c.

4. The second, which, according to Sozomen, the Arians professed to have found in the handwriting of Lucian, is of a higher cast of doctrine. It says, as S. Athanasius has given it, 'We 'believe in one Lord Jesus Christ the Son, the only-begotten 'God, by Whom were all things, Who was begotten before all 'ages of the Father, God of God, Whole of Whole, Only of 'Only, Perfect of Perfect, King of King, Lord of Lord, Living 'Word, Living Wisdom, True Light, Way, Truth, Resurrection, Shepherd, Door, Unchangeable and Immutable, the unaltered Image of the Father, the First-born of every creature, 'Who was in the beginning with God, God the Word, as it is 'written in the Gospel, "And the Word was God." . . . He 'was the Mediator between God and man.' In the conclusion it anathematizes those who say, 'that time or season or age 'either is or has been before the generation of the Son, or that 'the Son is a creature (*κτίσμα*) as one of the creatures, or an 'offspring as one of the offsprings, or a work (*ποίημα*) as one 'of the works.'

Whether this creed were really Lucian's, or not, of course we cannot say; but if it were, his followers kept on the whole to their master's doctrine, for however their expressions may vary, this may be taken as a fair sample of true Semi-Arian belief, which acknowledged, with the former part of the above creed, a Godhead of Christ, though one inferior to that of the Father; but held at the same time with the latter part, that He was in fact a creature; by which contradiction they must, if pressed, have either fallen into Arianism on the one hand, or into a Ditheistic creed on the other.

With this dilemma, S. Athanasius does not fail to press them: I. he says, to call Christ a creature, though with the qualification, 'not as one of the creatures,' is still to make Him essentially a creature; as to term Him 'an offspring, but not as

¹ Valesius' Annotations on Sozomen, ii. 30.

one of the offsprings,' is to deny that He is the only-begotten. 'One creature,' he argues, 'differs from another, light from light, sun from moon, angels from thrones; yet they are all creatures, and all remain in their own essence as they were made.'¹

II. To adopt Bishop Kaye's condensed account of S. Athanasius's words,

'The Arians are justly open to the charge of Polytheism^{or} Atheism, because they speak of the Son as a creature external to the Father, and say that the Spirit is from that which was not. Either they say that the Word is not God, or, being compelled by the letter of Scripture to admit that He is God, yet, by asserting that He is not proper to the essence of the Father, they give opportunity for the introduction of many Gods, because of their difference in kind. . . Athanasius enlarges upon the absurdities which flow from the Arian doctrine. By making the Son a creature, and yet acknowledging Him to be God, they introduce two Gods, one the Creator, the other a creature; one increate, the other created; and they have a twofold faith, one in the true God, the other in Him whom they have made and framed, and called God. . . They charge the Catholics with saying that there are two increate; but while they deny that there are two increate, they introduce two Gods, and these having different natures, one created, the other increate.'²

The Oxford annotator thinks the word 'Mediator' the most catholic of this creed; but it must have escaped him that Eusebius of Cæsarea employs the same expression to avoid the confession both of the true Godhead and Manhood: "A 'Mediator is not of one, for He has not His essence to be defined a Mediator in the case of one; wherefore He is not a mean of one, but necessarily a mean of two, being neither of those between whom He is. . . when He is Mediator between God and man, being between each class He is neither because He is a Mediator, being neither He Who is the One and only God, nor a man like other men.'"³

5. The creed of Lucian not satisfying the Arians, they at the same Council adopted another, framed by Theophrontius, Bishop of Tyana, a city afterwards the scene of a Catholic Council. This creed teaches that Christ is 'the Only-begotten Son, God, Word, Power, and Wisdom, begotten of the Father before the ages, perfect God of perfect God, with God in hypostasis.'

6. They drew up, lastly, a fourth formula a few months later, which they sent to Constans in France. It terms Christ 'the Only-begotten Son our Lord . . . before all ages begotten from the Father, God of God, Light of light, by Whom all things were made . . . Word, Wisdom, Power, Life, true Light.' At the

¹ Oration ii. § 19. Kaye, p. 191.

² S. Athanasius, Oration iii. § 16. Bp. Kaye, pp. 231, 232.

³ Contra Marcellum, lib. i. chap. 1.

conclusion it anathematizes those who say that 'the Son is from nothing, or is of another Substance, ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως, and not from God, or that there was a time when He was not.' Taking hypostasis, with the Benedictines and Bishop Kaye, to be synonymous with οὐσία, in which sense alone it would have been used by the Arians, as the chief opponents of Sabellianism, it is difficult to see how the second of these anathemas, if stated positively, can, in itself, be taken to express any but the Nicene doctrine.

We will here pause to correct a singular mistake of Baronius: Julius, in his letter to the Easterns, objected against the bishops of the Council of Antioch, who sent Gregory to usurp the see of S. Athanasius, as being incapable of ordaining a Bishop to Alexandria, because they were distant from that city thirty-six stages—ἐκ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑξ μονῶν—when the canon law required that every bishop should be ordained by the bishops of his own province. Baronius takes these words to refer to the Arians who were present at the Council, and he accordingly says, on their authority, that 'from so great a 'number of bishops as were there,' (ninety as S. Athanasius says, ninety-seven according to S. Hilary, ninety-nine as we read in Sozomen,) 'there were *only thirty-six Arians* who agreed to 'the decrees of the Council, which they carried their own way, 'either by clandestine means, or through the support of the 'emperor!'

7. Three years after this Council they met again, and produced the Creed which is called from its length the Macrostich; in which they speak of Christ in the same language as that of the fourth Antiochene. They also published, with others, the same anathemas, adding however a partial belief of the doctrine of the Circumincensio, or περιχώρησις, 'all the Father embracing the Son, and all the Son hanging and adhering to 'the Father, and resting in His bosom continually'—and in 'an 'all-perfect Trinity, that is, the Father and the Son and the 'Holy Ghost'—'and we call,' they say, 'the Father God and 'the Son God; but they are not two Gods, for we confess one 'dignity of the Godhead, and one exact harmony of the kingdom. 'For thus have the Divine words handed down to us the 'account that the Divine Monarchy exists in Christ.' At the same time that they speak in this catholic manner, on the one hand, they also, on the other, on the strength of Proverbs viii. 22, and in terms closely resembling those of the Creed of Lucian, make Him a creature. This Creed they sent into Italy.

¹ A.D. 341. §§ 4, 5.

8. The Council of Sardica, A.D. 347,¹ being composed of Catholic Bishops, admitted no new Creed; but the Arian Council of Philippopolis, held in opposition to it, repeated the fourth Creed of Antioch. In its anathema, however, the word 'substantia' is used for the 'hypostasis' of that Council. Their anathemas are mostly composed of those of the fourth Antiochene and Macrostich. According to Socrates and Sozomen, there now first fell on the Church the shadow of an event which was to come long afterwards; the separation of East and West: each, after this Council, following the division of the empire, and keeping to its own side of the range of Mounts Hæmus and Rhodope, which formed the boundary of Thrace and Illyricum.²

9. The first Sirmian, A.D. 351, was their next Creed. It is, as far as our subject is concerned, a repetition of the fourth Antiochene.

10. Sulpicius Severus makes mention of an epistle published by the Arians, in the name of Constantius, at the Council of Milan, A.D. 355, which is not extant. It would appear to have been of a more decidedly Arian cast than any of the preceding, for that historian describes it as 'omni pravitate refertam,' and the people refused to receive it.³

11. The second Sirmian, A.D. 357, shows a considerable decline in doctrine, forbidding all use of the words *ὁμοούσιος* or *ὁμοιούσιος*, as perplexing people's minds, and not being found in Scripture. It applies John xx. 17, and x. 29, to establish the Semi-Arian doctrine of an inequality in the Godhead of the Father and Son, but allows (against Anomæanism) that the Son only, with the Father, knows the manner of His own Generation. It was this Creed which the aged Hosius was persecuted into signing.

12. In the following year the Semi-Arians held a Council at Ancyra, under Basil the Bishop—the leader of the Semi-Arians—in protest against the last, as Dr. Newman thinks. To its creed were attached eighteen anathemas, twelve of which are preserved by S. Hilary; the eighteenth seems to have repeated the opposition of the Council last-mentioned to the term 'of One Substance;' but it appears to have been soon suppressed.⁴

13. In the same year the same party published another Creed, composed of the so-called Creed of the Council of

¹ We have given the usual date of this Council, but it is a question of some uncertainty. Our limits do not allow us to discuss it; but those who wish to examine the question at length will find a full dissertation on it in the preface of the Historical Tracts of S. Athanasius, Lib. Fathers, vol. xiii.

² Soc. ii. 22. Soz. iii. 13. Socrates terms this range *ρίζουκis*. See Valesius in loc.

³ History, book ii. chap. 55.

⁴ Tillemont, Hist. Arians, § 73.

Antioch, against Paul of Samosata, the Dedication or second Antiochene, and the first Sirmian. It is not extant; but according to Sozomen, the prohibition of 'One Substance' was again repeated. It was probably this Creed which S. Hilary so bitterly upbraids Liberius, Bishop of Rome, for having signed.

14. In 359 they published the third Sirmian, which says, 'We believe . . . in the One Only-begotten Son of God, Who 'was before all conceivable time, and all comprehensible substance—begotten impassibly from God . . . and was the Only 'from the Only Father,—God of God,—like the Father Who 'begot Him in all things, Whose Generation none knows but 'the Father only.' It concludes with forbidding the use of the word substance, *οὐσία*, for the same reasons as those alleged by the second Sirmian for forbidding *ὁμοούσιος* and *ὁμοιούσιος*, and adds, 'We affirm that the Son is like the Father in all things, as the Holy Scriptures also say and teach.'

To this Creed the framers were so unhappy as to attach the names of the Consuls, 'to show to all thinking persons,' says S. Athanasius, 'that their faith has its commencement not from antiquity, but now from the time of Constantius.'

15. The next Creed is that of Seleucia, A.D. 359, the preamble of which anathematizes *ὁμοούσιος*, *ὁμοιούσιος* and *ἀνόμοιος*, and confesses merely *ἕμμιος*, from S. Paul, Coloss. i. 15: 'Who is the Image of the Invisible God, the First-born of every creature.' The Creed itself speaks of Christ as 'Begotten before all time, God the Word, God of God, Light, Life, &c. like the fourth Antiochene.

This, however, not pleasing them, they went from Seleucia to Nice in Thrace, and there drew up another Creed, which the deputies from the Council of Ariminum, who were present, signed, and took back to that Council, which also adopted it. It terms Christ 'The Only-begotten Son of God, begotten of 'God before all ages, and before every *ἔρξη*, by Whom all things 'were made, . . . begotten as Only-begotten, Only of the Only 'Father, God of God, like the Father Who begot Him—ac- 'cording to the Scriptures;' at the conclusion it forbids the use both of *οὐσία* and *πρόστασις*. It was this Council, of which S. Jerome says, in his treatise against the followers of Lucifer, 'Ingenuit totus orbis et Arianum se esse miratus est.' But this transformation was only in appearance, not in truth. There is in S. Hilary, Hist. Frag. xi., a letter from the Gallican Bishops, who had been deceived into signing the Creed, to the Easterns, in which they say, 'We have embraced 'the word *ὁμοούσιος*, to express the true and proper birth of 'the Only-begotten God, of God the Father...born of a whole 'and perfect God, Who is incapable of birth, and He is there-

‘fore confessed by us to be of one Essence or Substance with God the Father, lest He should rather appear as a creature or adoption or appellation.’ ‘And because He is from Him as a Son from the Father, or God from God . . . we not unwillingly admit His likeness to God the Father (for He is the Image of the Invisible God); but we understand that only similitude, worthy to be compared to the Father, which is [the similitude] of very God to very God, so that there is to be understood not numerical oneness of Divinity (unio); but the quality of oneness (unitas), because unio is singular (*i. e.* the number one); but unity is the fulness of Him who is born according to the truth of the Nativity, especially since our Lord Jesus Christ declared to His disciples, “I and my Father are One,” by which He signifies *not only* the love which He had to the Father, but also the Godhead, which is God of God, according to the words, “He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father.”’¹

It is certain, that if these Bishops had been really Arians, they would not only have refused the *ὁμοούσιος* in any sense, but would also have omitted that confession, by implication, of the Circumincessio, with which our extract concludes, allowing instead of an essential unity of Father and Son, only a moral union,—which, as it is, they expressly and in terms repudiate. The Creed of Ariminum was confirmed by the Acacians, in a Council held at Constantinople in the following year, *i. e.* A.D. 360.

16. Lastly, to crown the whole, a Council of Arians was held at Antioch in the year 361, which came back to the original type of the heresy, and to the very point from which Arius had started in the beginning; teaching that the Son was, in all things, both in substance and in will, unlike the Father; and that He was created *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*.² But they had previously admitted the Son to be God; and when asked, says Socrates, how they reconciled these last assertions with that confession, they replied that He was God of God in the sense in which the Apostle says, (1 Cor. xi. 12,) ‘All things are of God—one of which things the Son is.’ Unable to endure the reproaches which this assertion brought on them, they returned to the Creed of Constantinople.

Thus there are three types of Semi-Arian doctrine in these formularies. This phase of Arianism, as opposed to the faith of Nice, taught, in a word, the Son’s similarity to, instead of His perfect identity with, the Father in nature, and it is expressed, as has been said in the above Creeds, in a threefold manner: first, in the higher sense of the fourth Antiochene and Philippopolitan Creeds, that the Son is from no other hypostasis, or substantia,

¹ Hist. Frag. vi.

² Sozomen, iv. 29.

than the Father; a term which, although it may appear to express more, was probably meant by those who used it to be of equal force with their *ὁμοιούσιος*: and this the Church has always rejected as being clearly inadequate to express the pure Godhead of its Subject, inasmuch as it may also be used of angels and the souls of men. Secondly, He is said to be 'like the Father according to the Scriptures;' a form of speech which either results in the same idea as that of *ὁμοιούσιος*, in which case it becomes a mere repetition and superfluity; or tends to the lower one expressed by, thirdly, the vague generalism that He is merely 'like;' a term which is, to say the least, radically deficient, as it may also be used, in a sense, of everything that has life. Besides these, there is the pure Arianism, that He is 'unlike.' A little reflection will show that this last expression, far from being a perversion of the others, is in truth its explanation, its natural and necessary result. If the Son, as the Semi-Arians taught, is only like the Father *quoad entem*,—which is the real and final meaning of their definitions,—He must, like all creatures, be unlike Him *quoad Deum*, and it is thus that Semi-Arianism is at last found to merge into true Arianism. Then such of the professors of the former as are shocked at this conclusion are compelled to fall back upon the only possible alternative, the true and Catholic doctrine of the One Substance.

Soon after the last-mentioned Council of Antioch, Constantius died; and as with him the era of Arian and Semi-Arian creeds had derived its commencement, so also with him it came to an end.

This event was followed by the accession of Julian. One of the earliest acts of the new emperor was to recal the banished bishops, and grant a universal toleration. This measure gave peace for a time to the Church; and its immediate result, as regards S. Athanasius, was the calling a Council at Alexandria, A.D. 362, to remedy in some measure the disorders of the times. The first thing ordered was the reception of all who were willing to return to the Church, on condition of their condemning the heresies of Arius, and of those Macedonians who asserted the Holy Ghost to be a Creature different in Essence from the Son, and confessing the Creed of Nicæa.

Writing subsequently to Rufinianus, in answer to his question as to what had been done in the Council about these unhappy persons, S. Athanasius says that it seemed good to grant pardon to the leaders if they repented, but not to allow them the rank of clergy; but that those who had not lapsed willingly, but had been forced into heresy, should be pardoned, and allowed to retain their orders, 'especially,' he continues,—and this is the only

passage in the life or writings of this great upholder of God's truth that must excite our disapprobation,—we might in an ordinary case be justified in using a stronger term,—‘especially as they offered a credible excuse, and proved that this was done in a manner œconomically, for they declared that “they had not been drawn into impiety; but, lest certain of the most abandoned should be appointed in their places, and corrupt the Churches, they preferred rather to yield to compulsion, and bear the burthen, than destroy the people:” and, in saying this, they appeared to us to speak credibly, for they instance, in their exculpation, the case of Aaron, the brother of Moses, who, in the desert, united with the transgression of the people, and urged as his excuse, that they would otherwise have returned to Egypt, and remained in their idolatry.’¹ We submit that not the widest latitude that can possibly be accorded to the term œconomy, could justify even S. Athanasius in so treating a case which Holy Scripture itself has expressly condemned.

The Council then proceeded to inquire into the meanings affixed to the word *Hypostasis* by parties in the Church who differed on the subject; and finding that they who confessed one *Hypostasis* did not use the word in a Sabellian sense, but conceived it to be equivalent to *Essence*, and that they who spoke of three *Hypostases* did not hold three *Principles*, or three *Gods*, but took the word in the sense of *Person*, and that both alike received the *Nicene Creed*, it was decided that either sense was allowable. From this time, however, *οὐσία* has been confined to express the *Essence*, and *Hypostasis* to distinguish the *Persons* of the Holy Trinity.

Lastly, against the heresy lately adopted by Apollinaris, denying the reasonable part of the soul of Christ, and supplying its place by the Godhead, the Council declared the true faith of His nature, that He had a reasonable soul and mind, together with human flesh.

The letter of the Council was carried to Antioch, in hopes of composing certain divisions then rife in that city, for an account of which we must be content with referring to Bishop Kaye. Julian was killed in the Persian war, A. D. 362, and was succeeded by Jovian, to whom, at his own request, S. Athanasius, with a synod of bishops to support his authority, sent a letter containing a statement of the Christian faith as defined at Nicæa, in which he dwells chiefly on the novelty of the Arian and Macedonian heresies, and the want of authority of their authors. Jovian consequently refused all countenance to the heretical bodies. The Acacians, however, with Acacius himself at their head, as if to make their time-serving and irreligious

¹ Tom. i. part ii. pp. 768, 769.

spirit the more glaring, now held a Council at Antioch, in which they addressed the emperor, professing their acceptance of the Nicene Creed; a movement peculiarly odious in those who had long been among the foremost of the Semi-Arians, and had ruled at Constantinople no longer ago than the year 360, as we have seen, that the terms, 'consubstantial' and 'like in substance' were to be wholly forbidden.

Jovian, after a brief reign of eight months, died suddenly, and was succeeded in the East by the Arian Valens. S. Athanasius was hereupon once more driven from Alexandria; but the policy, rather than the humanity, of his enemies soon permitted him to return. The remainder of his life was spent in peace. He exerted himself, together with the great S. Basil, to heal the schisms of the distracted Church in Antioch; and he now composed his two unrivalled treatises in assertion of the true doctrine of the humanity of Christ against Apollinaris and his followers, together with his letter to Epictetus, Bishop of Corinth, on the same subject. His last public act was, in Bishop Kaye's opinion, the calling of a Synod at Alexandria in the year 369, in which he wrote to exhort the bishops of Africa to adhere to the Creed of Nicæa, and to pay no attention to that of the Semi-Arians at Ariminum. The exact date of his death is matter of doubt; but, as it would appear, in the year 372 or 373 the Church lost in him the ablest defender of her faith, of his own or perhaps of any other age. He lived to perceive the fallacies which the Arian principles contained within themselves begin to operate to the destruction of the heresy, and to foresee clearly that whenever the imperial support should be finally withdrawn from it, the system would speedily fall.

Bishop Kaye has given his character, as drawn by Gibbon and Cudworth. We prefer, however, to seek it in the pages of S. Gregory Nazianzen, who has dedicated an Oration to the subject, and who, as concerned in the controversies of the times, could, better than any modern, especially a cold-hearted infidel like Gibbon, appreciate his actions and sufferings, his temper and disposition. 'He was,' in the quaint but nervous language of Cave, who has transferred the pith of the Oration to his own pages,—

'He was one that so governed himself, that his life supplied the place of sermons, and his sermons prevented his corrections; much less need had he to cut or lance where he did but once shake his rod. In him all ranks and orders might find something to admire, something particular for their imitation; one might commend his unwearied constancy in fasting and prayer; another his vigorous and incessant persevering in watchings and praise; a third, his admirable care and protection of the poor; a fourth, his resolute opposition of the proud, or his condescension to the humble. The virgins may celebrate him as their bride's-man, the married as their gover-

nor, the hermits as their monitor, the cœnobites as their lawgiver, the simple as their guide, the contemplative as a divine, the merry as a bridle, the miserable as a comforter, the aged as a staff, the youth as a tutor, the poor as a benefactor, and the rich as a steward. He was a patron to the widows, a father to orphans, a friend to the poor, a harbour to strangers, a brother to brethren, a physician to the sick, a keeper of the healthful, one who "became all things to all men, that if not all, he might at least gain the more." . . . With respect to his predecessors in that see, he equalled some, came near others, and exceeded others; in some he imitated their discourses, in others their actions, the meekness of some, the zeal of others, the patience and constancy of the rest; borrowing many perfections from some, and all from others; and so making up a complete representation of virtue like skilful limners, who, to make the piece absolute, do first from several persons draw the several perfections of beauty within the idea of their own minds; so he, insomuch that in practice he outdid the eloquent, and in his discourses outwent those who were most versed in practice; or, if you will, in his discourses he excelled the eloquent, and in his practice those that were most used to business; and for those that had made but an ordinary advance in either, he was far superior to them, as being eminent but in one kind; and for those who were masters in the other, he outdid them, in that he excelled in both.'—*Cave's Lives of the Fathers*, vol. ii. pp. 358, 359.

With this sketch of the chief actor in it, we dismiss the historical part of our subject. Bishop Kaye's digest of the four Orations of S. Athanasius against the Arians, contains a full analytical account of those remarkable treatises, and is well adapted to give the reader a clear outline of the arguments used in them. This part of his work would, therefore, form a very useful accompaniment to the Orations themselves, either in the Greek of S. Athanasius, or in the translation from it of the 'Library of the Fathers.' Our space will permit us to do no more than glance at one or two particular points in them, which may either appear to be of most importance in themselves, or which have been more particularly illustrated by Bishop Kaye.

S. Athanasius, in these Orations, treats at length of the consequences which follow from the denial of the Co-eternity and Godhead of the Son.¹ He then proceeds to the examination of some of those texts on which the Arians chiefly relied, in proof of their opinions that He was a Creature, and not a Son: *e. g.* Proverbs viii. 22, 23; Heb. i. 4, iii. 2; Acts ii. 36; John xiv. 10, in which, they say, He is declared to have been made, and not begotten; Matthew xxviii. 18; John v. 22, iii. 35, vi. 37; Luke x. 22, which affirm that gifts and powers were given to Him, and prove, they say, that He had them not previously to that bestowal; John xii. 27, xiii. 21; Matthew xxvi. 38, which describe those infirmities and sufferings which they deny to attach to the true Power of God; and John vi. 6, xi. 19; Mark xiii. 32, in which He speaks as if ignorant of what was to be.

¹ Orat. i. §§ 1—51.

To all which S. Athanasius gives the general and obvious answer, that they apply to the assumed Humanity, and not to the natural Divinity of their Subject.¹ In § 22 and following, he opposes to them other texts, which can only be applied to Christ's Godhead; *e.g.* John xiv. 9, 10, xx. 28; Heb. i. 6. From Christ's being always termed *γέννημα*, or *μονογενής*, as opposed to *κτίσμα*, S. Athanasius proves² that Proverbs viii. 22, *ἐκτίσέ με*, cannot be meant of his Divine Generation, but must apply to His Incarnation, and that the passage was fulfilled in Him when He took flesh. Orat. iii. begins with the proof of the Essential identity of the Father and Son, §§ 1—26. From this he passes on to the more particular consideration of the class of texts above cited, which contain the Arian objections—the bestowal of power on the Son, §§ 26—37; his partial ignorance, §§ 37—50; his growth and increase, §§ 51—53; and his infirmities, §§ 54—58. In a separate piece on Matthew xxi. 27, 'All things are given to Me,' he had treated at length of the communication of graces from the divine to the human nature; and on the subject of Christ's ignorance—as of the last day—he proves that He knew as the Word, what He knew not as Man.

Such, in outline, are the chief contents of the first three Orations. The fourth, as Dr. Newman and Bishop Kaye are agreed, and as is evident in itself, treats chiefly of other heresies than that of Arius; what little it does contain that bears relation to the last being mostly a repetition of the other three.

But the great question, after all, between the Catholics and the Arians is, the reasonableness or otherwise of the objections urged by the latter to the term *ὁμοούσιος*. These first used the Sonship to deny the Godhead, and then changed their ground and used the Godhead to destroy the Sonship. 'If the Son is God,' they said, 'the Essence is divided, and there are two Gods. If He is the Son, He must be a Creature Who existed not before the time of His Generation, and He cannot, therefore, be God.' Consequently when the Council of Nicæa ruled the *ὁμοούσιος*, that is, sameness of Essence possessed in different Subjects, they at once turned round and accused the Fathers of holding Division of the Divine Essence. To this S. Athanasius replied, to use Bishop Kaye's words, that

'if the objections were well-founded, the Father could not have a Son, notwithstanding the express declaration of Scripture that He has. For a Son must be of the same essence as His Father; and the Father's essence not being divisible, He cannot, on the Arian supposition, have a Son.'³

¹ Secs. 51 to the end, and Oration ii. secs. 1—21, and following.

² Sec. 44 to the end.

³ Page 160.

In a word, the Arians denied both the Sonship and the God-head of Christ; their doctrine was, that in calling Christ a Son, we by the force of terms imply that He is *no* Son, but a Creature, the word Son proving that He existed not before the time of His Generation: and in calling Him God, of One Substance with the Father, we acknowledge two Substances which are in no sense one, and therefore that if both are God, there are two Gods.

The answer to the argument derived from the word Son we have already seen: as to the other, the early Fathers acknowledged such a Communicatio Essentiæ as allowed to the Son (with the Holy Ghost, of Whom there is no question at present) a real and proper Substance. Then, to prevent any Ditheistic conclusion, they taught a Circumincessio or *περιχώρησις*; that is, such an embosoming of one in the other as is taught by S. John i. 18—‘The Only-begotten Son Which is in the bosom of the Father,’ and xiv. 9—‘He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father,’ which makes that Essence, which they hold in one sense three, to be in another sense perfectly and finally one. To hold a *ταυτοουσιότης* or a *μονοουσιότης*—a Substance in no sense three, but simply and absolutely one only, is, as S. Epiphanius holds, Sabellianism¹—would involve, as S. Augustin says, the whole Trinity, instead of One Person only, having been born of the Blessed Virgin. The Father gives to the Son His Own Essence so as to communicate it to Him without depriving Himself of any part of it; just as S. Augustin teaches that He gives Him the Kingdom without taking it from Himself.² To cite the words of a few Fathers whose authority is beyond dispute.

S. Hilary: ‘Hic ergo Ingenitus ante omne tempus ex se
‘Filius genuit, non ex aliqua subjacente materia, quia per
‘Filius omnia; non ex nihilo, quia ex se Filius; non ut par-
‘tum, quia nihil in Deo demutabile aut vacuum est; non partem
‘sui vel divisam, vel discissam, vel extensam; quia impassibilis
‘et incorporeus Deus est; hæc autem passionis et carnis sunt;
‘et secundum Apostolum, in Christo inhabitat omnis plenitudo
‘divinitatis corporaliter. Sed incomprehensibiliter inenarra-
‘biliter, ante omne tempus, et sæcula *Unigenitum ex his quæ*
‘*ingenita in se erant procreavit*, omne quod Deus est per caritatem
‘atque virtutem nativitati ejus impertiens: ac sic ab ingenito,
‘perfecto æternoque Patre, Unigenitus et perfectus et æternus
‘est Filius.’³

S. Ambrose, De Fide, i. x.: ‘Incomprehensibiliter generatur Filius, impassibiliter generat Pater, et tamen ex se

¹ Hær. lxxvi. § 7, p. 920.

² De Trin. i. § 16.

³ Ibid. iii. § 3.

‘generavit et ante omnem intellectum generavit Deus verus
‘Deum verum.’

S. Augustin, De Trinitate, lib. v., explains the words of S. Paul, Philipp. ii. 6, ‘Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God,’ of an ‘*æqualitas secundum substantiam*,’ and in his treatise De Fide et Symbolo, § 4: ‘Deus cum Verbum genuit, *id quod est ipse genuit*, neque de nihilo, neque de aliqua jam facta conditaque materia, *sed de seipso id quod est ipse*.’¹

For the Greek Fathers, Bishop Kaye tells us that, according to Cudworth, SS. Cyril of Alexandria and Gregory of Nyssa held that the three hypostases of the Trinity have no otherwise one and the same Essence of the Godhead in them, nor are one God, than three individual men have one common specific essence of manhood in them, and are all men. ‘I doubt not,’ the Bishop continues, ‘that if Cyril or Gregory had been charged with affirming that there are three Gods, they would indignantly have denied the charge.’²

Such was the system of the whole Church until the twelfth century, when Peter Lombard first propounded a new theory, based, as Bingham says, on a new definition of the term Person³ for that generally received, ‘an individual substance of a rational nature,’ making it merely ‘a mode, an office, a habitude, or quality;’ in a word, a mere *τρόπος υπάρξεως*, a definition which has since obtained considerable, though not universal, sanction with the Romish theologians. In the fifth Distinction of the first book of Sentences, Lombard raised the question whether we ought to say that because God the Father begot God the Son, God begot God. ‘Si enim,’ he replies, ‘Deus genuit Deum, videtur quod aut se genuit Deum aut alium Deum genuerit. Si vero alium Deum genuit, non est tantum unus Deus; si autem seipsum Deus genuit, aliqua res seipsam genuit.’ He negatives the first from the Doctrine of the Unity, and the second from S. Augustin, De Trin. i. 1.

¹ Ed. Bened. tom. vi. p. 153. Venet. 1731.

² Page 168, note. Bingham has also said, ‘I likewise conclude that Cyril of Alexandria was one of those who allow three particular substances in the Trinity united in one common nature.’—*Sermon on the Trinity*, p. 339.

³ Bingham, *Sermon on the Trinity*, p. 330, vol. ix. Straker, 1840. ‘Whilst the Fathers speak sense and reason, in allowing the three Persons to be three substances in one sense, as well as one substance only in another, the schoolmen, who deny them to be three real substances in any sense, are justly charged with a contradiction.’ ‘The latter deny the distinct substances of the Persons, whilst they allow that the Person of the Son is begotten of the Person of the Father, but not his Essence of his Essence; which distinction of a Person from his own proper peculiar Essence is an airy notion that might sufficiently be exposed.’—*Ibid.* *Sermon* i. pp. 335, 337.

He then raises the question, which was so widely discussed after his time, 'Whether Essence begot Essence, or whether Essence neither begot nor is begotten?' and he concludes, 'Nec Pater genuit divinam essentiam, nec Divina essentia genuit Filium, nec Divina essentia genuit divinam essentiam, hic autem nomine essentiæ intelligimus divinam naturam quæ communis est tribus Personis et tota in singulis.'¹ This, as our readers will see, is directly opposed to the teaching of S. Ambrose; and also, as Lombard admits, to that of S. Augustin. He endeavours, indeed, to explain away the latter, but we cannot say that, in our judgment, he has at all succeeded. Between his 'aut seipsum genuit, aut alium Deum,'—that is, between Sabellianism and Semi-Arianism, which did hold *alius Deus*,—there is an evident alternative, and this is found in such communication of Essence by generation as was held by the early Church, and as is taught by Melancthon, cited by Bull in his *Defensio*: 'Philip Melancthon,' he says, 'in the exposition of the Nicene Creed, thinks that it is truly said, The Essence which is the Son is born, as it is said in the Creed, "God of God, Light of Light;" and to the objection that the same thing does not beget itself, so that as the Essence is the same, Essence cannot beget Essence, he answers: "The same thing, as far as it is incommunicable, does not beget itself; but in that it is communicable, it is communicated to Him who is begotten. But the Essence is communicable, and it is, therefore, communicated to Him who is begotten."'²

Lombard's doctrine was, however, confirmed in its main position by the fourth Lateran Council, A. D. 1215, and the Council of Florence, 1439. The former says: 'Each of the three Persons is that definite Thing, or Essence, or Substance, or Divine Nature, which alone is the Principle of all . . . and this is neither begetter, nor begotten, nor proceeding; but it is the Father Who begets, the Son Who is begotten, the Holy Ghost Who proceeds, that there may be differences in the Persons, and unity in the Nature, and that thus the Father may be one Person, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another: . . . for the Father begetting the Son from Eternity, gave to Him his own Essence, as He Himself bears witness, John x. 29—*ὁ πατήρ μου, ὃς δέδωκέ μοι, μέζων πάντων ἐστίν*³—and it cannot be said that the Father had given Him a part of His own Essence, and kept a part for Himself, for the hypostasis [sub-

¹ *Distinct.* V.

² *Defensio*, Pars iv. cap. 1, § 9.

³ The subject of these words, however, is not the Divine Essence, as these Fathers suppose, but the 'sheep' mentioned in verse 28, as our version rightly represents.

‘stantia] of the Father is indivisible as being wholly simple. ‘Nor can it be said that the Father transferred his own Essence to the Son, as if forsooth He’ (the Father) ‘had so given it to Him’ (the Son) ‘as not to have power over it, for otherwise the Father ceased to be a Substance. It is plain, then, that without any defect the Son, when begotten, received the Essence of the Father, and thus Father and Son have the same Essence, and thus Father and Holy Ghost are the same thing.’¹

The Westerns when asked by the Greeks, at the Council of Florence, whether Essence and Person were one and the same thing, answered in like manner: ‘We say *Essence and Person are one and the same secundum rem, and differ only according to our mode of understanding*, so that Person is understood to be constituted of Essence and Propriety.’ The Proprieties are, they grant, incommunicable, or they would not be Proprieties, and when the Son is begotten by the Father, it is the same, they say, as to assert that He is begotten from the substance of the Father; ‘for the Person is the Principle which generates, and the *Essence is communicated so that it is not generated*. The Father is the Principle which generates, for “Father” implies a subject. The Divine Essence is not that which generates, for it is not signified as a subject . . . but we say that the *Person of the Father is signified*, therefore the Person of the Father is that which generates; the Essence is the Principle from which He generates. The Divine Nature is the Principle by which the Father generates the Son, and the Father is not communicated, but the Essence.’² The Roman Theologians, however, are by no means unanimous on the subject. Bingham tells us that one of the Schoolmen, Richard (a contemporary of Peter Lombard, and Prior of the order of S. Victor), in his sixth book *De Trinitate*, defined that ‘without doubt the Substance of the Son is begotten, the Substance of the Father is unbegotten; neither is the unbegotten Substance begotten, nor the begotten Substance unbegotten,’—and adds that he complained of some who had forsaken the Catholic and primitive doctrine; concluding with a challenge, which will remind the English reader of that of Bishop Jewel—‘Let them produce authority, I do not say more than one, but at least one, which denies that substance begets substance.’ Like Jewel’s, his challenge was never answered.³ In fact, the whole gist of the matter lies in this point; if the system of Lombard is correct, the early Fathers opposed the opposite heresies of Arius and

¹ Harduin, vol. vii. p. 17.

² Session xvi. Harduin, vol. ix. pp. 869, 870.

³ Bingham, *Sermon on the Trinity*, pp. 341, 342. Petavius discusses this subject in the 7th Chap. of his 4th Book on the Trinity: he follows Lombard and the Schoolmen in his decision.

Sabellius on grounds that were wholly untenable. Arius held two Substances, but made them *Essentially* different; Sabellius acknowledged one only, but without those Personal distinctions, the absence of which involves the One Person acting on Himself throughout the whole work, both of the Creation and of our Redemption. In consequence, their Catholic opponents taught one Substance, which was both begetter and begotten, by such a distinction at once and union as is expressed by the term *ὁμοούσιος*, and necessarily implied by that of Perichoresis.

It would seem to be one immediate and inevitable result of the system of Lombard, considered in itself, to confine the doctrine of the Perichoresis to the Persons alone, there being no union possible to that which is in no sense whatever more than one, but is simply and absolutely one, and one only;¹ in which case, among other results, the Doctors of the Church of Rome are, in a great part, divided against themselves, Lombard and the Councils above cited allowing it of the Persons only, S. Thomas Aquinas extending it to the Essence also.² It is unquestionable that the voice of antiquity would be with the latter. If (and here the question is at once applicable to the subject before us)—if, to avoid Arianism, we do not admit a generatio essentialis, we run great risk of falling into Sabellianism; and, accordingly, Bull does not hesitate to accuse Lombard and the fourth Lateran of this very heresy; in that they deny the Son and Holy Ghost, he says, to be Substantial Persons, and make Them no more than mere *τρόποι ὑπόψεως*.³ It seems impossible that a mere protest on their part against being thought to hold that doctrine, can suffice for their acquittal from a conclusion which inevitably follows from their premises.

If, however, the system of Lombard tend to narrow the Perichoresis, the Arians and Semi-Arians denied it altogether, for they denied the doctrine which it expresses, and from which it comes, making the Oneness of the Father and Son to be not of Essence, but of will merely: just as Nestorius afterwards made the Union of the Godhead and Manhood in Christ not a hypostatical, but a moral one. Thus, Eusebius of Cæsarea, in a passage of his *Theologia Ecclesiastica*, which is enough of itself to stamp him a holder of Arian doctrine, and on which Petavius has severely, but justly, animadverted, says that the Son rests in the Father's bosom, as He promised that we should

¹ So Bingham: 'The Fathers often tell us that the three Persons are united into One Being without confusion; which is a very inconceivable thing upon the hypothesis of one single substance, mind, or spirit; for whatever things are properly united, must be substances really distinct from one another; for there is no proper union of one single substance with itself.'—*Sermon on Trinity*, p. 336.

² P. I. Q. xlii. art. 5. Perrone de Trin. cap. vi.

³ Defensio, p. iv. cap. 1.

rest in the bosoms of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.¹ In another place he says, 'As the Father and Son are One, so are all men one; the unity of the Father and Son is not, as Marcellus thinks, of the Word made One with God, and joined to Him in His Essence. The Father is so in Him as He wills to be in us, not that He and the Father are one, καθ' ὑπόστασιν, but that the Father has given to the Son of His own glory, and He, in imitation of the Father, gives it in like manner to His own; as He says, John xvii. 22, 23, "The glory which Thou gavest Me, I have given them; that they may be one, even as We are one: I in them, and Thou in Me, that they may be made perfect in one."'

S. Athanasius, as Bishop Kaye has shown, confutes their doctrine and reasoning more than once and at great length, as containing in itself the essence of their chief heretical proposition, that the Son of God is no Son nor God, but a creature. We can, however, only afford space for the following extract:—

'We cannot be indissolubly united to the Father in essence, as the Son is; but we can take their indissoluble union in Essence as an example of the unity of heart which ought to subsist among believers. If it were possible that we should be as the Son in the Father, it ought to have been written, "that they may be one in Thee, as the Son is in the Father;" whereas our Saviour's words are, "As Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in Us," (John xvii. 21.) The words in *Us* show that He only is in the Father, being the only Word and Wisdom; but we are in the Son, and through Him in the Father. Christ means to say, "that by Our unity they may be one with each other, as We are one by nature and in truth; otherwise they cannot be one, unless they learn in Us what unity is." The words in *Us* do not mean that the disciple is in the Father, as the Son is; but are an example and image, as if it were said, "Let them learn of *Us*." Or again, the words may be understood to mean that they, by the power of the Father and Son, may be one, speaking the same things; for without God this cannot be. In the name of Father and Son being made one, men may hold firm the bond of love. The text, therefore, "that they may be one as *We are*," does not imply identity, but an image and example. The Word, therefore, has really and truly an identity of nature with the Father; it is our part to imitate Him; for He adds, "I in them, and Thou in Me, that they may be made perfect in one." Here the Lord asks something greater and more perfect on our account. It is plain that the Word was made, γέγονεν, in us, since He put on our body. He adds, "Thou in Me," for I am Thy Word; and since Thou art in Me, because I am Thy Word, and I am in them through the body, and the salvation of men is perfected through Thee in Me; I ask that they may be made one according to the body in Me and its perfection, that they also may be made perfect, having unity in it, and being made one in it: so that all being borne by Me, may be one body and one spirit, and may grow up to the perfect man. All partaking of the same, are made one body, having the one Lord in themselves. The use of the word καθὼς, "as Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in Us," shows that Christ did not mean to express our identity or equality with the Father and Himself, but merely proposes their unity as an example.—P. 233, &c.

¹ Eccles. Theol. ii. 19, § 5, p. 86, folio.

Again:—

‘Athanasius produces, in support of his interpretation, 1 John iv. 13: “Thereby we know that we dwell in Him, and He in us, because He hath given us of His Spirit.” We, therefore, are in Him, and He in us, by the grace of the Spirit given to us; and as the Spirit is the Spirit of God, therefore we, having the Spirit, are reckoned to be in God; and thus God is in us. We are not in the Father, as the Son is in the Father: we are in Him by partaking of the Spirit: but the Son does not receive of the Spirit, He supplies the Spirit to all: nor does the Spirit unite the Word to the Father, but the Spirit receives from the Word.’—Pp. 236, 237.

To conclude the subject of the *ὁμοούσιος*, we will briefly observe, although it is beyond the strict limits of our question, that the Arians of S. Augustin’s time, feeling the pressure of the original Arian system, admitted the Nicene *ὁμοούσιος* in word, but held another doctrine in fact; viz. that the Son was of one Substance with God in the same sense as that held by the Manichees and others, of the souls of men; who thought, not that these were of equal infinity and majesty with Him, but that they were created out of His Substance, and were thus consubstantial with Him.

The last point that remains for our notice is Bishop Kaye’s account of S. Athanasius’ treatise ‘De Incarnatione.’ We are glad to see this piece thus popularly brought forward. We know of none, in the whole course of early theology, which contains, for its length, so simple and lucid an account of the Divine Purpose and method of acting, in the schemes of our creation and redemption, or which more satisfactorily answers those questions as to particular portions of the Divine Economy, *e. g.* the *modus operandi* of vicarious sacrifice, and of the death and resurrection of Christ, which every inquiring mind may and ought to ask. Especially would its study, we think, be useful in these days of missionary activity, as showing how the author dealt with those who were yet strangers to the Christian covenant, Jews or Gentiles.

The ‘De Incarnatione’ commences with a statement of the Scripture account of the creation, as opposed to the notions of the philosophers.¹ The author then shows that man was placed in paradise in a state of original righteousness, with a promise, if he continued obedient, of immortality, without death, in heaven.² But the law was broken, and henceforth it became a question as to what, in the counsels of God, should become of him. Death had been threatened if he sinned, and it was unfitting that God should fail in the fulfilment of His word. Repentance alone could not have satisfied Him, because there was not only a sin to be wiped out, for which it might have

¹ Kaye, p. 283.

² Ibid. p. 284.

sufficed, but also an indwelling corruption which it had no power to purify.¹

To heal this corruption the Son of God, Himself God, came down, in the nature of His creature, to rescue him by His own arm from his enemy, and by engrafting him into that purity which, existing not in Him in degree, must be of more power to cleanse and to save, than the lust of the betrayer had been to pollute and to destroy, He renovated His work, not Himself suffering from the pollution of the body; but, by taking a body to be a part of Himself, and uniting it to His all-powerful and all-spotless Godhead, He purified it.²

Lastly, there was not only restoration to be bestowed, but a penalty for a wilful transgression to be paid; and that penalty was death. Here again the justice of God was amply satisfied by the death of His only-begotten Son, in whose death this penalty was paid far more completely than it could have been paid in the deaths of all men.³ So much for that death in itself: the next thing to be considered is the manner of it. He who was Life and the Lord of life could not die of infirmity; nor could the Healer of diseases die of disease: again, He must not die a private death of which few could know; nor must He inflict death on Himself: His death must be public, to show both that He had verily died, and also to prove the truth of His resurrection: and it must be the work of others; of this the cross was the most fitting instrument, both as it was part of the curse that He must bear, and also as by it were fulfilled His own declarations, Isaiah lxx. 2, Rom. x. 21, John xii. 32, and Ephes. ii. 2, and other like passages which point to the disarming of the power of Satan.

His death had this further power, that it destroyed death, and changed it evermore into dissolution or sleep, as is shown from the expressions of the Apostles, Philippi. i. 23, 2 Cor. v. 1, 2 Pet. iii. 11, 12.

As regards the time that He remained in the grave:—He might have despised the power of death, and raised His body at once had He so pleased, but men might then have said that He had not truly died, and the glory of the incorruptibility might have been obscured.

Hence the Word underwent death that His body might be seen to be dead, and on the third day He showed it to all incorruptible: had He risen later, it would not have been believed that He had raised up the same body which had died,—nor would He keep His disciples longer in suspense,—but, whilst His words were yet fresh in their ears, and whilst

¹ Kaye, pp. 284, 285.

² Ibid. p. 288.

³ Ibid. pp. 288—294.

those who put Him to death were on earth to testify of it, He showed the body that had been dead immortal and incorruptible. Thus it might be known that He had died not through weakness of the nature of the indwelling Word, but that by the power of that Word death had been destroyed in Him.

S. Athanasius thus adduces the moral change that has since taken place in the nature of man, as a proof that Christ has risen and is living still:—

‘ Before Christ came, death was formidable even to holy men; now, even women and youths disregard it. In like manner the daily conversions of the Gentiles to the truth of Christ; the influence exerted over the thoughts and consciences of men, so that the adulterer, the murderer, the unjust, the blasphemer forsake their evil courses, and submit to the teaching of Christ; the expulsion of evil spirits by His very name; these all prove that He is not dead, but that He has risen from the dead, and lives, or, rather, is the Life. He cannot be dead, who daily performs so many acts; drawing men to piety, persuading them to virtue, teaching them concerning immortality, leading them to the desire of heavenly things, inspiring them with power against death, showing Himself to every one, and destroying the impiety of idolatry. The works which the Son of God daily works for the salvation of men are the proof of His resurrection.’¹

And if unbelievers object that Christ has not risen because they do not see Him, they object to that which is according to nature, for God is by nature invisible—and if their minds are blind, they can see with their eyes the proofs of His being alive, *i.e.* His works—as a blind man, though he cannot see the sun, feels its influence, and knows that it is in heaven—nor would the devils, who can see what we cannot, obey Him if they did not know Him to be alive, and therefore their obedience is a proof of His life, and of His having raised His own body, and of His being the true Son of God and from Him, as His own Word, Wisdom, and Power.

Lastly, he applies the Prophets to the confutation of the Jews, and the *argumentum ad hominem* to that of the Gentiles:—

‘ The former ought to have learned from their own Scriptures that the Messiah was to be born of a Virgin, and to assume the nature of man, and to be Lord of all; that His birth was to be announced by the appearance of a star; that He would be called out of Egypt; that He would suffer every kind of indignity, and would not only die, but die upon the Cross; that He would rule over the Gentiles; that He would restore sight to the blind, and cause the lame to walk. All these predictions were fulfilled in Jesus of Nazareth, and in none other. The Jews appear to have admitted that these prophecies applied to the Messiah, but to have denied that they were fulfilled in Jesus, and to have said that they still looked for the promised Saviour. In confutation of this objection, Athanasius alleges Daniel’s prophecy of the seventy weeks, and the prediction of Jacob, from both of which it was clear that the time appointed for the appearance of the Messiah had passed.’²

¹ Kaye, p. 300.

² *Ibid.* p. 301.

The heathen Pantheists are told of the inhabiting, by the Word, of a human body, in order to make use of it as an instrument to convey the knowledge of God to man; and that where sin had abounded, *i.e.* in the human body, there grace might abound more.

'The Word was made man, in order that we may be deified; He manifested Himself through the body, in order that we may attain to the idea of the Invisible Father; He suffered contumely from man, in order that we may inherit immortality. He sustained no injury, it is true, being impassible, incorruptible, the very Word and God; but He keeps and preserves suffering mankind, for whom He underwent these sufferings, by His own impassibility.'¹

And S. Athanasius ends with an exhortation to all to purify their hearts and lives according to the doctrine of Christ and the example of the saints; that they may thus read the Scriptures with profit, and, as far as is possible, attain to the knowledge of God.

In conclusion, we can only again congratulate our readers on the appearance of a volume which contains much that is of real value, and the study of which may benefit so many. It is not sufficient that fundamental truths should be stated once or twice only, and then be considered as fully vindicated; it is well that they be repeated from time to time in a form adapted to the needs and requirements of the age; and as far as Bishop Kaye has done this, he has fulfilled the apostolic injunction to hand down the form of sound words, and has done his duty as a good and faithful ruler of the Church of God.

¹ Kaye, p. 304.

ART. V.—*History of Europe, from the Fall of Napoleon in 1815, to the Accession of Louis Napoleon in 1852.* By SIR ARCHIBALD ALISON, Bart. Blackwood: Edinburgh.

To speak of the vast differences in dignity and importance between one subject and another, in the wide range of literature, may very easily end in mere verbiage. The remark acquires more force, if we note the different attitudes which the mind, often unconsciously, assumes towards any particular study. There are certain subjects to which in themselves men yield a general homage,—there are others wherein the mind preserves an impartial independence,—others on which it looks down with a careless indifference. No author perhaps obtains a wider hearing, or is listened to with a spirit of readier docility, than the historian;—men are often disposed to pay only too much deference to the dignity of his office. The reader may suffer from doing so; but it furnishes a solemn caution for the historian, to take heed how he uses the pen of the ready writer. He is only the more deeply responsible for what he says, if he knows, that for the vast majority of his readers, ‘to hear is to believe,’ often also to ‘obey.’ The wider too the subject which he takes in hand, the stronger is the antecedent influence which he exercises over them. The historian of a nation, yet more of many nations, sits on a more exalted judgment-seat, and vindicates for his words a far wider acceptance than men would dream of giving to the narrow and local lucubrations of the chronicler of a county.

Sir A. Alison has sought to take his stand on a very lofty height; and his former historical work will obtain a wide circulation for this its sequel, and perhaps win from many a simple and trusting adoption of the views contained in it. It remains, however, to be seen whether the present volume will not have the effect of diminishing his influence, and of throwing some doubt on the general soundness of his opinions. Meanwhile, the very popularity of his preceding history will procure for many an erroneous notion, or false conclusion, in the present one, a more general acceptance than would have been accorded to them if the other had not gone before, to shed a portion of its own light on its successor. The great reputation of the earlier work is accounted for without much difficulty. A lively and vigorous narrative of a period more full of rapid and stirring change and momentous events than any other in the

world's history, deserved the popularity which it won; and the same merit will doubtless again be discerned in those portions of the present work, which may draw forth the especial powers of a writer whose facility in narration far exceeds his profoundness as a thinker, or his wisdom as a judge. His deficiency in these respects is unfortunately brought out by the very character of the period of which he has in the present instance undertaken to write the history. Unlike the former, it is a time of quiet; not less full, however, of change, or of changes less momentous; but one requiring (if we may resort to comparisons which are often only misleading) the deep sagacity of Thucydides, in a far greater degree than the superficial brilliancy of Livy. Here and there only is a gleam of the vivid light which casts such unnatural splendour on the previous age of turmoil and violence; and only in such transient glimpses are the real powers of the author made manifest. The last romantic episode in the chivalrous career of Murat is conveyed in language very different from that which records the gradual workings of national legislature and public opinion.

Still it is a subject which more fully than the former reveals the writer's mind, and his own individual convictions; and it does in fact display an array of notions, and a system of philosophy, very greatly at variance with those which are acknowledged by any considerable numbers at the present day. So complete an isolation from any of the ordinary opinions of the time, might scarcely have been anticipated; at all events, far greater power of argument, and depth of analysis, and originality of thought, might reasonably have been looked for. Such preconceptions we had formed before coming to the perusal of this volume: and though it would have been vain to look for any entire concurrence in his conclusions, we had expected to encounter the vigour and energy of a keen antagonist, the force and impartiality of (to say the least), a candid and independent thinker; we had invested him with all the dignity wherewith the heated imagination of the Knight of La Mancha invested his 'Windmill' foes; we can scarcely do more than confess that our deception may not have been so signal as that of the would-be restorer of chivalry.

The inference might suggest itself, that to refute the erroneous assertions and opinions of such a writer, would be a superfluous labour. In part only would such a conclusion be true. Certain, indeed, it is, that far the greater portion of the mistakes and prejudices contained in this volume, will never produce any harvest;—their own weight will crush them; but amongst these strange notions and preconceptions there are some which will win a more ready hearing. They too will one

day come to nothing; but they chime in with too much of the present popular feeling—they are too much in accordance with the present amount of general knowledge, to be altogether effete now. There is only too much in Sir A. Alison's new history, to entitle it to be named a repository of exploded notions, of fancies in which few take interest, of judgments on numerous points altogether behind the information looked for at the hands of any writer of the present day.

Much has been said and written about the historian's office. So long as it is kept within its own proper bounds, it can scarcely be magnified too highly. The vindicator of right and justice, the handmaid of True Philosophy, History leads to that region of higher Wisdom, which 'it may not enter, but to which it for ever points the way.' Such was its estimate in the mind of one than whom few have had a truer or a stronger perception of its nature, however much his own foregone conclusions may have clouded his apprehension of its teaching. Is it too much to say, that of this its lofty office, of this its sacred work, Sir A. Alison has a very faint and uncertain perception? It is a hard thing to assert this of another; but his own words seem to convey this lower idea and estimation of it. Can we speak otherwise, when it is asserted, that the fall of the Roman empire, the destruction of ancient civilization, the extinction of the life of the old world, was not owing to widespread corruption, to tyranny long since grown intolerable, to a pestering mass of moral and physical misery and degradation, not to utter lifelessness in religion, to an entire abnegation of their allegiance to God, and to a refusal to recognise all things as His, to a luxurious and despotic Atheism in the rich, to a desperate and enslaved superstition in the poor? The idea that these were the causes contributing to its dire catastrophe, Sir A. Alison has branded as a delusion:—it is a mere mistake to think so.

'The fall of the Roman empire,' he affirms, 'so long ascribed in ignorance to slavery, heathenism, and moral corruption, was in reality brought about by a decline in the gold and silver mines of Spain and Greece, from which the precious metals for the circulation of the world were drawn, at the very time when the victories of the legions, and the wisdom of the Antonines, had given peace and security, and with it an increase in number and riches, to the Roman Empire.'—P. 31.

We may, indeed, hope that the meaning was not present to the mind of the writer, as he penned this passage; but the whole of it leaves a strong impression that he considered a continued supply of this precious material would have averted the impending ruin, or rather that but for this failure ruin was not impending at all. We are to suppose, then, that so long as

the supply of gold and silver does not fail, moral corruption and physical degradation, lawless tyranny and boundless oppression, in fine, a chaos of moral disorder, will not by its direct working bring about the utter overthrow of any nation or people; that the very riches which men have misused, the very powers of nature to which they have yielded a crouching and terrified submission, would not themselves be made the instruments of their destruction. This is indeed but the first opening up of one leading and grand idea of the paramount influence of the precious metals over the happiness and well-doing of mankind, which seems well-nigh, to the exclusion of any other, to occupy the writer's mind.

Into the questions of political economy, which the discussion of this subject involves, we do not propose to enter,—not, however, from any disposition to undervalue their importance, or to understate the influence which they exercise on the conduct of human affairs; but because there are higher points, affecting our judgment on things of far greater moment, in which Sir A. Alison has pronounced a verdict yet further removed from the standard of a true and correct decision. His verdict is indeed on all subjects enunciated with the most absolute authority;—but it may be questioned, whether many minds could be found to harmonize with the mind of the writer from whom these despotic declarations proceed. Failing such harmony, this parade of authority is fruitless. Undoubtedly, many could be found to sympathise with some portion of the author's opinions and theories; but then these same would as certainly be completely at variance with other notions and dogmas to which he adheres with equal pertinacity. Doubtless he might find in far too great abundance men who would go along with him in his application of a theory of persecution,—a theory by no means modified like that which Dr. Arnold was prepared to advocate, but extending to very summary arguments of fire and sword. The theory is very old, and its sway has been a very wide one—far too wide, far too prevailing still. Unfortunately it has this inconvenience attached to it, that it affords as much justification to the terrific career of Mahommed as to the more orthodox bombardment of Algiers by Lord Exmouth. Men are willing enough to receive the major premise, that the truth may sometimes require to be propagated by the sword; they are still more willing to supply, as the second step, ‘My convictions are true:’ failing the existence of any court recognised by all mankind as having power to decide on these momentous assertions, it is difficult to grant to one persuasion the right of employing an argument which is peremptorily refused to others.

'Christianity, indeed,' says Sir A. Alison, in his exulting peroration on the theological importance of the victory of Algiers, 'is destined to spread *mainly* by its winning the hearts of men; but in a world of selfishness and violence, it is not thus alone that mankind are to be converted, even to their own blessing. The first entrance must be sometimes won by conquest; and he who bears even the olive-branch and cross in one hand, may often despair of success, if he is not prepared, when necessary, to grasp the naked sword in another.'—P. 155.

It is not customary to employ troops for such a purpose; but the passage suggests the propriety of attaching a battalion or two to our most important scenes of missionary operations. The physical argument, not dimly looming, but fearfully visible behind, might give spurs to sluggishness in the apprehension of the truth. But the subject is one far too solemn for railery;—we may well mourn that the historian has so lowered his own office, that he has so witnessed against the truth with which his words should ever sound in unison, so outraged the upbraiding voice of the heart for the sake of a sounding sentence, or a majestic climax. We never remember meeting with a writer whose expressed opinions so frequently clash with each other, so nearly approach to a contradiction in terms, even when he is speaking of entirely different topics. His theory of persecution, *mutatis mutandis*, would have found him wonderful favour with the founder of the false faith of Islam; it was precisely *his* idea that his religion was to be spread mainly by persuasion—failing this, by the strong arm, and the sharp sword. Yet, strange to tell, with this kind of argument in religion, we find him as strenuous in asserting, that 'purely political offences should not be punished with death.'

'Death,' he says, 'should be reserved for great moral crimes, concerning which all mankind are agreed, as murder, fire-raising, or violent robbery; and not extended to acts such as those of treason, which originate not in moral wrong, but in difference of political opinion, and are sometimes justified by necessity, or rewarded by the highest fortune or lasting admiration of mankind.'—P. 305.

Without controversy, or maintaining the proposition ourselves, we may say that few subjects assume such different aspects when viewed in the details of particular cases. In all practical conclusions, indeed, these *τὰ καθ' ἑκάστην* must guide and control the judgment; and on the question of purely political offences, they do exercise an especial and extraordinary influence. The crime of treason, indeed, is one which we may stigmatise as the execrable wickedness of a murderer or a ruffian, the selfish schemes of a wily and ambitious plotter, meeting with its most just reward, if overtaken by the most signal overthrow; or we may extol it as the brave and uncalculating sacrifice of temporal interest or public reputation to a

heroic sense of right and duty. The actor in it may come before us invested with all the dignity of a sufferer in a righteous cause, his career may be illuminated in our eyes with the halo of old associations, with the magic of a time-honoured name, and the memories of fallen greatness—with the sanction of ancient jurisdiction, repudiated by those over whom it was exercised, never abandoned by those who possessed it. It may be thus; or the act may appear to us simply the struggle of violence, to overthrow order, and reap a harvest of unholy gain from the wreck of law and justice; our hearts may now bleed with an agony of sympathy for the high-souled warrior, who has grasped his sword to fight for the descendant of a line of kings, to do battle for him whom he deems the anointed of Heaven, the sovereign to whom alone his fealty is owing,—or with a sense of horror, and yet with unquestioning acquiescence, we may contemplate the doom of one who, for his own gain, or his own lust of pride and power, has overthrown kingdoms, made the father childless, and the child an orphan. Sir A. Alison, in enunciating this principle, was contemplating instances which belong to the latter class rather than to the former. He is speaking of Ney and Labedoyere, and of the few others who suffered (to use his own words), 'for a rebellion which dethroned the king, caused the conquest of the country, and fixed a debt of 64,000,000*l.* on its inhabitants.' And yet, in the calm solemnity of the judicial chamber, Marshal Ney ought not to be visited with a penalty, which may be inflicted indiscriminately on thousands in battles to be fought for the spread of Christianity. But Sir A. Alison, in the conclusion of his third chapter, has happily furnished a sufficient antidote for the strange principle which we have already quoted from the termination of the second. To shed the blood of such purely political offenders on the scaffold 'is' (he tells us), 'the same injustice and the same error as to burn for heresy. Opinion is not the proper object of punishment; it is acts only that are; and the appropriate punishment for acts tending to dispossess the government is 'to dispossess the person attempting it.'—(P. 506.)

We will gladly assume this to be the more real expression of the author's mind; and certainly to be charged with careless and rambling writing, is a less matter than to be guilty of tampering with the high standard of Christian practice. But it is not here only that the writer shows himself not very sensitive on the subject of a just and righteous legislation. Except on this supposition, it seems difficult to account for his opinion, that 'the ostracism of Athens, the banishment of Rome, were 'wise and humane institutions, had they not been often abused 'by a tyrant majority.' (P. 330.) Is it not in itself an evil

thing to inflict any penalty, however slight, on a man who has undergone no trial either present or absent? Would it not be an argument especially against ostracism—not that it *may* be abused, but that it *must* be?

It is no part of our purpose to inflict on our readers a review of the whole of this volume. Such an examination would certainly run to a greater length than the volume itself, if it were really our desire to analyse and to refute all the mistakes and fallacies to be found throughout it. The fact, therefore, that we have lightly touched on some, must by no means convey the impression that none remain unmentioned, or even that those which we have not space to notice are of a less serious nature than the few which may come under examination. His strange judgments on the subject of education,—his marvellous inference that the injunction of our Lord to '*preach* the Gospel to all nations' was not a command to *educate* all nations,—his heedless assertion that the growth of crime has been in direct ratio to the increase of *education* (an assertion false from its very heedlessness, resting as it does entirely on the equivocal use of the word);—all this might appear to call for a lengthened refutation, were it not that the obvious falsity and strangeness of such talk will be the best remedy for the mischief which the spread of such ideas would involve.

Common-place reflections and trite observations are especially acceptable to a certain class of writers; they furnish their natural element of thought. Whatever be the subject on which they desire to speak, they find it equally easy to string together what may seem to them very pertinent and appropriate reflections, which yet, in the judgment of others, are either irrelevant or unnecessary. In this mould Sir A. Alison's mind seems to be cast,—we will not say because he is one of those, the utter dulness of whose thoughts proceed from their inability to perceive any difficulty, or measure the depth of any subject; although such a conclusion might appear to be justified by his proneness to garnish his pages with maxims and reflections long since worn threadbare, and to enunciate at every favourable opportunity certain cherished theories of his own. These constantly recurring notions lead him often into a questionable morality, and not unfrequently (as in the assertion respecting the fall of the Roman Empire) to falsify the teaching of history. But if he sometimes falls greatly short of the rightful standard of the historian's office, he has not less signally erred in his estimate of its extent. '*Ne sutor ultra crepidam,*' is a maxim which (if there be any truth in it at all) must apply as much to the historian as to any one else. Sir A. Alison has, of his own free will, greatly widened the field of

history, and cannot therefore complain if he is weighed in a different balance, and met by a more scrutinising criticism. It is undoubtedly the rightful task of the historian to draw an accurate and faithful picture of the particular time about which he has undertaken to write;—his work would be as imperfect if he were altogether silent on the subjects of science, art, and manners, as if he confined himself wholly to the delineation of a nation's internal policy, without any reference to its relations with the world beyond itself. Accordingly, we have no reason to be surprised, at finding one of his chapters entitled the 'Progress of Literature, Science, the Arts and Manners, in Great Britain after the Peace.' But it may well be questioned, whether the particular method of treatment adopted in this instance, has ever been considered incumbent on a writer of a history not exclusively devoted to this topic. If this mode of handling it be right in principle, then the historian's work in this province is to enumerate carefully every single invention, and describe every form of manufacture,—to give a sketch and criticise all the works of every single author, whether of poetry or of fiction, of history or philosophy, throwing in as much personal description as possible,—to delineate the various schemes set forth by all political economists, the progress of inquiry throughout the wide range of physical science,—to describe at length every species of current literature, reviews, newspapers, &c., with something like a memoir of every famous critic, essayist and historian, of writers of novels and writers of satire, of biographers and travellers, of painters and architects, with a disquisition on the principles of the arts of architecture, painting, and sculpture, and the important works wrought in each kind,—to exhibit the state of the drama, and the characteristics of the celebrated actors and actresses, with the tone of society in general, and the various influences at work within it. Nay, if all this be necessary, surely much more is necessary. Many items must be added, before the catalogue can be considered complete. And here we have a very gigantic and herculean task indeed,—a perfect pyramid of labours, by the side of which the physical exploits of the Son of Alcmena almost dwindle into nothing. All these topics, so wide in their range, so multifarious in their subjects,—are to be discussed within the limits of a single chapter of ninety-eight by no means closely printed octavo pages,—a single paragraph being required to do the duty almost of a volume. If this be indeed but an incidental portion of the historian's work, no wonder that the writer has fallen very far short of the mark. Our hearts would be hard indeed, if we imputed blame because his shoulders refused to bear the intolerable burden, which long-established usage sought to impose on them. If such a performance were expected, the

only praise possible would be to have made a respectable failure. But no such expectations are formed; and Sir A. Alison's failure can scarcely be deemed respectable. He has undertaken a task not congenial to himself, or rather one indefinitely beyond him, to confess his inadequacy for which need never bring a blush into his cheek, or excite the least feeling of shame in a writer of profounder mind, and far more extensive learning. But the present writer is very far indeed from making any such confession. There is not the slightest intimation of his having felt the least difficulty in commencing what one might have supposed would be so enormous a labour. He evidently considers himself perfectly well qualified for the task. Like Johnson, in discussing coining he would fain be thought to have been bred in the Mint; and his ambition is to be so familiar with the mash-tub as to be taken for having been bred a brewer. He has enough in himself of the manufacturer, the poet, the novelist, the geologist, the painter, the architect, the historian, the chemist, the biographer, the essayist, the reviewer, the sculptor, the political economist,—to pass decisive judgment on every one of them, as well as on the principles of their art or science, to weigh their work, and assign to each the niche which he must occupy in the Walhalla of the World.

Far be it from us to face the portentous mountain over which Sir A. Alison, '*pede libero*,' moves with so much facility and grace. Our slender powers do not enable us with him to sit 'like Zeus upon his high Thessalian hill,' while gods and men pass in rapid array before us, giving the most exact estimate of the work and the character of each. We can but dwell very briefly on some one or two of the details of this magnificent phantasmagoria of science, theology, and art: to say nothing of 'other fashionable topics, such as pictures, taste, Shakspeare, and the musical glasses.'

The writer has already propounded his opinion, that persecution may be, under certain circumstances, a very good thing: we must accept the conclusion that war is a very good thing also; at all events, that it is nothing like the evil which it is held to be,—because directly from it spring all the wonders of art and science which have shed so dazzling a lustre on this present century; because to it we owe that marvellous array of poets and philosophers which the generation immediately preceding the present one regarded with such astonished admiration; because to it is to be ascribed the temporary (for it can be no more than temporary) liberation of men from the all-absorbing selfishness, which is the '*upas-tree*' of his existence—the '*greatest weakness and radical curse of humanity*.'

It is an unfortunate circumstance, that, whenever it is necessary to refute any position of the present writer, we have to

unravel the whole thread of his argument, the error lying often in some false step taken in the midst of it,—or in some equivocation which is not apparent at the outset. And so it is here. War, we are told, is a benefit, *because* man thereby becomes less selfish, because—

‘He is obliged, by the approach of danger, to extend his view to the furthest parts of the horizon; to become interested in remote and future events; to sympathize with the fortunes of men in distant lands. The actors in war, indeed, are often selfish, rapacious, hard-hearted; though many among them are noble, generous, devoted. But the sufferers under it are actuated in general by the generous emotions. Among them is to be found the patience which endures suffering, the heroism which braves danger, the patriotism which sacrifices self to country.’—P. 415.

This statement is strangely one-sided and equivocal: Sir A. Alison may accept whichever epithet he prefers. He speaks of the actors in a war without in the least distinguishing between them. Are they aggressors, or acting in self-defence? are they fighting from lust for power; or from a sense of duty, to guard all that is sacred and dear to them? He speaks of the war itself: does he keep distinct the *scene* of the war, and the nations who from a distance send their contributions of men and money to carry it on? These are points on which not a word is said; and yet surely in them lies the gist of the matter, otherwise the nearer men are to the scene of action—if war is not only knocking at their doors, or looming grimly in the distance, but making havoc of their hearths and homes—these generous emotions and unselfish feelings ought only to be experienced the more keenly. Will this assertion be borne out by the truth of facts? If English science, and art, and literature received such immense and unparalleled additions as a direct consequence of the last continental war, why were not these effects yet more conspicuous and general in Spain, the dark theatre of its most tragic scenes, where resistance was the fiercest, and hatred most obstinate even in despair? why was not the like brilliant result produced in Italy, or Austria, or Russia—why not even in France? England was at no time the scene of the war; the dark cloud of invasion hung for awhile over the horizon, and then it vanished away. True it is, the hearts of hundreds and thousands beat fearfully and tremblingly for those dear to them who were fighting manfully in the land of the stranger; but in no other sense than this were the inhabitants of Great Britain sufferers under the war. A more specious argument might present itself to one who desired to prove that the increased activity of intellect manifested at that time was brought about and nourished by a romantic excitement, produced by a danger which did not immediately affect them—not that such an assertion would be true—but it might be made to exhibit a more plausible colouring than the

other, with less equivocation in words. The author blames those who assert war to be 'a universal and unmitigated evil.' Certainly it is not so: nowhere is evil victorious in the struggle which it has so long been waging against all that is good. With thankfulness we may say, that God has not suffered anything to produce results of unmixed wrong, or even to be wholly evil in its working. True, also, it is that what is in itself evil can only bring forth evil issues; but this would only show that so far as war is caused by the sin of men, its only tendency is to multiply sin; all the good which follows *after*, not *from* it, is owing to the elements of good involved in the struggle which has been caused by human sinfulness. This is but saying, in other words, that the apparent is not always the real cause of any given effect.

A few pages are devoted to a cursory view of the progress of science in the application of steam to locomotion and manufactures, and of the increased tastefulness in designs displayed in the useful arts; on which latter point the author reveals his worship of ancient forms, and his recognition of them as the sole models for present imitation; and then, in long array, the whole phalanx of recent authors is made to pass before his tribunal. Whatever may have been their work—however wide in its extent, however profound and abstruse their researches—of each and all he declares himself to be a fitting and competent judge. The qualities which form a great historian, he tells us, would equally secure him preeminence in the arts of painting and of sculpture. The practical corollary from the whole chapter is, that a man who undertakes to write a history becomes, *ipso facto*, a judge in every province of universal knowledge, and bound to exercise his judicial functions in each and all of these. In that trusting spirit which looks forward from the present to the future, he contemplates the time when his decisions shall be received as conclusive on the merit of the various writers of the present day. Those whom he thinks fit to mention will have each their niche in the temple of fame; they who are not so fortunate as to win that honour, will vanish into thin air,—they will become mere names, if even that empty relic still survive of them. Surely every one would say that, if this be so, the historian will have exercised these mighty powers with most religious and careful impartiality; and great writers on moral philosophy, or theology, or any other subject, will have each their due meed of praise assigned to them in a chapter which diligently records the colour of an actor's hair, and the smoothness of an actress's skin (p. 503). Any one who takes up this chapter with such a preconception, will probably arrive at a different conclusion before he reaches the close of it.

First in the solemn procession comes Sir Walter Scott. Two or three meagre pages suffice to examine his voluminous works. For quantity of space allotted to him we have but little reason to complain. Many, as great in other ways, have less,—some whose names have acquired no slight renown, fail of obtaining any. His chief title to fame, in the writer's opinion, is 'the elevated strain of his mind' and writings. 'It was on the noble, whether in high or low life, that his affections were fixed: the ordinary was delineated only as a set-off to its lustre. Thence his enduring fame, thence his passport to immortality. Nothing ever permanently floated down the stream of time but what was buoyant from its elevating tendency.' Sir A. Alison draws, both here and elsewhere, a very marked distinction between the ordinary and extraordinary in life, and seems to look with the most profound indifference, and even contempt, upon the former. Crabbe's reputation is declared to be fast declining,—nay, to be almost gone; the reason given (almost in the same words as before, for Sir A. Alison is fond of repeating himself) being, 'that they want the lofty spirit, the elevating tendency, which is the only passport to immortality.' Crabbe is certainly hard, almost to repulsiveness; but in many cases, it must be allowed, not from want of interest and pathos in his subject. His faults, and they are not slight, must be sought for elsewhere. So, too, Mr. Warren—Mr. Samuel Warren, in the Temple of Fame—

'like so many romance-writers of the age, has often filled his canvas with pictures of middle and humble life, to an extent which those whose taste is fixed on the elevating and the lofty will not altogether approve. But this is the fault of the age rather than the man. It is amply redeemed, even in the eyes of those who regard it as a blemish, by the gleams of genius which shine through the dark clouds of melancholy with which his conceptions are so often invested; by the exquisite pathetic scenes with which they abound; and the pure and ennobling objects to which his compositions, even when painting ordinary life, are uniformly directed.'—P. 487.

If the employment of a very ordinary phrase may be excused, these passages might not unjustly be termed 'clap-trap.' If it really be the fault of this age to value the delineations of ordinary life, and in any degree to recognise its importance and its real sacredness, we can only say that it is a most excellent fault, and that its increase is very much to be wished for. The author is fond of sounding sentences, and of conveying, by means of antithesis, statements between which it is very difficult to discover any real opposition. It is not easy to perceive any in his opinion of Sir W. Scott, that—

'no man ever threw a more charming radiance over the traditions of ancient times; but none ever delineated in a nobler spirit the virtues of the present. . . . It has been truly said that the influence of his writings neutralized, to a certain extent, the effect of the Reform Bill; but it is not less true that no one ever contributed more powerfully to that purification—

without which all others are nugatory—the reform of the human heart.—P. 423.

The passage looks very profound; but it seems impossible to say why the one fact should be considered as standing in the way of the other. This style moreover is everywhere obscured by a mere redundancy of words, and the complicated construction of sentences. One of many instances may be taken from his observations on Dr. Lingard:—

‘However much we may pride ourselves on the liberty of our constitution, and the manner in which, under the influence of unbounded freedom of discussion, truth is elicited from the collision of opposite opinions, there is nothing more certain than, not only that it is not immediately that this effect takes place, but that centuries may often elapse before the most important transactions are represented in their real colours.’—P. 454.

It would be useless to note one by one the peculiar and strange criticisms on different writers to be found in this chapter. The author speaks much of want of imagination as causing the failure of many poets. We are tempted to conclude, that the faculty is not especially strong in himself. Many passages which he quotes as examples of the highest beauty, are in no way deserving of such marked distinction. Few perhaps would expect to find Shakspeare, the most natural, and Gray, the most artificial, of poets, coupled together for any purpose. Yet we are told that, with the exceptions of these two poets, there is no writer ‘of whom so many ideas and lines have been riveted in the general mind of his country,’ as Campbell. The fact is true of the latter, whatever it may be of Gray; but it is a perilous chance, on which to rest the well-doing of mankind, if, as the author asserts, ‘we may despair of the species when the admiration for the “Pleasures of Hope” begins to decline.’ (P. 430.) To us it seems very poor praise indeed to assert, of such magnificent lyrics as *Hohenlinden* and the *Battle of the Baltic*, that ‘they have all the terseness and felicity of expression, which have rendered Horace immortal,’ and mere absurdity to place in the same list with these matchless songs his effusions on ‘painting,’ ‘the Last Man,’ or ‘the Rainbow.’ Ancient art and ancient poetry is a sacred subject with the author, not to be rashly criticised or tampered with; his unbounded and indiscriminating respect for τὰ πρὶν πελάγια, finds in them excellences which others have been slow of discovering. The secret of Virgil’s success, the guarantee for the permanence of his fame, was, we are told, his ‘profound knowledge of the human heart.’ The judgment which Virgil passed on his own poem, by his request that it might be destroyed, is more faithful and more true than that of Sir A. Alison. To those who think of his *Eclogues*, such praise will sound almost like satire. Virgil knew better

than most others, (and the child-like simplicity of his character was the reason of it,) that profound knowledge of the human heart was what he could least lay claim to. Southey, however, is to be considered his inferior, because his great poems of 'Madoe,' 'Don Roderick,' and 'Kehama,' 'do not contain the traits which speak at once to all mankind,' but 'are addressed 'to the learned and studious; and these are a mere fragment of 'the human race.' (P. 433.) We are disposed to deny this of the 'Curse of Kehama;' we do utterly deny it of 'Don Roderick.'

Men are frequently tempted to resistance in direct proportion to the peremptoriness of a command; they feel inclined to call the judgment of an arbiter in question, if he assumes to be a universal judge. Something of this tendency is roused in us, as we read page after page of Sir A. Alison's summary assessments of the value of English writers and English literature. One by one, with the same imperturbable air of superiority, they are summoned by him upon the stage, and hurriedly examined, till we think of a pedlar exhibiting his wares, or a Van Amburg propounding the merits of his menageries. And this universality of his decision involves (as might have been looked for) no little inconsistency,—the same reason being assigned as the cause of failure in one man, and of success in another. At one time we are told that it is only through 'contact with men in their business transactions' that 'a thorough knowledge of their secret springs of action can ever be obtained:' at another we are informed, that 'it is not in the arena of politics, or in the busy world of party contention' (*i.e.* by coming in contact with men in their every-day life), 'that the fountains of wisdom are unlocked to mankind.'

If this general criticism of all recent authors be required in order to give a faithful picture of the manners and tone of a particular period, we might with sufficient reason anticipate a failure, no matter who may have undertaken the task. Such an investigation would be protracted through an interminable array of volumes; and a general history cannot spare a thousandth part of the requisite space. The task itself, rashly undertaken, must necessarily be most imperfectly accomplished;—unless indeed there be some principle of selection, some choice of the leading writers in each province of literature, some delineation of each phase of public opinion. But for any such principle, we shall in the present volume look in vain; not only are men, who stand in anything but the foremost ranks of fame, paraded forth with superlative eulogiums,—not only are many, who have influenced the whole tone of thought in the present generation, passed over without notice of any kind;

but in a sketch of British literature professedly *since* the peace, we are treated to a criticism on some who belong to it as little almost as they do to the age of Bacon or of Shakspeare. An attempt is made to show what progress has been made in the study of moral philosophy; but not a single line is devoted to the notice of works written in the kindred province of theology, or to show the momentous influences which have affected religious conviction and practice in the present day. And even in the former,—(from utter want of principle in selection, we presume, or from a most contracted circle of observation, which he has taken no pains to enlarge)—all that the writer deigns to bestow on us is a eulogium on one or two Scotch professors, whose lectures he attended. Without the most distant allusion to either of our great English Universities, without the faintest recognition of any influence which they may have exercised on the present tone of thought—we are left to draw the inference, that Scotland monopolized at this time all that was accurate and patient in investigation, with all that is profound in generalization and induction. We have no wish to underrate the powers of the learned professors of Scotland, nor do we suggest that a history should be filled with an account of long religious controversies; but when a writer undertakes to draw such a picture as that which we conceive Sir A. Alison to have aimed at painting, mere fairness, we think, requires that he should not ignore all the influences which have been chiefly and most prominently at work on the public mind. And surely, in this point of view, the works of what is called the Oxford school of theology are as much to be taken into account as the lectures of Dugald Stewart or Dr. Brown;—at the least, they have more powerfully and deeply left their stamp on a large portion of English society. We might point to many a memorable name, which might deserve to be placed, in a merely intellectual view, not in juxtaposition with, but in indefinite precedence of, that of Dr. Chalmers. But, indeed, it would seem, that the bent of the author's mind does not lead him to dwell long on the higher and more important aspects of things; his intellect is not cast in the mould of Bacon, or of Butler;—there is an eagerness to speak of the pettiest matters of personal appearance and manners, and of his own casual meetings with any of the writers whose merits he is deciding on. The search for truth,—the desire to obtain a more full insight into it,—to get rid of our many crude fancies and misconceptions,—to advance daily in the knowledge of those highest matters which most intimately concern our whole being,—all this seems in his opinion to be of very little consequence. We cannot therefore feel surprised at being told that it is only—

'in statesmen, diplomatic characters, and men of the world, where they are also well-informed, that we must look for the true conversational talent, which consists in the rapid interchange of thoughts on interesting subjects, and which, when it occurs between persons of equal abilities, sympathetic minds, but of opposite sexes, is, perhaps, the greatest enjoyment which life can offer.'

We do not know whether (as his words seem to imply) Sir A. Alison is acquainted with statesmen of opposite sexes; but we marvel to find any writer making use of a word in such a way as to leave the impression, either that he knows not, or cares nothing for the distinction between kind and species, or that he purposely employs a very unworthy equivocation, in order to obtain a support for his own most arbitrary limitations. We will not say, that to give this definition of conversation savours not a little of an empty vanity and conceit; but we must hold it an altogether unjustifiable thing, thus to put into harness, as it were, those powers of oral intercourse which were given to us, to say the least, for other ends, as well as to be the vehicle of the polished refinements of a council, or the courteous pleasantries of a drawing-room. Of those who are gone from their work here, men are for the most part willing enough to speak in terms chiefly of praise or of excuse:—a sterner rule is applied to the living. Sir A. Alison is perhaps desirous of reversing the practice,—a desire which, so far from seeking to thwart, we should wish in every way to be successful. Yet most people will own to a feeling of greater reluctance to utter or to listen to excessive and immoderate praise of men who are still alive, to hear it all themselves;—the feeling is weakened in proportion to the amount of proof brought to bear on the eulogium: it is greatly strengthened, if the praise consist, on the whole, of a string of unsupported assertions. Of this kind certainly are the extravagant encomiums bestowed on Mr. Macaulay, both as an essayist and historian. It would not indeed be true to say, that no touch of shade relieves the blaze of his panegyric; but his qualifications for the latter office (inferior as they are to those which have won such a brilliant reputation for his essays) are made utterly to eclipse all that can be claimed for Arnold or Thirlwall, Grote or Palgrave. It is curious, by the way, to note, that while more than a page is bestowed on Mitford, not a word or allusion occurs to the great work of Thirlwall. Macaulay, it would seem, is fitted to write history in a degree incomparably beyond all these; he has greater knowledge of the way in which the work should be done, and the ends which it should serve. We can but say that we are far from agreeing with him; it is almost tedious to say even this: it is wearisome to be at constant issue with the conclusions of any one, still more to encounter, in page after page of a voluminous work,

fancies and opinions, which belong to the writer, and scarcely to any one else. How strangely must the subject have been studied, when a writer can affirm of all Greek history, that,

'With the exception of the magnificent periods of the Persian invasion, the Syracusan expedition, and Alexander's conquests, it is nothing but the annals of the internal divisions and wars of a cluster of republics, the transactions of which are at once so insignificant and so complicated, that if there is anything more difficult than to make them intelligible, it is to render them interesting to the reader.'—P. 473.

Sir A. Alison's view of history is a little at variance with that of Thucydides: his ideas of the importance and the insignificance of events are confined to mere physical considerations: a war between two states, (whatever be their civilization or their state of society,) each with an army of five thousand men, is a very unimportant matter: the struggle between two armies of a hundred thousand is quite another thing. If, however, the object of the historian be to know what men are at all times and under all conditions, then Thucydides is not uninteresting, although the thread of his history may possibly be somewhat intricate. But we know not with what mind the present author has perused those portions of the narrative of Thucydides which do not relate to the Syracusan expedition, if indeed he has ever read them at all, an alternative which suggests itself as possible from the peculiarities attributed to various writers in whom general opinion has discovered qualities entirely different. We are drawn on to question his acquaintance with Thucydides or with Arrian, when we find him speaking of Hallam—a writer (whatever the soundness of his conclusions) unimpassioned almost to frigidity—as being one whose 'mind is more imaginative than those of his laborious predecessors,' and in whom 'a fervent eloquence, a poetic expression, often 'reveals the ardour which the heart-stirring events of his time 'had communicated to his disposition.' (P. 463.) Either he cannot have read Hallam, or his ideas of poetry and ardour must be even more strange than we had taken them to be.

In this singular chapter, however, little is left us but to select some few strange criticisms, where almost all are strange and curious. We feel lost in a sea of common places, in which he seems to float with all the facility of a sea-bird in its native element,—common places so trite, and forms of expression of great sound but with so little meaning, that we refuse to receive him as a judge in anything. If the learned New Zealander of a future day, standing on the ruins of Westminster bridge, will imbibe strange ideas of the former greatness of fallen London, he will arrive at opinions no less strange of English literature at the present time, if this chapter be the only clue left to him in the study of it. For independent judg-

ment we look in vain,—the old forms hang like a mill-stone round his neck. If Southey is great in poetry, he must be compared to Virgil; if Campbell be magnificent in lyrics, he must be placed behind Horace; if Grote is to be spoken of as a historian, he must be weighed in the balance with Tacitus. There is something too much of this when we are told that Arnold's 'account of the campaigns of Hannibal, the best that exists in any language, proves that, like Livy, he was adequate to the history of the majestic series of Roman victories;'—something too much of verbosity, when we are informed that he 'had great graphic powers, a strong turn alike for geographical description, strategical operations, and tactical evolutions;'—a somewhat superfluous minuteness, (even if the judgment be not altogether questionable,) when we read that 'a critical taste will probably condemn the strange style in which he has narrated the early and immortal legends of Rome, and regret that the charming simplicity of Livy was not imitated in translating his pages;'—something too much of grandiloquent affectation of superiority, when he graciously allows that 'a generous mind will hesitate to condemn where there is so much to admire.' We may think the criticism as little to the point, as we may wonder at the principle on which (one to each) successive paragraphs are devoted to Sir Bulwer Lytton, D'Israeli, Dickens, Thackeray, Miss Austin, Mrs. Norton, Warren, Carlyle, Dr. Croly, Hazlitt, Bentham, Chalmers, Monckton Milnes, and Aytown, L. E. L., Eliot Warburton, and the author of 'Eothen.'

One subject yet remains—that of Art,—Sir A. Alison's treatment of which will leave on those, who have really studied it with serious honest thought, an impression of mere astonishment at the startling boldness with which he has acted on the principle, that to be a judge in any matter it is quite unnecessary to know anything about it. So much of redundant verbiage, such an assemblage of hackneyed opinions, such a strain of feeble thought, is not very often presented to the reading public. The quantity of space devoted to each is—to architecture one page, to painting five, to sculpture two and a half, to the drama more than five. We have no intention of writing a treatise on each of these arts, although such certainly would be required for a refutation of Sir A. Alison's lucubrations; and, moreover, a fear of lost labour would restrain us, (if we felt competent for so Herculean a task,) for he has probably 'done thinking' long ago, and it would perhaps be useless to attempt the uprooting of stereotyped truisms and long-cherished fallacies.

The histrionic art, we are told, is 'the efflorescence of sculpture,' as the drama is 'the efflorescence of epic poetry.' With

this solitary observation he passes on to personal descriptions of first and second-rate actors, in which 'the commanding figure, raven locks, and sonorous voice of Mrs. Siddons,' 'the raven hue' of John Kemble's hair, 'the finely-chiselled Grecian countenance, dark glossy hair, the skin smooth as monumental marble,' of Miss O'Neil, are carefully specified; while the 'dark raven locks, fine figure, and expressive countenance,' of Miss Helen Faucit are not forgotten.

But the palmy days are over, and Siddons and Kemble are no more seen in their majestic dignity; and if they were, their surpassing excellence might be thrown away on a sensuous over-stimulated age. This decay of the 'histrionic art' elicits the lamentations of the writer; and the words which convey them are again a curious specimen of unfair and inconclusive reasoning. This deterioration is caused by 'the gradual rise and 'ultimate ascendancy of a middle class in society, the minds in 'which are not so cultivated as to enable them to enjoy intellectual or moral pleasures, while their senses are sufficiently 'excited to render them fully alive to the enjoyments of the 'physical.' On this point each man may think as he pleases, although it may perhaps be noted, that the most rapturous applause even from the most degraded audience is invariably elicited by the delineation of high and noble feeling, and the unselfish daring of self-sacrifice and devotion.

'The change,' moreover, 'was accelerated, and perhaps prematurely brought on in this country, by the well-meant and sincere, but unfortunate, prejudices of a large and respectable portion of society, which withdrew altogether from our theatres, from a natural feeling of indignation at the immorality of some of its dramas, and the licence of many of its accessories. There can be no doubt it would be well if these abuses could be corrected; and it would also be well if corruption could be banished from literature, vice from the world. Unfortunately, the one is not more likely to happen than the other . . . and the unhappy result of the respectable classes withdrawing from the theatre has been too often to convert what might be at least occasionally the school of virtue into the academy of vice.'—P. 507.

Such an argument as this would not be utterly worthless, if the parallel between dramatic representations and general literature were such as he represents it to be. The chief way in which the latter is brought before us, is by the books which a man keeps in his house or in his library: and any one may possess ten thousand volumes without including a single work which should outrage decency, or be at war with all right moral feeling. Undoubtedly the presence of the respectable classes at the theatre may have some control over the selection of pieces to be performed,—it is a known fact that it had little or none over the 'licence of the accessories.' We may pass into and leave our libraries without encountering scenes of the grossest

temptation and most degrading coarseness at its threshold. No one, in seeking to derive wisdom from the thoughts of Pascal or the arguments of Butler, is required to drink in, before or after it, the gross unseemliness of Wicherley or Congreve.

It may be a grave question, or perhaps to many a matter not worth questioning, whether any man was ever really qualified for the office of a universal critic. 'Non omnia possumus omnes,' is a maxim which may possibly be taken as conclusive on this subject. To each science, to every branch of learning, in every department of art there is its own, peculiar labour; no royal road will open up an easier access to excellence in any one of them. In most of them, it is generally agreed, we must be tolerably well versed before we may presume to give any judgment at all. The keenest sagacity in discovering the merits or demerits of cattle, will not entitle a man to pronounce an opinion on the growth of cotton; the greatest experience in the application of machinery, as a substitute for manual labour, will not qualify a man to decide on a point of logic or metaphysics. Sir A. Alison appears, indeed, to have a profound disregard of all such conventional limitations of the critic's authority: with regard to many of them, we might be willing to leave him to the judgment of the world, which will readily deprive him of the judicial garb wherewith he has been pleased to array himself. There is but one subject on which, unfortunately, a conventional licence suffers any one to give a dictatorial judgment; and that subject is one in which, perhaps more than all others, both study and experience are needed to qualify a man to give any opinion. It is quite true that the subject-matter of art in general is that which is presented to the senses, and that all alike are possessed of these senses; but there are, perhaps, no differences so great between man and man as the various amount of power, which from education, each sense possesses. The eye will not see, the ear will not hear, that which it has not been trained to see and hear: one man will look on the unmoved surface of some sleeping waters, and see nothing but a flat, smooth surface undisturbed by wind; another will therein discover a new world, a fairer image of the actual world of material earth on which he treads—will watch each trembling shadow as it leads him gently down to the clear depths of a most serene and peaceful home of quietness and repose—will dwell on each changeful hue which speaks to him of a splendour borrowed, while increased in brilliancy, from the fair flowers which clothe the margin of the slumbering lake. One man will hear in the most celestial strains of music nothing but mere sound; another will by the same be led on from earth to heaven, and to deem that the sounds which entrance his

material ear are echoes from a home which belongs to him in a better world—will catch the hidden and wondrous harmonies which impress their own unmistakable character on the volume of song which falls as mere physical reverberation on the ear of him who has in his soul no music. The world takes no cognizance of these distinctions, while it calls them frequently too subtle and fanciful; it rests, for the most part, merely on the fact that each man has an eye and ear, and concludes that each man is therefore a competent judge of everything which addresses itself to either, whether his opinion be based on long and careful study and experience, or whether it be the mere enunciation of a conclusion at which he has arrived without a moment's thoughtfulness. To this conclusion Sir A. Alison, in practice, most eagerly assents; this licence of judging on unstudied subjects he most fully claims. Our unaided reason would perhaps lead us to think that a man had acquainted himself, however slightly, with that which he undertakes to criticise; and so we might feel a delicacy in insinuating an opposite conclusion with regard to any writer. But in the present instance there is no option left us;—it would be marvellous, indeed, if any possessed a full and thorough acquaintance with every subject touched on in this chapter of which we are speaking. It is ten times more difficult to suppose that Sir A. Alison possesses this multifarious knowledge, when the result of his labours is so astonishingly strange: yet more, a man may disagree with another on many points of intellectual or moral research; he may think one man has attained in these respects to a higher standard than another; but he is not excusable if he attributes excellence to one who is entirely destitute of any claims to a reputation for it.

Still more is this the case in an age in which so much of time, and labour, and energy has been devoted to the promotion of art in every shape. Art has become an object of study—of the most serious, patient study—the object of a life's research to many whose powers would qualify them to attain eminence in almost any branch of human learning. Nor has the result produced by these efforts been small. We have had many books written—many works of art accomplished—of which we may well be proud, surrounded at the same time by still more numerous examples of labour wasted and energy misapplied. It becomes, therefore, matter of grave moment that both should be rated at their exact value, and that none should have accorded to them a praise which they do not deserve; and yet we say boldly, that in no other part of his book has Sir A. Alison so striven to throw dust in our eyes, so to invest mere verbose inanity with an air of philosophical grandeur, as in the paragraphs which he

has (we will not say, devoted, but) expended on the examination of the arts of architecture, painting, and sculpture. The author knew perfectly well, that he was writing wholly and solely 'ad captandum vulgus,' and the most unthinking portion of it, when he penned the following lines on the architectural improvements of London after the peace of 1815:—

'Regent-street, opened up through one of the densest parts of London, soon exhibited a splendid and varied scene of architectural decoration and mercantile opulence; Regent's Park showed long lines of pillared scenery surmounting its glassy lake and umbrageous foliage; and Waterloo, Southwark, and London Bridges bestrode the floods of the Thames with arches second to none in magnificence and durability.'

The Commissioners may have formed a somewhat different opinion on this last statement. But of the really great works of restoration of ecclesiastical buildings—and of churches newly designed since that period,—in short, of the whole revival of art in our days,—not a single word is spoken; and, so far as the present volume is concerned, we should be far from dreaming that we had lived in the days of Scott and of Pugin.

If superficial knowledge be all that is needed to constitute a critic, certainly Sir A. Alison may claim the title; in many cases, he can lay claim to no other. Still, whatever advantages there may be, according to Mr. Macaulay, in this kind of learning, it may be doubted whether any one will, in this day, be suffered to issue imperious decrees of judgment on points wherein he is possessed of no experience. Such merely arbitrary criticisms might almost be dismissed without notice, were it not that many are likely to be led astray by the bare assumption of superiority; and the author, imperious and dictatorial elsewhere, speaks in a tone still more dogmatical of topics in which public taste is, perhaps, least cultivated, and where a certain kind of conventional criticism is most likely to produce erroneous convictions. After all, however, that has been written on the subject of art, more especially on the art of painting, it is astonishing to find any writer giving publicity to such miserably feeble and vapid reasoning (if, indeed, it deserves the name) as the following:—

'Turner,' he says, 'in landscape-painting has attained a reputation more likely to be durable' than Sir T. Lawrence in portraits; 'for in genius he is equal, in variety of conception superior, to Claude himself. No one can study the "*Liber Studiorum*" of the former master, with the "*Liber Veritatis*" of the latter, without perceiving that the palm of originality and variety of imagination must be awarded to the first. There is none of his pictures as perfect as one of Claude; none over which the glow of an Italian sunset is thrown with such magic over every object in the piece—the sky, the sea, the trees. But there is greater variety in his effects; his drawing from nature has extended over a much wider surface; his fancy is more discursive, his conceptions wilder and more dissimilar. He has aimed at and

succeeded in awakening emotions of a far more varied kind than his predecessor. Within his own limits, Claude is perfection; but those limits are narrow. Turner's embrace the whole earth and all ages of history. It is to the power of his conceptions, however, and the vigour of his imagination, that this unqualified praise applies. In delicacy of finishing, harmony of colouring, and minuteness of detail, combined with generality of effect, he is inferior to Claude; as, indeed, every subsequent painter has been, and perhaps ever will be.—P. 495.

A passage which should equally deserve to draw upon the author all the contempt which Horace lavishes on his countrymen for a slavish worship of the old, merely as being old, could scarcely be produced throughout the wide range of English literature. They who can give a moment's hearing to such words as these, do indeed fill themselves with the east wind. It is only because so many—because the ordinary run of men—are so ready to be deceived by such high sounding emptiness, that they can be considered to deserve mention at all. In order to account for his strange estimate of Hallam, we were driven to suppose he had not read his writings: we cannot draw, in this instance, a similar conclusion, and say that he has not seen Turner's or Claude's pictures. Unfortunately, it is easier to form a wrong judgment on these, even after having seen them an indefinite number of times, than to be wide of the mark in speaking of a book which one has never perused. We have had—we still have—very great men amongst our landscape painters,—men whose works are in greater or less degree reproductions of the wonderful thoughts of God impressed on the natural world. There is, moreover, a far keener and higher appreciation of these works, and of nature herself, than ever there has been before: but it is difficult to conceive a more utter blindness than that which prevails on this subject with, perhaps, nine-tenths of those who consider themselves—and perhaps are—well qualified to judge on many other points, whatever may be their deficiencies in this. We have ourselves passed with many from a survey, not only of Turner's pictures, but those of other painters, to the ancient 'master-pieces' of Claude, Salvator, and Poussin. Without any paltry desire to underrate the latter, because men frequently assign to them an absurdly extravagant value, it would be far nearer the truth to characterise the change as a transition from daylight to the regions of utter darkness,—from the rich exuberance of life to the dull monotony of one, or, at the utmost, three or four hackneyed ideas, or the exaggerated expression of a few truths at the expense of the utter sacrifice of countless others; and yet we have known educated people look on the faithful portraits of recent artists with a patronising air of infinite superiority, and bow down in abject, unquestioning homage before the works,

good or bad, which the painters of a so-called classical age have left to us. Argument in such a case is thrown away; it is as unnecessary as, for the purpose of producing conviction, we fear, it would be useless.

An absolute and entire denial is the best method of meeting such assertions. Claude's limits are, as Sir A. Alison rightly says, very narrow indeed. It is false to assert that he is anything like perfection, in the narrow cage wherein he has chosen to coop himself. With regard to Turner's power of execution, it must first be stated whether we refer to his oil paintings, or his water-colour drawings; but, in any case, it is a matter of indifference whether the surface of a picture in oils be as smooth 'as the alabaster skin' of Sir A. Alison's actress. The question is, whether the painter has succeeded in conveying some true and beautiful lesson which he has learnt from the works of God,—whether he has conveyed it in all its fulness, with an equal regard to every truth in all its infinite variety; not whether he has embodied some one portion of its teaching, to the utter loss of every other. To assert that Claude does thus convey the truth of nature's lessons, in faithful translations of its breadth, and its endless variety of detail, is obviously false. If a man will profess to discover, in the canvas of Claude, the poor home of at best one or two ideas,—we will not say, the rich and exuberant truth of Turner, but the indefinitely greater faithfulness of even our average recent painters,—if he will delude himself into the thought, that the pitchy blackness of Nicolo Poussin is radiant with the light of Roberts, or of Stanfield,—if he will assert, that Salvator and Rubens are more varied in their effects, more beautiful in their colouring, than Landseer or Copley Fielding,—nothing more can be done than to leave such an one to his own devices, like the mole to its earth, and the bat to its darkness. The wonderful and ever-varying beauty of nature is spread out before him in vain: these deep thoughts of God he has no soul to understand. The unwise man cannot well consider them, nor can he discern who is a faithful student of nature's touching loveliness, or the copyist of some one of its prominent characteristics, which he stereotypes for almost every picture.

But we may leave the National Gallery to answer any question respecting Claude's perfection, and Turner's inferiority,—only remarking that it is unfortunate that Sir A. Alison seems to have a peculiar knack of saying of a particular book or thing, the very reverse of what would be said by others. Mr. Ruskin, in one most important branch of art, has done very great and good service; nor do we think that, in respect of landscape painting, his 'ingenuity has been exerted in an inde-

fensible cause;' but we are as far from thinking that his 'Seven Lamps of Architecture' is 'one of the most profound and original books of the kind in the language.' It would be mere absurdity to assert this of a work, in which architecture is defined to be the introduction of unnecessary and useless ornaments on the necessary form of a building. There is little extravagance in his work on 'Modern Painters:' in the others there is much more. To Sir A. Alison's vision, the tree seems to be less fruitful in proportion to its luxuriance.

But the reader may be wearied with a longer catalogue of fallacies, as much as the critic may be bewildered in his effort to select from such an exuberant harvest some which stand out more glaringly than others. If our judgment appear harsh, it is because an affectation of universal knowledge, and a self-opinionated dogmatism, are not to be suffered to establish an undisputed supremacy; and it is our deliberate conviction, after a most careful and patient examination of the volume, and especially of this chapter on Art and Literature, that a more extraordinary farrago of trite common places, of reflections obvious to a school-boy, of antiquated and obsolete maxims, has rarely been presented to the English public. Such an attempt to lord it over the whole realm of knowledge is as sure to be unsuccessful as it is to be resisted. Sir A. Alison may think himself monarch of all he surveys, but he will find no lack of antagonists to dispute his right. We have but endeavoured to root up a few of the weeds which have appeared to us to multiply the longer we have looked on them. To describe fully their wonderful fertility we frankly confess to be altogether beyond our powers. We have not spoken of the learning, which mentions Socrates as a writer along with Sophocles and Thucydides. Not being aware of the discovery of MSS., which boast of the husband of Xantippe as their author, we are reluctant to suppose that Sir A. Alison has confounded him with the ecclesiastical historian of another era: we have not paused to note his comparison of Sir Bulwer Lytton to a horse, when he attributes to him chivalrous feelings which 'never perhaps exist 'in such purity as in those, who, like the Arab steed of high 'descent, can trace their pedigree back through a long series of 'ancestors:' we have not admired the discrimination which perceives in Miss Strickland excellences similar to those of Macaulay: we have not dwelt on the taste which speaks with such relish of entertainments, whereat Lady Holland and Sir James Mackintosh, Macaulay and Landseer, Jeffrey and Chantrey, were to be met at dinner, 'where Moore sang his 'bewitching melodies with still more bewitching right honour-'ables in the evening.'

History, indeed, has a work to perform, the sacredness of which none can describe in terms too forcible: the present work might almost make us blush that any writer of the present day could entertain so poor a notion of its dignity. Sir A. Alison's second volume has just been given to the world: it cannot be expected to refute all the fallacies, and remove the erroneous impressions of the first; we can only hope that it may not contribute to multiply and heighten them. Some lessons certainly there are which he may learn from Arnold and Macaulay: some possibly from what may be to him the unknown labours of Thirlwall and of Merivale.

- ART. VI.—1. *Theological Essays.* By FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE, M.A. Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn, and Professor of Divinity in King's College, London. Cambridge: Macmillan. 1853.
2. *Grounds for laying before the Council of King's College, London, certain Statements contained in a recent Publication, entitled 'Theological Essays, by the Rev. F. D. Maurice, M.A. Professor of Divinity in King's College.'* By R. W. JELF, D.D. Principal of King's College, and Canon of Christ Church. Oxford and London: Parker and Rivingtons. 1853.
3. *The Word 'Eternal,' and the Punishment of the Wicked. A Letter to the Rev. Dr. Jelf, Canon of Christ Church, and Principal of King's College.* By FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE, Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn. Cambridge: Macmillan.

THE publication of these Essays has, as our readers are well aware, led to the removal of Mr. Maurice from King's College. His removal, whatever reasons have compelled it, is the loss to that institution of a man of great ability, energy, zeal, and disinterestedness, who has lived above worldly motives, and devoted himself to public interests, religious, moral, and social; and who, as a theological professor, has imparted life and interest to a subject too often abandoned to technicality, and made dry and distasteful to students by its mode of treatment. We cannot, however, after reading these Essays, own to much surprise at such a result, however we may regret it, or consider Mr. Maurice a safe guide to theological students. He will himself readily allow, that there are other qualifications which a divinity professor ought to have, besides high personal character, or animation as a lecturer and writer, though he will differ from us, and from the authorities of King's College, as to what those qualifications are. We will at once say,—with whatever sorrow we have arrived at such a judgment,—that the opinions advanced in these Essays unfit him for the position of a theological teacher in any Church of England college.

But we will defer these critical points for the present. We had rather meet Mr. Maurice, to begin with, on more general subject matter, such as can be discussed and commented on, without any charge affecting orthodoxy being involved. The Essays are highly discursive, and embrace much material belonging to ordinary philosophy and thought. And though a

taste for philosophy does not necessarily make a philosopher, Mr. Maurice's taste for this department is such as to give an interest to his reflections and speculations in it, and to claim a respectful examination of them,—a task which is attended, indeed, often with considerable difficulties, in the case of a writer whose strength is that of vehemence rather than accuracy, and who thinks less like a reasoner than a rhetorician; who employs, to prove his conclusions, rather a determination of the will than the ordinary instrument of argument, and is too generally almost as obscure as he is emphatic; but a task, at the same time, which will not be without its reward, as bringing us into contact with a mind of considerable gifts and resources. It is fortunate for the world, in the long run, that all the men who come forward to instruct and enlighten it are not cast in the same mould, and that some, according to their natural bent, reason, and others prophesy. There is a depth of mind which explains itself, and unfolds its ideas in regular order; and there is also a depth which asserts itself, which throws out its contents, to produce their impression and make their way as such. The former is the more perfect method humanly; the latter is more divine. It is a kind of inspiration, and has an authoritativeness from the absence of art. Indeed, in proportion as minds are full of an idea or ideas, it is difficult for them to arrange or methodise them, or put them in the order of proof as addressed to other intelligences. Luther is little better than a chaos; Jansen the same. Even S. Augustine disguises much involved repetition of himself, under the charms of an antithetical and highly worked style. The reason is, these men were exceedingly full of the ideas to which they respectively devoted themselves. The consequence was, that they could not afford to adopt that stationary attitude of mind toward them, which was necessary to see them in their argumentative place. It may be pretty safely said, that no one can see clearly except he stands still. But the act of standing still is exceedingly distasteful to minds under the impulse of particular ideas. To go forward is their natural bent; the instant they feel themselves stopping, they are as uneasy as passengers in a quick train. Quiescence, however short or provisional, is to them stagnation, torpor, and death. They feel a total cessation of their inner life, the instant the active office of putting forth and expressing stops: they are tormented by a sense of barrenness and shame, as if they were idle and vain portions of the universe. They consequently never get one fair look at the idea which is impelling them, so as to examine it, and see on what it rests. To minds cast in a critical mould, on the other hand, the attitude of rest and examination is comparatively easy. Mr. Maurice will, we are sure,

not take it amiss if we put him into the order of prophets, and assign strength of conviction rather than of argument as his fort.

We will begin with Mr. Maurice's philosophy respecting conscience, and his reflections on the defects and uncertainty of Bishop Butler's doctrine on that subject. 'As Butler is commonly interpreted,' he says, 'he assumes all moral principles to depend entirely on probable evidence.' He regards Butler as entertaining 'strong *presumptions* in favour of a moral constitution of man,' but, apparently, no more than presumptions. We wish Mr. Maurice had stated positively what he considered Bishop Butler's grounds to have been, and not put his assertion respecting those grounds into the ambiguous form of an assertion respecting them 'as commonly interpreted.' But as he considers this to be the common interpretation of Butler, and nowhere endeavours to prove that this interpretation is a wrong one, but proceeds to argue at length on the supposition of its truth, we shall suppose Mr. Maurice to state that Bishop Butler 'assumes all moral principles to depend entirely on probable evidence,' and to assert that his scheme only puts forth 'strong presumptions in favour of a moral constitution of man.' And when Mr. Maurice proceeds, as he does, to lament the scepticism of such a scheme, and to treat it as erecting the whole moral law upon a basis of uncertainty, we understand him to describe consequences which, in his opinion, flow from the natural interpretation of Bishop Butler's doctrine respecting conscience.

Now, of such a charge against Bishop Butler we can only say, that we cannot easily understand how anyone can make it, who has read Butler's statements on the subject of conscience and human nature with ordinary attention. Probability has been defined by Butler himself—and his definition is one which nobody can object to—to consist principally in *likeness*. Where we have no actual *perception* of any thing or event, we may still argue the truth of it from the fact of its likeness to other things or events which we have perceived. Probability, therefore, does not apply in the case of things of which we have actual perception: these are not probable, but certain. And though there may be cases in which we do not know for certain whether we perceive or not, and in which, therefore, probability comes in, still so far as we perceive, so far we are certain about a thing. Now, Butler places moral obligations upon certain plain and immediate perceptions inherent in our nature—perceptions which distinguish some actions from others, and attach to them the respective epithets of good and bad. It is almost frivolous to prove by extracts, what runs through the whole of the Sermons on Human Nature, and either appears in, or is supported by, every statement which Bishop Butler makes respecting morals,

from one end of his works to the other. 'There is a principle,' he says, 'of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, 'approve and disapprove their own actions. We are plainly 'constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our own 'nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within 'itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, as respecting such objects and such degrees, and of the several actions 'consequent thereupon. In this survey, it approves of one, disapproves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither 'of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This principle in man, 'by which he disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is 'conscience.' Here is a certain act of the mind described, which is plainly that of perception; to approve or disapprove being evidently to *see* a certain character good or bad in the actions which come under our view. And just as the act of conscience is an act of perception, so the authority which attaches to this act is an object also of perception. And supposing a man to allow the fact of a conscience, but deny its authority, Butler tells him in reply, that the *authority* of conscience is perceived. 'The principle of reflection or conscience being compared with the various appetites, passions, and affections in men, 'the former is *manifestly* superior and chief, without regard to 'strength.' It 'manifestly' is superior and chief. *i. e.* it is *seen* quite plainly to be so. The appeal which Butler makes throughout is to certain immediate and clear perceptions in our nature; and it might as well be asserted that the evidence of our bodily senses rested upon presumption, as that moral obligations did upon Butler's system.

But it may be said that though Butler places morality upon the basis of natural perception, he places religion upon a basis of presumption simply; and that for the grounds for believing in a Divine moral government of the Universe, and a final state of reward and punishment, he refers us to analogy;—to the circumstance, that is, that we see a moral government in this world, and therefore that we may expect it in another. Now it is quite true that Butler does not—and it would be absurd if he did—represent the evidence of religion as being that of immediate perception, but neither does he represent it as being merely presumption. There is a mode of proof which is neither immediate perception nor presumption, which is commonly called reasoning; that act of the mind by which we see a certain conclusion follow from certain premises before us, without being actually in or part of those premises. There are, it is true, different kinds of this sort of proof—different kinds of reasoning. There is demonstrative, or mathematical; and there is a less urgent kind, such as the argument from final causes:

but both kinds are in strength far above the argument of mere presumption or analogy; and Butler moreover proved the truth of religion by both these modes of reasoning.

First, he held the existence of a God to be proved demonstratively, in the same way in which mathematical conclusions are deduced from their premises. And there later philosophy does not appear to go along with him. But this mode of proof was part of the religious philosophy of the age in which he lived, and which he seems to have adopted out of respect to high names, and—we may almost say—contrary to his own better judgment. Locke and Clarke proved the existence of a God by demonstrative reasoning; they argued from the principle, that all things that begin to exist must have a cause, and by a keen and subtle use of this argument, professed to reduce the atheist to the position of a man who denied that two and two were four, or that things that were equal to the same were equal to one another. Locke begins his chapter on the proof of a Deity with these words,—‘We are capable of knowing *certainly* that there is a God:’ and by certainty he proceeds to say that he means ‘a certainty equal to mathematical certainty;’ adding indeed—‘if I mistake not’—a rather ominous commencement of such a proof, but of which the spirit does not appear to last or to operate as a hindrance on him. His reflection upon his argument, after the explanation of it, is—‘From what has been said, it is plain to me that we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God, than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say that we may more certainly know that there is a God, than there is anything else without us.’ ‘It is as certain,’ he says elsewhere, ‘that there is a God, as that the opposite angles, made by the intersection of two straight lines, are equal.’ Clarke expanded the fundamental axiom on which all this reasoning went, and said not only, ‘everything that *begins* to exist must have a cause,’ but ‘everything that *exists* has a cause,’—a startling proposition, but which he makes orthodox by means of a larger sense which he annexes to the word cause. ‘Whatever exists has a cause, a ground of its existence, a foundation on which its existence relies; a ground or reason why it doth exist, rather than not exist; either in the necessity of its own nature, or in the will of some other being.’ The former of these two grounds or reasons he then applied to the case of the Supreme Being, and laid down a necessity for the existence of a God, as contained in the existence of Time and Space, which, as being not substances themselves, but modes and attributes of substance, implied a substance which supported them; and, inasmuch as they were

infinite, an infinite and eternal substance. This necessity for the existence of a God, he calls 'a necessity absolutely such in its own nature,' *i. e.* nothing else but 'its being a plain impossibility, or implying a contradiction to suppose the contrary,'—a necessity of which 'the relation of equality between twice two and four is an instance; it being an immediate contradiction in terms to suppose these two unequal.' And upon this proof of the existence of a God, he bases this reflection: 'From hence it follows that there is no man whatsoever, who makes any use of his reason, but may easily become more certain of the being of a Supreme Independent Cause, than he can be of anything else besides his own existence. For how much thought soever it may require to demonstrate the other attributes of such a Being, as it may do to demonstrate the greatest mathematical certainties; yet as to its existence, that there is somewhat eternal, infinite, and self-existing, which must be the cause and original of all other things; this is one of the first and most natural conclusions that any man can frame in his mind: and no man can any more doubt of this, than he can doubt whether twice two be equal to four. 'Tis possible, indeed, that a man may in some sense be ignorant of this first and plain truth, by being utterly stupid, and not thinking at all. But this I say, there is no man who thinks or reasons at all, but may easily become more certain that there is something eternal, infinite, and self-existing, than he can be certain of anything else.'

It may appear indeed somewhat strange that it did not occur to a philosopher that he was getting out of his depth when he argued that the existence of the Deity was necessary as the substratum of time and space; and the correspondence between Butler and Clarke, given in the common editions of Butler's works, shows that that suspicion was entertained by Butler, though then a youthful thinker, and expressed as became a young man writing to the great metaphysician of the day, with the utmost modesty and caution. 'I cannot say that I believe your argument not conclusive; for I must own my ignorance, that I am really at a loss about the nature of space and duration. But did it plainly appear that they were properties of a substance, we should have an easy way with the atheists; for it would at once demonstrably prove an eternal, necessary, and self-existent Being; that there is but one such; and that He is needful in order to the existence of all other things;—which makes me think that though it may be true, yet it is not obvious to every capacity; otherwise it would have been generally used as a fundamental argument to prove the being of a God.'

Now this metaphysical ground for the existence and attributes of God has its weaknesses, but one weakness certainly cannot be laid to its charge, viz. that of being too diffident, and too doubtful. It professed to be a demonstration, a mathematical proof of the existence of a God. And so far as Butler acknowledged this ground,—and he always does appeal to ‘abstract reasonings,’ as proof of religion,—so far, certainly, he cannot be said to have based the evidence of religion on mere probabilities and presumptions.

But such arguments as these could not prove the moral government of God. To prove this, philosophy has used the second sort of reasoning. It has argued from the moral nature of the creature to the moral character of the Creator; and from the moral character of God to His moral government. This common recognised argument of religious philosophy is always supposed and its validity taken for granted by Butler. He regards conscience as the ‘voice of God within us,’ and its approbation and disapprobation as anticipations of a future and final Divine judgment. This is not demonstration; but neither is it an appeal to mere chances and presumptions.

To Mr. Maurice’s charge then—that Butler ‘assumes all moral principles to depend on probable evidence,’ our answer is plain. If by ‘moral principles’ are meant moral obligations, moral principles are maintained by Butler to be the objects of clear mental intuition: if by ‘moral principles’ are meant the Divine moral government, moral principles we then allow are made by Butler to depend on probable evidence; but only on probable evidence as distinguished from demonstration, not as being mere guess and presumption; on sound, valid and irresistible probable reasoning.

But it will be said, that the arguments which Butler has *put forward* are at any rate arguments of analogy or presumption; and that he has written a book called the ‘Analogy,’ which is entirely devoted to them. He has; and nothing can show more clearly that which we assert of Butler—that he did not rest the evidence of religion on analogy—than the ground which he assigns to analogy in this book. He tells us expressly, that he adopts analogy as an appeal to men who will not acknowledge any other ground. He says in the advertisement, ‘It is come, ‘I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons, ‘that Christianity is now not so much as a subject of inquiry; ‘but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious. And ‘accordingly they treat it as if in the present age this were an ‘agreed point among all people of discernment; and nothing ‘remained but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth ‘and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals for having so long

'interrupted the pleasures of the world. On the contrary, thus much at least will be here found, not taken for granted, but proved, that any reasonable man who will thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured as he is of his own being, that it is not however so clear a case, that there is nothing in it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth; but it is certain no one can upon principles of reason be satisfied of the contrary.' He is arguing then with men who do not acknowledge the ordinary evidences for Christianity. And it is the same with respect to natural religion. He is arguing with men who do not admit the ordinary evidence for natural religion, and the Divine moral government. Having excluded themselves then from the strong ground of evidence, he offers, or rather fastens upon them, another much weaker, but still better than none at all. 'There is, I think, strong evidence of the truth' of religion; but that evidence he does not now bring forward, because it consists of an appeal to our moral nature, which can be strong evidence only to those who admit that moral nature. He is obliged to confine himself to a kind of evidence which leads to a much weaker result, and does not prove that religion is true, but only that it cannot be set down as false—'that they cannot be satisfied to the contrary.' But as that is the only kind of evidence they acknowledge, he uses it. It is evidently a gain if even such a result can be produced. Evidence which leads even to an inferior conclusion, is valuable if it is of a species which is admitted and recognised by the persons addressed, while to address evidence to them which led to the most positive conclusion, would be wholly useless, if the evidence itself was of a species which they did not recognise. The argument, then, on which Butler *himself* considered the truth of religion to rest, was a different one from the argument used in the Analogy. Does not Mr. Maurice himself admit this?

'He did, however, use words addressed to the loose thinkers of his day, the men of wit and fashion about town, which seem to confound "probabilities," with "chances;" to suggest the thought that we are to calculate the likelihood of religious principles being true, and that if there is even a slight balance in favour of them—nay, none at all—we are to throw in the danger of rejecting them as a makeweight, and so to force ourselves into the adoption of them. I groan over these words as I read them, feeling how much a great and good man was sacrificing of what was dearest to his heart, for the sake of an *argumentum ad hominem*, which, after all, was not an argument that ever reached the conscience of any man, or that could do so, if the conscience is what Butler affirms it to be.'—*Maurice's Theological Essays*, p. 234.

Why does Mr. Maurice groan? We see no reason for it, even according to his own statement. He calls Butler's argument an *argumentum ad hominem*. But is not an *argumentum ad*

hominem, by the very force of the expression, an argument which a man uses out of accommodation to another, and not the argument upon which he rests himself the truth of the conclusion in which he believes? Does a man give up his own stronger ground, because he uses another weaker one, out of accommodation to another man, who will not listen to the stronger? And if he does not, what is there to deplore? Truth is not injured, and a charity is done.

Not that the Analogy, though addressed primarily, is addressed solely to those who do not admit the stronger ground of evidence for religion. Undoubtedly, however we may admit that stronger ground, analogy is a confirmation of it; and that testimony of conscience to the moral and immoral character of actions, on which we substantially base our anticipation of a future judgment, is strengthened when we see that as a matter of fact these actions are, to a large extent, respectively rewarded and punished in this life. But this again does not make analogy the *ground* of our belief in religion. On the contrary, it makes it pre-suppose that ground. Nor can anything be more distinct and express than Butler's own statement on this subject. '*It is not the purpose,*' he says, '*of this treatise properly to prove God's perfect moral government over the world; but to observe what there is in the constitution and course of nature to confirm the proper proof supposed to be known. Pleasure and pain are indeed, to a certain degree, say to a very high degree, distributed amongst us without any regard to the merit and demerit of characters. And were there nothing also concerning this matter discernible in the constitution and course of nature, there would be no ground from the constitution and course of nature to hope or to fear that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter according to their deserts. And thus the proof of a future state of retribution would rest upon the usual known arguments for it, which I think are plainly unanswerable, and would be so were there no additional confirmation of them from the things above insisted on.*'¹ Again, '*That there is an intelligent Author of Nature, a natural governor of the world, is a principle gone upon in the foregoing treatise as proved, and generally known and confessed to be proved. And the very notion of an intelligent Author of Nature, proved by particular final causes, implies a will and a character. Now as our whole nature, the nature which He has given us, leads us to conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and good, so we can scarce in imagination conceive what it can be otherwise.*'² This is the proof then, according to Butler, of the truth of religion and

¹ Chapter on the Moral Government of God, (near the end.)

² Conclusion of First Part of Analogy.

the divine moral government, viz. not analogy, but something which analogy supposes, 'an argument which is plainly unanswerable, and would be so, were there no additional confirmation of it from analogy,'—the argument that we have a moral nature, and that, therefore, the existence of a God, the maker of that nature, supposed, His nature and character must be moral too.

It would be a hard task to go into all the mistakes which Mr. Maurice makes, in consequence of supposing, against Butler's own distinct protest, that analogy is the *original* evidence of religion, in his scheme, and not a mere secondary and confirmatory one. But his comparison between Butler's moral system and Mr. Combe's physical one should not be passed over. Mr. Combe proves that the observance of certain physical laws is necessary for the welfare of man, and, therefore, that these laws have, according to the design of the Author of nature, a claim on our attention and obedience, as guides to life. Butler proves the same of moral laws. Mr. Maurice, on a comparison of the evidence brought forward by the two for their respective sets of laws, asserts Mr. Combe's to be based on sure scientific observation, and Butler's on mere guess and presumption; and remarks, 'Whenever guesses are balanced against laws, guesses must kick the beam; if divines and moralists have nothing but guesses to produce, and Mr. Combe has laws, it is not a matter of doubt, but of certainty, that he will be the teacher of the world, and that they must make their way out of it as fast as they can.'

This comparison is evidently founded on the mistake we have noticed, viz. on Mr. Maurice's idea that analogy is Butler's primary argument for the truth of religion. Analogy being supposed to be his argument, Butler's argument, and Mr. Combe's argument, are both arguments of the same kind; the proofs are the same in both cases: Mr. Combe observes as a fact that certain *physical* antecedents produce certain consequences painful or pleasant; Butler observes, that certain *moral* antecedents, or actions and ways of life, produce certain consequences painful or pleasant. The arguments of the two are therefore, on Mr. Maurice's supposition, arguments of the same kind; they are both of them inductions; and Mr. Combe's induction is a much more correct, accurate and certain one, than Butler's. But Butler's primary argument for the truth of religion is *not* analogy, and implies no induction at all; it is an appeal to our consciousness of a certain moral nature within us in the first place; it is an immediate inference from that moral nature in the next. His and Mr. Combe's, therefore, are different arguments, and cannot be compared.

Indeed, if Mr. Maurice will only reflect, he must see how perfectly inconsistent Butler's whole view of morals is with induction as its basis. Whatever uncertainty may attend Butler's view of morals, he is yet regarded by Mr. Maurice as maintaining morals, in the true sense of that word; *i. e.* as holding a fundamental distinction between good and evil, in actions. But he could not, by possibility, get at such a distinction by induction. In induction we observe facts, and put them together, but we cannot get beyond this colligation or summary of the facts themselves, or get at an internal quality or characteristic of them, such as the moral one. To observe that intemperance, veracity, pride, lying, temperance, honesty, fraud, and many other habits and lines of behaviour, in the department of human life, are connected as antecedents with certain consequences,—such as intemperance with disease, lying with dishonour, veracity with credit, and so on,—is not to arrive at the quality of moral good or evil attaching to these respective ways of acting. That can only be discerned by an internal sense. The argument of the 'Analogy'—we mean the argument put out there, as distinct from any ground presupposed—is indeed one of this simply inductive sort. Nothing being taken for granted with respect to the intrinsic moral good and evil of actions, and without saying that temperance is at all better morally than drunkenness, or veracity than lying, all the actions that take place in human life are in that argument simply looked upon as *facts*; and Butler asserts the present experienced connexion of certain pleasures or pains with them, in the way of antecedent and consequent, exactly as a medical man would connect one physical state or habit with another, or as a chemist would observe that certain results were produced when certain materials were brought together. The argument of the 'Analogy' is thus a purely inductive one; and we will admit further, that as an inductive argument it is much weaker and much less conclusive than Mr. Combe's—simply for this reason, that the facts in Mr. Combe's department are so much more fixed and clear than in Butler's. That some things produce health, and other things produce disease, is a much more uniform connexion of antecedent and consequent than that virtues produce happiness, and vices misery, in this world. It is admitted that the facts in this latter department are not constant; that there is a large disturbance, that evil is often triumphant, and good depressed. And this causes the manifest weakness and poverty of the argumentative result of analogy pure. It cannot be helped. The result is, indeed, as far as it goes, decided. There is a clear balance on the whole in favour of virtue; and that being

the case, a man is as really bound by the result, as if it were a much larger one. Still the facts are inconstant, and the induction must represent the facts. Admitting, however, that the argument of the 'Analogy' is of itself an induction, and that a necessarily poor induction, we repeat that Butler did not rest the evidence of religion on the argument of analogy.

But now we must turn the tables upon Mr. Maurice, and having stood so long on the defensive, must become the accuser on this subject. We have explained what induction is, and its inherent weakness as an argument in morals. But, after charging Bishop Butler with resting morals on a weak and uncertain ground, what does Mr. Maurice do himself but rest the evidence of moral truth upon this very ground—that of induction? This is certainly implied in the following passage, which is given at large, marking what part we especially refer to:—

"But though there may be this single point of agreement amongst Christian doctors on this subject, are there not the greatest disagreements among them; such disagreements as entirely bear out Mr. Combe's assertion that nothing is settled about the moral or spiritual constitution, while *he* is able to argue from the most certain data respecting the physical!" Before I answer this question, I wish to inquire what those data are, from which Mr. Combe argues, and what is his method of coming at conclusions from them. These data, I conceive, are certain facts respecting the condition of men in different circumstances; respecting their states of health and of disease; respecting the treatment, mischievous and beneficial, which has been applied to them. Such facts have not been merely observed, loosely and carelessly: they have been submitted to a series of searching experiments. There have been experiments on the bodily frame which illustrated those on the influences to which it is exposed; the anatomist, physiologist, chemist, geologist, each contributing his quota of observation and thought, to the confirmation or correction of the other. Thus, after many theories have been accepted, and thrown aside, some simple law has been brought to light, the great test of which has been, its power of explaining facts, new and old; so far as it can do that, it sustains its character; when it fails, it is not discarded, but it is supposed that some deeper, more comprehensive law is yet to reward the toil and humility of the inquirer. What can be better or truer than investigations of this kind? What duty can be greater, than to avail ourselves of the results to which they lead? *But the more we study them and admire them, the less shall we adopt those loose expressions which represent this evidence as something altogether different in kind from that which is open to moralists and divines, if they like to make use of it.* I do not believe that Butler intended to distinguish the probable evidence to which he appeals in his Analogy, from this kind of induction. On the contrary, he is applying the inductive method with the same hesitation and unwillingness to accept hasty generalizations, with the same readiness to look at facts and test them, which characterises the physical inquirer. And he wished his reader to feel how satisfactory that method was, what a guide it was to practical decisions, what a deliverance from mere vague hypotheses.'—*Ibid.* pp. 232—234.

To say that we understand this passage as a whole would, indeed, be boastful. The author thinks that Butler distinguished, though without intending it, probable evidence from

induction. What does he mean? Butler, in the 'Analogy,' founds the probability of a Divine moral government *upon* an induction, *i. e.* observation of present facts. So much, however, is clear, that Mr. Maurice says the argument which moralists and divines ought to use for their conclusions is the argument of induction, which Mr. Combe uses. But what can Mr. Maurice be thinking of, with his dislike of uncertainty, to rest the evidence of religion upon induction? How can he think that a 'satisfactory method' of proof? Will he say Butler has not made so much of it as he might have done? We shall be truly obliged to Mr. Maurice if he will make any more of it. Will he prove what Eliphaz the Temanite, Bildad the Shuhite, and Zophar the Naamathite, wanted to do, that virtue and vice have uniform consequences respectively of pain and happiness in this world? But till he does that, the induction from the facts of this life in favour of the truth of religion, or the ultimate reward of virtue and punishment of vice, must remain a very imperfect one. And, even supposing him to succeed here, a still greater difficulty awaits him. With the most perfect induction as to the consequences of actions in this world, it would be still a mere presumption and no more that there would be the same consequences in another. Religion would rest on the most uncertain basis, if induction were its primary proof.

Again, after objecting so strongly to the uncertainty of Butler's proof in morals, what does Mr. Maurice do but actually charge Butler—and a most serious mistake he thinks it—with too great certainty in that proof? We allude to the remarks on the subject of conscience. Butler thinks that conscience, though liable to be occasionally disturbed by superstition, is, in the main, to be depended on as a guide, and puts it forth as a sound foundation of morals. Mr. Maurice disputes this, and sees in superstition, not that mere exception to, which Butler does, but a general and wholesale proof against, the trustworthiness of conscience.

'The student of Butler's doctrine on the Conscience, is often forced even more painfully upon this conclusion. For he will say to himself, "My conscience ought, you say, to be a king. But it is not a king. It is a captive. How shall it be raised to its throne? And when it has got a temporary ascendancy, can I trust it? Does not Butler himself admit the possibility of superstition acting upon it, and deranging its decisions? Is that a slight exception to a general maxim? Does not all history show that the decrees of this great ruler may be made contradictory, monstrous, destructive, by this disturbing force, which Butler notices, but hardly deigns to take account of?"—*Ibid.* p. 221.

Who is it here who is throwing doubt and uncertainty upon morals?—Butler, who maintains the trustworthiness of conscience,

or Mr. Maurice, who seems to think conscience a mere guesser, and a very bad one? We have not time or space to enter at present further into this question, which is undoubtedly an important one, or explain how conscience may be an authoritative guide to us in action, though we may know it is not an absolutely infallible one. We shall content ourselves with saying that we think Mr. Maurice greatly exaggerates the errors of conscience, and, over-occupied with the effects of one disturbing force, forgets the many large fields of action on which it is quite clear-sighted and not liable to mistakes; and with reminding Mr. Maurice that if he unseats conscience as a guide, he is indeed throwing us on the wide world for any standard of action or rule of life. He may think he has a corrective for this defect which he has discovered in conscience, but it is much easier to pull down than to build up again, and to inflict a wound than to remedy it. His remedy appears, as far as we can understand him, to lie in a certain 'regeneration' of the conscience. 'Christ, the true bridegroom of man's spirit, is ever drawing it towards Himself—is holding out to it freedom from evil, and the knowledge of Himself as its high reward. Owning Him, the man rises out of dark superstitions, out of immoral practices; he recognises the fitness of all God's arrangements in the physical and moral world; he claims for the body as well as the soul a redemption from all which corrupts and degrades it.' He enforces this discovery by a prayer of great earnestness:—

'But Thou, O strong Son of God! give Thy servants grace with all boldness to speak of Thee as that Lord of the inner man, in confessing whom each of us knows himself to be a person, knows himself to be a subject: knows that he is meant to rule the turbulent impulses and energies within him, because they are Thine, and have all been redeemed by Thee, and are all consecrated to Thee. Suffer us not to shrink through any shame, or through the desire of being reputed philosophical among philosophical men, or religious among religious men, from making this confession of Thee, seeing that Thou, who didst raise up men in other generations to speak that which was needful for them, hast mercifully awakened some of us to feel, that only in this way can we be saved from sinking into the deepest pit of unbelief, the most practical denial of that consciencer, which, yet, not a few are ready to put in the place of Thee.'—*Ibid.* p. 229.

We do not see, in spite of Mr. Maurice's earnestness, any correction here to the doubtfulness which he has thrown over the dictates and guidance of conscience. A 'regenerated' conscience is undoubtedly a better guide than an 'unregenerated' one; but how is a man to know that his conscience is 'regenerated'?

We have thought it right to notice this very groundless attack upon one of our great class-books in morals and philosophy; and now we go to other and more critical portions of

Mr. Maurice's Essays. And first, we shall make some remarks on the Chapter on the Atonement.

Many statements and arguments in this chapter appear to us not only highly dangerous, but positively unsound, and opposed to the doctrine of the Atonement as revealed in Scripture, and always understood in the Church. At the same time we are anxious, in justice to Mr. Maurice, to make a distinction. He appears to us sometimes more unsound as a destroyer than he is as a constructor. He has a bias against all existing forms of opinion, all doctrines in the way in which they are actually held and received, and seems to consider it his special vocation to assail them. But allow him to construct the doctrine himself, and put it out in his own formula, and it will be not so very unlike the original one. In the following passage, he protests against the doctrine of the death of our Saviour as a satisfaction for the penalty of sin. The first portion of it is not his own protest in form, so much as that of certain parties whose scruples and objections to orthodox doctrine these Essays are written to meet, and whose sentiments he here expresses. But, so far as that point is concerned, he avows agreement with their protest; and we must add that we cannot, from the whole context, but regard him as agreeing in the main with the arguments on which it is founded.

'But I admitted that there were grave and earnest protests against much of what is called the Protestant doctrine of the Atonement. "You hold," it is said, "that God had condemned all His creatures to perish, because they had broken His law; that His justice could not be satisfied without an infinite punishment; that that infinite punishment would have visited all men, if Christ, in His mercy to men, had not interposed and offered Himself as the substitute for them; that by enduring an inconceivable amount of anguish, He reconciled the Father, and made it possible for Him to forgive those who would believe. This whole statement," the objector continues, "is based on a certain notion of justice. It professes to explain, on certain principles of justice, what God ought to have done, and what He actually has done. And this notion of justice outrages the conscience, to which you seem to offer your explanation. You often feel that it does. You admit that it is not the kind of justice which would be expected of men. And then you turn round and ask us what we can know of God's justice; how we can tell that it is of the same kind with ours? After arguing with us, to show the necessity of a certain course, you say that the argument is good for nothing; we are not capable of taking it in! Or else you say that the carnal mind cannot understand spiritual ideas. We can only answer, We prefer our carnal notion of justice to your spiritual one. We can forgive a fellow-creature a wrong done to us, without exacting an equivalent for it; we blame ourselves if we do not; we think we are offending against Christ's command, who said, Be ye merciful as your Father in Heaven is merciful, if we do not. We do not feel that punishment is a satisfaction to our minds; we are ashamed of ourselves when we consider it is. We may suffer a criminal to be punished, but it is that we may do him good, or assert a principle. And if that is our object, we do not suffer an innocent person to prevent the guilty from enduring the consequences of his guilt,

by taking them upon himself. Are these moral maxims in our case, or are the opposing maxims moral? If they are moral, should we, because God is much more righteous than we can imagine or understand, attribute to Him what we should consider a very low righteousness, or unrighteousness in us?"

'These questions are asked on all sides of us. It is obvious that they are most deep and awful questions. They touch upon the very principles of morality and godliness. I know well how clergymen persuade themselves that it is right and safe to pass them by. They say, "Such doubts bewilder the minds of our flocks upon a doctrine which is, of all others, the most vital. Let one of these objectors," they say, "go with us to the bed-sides of some of the humblest, purest Christians. We will show them those who have grown up from their childhood in love and good works. We will show them penitent Magdalens. The testimony of both will be the same. 'To lose this doctrine, of God having reconciled sinners to Himself, would be to lose everything. Without it we do not care for life here or hereafter. We do not know what life here or hereafter could mean.' Are we to rob such souls as these of their treasure, because some captious people find the casket which contains it disagreeable to their pride—because they cannot bend their reasons to the Cross?"

'I answer, No; you are to defend this treasure to the death. You are to let no man take it from those suffering spirits, or—if you have it—from yourselves. You are to desire that all, you among the rest, should be brought, with all your notions and theories, to the Cross. But what is the treasure which you see your humble, dying saints, grasping with such intense resolution? Is it not the belief which is expressed in our collect for Passion Week, that "God of His tender love towards mankind sent His Son, our Saviour Jesus Christ, to take our flesh upon Him, that all mankind should follow the example of His great humility?" Is not this Love of God, this perfect obedience of Christ to His Father's loving will, the ground of all their confidence, their hope, their humility? Has their confidence, their hope, their humility, anything whatever to do with the theory that has fastened itself to this doctrine of Atonement, and, in many minds, has taken the place of it? Do you hear any allusion to it amidst the pauses of that sepulchral cough? Does the feverish hand clasp yours with thankful joy, when you speak of a Divine justice delighting in infinite punishment? Does the loving, peaceful eye respond to the idea that the Son of God has delivered His creatures from their Father's determination to execute His wrath upon them?

'But go from the dying chamber to the house across the street, or, it may be, to the fashionable withdrawing room below, and there you will find what hold this doctrine has upon your people. There you may hear some religious dowager, with the newspaper, from which she derives her faith and her charity, on the ottoman beside her, denouncing a youth just returned from Cambridge, and, as you enter, imploring your help in delivering him from the horrible scepticism into which he has fallen, respecting the faith which is her only consolation in time and eternity. That faith is *not* in the tender love of God, in the obedience of Christ, in His great humility; it is in the theory of the satisfaction He has offered to offended Sovereignty, or, as she calls it, justice.—*Ibid*, pp. 137—141.

Here, then, Mr. Maurice plainly refuses to admit the doctrine of our Lord's atonement, in the sense of a satisfaction for the penalty of sin. He asks, 'Does the loving, peaceful eye respond to the idea that the Son of God has delivered His creatures from their Father's determination to execute His wrath upon

'them?' meaning, of course, that such a doctrine is essentially repugnant to true spiritual thought and feeling. He speaks of 'satisfaction to offended Sovereignty,' i. e. to the Divine wrath, as 'a theory' which fashionable dowagers, devoid alike of faith and charity, may hold and repose in; but which the contrition of real penitents thrusts aside as revolting, foreign, and unedifying. But what, may we ask, is the doctrine of the Atonement, if it is not the doctrine that Christ's death and sufferings have been accepted as a sacrifice in our behalf; and, whereas our sins would, in the natural course, have brought eternal punishment upon us, this sacrifice has redeemed us from it? We do not say that deliverance from punishment is the only mode of expressing the benefit of the Atonement: that benefit is deliverance from sin as well. The two consequences, indeed, cannot be considered apart, so far as this, that the individual cannot have deliverance from punishment, if he does not exhibit a deliverance from sin too. But the one consequence cannot be regarded as absorbed in the other; nor can we afford to throw aside the deliverance from punishment, as if it had no separate and independent interest to us. All that deliverance from sin can amount to, even if by grace we have cast off our sins, is repentance and reformation. But reformation can only affect our future life; it cannot prevent the sins we have committed. And if those sins remain, how do we escape their natural consequence, unless the atonement of Christ is a special rescue from that consequence—a satisfaction for, and removal of a punishment, which would otherwise have been executed upon us? Accordingly, when Bishop Butler defends the doctrine of 'a Mediator and Redeemer,' this is the doctrine which he defends. 'The Son of God loved us, and gave himself for us, with a love which he compares to that of human friendship; though, in this case, all comparison must fall infinitely short of the thing intended to be illustrated by them. *He interposed in such a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of justice upon sinners, which God had appointed should otherwise have been executed upon them; or in such a manner as to prevent that punishment from actually following, which, according to the general laws of Divine government, must have followed the sins of the world, had it not been for such interposition.*' If repentance cannot of itself do away with the natural effects of our past sin upon ourselves—a power it is plainly repugnant to revelation to assign to it—we are evidently left without a remedy for those effects, and are still under sentence of eternal punishment, unless the Atonement is what Mr. Maurice denies it to be.

We do not argue, however, with Mr. Maurice. All we are

concerned with, is to show that the doctrine which he impugns is the doctrine of the Atonement as held by the Christian body throughout the world, and supposed and taken for granted by divines in their defences and explanations of it. Indeed, Mr. Maurice almost admits this himself, for he admits it to be the doctrine in defence of which Archbishop Magee wrote his book on the 'Scriptural Doctrine of the Atonement;' and he allows that both parties in the Church accept the doctrine defended in that book.

'Men of the Evangelical school, who did not like Archbishop Magee's book, because they found nothing in it which responded to the witness of their hearts, yet accepted it on the poor calculation that it was a learned book, and might defend what they were pleased to call the outworks of the faith. Men of the Patristic school, who knew how little it accorded with the divinity they most admired, yet argued æconomically, that it might serve the purposes of such an age as ours is, and might confute objectors who did not deserve to be acquainted with any higher truth. I acknowledge the dishonesty and faithlessness of both decisions; I feel most deeply the mischiefs which have followed from both; but I see how much there was to make them plausible. I believe it is only a peculiar discipline, and some very painful experience, which has led me to abandon them, and to say boldly, I must give up Archbishop Magee, for I am determined to keep that which makes the Atonement precious to my heart and conscience; to keep the theology of the Creeds and the Bible.'—*Ibid.* pp. 148, 149.

Whatever reasons, then, he may give for their respective approvals, the fact is admitted that men of the Evangelical school, and men of the Patristic school,—that is to say, the whole of the Church,—accept that doctrine of the Atonement which Archbishop Magee defends; while he has 'been led by 'painful experience to say boldly, I must give up Archbishop 'Magee.'

The arguments in apparent deference to which the received doctrine of the Atonement is thus rejected, are the ordinary arguments of Sceptics and Deists, which we meet with in the controversial treatises of divines who have undertaken the defence of the doctrine of the Atonement. There is the argument drawn from the Divine benevolence, that it is unworthy of the Divine nature to suppose that God does not forgive sin simply upon repentance, without the condition of atonement and mediation. There is the argument drawn from the Divine justice, which, it is supposed, is contradicted by making an innocent man suffer for a guilty one. There is an argument against all punishment, as being a sort of vengeance. Our first remark on these arguments is, that it would have been more satisfactory if Mr. Maurice had distinctly stated how far he agreed with them and how far he did not. As it is, he puts forth certain arguments with a great appearance of sympathy; he accepts the result to which those arguments lead, in the minds of the

parties whom he represents; and he puts forward for this result no other arguments as his own in their stead. We do not say that these are, under such circumstances, to be regarded as Mr. Maurice's own arguments; but this we must say, that for a Professor of Theology in a Church of England College to treat with the greatest apparent sympathy and respect a class of arguments which are known as the common arguments of Sceptics and Deists, without even stating dissent from them, or giving his readers any mark by which to separate the sentiments of the represented parties from those of their mouth-piece, is, if it is not an appropriation of those arguments, an inattention to what was due to his position as a Theological Professor in the Church of England.

Our next remark is, that as the Essay advances this ambiguity is somewhat lessened—to the satisfaction of the reader so far as he wants to know what Mr. Maurice's own arguments are—to his grief inasmuch as he finds that Mr. Maurice's own arguments are but too like in character those of which he was the mouth-piece. He says,—

‘What we have a right to insist on is, that no notion or theory shall be allowed to interfere with this fundamental maxim, that if any one, by any means, leads us to suppose that Christ did not simply submit to the will of His Father, and carry it out, but sought to move it or change it, he shall be held to have departed from the faith once delivered to the saints.’—*Ibid.* p. 144.

Again:—

‘The Scripture says, “The Lamb of God taketh away the Sin of the world.” All orthodox teachers repeat the lesson. They say Christ came to deliver sinners from sin. This is what the sinner asks for. Have we a right to call ourselves scriptural or orthodox, if we change the words, and put “penalty of sin” for “sin;” if we suppose that Christ destroyed the connexion between sin and death—the one being the necessary wages of the other—for the sake of benefiting any individual man whatever? If He had, would He have magnified the Law and made it honourable? Would He not have destroyed that which He came to fulfil? Those who say the law must execute itself,—it must have its penalty—should remember their own words. How does it execute itself if a person, against whom it is not directed, interposes to bear its punishment?’—*Ibid.* p. 146.

These are arguments which Mr. Maurice himself brings against the Atonement as effecting a delivery from a sentence of punishment which would otherwise have been executed. He says first that to suppose this is to suppose that ‘Christ sought to move and change’ the Father's will; and secondly, to suppose that Christ destroyed the connexion between sin and death, and so violated, instead of fulfilling, the law. Both these are rationalistic arguments. A change in the will of God, such as is supposed in the doctrine of the Atonement, is of course a mystery. We do not mean to say that God's will is changed in the sense in which a human will is; that would be repugnant

to our idea of the Divine Nature. We only use such language as a way of expressing some act of the Deity, which cannot really be expressed. Not to allow such modes of expression as these is rationalism; because it is a clear limiting of the truths of religion to such truths as we can understand. The same answer may be made to the argument that Christ did not destroy the connexion between sin and death. Let it be said—which is not true—that our natural idea of justice demands that real guilt should be punished, just as it demands that real virtue should be rewarded; while the doctrine of the Atonement represents real guilt as let off its just punishment. Still this is only a mode of speaking. It is the expression of a mystery to which our thoughts cannot reach, and which is only expressed in this language, because there is no language by which it can be truly and adequately expressed.

We have been viewing Mr. Maurice as an assailant, and we find him not very tender about the arguments he uses. It seems to be *quocunque modo rem*. He appears to regard established forms of belief as things to be knocked down; as so many incrustations, harsh and artificial, which surround the essential truth, and exclude the mind from access to it. But after knocking down the established formula, when he comes to give his own, we find that it does not substantially so much differ from the established one. Mr. Maurice, we find then, is no rationalist, though he could use rationalist arguments before. It makes all the difference in this respect, whether he is the destroyer or the constructor. His own edifice is sacred, and no rationalist even wishes to touch it. He has found a formula which is open to none of the objections to which the established one was, while it does not gain this security by any concession; which satisfies reason much more, while it exercises faith quite as much. After laying down various principles, he concludes,—

'Supposing all these principles gathered together; supposing the Father's will to be a will to all good; the Son of God, being one with Him, and Lord of man, to obey and fulfil in our flesh that will by entering into the lowest condition into which men had fallen through their sin;—supposing this Man to be, for this reason, an object of continual complacency to His Father, and that complacency to be fully drawn out by the Death of the Cross; is not this, in the highest sense, Atonement? Is not the true, sinless root of Humanity revealed; is not God in Him reconciled to man? May not that reconciliation be proclaimed as a Gospel to all men?'—*Ibid.* p. 147.

If this passage means, what it appears to do, that the life and death of our Lord, regarded as one sacrifice, are perfectly pleasing and acceptable to the Father, and that for the sake of that life and death He is reconciled to or forgives the sins of man, we must confess we do not see the great difference between

Mr. Maurice's doctrine and that which he has been so strongly impugning; nor can we see exactly the reason why this Essay has been written. This Essay is written to show that the ordinary idea of the doctrine of the Atonement, the idea, viz. that our Lord 'has delivered His creatures from their Father's determination to execute His wrath upon them'—the idea 'of satisfaction to offended Sovereignty'—is erroneous, and contrary to our fundamental notions of the Divine Nature; he has declared his sympathy with the objections of Socinians to this doctrine, and made common cause with them against it. But if his own formula to express the Atonement is to bear its natural meaning, what does it amount to but to this very doctrine? It supposes God to be offended with man, and asserts His wrath to be appeased and removed by Christ's life and death. 'God is reconciled' to man in consequence of His delight in the Life and Death of the Incarnate Son. Does Mr. Maurice imagine that he has satisfied the scruples of Socinians against the doctrine of the Atonement, by the substitution of such a formula as this for the one he impugns? If he does, with all deference to his knowledge of Socinian grounds of scruple, we cannot but think him mistaken as to what the ground of scruple in the minds of Socinians to the doctrine of the Atonement really is. This ground of scruple is a general one against the *vicarious* principle in moral and divine things. They do not see in reason, why one being's goodness should make any difference in the Divine regards towards another being; why God, being offended with man on account of his own acts, should be reconciled with him on account of Christ's? But Mr. Maurice's formula acknowledges the vicarious principle, as much as the established one does. His language is, that God, in consequence of His delight in the obedient, is reconciled to the disobedient. Nor does he avoid the vicarious principle implied in this language, by speaking of our Lord as 'the sinless root of humanity;' as if man were pardoned in consequence of something within himself, and not external to him. For the Socinian will say, 'What is this mysticism? I do not understand it: it is contrary to my common sense to regard one man as the root of another. Every man is his own root, and must rise upon the basis of his individuality.' He will see that this language only expresses the vicarious principle under another form.

We shall go now to the subject, which, though occupying but a small space in these Essays, has furnished the principal charge against Mr. Maurice, has filled the correspondence between him and Dr. Jelf, and has supplied the avowed ground for the Professor's dismissal from his office—we mean, the subject of eternal punishments. We enter on such a question

with great reluctance, but as one already agitated, brought into public discussion, and obtruded upon the attention of the whole world, we cannot avoid noticing it; though we see, as clearly as any one, the evil of bringing so deep and mysterious a doctrine into the common field, and subjecting it to ordinary criticism; and cannot therefore but express our deep regret that Mr. Maurice should have thought it necessary to bring it forward, and excite a controversy about it. We agree with Dr. Jelf in saying, that there does not appear to be any general disposition in the present day to use this doctrine uncharitably. The Church preaches the doctrine which Holy Scripture has given to her, that the finally impenitent will be eternally punished; but who are the finally impenitent, she does not profess to know, and she warns her children against any other use of the doctrine than such as is edifying to themselves, and sharpens the wholesome principle of fear, as regards their own salvation.

Mr. Maurice's declarations of opinion on this subject are such as prevent, we confess, any surprise at the step which the Council of King's College has taken. The Church of England allows, it is true, considerable latitude to her members, and even to her teachers, in their mode of holding and expressing various important truths. Such a liberty nobody would wish to destroy; but there are, though not very clearly defined, certain recognised limits to this liberty. It is felt when a man has transgressed these, has violated truths which the general body holds to be sacred, and has departed from the recognised ground and standard of the Church. The results connected with such a question as the present, too, come home with peculiar and alarming force to men's minds; the connexion between error of doctrine and of practice is more immediate and more visible in the case of this doctrine, than in that of some others as near to the foundation of the faith. Nor could the Council be expected to regard with any other feelings than those of the deepest alarm, the teaching of a professor, who inculcated upon a rising generation of clergy Preachers and expounders of Scripture, from which future congregations were to receive Christian instruction, an interpretation of Scripture which wholly unsettled, if it did not overthrow, the powerful sanctions of religion contained in the doctrine of eternal punishment.

The objections ordinarily made to the doctrine of the eternity of future punishments, are made upon what—to use the word in a somewhat large and mixed sense—we may call a moral ground; that is to say, upon the ground of the repugnancy of such a doctrine to the Divine Attributes. It is urged that eternal punishment is contrary to the Divine Love. Or if that objection is seen not to be valid, inasmuch as the Divine Love

is not inconsistent with the punishment of an evil being, and eternal punishment supposes the being punished to be eternally evil; another is made on the ground of the Divine Power. It is urged that Almighty Power must be able to stop this moral evil in His creatures.

But this is not Mr. Maurice's ground of objection to the doctrine of eternal punishment. He betrays some tenderness on this latter point, and expressions which he uses every now and then show a considerable inclination toward the position that eternal punishment is positively inconsistent with the Divine Attributes. Indeed, we can give no other meaning to the concluding passage of the 'Essays,' to which great attention has been called.

'We do not want theories of Universalism; they are as cold, hard, unsatisfactory, as all other theories. But we want that clear, broad assertion of the Divine Charity which the Bible makes, and which carries us immeasurably beyond all that we can ask or think. What dreams of ours can reach to the assertion of St. John, that Death and Hell themselves shall be cast into the lake of fire? I cannot fathom the meaning of such expressions. But they are written; I accept them, and give thanks for them. I feel there is an abyss of Death, into which I may sink, and be lost. Christ's Gospel reveals an abyss of Love, below that; I am content to be lost in that. I know no more, but I am sure that there is a woe on us if we do not preach this Gospel, if we do not proclaim the name of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit,—the Eternal Charity.'—*Ibid.* pp. 442, 443.

In this passage, though he first says that we do not want theories of Universalism, he proceeds immediately, if his language is to have its natural meaning, to give one. For he says that there is *below* that 'abyss of death in which he may sink and be lost,' an abyss of love. An abyss of love must be a state of salvation; and therefore the ultimate state appears, according to this passage, to be a state of salvation exclusively. But his language elsewhere avoids decision on this point. The spiritual mind he says—

'Feels that God is altogether Love, Light with no darkness at all. But then that which is without God, that which loves darkness, that which resists love, must not it be miserable? And can it not fix itself in misery? Has it not a power of defying that which seeks to subdue it? I know in myself that it has. I know that we may struggle with the Light, that we may choose death. But I know also, that Love does overcome this rebellion. I know that I am bound to believe, that its power is greater than every other. I am sure that Christ's death proves that death, hell, hatred, are not so strong as their opposites. How can I reconcile these contradictory discoveries? I cannot reconcile them. I know no theory which can. But I can trust in Him, who has reconciled the world to Himself. I can leave all in His hands. I dare not fix any limits to the power of His love. I cannot tell what are the limits to the power of a rebel will. I know that no man can be blessed, except his will is in accordance with God's will. I know it must be by an action on the will that love triumphs. Though I have no faith in man's theory of Universal Restitution, I am

taught to expect "a restitution of all things, which God who cannot lie has promised since the world began." I am obliged to believe that we are living in a restored order. I am sure that restored order will be carried out by the full triumph of God's loving will. How that should take place while any rebellious will remains in the universe I cannot tell, though it is not for me to say that it is impossible. I do not want to say it. I wish to trust God absolutely, and not to trust in any conclusion of my own understanding at all.—*Dr. Jelf's Pamphlet*, pp. 7, 8.

There are leanings here, we say, toward the position which we mentioned, that of an universal irresistible grace. But Mr. Maurice keeps these in check, and does not give way to them. He speaks more strongly against any dogma in such a direction, in his final Letter.

'What I dare not pronounce upon is the *fact* that every will in the universe must be brought into consent with the Divine will. Stating the proposition as you state it, I should indeed tremble to affirm the contrary, and I think any man would. Dare you make it a positive article of faith that God's will, being what the Scripture says it is, shall *not* finally triumph? Nevertheless there is such a darkness over the whole question of the possible resistance of the human will, that I must be silent, and tremble and adore.'—*Maurice's Letter*, p. 16.

Mr. Maurice, then, does not take the ground which has been ordinarily taken against the doctrine of eternal punishments, and refuses to decide upon any inconsistency of the Divine Attributes with the doctrine. We are glad to admit this, though at the same time we will just remind him of one argumentative result of such a scrupulousness. The texts of Scripture declaring the eternal punishment of the wicked are so decisive and plain, that they must be taken to mean what they appear to do, unless some positive ground of reason or morals can be shown against it. The arguer upon the Divine Attributes professes to have such a ground, and therefore can, if his ground is proved, treat these texts as explained away, or proved not to mean that which they apparently do. But if an arguer can only say that he is doubtful as to the consequences of the Divine Attributes on this subject, he has no ground derived from this quarter against the apparent meaning of these texts: and in the absence of any reason against the plain meaning of the texts, that meaning must be admitted.

Mr. Maurice's ground against eternal punishments, in the common understanding of that term, lies in the sense itself of the word eternal, which he conceives to have been mistaken by the world at large, and which he himself thinks to be a sense necessarily disconnected with any idea of time or duration. Accordingly he does not require any argument for the purpose of explaining away a meaning admitted to be the apparent meaning of these texts. The apparent meaning itself of these texts is to him a meaning wholly disconnected with any idea

of time or duration. 'I believe that we must take the words of Scripture literally,' he says, and their literal meaning, he adds, is one thus wholly removed from the popular one. And he appeals to Scripture for his proof:—

'The word "eternal," if what I have said is true, is a key-word of the New Testament. To draw our minds from the temporal, to fix them on the eternal, is the very aim of the divine economy. How much ought we, then, to dread any confusion between thoughts which our Lord has taken such pains to keep distinct,—which our consciences tell us ought to be kept distinct! How dangerous to introduce the notion of duration into a word from which He has deliberately excluded it! And yet this is precisely what we are in the habit of doing, and it is this which causes such infinite perplexity to our minds. "Try to conceive," the teacher says, "a thousand years. Multiply these by a thousand, by twenty thousand, by a hundred thousand, by a million. Still you are as far off from eternity as ever." Certainly I am, quite as far. Why then did you give me that sum to work out? What could be the use of it, except to bewilder me, except to make me disbelieve in Eternity altogether? Do you not see that this course must be utterly wrong and mischievous? If eternity is the great reality of all, and not a portentous fiction, how dare you impress such a notion of fictitiousness on my mind as your process of illustration conveys? "But is it not the only process?"—Quite the only one, so far as I see, if you will bring Time into the question; if you will have years, and centuries, to prevent you from taking in the sublime truth, "This is life eternal, to know God."

'For what, then, is Death Eternal, but to be without God? What is that infinite dread which rises upon my mind, which I cannot banish from me, when I think of my own godlessness and lovelessness,—that I may become wholly separated from Love; become wholly immersed in selfishness and hatred? What dread can I have—ought I to have—besides this? What other can equal this? Mix up with this, the consideration of days, and years, and millenniums, you add nothing either to my comfort or my fears. All you do is to withdraw me from the real cause of my misery, which is my separation from the source of life and peace; from the hope which must come to me in one place or another, if I can again believe in God's love, and cast myself upon it.'—*Maurice's Essays*, pp. 436, 437.

So completely does he dissociate the meaning of eternity from any idea of duration, that he actually supposes eternity may end. The reader must defer a logical comment, which will occur to him upon this mode of speaking. He says:—

'My duty then I feel is this, 1st. To assert that which I know, that which God has revealed, His absolute universal love in all possible ways, and without any limitation. 2d. To tell myself and all men, that to know this love and to be moulded by it is *the* blessing we are to seek. 3d. To say that this is eternal life. 4th. To say that the want of it is eternal death. 5th. To say that if they believe in the Son of God they have eternal life. 6th. To say that if they have not the Son of God they have not life. 7th. *Not* to say who has not the Son of God, because I do not know. 8th. *Not* to say how long any one may remain in eternal death, because I do not know. 9th. *Not* to say that all will necessarily be raised out of eternal death, because I do not know.'—*Dr. Jelf's Pamphlet*, p. 8.

Eternity having thus, in Mr. Maurice's opinion, nothing to do with our idea of time and duration, he wholly rejects the

common and popular idea of eternal punishments as eternal in the sense of duration; he considers that sense as not only not intended by Scripture, but positively prohibited, and he is prepared to inculcate and propagate such a prohibition, as an essential part of the Gospel revelation.

Now upon such a mode of treating the word 'eternal' as this, the first observation we must make, is, that it appears to deprive that word altogether of any meaning which can be in the slightest degree perceived and apprehended by the human mind. The word eternal is obviously used in Scripture with reference to some meaning which the hearer can annex to it; and that, we will add, a meaning by no means far removed from ordinary comprehension. We say comprehension, not forgetting, of course, that the meaning is in its fulness incomprehensible; but only intending to say, that a meaning of some kind is supposed in Scripture to be immediately suggested by the word, and to rise up instinctively in a hearer's mind, even the most unlearned and uncultivated one. The texts in which mankind are warned of eternal punishments in a future state, are evidently addressed to the whole of mankind, and meant to convey a particular meaning to the natural and average understanding of man. But if the meaning of eternal is to be entirely dissociated with the idea of duration, the word eternal ceases to have any meaning, which any man, learned or unlearned, can possibly in the remotest way apprehend. For what is the idea of eternity which is left, when all idea of it as duration is taken away? None. There is no idea in our minds, when we think of the word. There is absolute vacancy, and our mental interior is literally empty.

It may be said that we have the idea of simple existence; and that that idea of pure existence, abstracted from all idea of time, is the legitimate meaning of eternal. And something like this we understand to be Mr. Maurice's meaning. But such an assertion will not bear examination. If I think of existence at all, I cannot think of it but as the existence of something or other; nor can I think of that something's existence, but as continuing or not continuing. You may tell me to think of existence absolutely, and to remove that foreign and irrelevant addition of duration, long or short, ending or not ending, that I have attached artificially to it; but if you do, you are simply imposing a task on me which the laws of human thought wholly disable me from fulfilling. I find in attempting to do so, that I simply make my mind empty, and my meaning nothing. If the idea of eternity then is reduced to the idea of pure existence, independent of duration, it is reduced to an idea which I have not got within my mind. And the notices of an eternal state in Scripture, so far from appealing to the

plain average understanding of the human race, and being met by an instinctive meaning in our minds, find simply no response at all, and excite no idea whatever.

But our next observation must be that Mr. Maurice *does* give a meaning to the word 'eternal,' a meaning *contradictory* to the idea which we naturally assign to it. After protesting against any association of duration at all with eternity, Mr. Maurice uses language, which, in its natural acceptation, plainly associates duration with it, only speaking of that duration as possibly a limited one, instead of being necessarily endless. 'I feel it my duty,' he says, 'not to say *how long any one may remain in eternal death*,' i.e. in a state of eternal punishment. Is not eternity here spoken of as time, and capable of a limit? What are the ideas which Mr. Maurice has before his mind, when he writes this sentence? First, he has evidently an idea of some space of time before eternal punishment begins; secondly, he has an idea of a space of time during which eternal punishment lasts; and thirdly, of a space of time which succeeds that. What is this but eternity positively embedded in time, bounded by time before, and time to come? It is not only duration, but limited duration. The sentence following comes under the same observation, 'I feel it my duty not to say that all will necessarily be raised out of eternal death.' So then, Mr. Maurice has the idea, that in some cases, at any rate, men will be punished eternally, and after having been punished eternally, will enter another state and condition. That is to say, he first puts forward a transcendently subtle idea of eternity, as pure existence without duration; and when he comes to apply it, he plunges into the very thick of time, and makes his eternity an intelligibly limited period. If this is the practical working, however, of a philosophy which professes to raise and refine the popular conceptions on this subject, we should, at any rate, recommend the adoption of another language; for, indeed, Mr. Maurice must allow us to tell him that it is eccentric to speak of eternity as ending.

The ground, it would appear, of this whole interpretation of the word 'eternal' is the assumption, that our idea of time is not only not an adequate exponent—which none would assert it to be—but no exponent *at all* of eternity. But this is, indeed, a hasty assumption. Undoubtedly, if we have nothing in our idea of time to give us the least notion of what eternity is, it follows immediately that the latter is purely unintelligible, and that we take unauthorized and fictitious means for explaining it, when we put it before our minds in any way as time. But we wholly dissent from the ground, that our idea of time is to be regarded as no exponent at all of what eternity is. It is an inadequate and

poor one, but it would be a great error to consider that it was designed to do nothing at all for us toward this object, that it was to be wholly separated from eternity in our thoughts, and that we ought to think of the latter as if there were no such idea as the former in our minds, *i.e.* to entertain no conception of it at all. We are expressly commanded to think of ourselves as existing beyond the grave; but we cannot think of ourselves as existing except in time. Then it is evidently intended that we should carry our ideas of time beyond the grave; only using such salvos and qualifications as reason suggests should be used in such a case. If this is forbidden us, God has imposed an impossible duty upon us.

If any one will be at the pains to examine his idea of time, he will find it to be by no means an inferior, sensual, or narrow idea. It is not like the idea of this or that particular external object. There is an evident distinction between it and the whole class of ideas which come in through senses, which proves a higher source. And that which gives it this distinction, and proves this higher and supersensual source, is the idea of infinity, which is involved in our idea of time.

The idea of infinity, with which we find ourselves endowed, is a very remarkable and peculiar idea, for this reason, that, while it is undoubtedly a true and in some sort apprehended one, it is at the same time only a preliminary and incipient idea, vanishing while we are upon its very threshold, and launching us upon the unknown and unconceived. We cannot rid ourselves of this idea of infinity; we cannot think of anything at all, but we may imagine that thing repeated once, twice, three times, three thousand times, till we exhaust ourselves with numbers; and then we feel ourselves as far from the goal as ever. Thus space widens on all sides of us into boundless space, and time stretches into an infinite time anterior and prospective. We cannot prevent the mind from exceeding the bounds of the objects and the sphere of its actual experience; because there is that in us which is ever growing and necessarily expanding, without capacity of check; and when we get to the very furthest horizon, we feel an action of excess or stretching over going on within our minds. But while we stretch over, we just stretch over, and no more. We cannot grasp that quantity and extent which lies beyond. It is unknown magnitude, unknown number. The idea of infinity is a true and an apprehended, but only an incipient idea, and Locke's distinction is a true one, in meaning, whatever defect there may be in his mode of expressing it, that we have an idea of infinity of space and time, but not an idea of space and time infinite. 'The idea of infinity,' he says, 'has something of positive in all those things we apply it to.

' When we would think of infinite space or duration, we at first step usually make some very large idea, as perhaps of millions of ages, or miles, which possibly we double and multiply several times. All that we thus amass together in our thoughts is positive, and the assemblage of a great number of positive ideas of space or duration. But what still remains beyond this, we have no more a positive and distinct notion of, than a mariner has of the depth of the sea; where, having let down a large portion of his sounding line, he reaches no bottom: whereby he knows the depth to be so many fathoms and more; but how much the more is, he hath no distinct notion at all; and could he always supply a new line, and find the plummet always sink without ever stopping, he would be something in the posture of the mind reaching after a complete and positive idea of infinity. In which case, let this line be ten, or one thousand fathoms long, it equally discovers what is beyond it; and gives only this confused and comparative idea, that this is not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the mind comprehends of any space, it has a positive idea of; but in endeavouring to make it infinite, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the idea is still imperfect and incomplete. ... For to say a man has a positive clear idea of any quantity, without knowing how great it is, is as reasonable as to say, he has the positive clear idea of the number of the sands on the sea shore, who knows not how many there be; but only that they are more than twenty. For just such a perfect and positive idea has he of an infinite space and duration, who says it is larger than the extent and duration of ten, one hundred, one thousand, or any other number of miles or years, whereof he has or can have a positive idea; which is all the idea, I think, we have of infinite. So that what lies beyond our positive idea towards infinity, lies in obscurity; and has the indeterminate confusion of a negative idea, wherein I know I neither can nor do comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow capacity: and that cannot but be very far from a positive and complete idea, wherein the greatest of what I would comprehend is left out, under the indeterminate intimation of being still greater.'—*Locke's Essay*, book ii. ch. 17.

Such is the idea of infinity which we find in our minds, and from such an account we first infer that this idea is a true, solid, and constitutional part of our minds, and not a fantastic and fictitious conceit; and next, that it is what may be called a mysterious idea, or one of which we have only an incipient apprehension; which very dimness and imperfection is a result of its rank, because it is dim, and is imperfectly apprehended,

only because it is out of proportion with the rest of our minds; because it is the threshold of a higher range of capacities, the border line where our limited reason mingles for an instant with, and just tastes the greatness of another form and other laws of conception. Let no one suppose, that because this idea is concerned with simple magnitude and quantity, that therefore it is not an idea of high rank; a man may think so for a moment, but the voice of nature will the next moment correct his fastidious criticism, and tell him that nature, reasonable and intellectual nature, admires magnitude. Whence it is, or how it is, we know not, but the very inner mind swells with the idea of extent and number, and feels in the contemplation of them a satisfaction to a certain innate ambition and high desire. The vastness of space, and the interminable lengths of time, fill us with awe, not only with reference to the objects and events there may be residing in them, but an awe excited by their own simple infinity. Every step in the world of magnitudes and extents is full of wonder, and the mind is subdued as in the presence of supernatural forms and powers.

We find, then, in our minds, an idea, such as Locke describes, a dim, indistinct, and mysterious idea of infinity; and that, consequently, we necessarily think of time as infinite. The inference is that we have in our idea of time something which is exponent of eternity, and adapted to represent it to our minds. The infinity of time is representative of eternity, so far as eternity is simply endless and boundless. You say that eternity is a mystery, and that therefore time is no exponent at all of it. But time is a mystery too; you do not think of that. We have not to go to another world for mysteries. Simple astronomical infinite time is a mystery; its quantity is incomprehensible; we have not, as Locke says, the idea of it. But a mysterious idea is, so far as we apprehend it, the fit exponent of a mystery—the mystery of eternity. We are let into the secret of infinity here, and something about eternity is already revealed to us in our natural reason.

But Mr. Maurice, as it appears to us, does not at the very outset do justice to this idea of time; and his mistaken conclusion seems to follow very naturally from this mistake at the outset. He acknowledges, indeed, that we have an idea of infinity and of infinite duration, but he speaks of it more as if it were a grotesque, fictitious, and fanciful conceit, than a solid, true, and noble part of our minds. He says,—

‘I cannot apply the idea of time to the word eternal. I feel that I cannot. Every body feels it. What do the continual experiments to heap hundreds of thousands of years upon hundreds of thousands of years, and then the confession, “after all we are no nearer to eternity,” mean, if not

this? Do they not show that we are not even on the way to the idea of eternity? Might we not just as well have stopped at the hundredth year, or the first? But this trifling becomes very serious and shocking, if there is a great and awful idea of eternity which our Lord would teach us, which belongs to our inmost selves, and which we are flying from by these efforts to get it into another region.'—*Letter of Mr. Maurice in Dr. Jelf's Pamphlet*, p. 6.

'I am met with the complaint, that there is a simple, natural, admitted meaning of the word "eternal" which every one understands, and which I am trying to get rid of. I ask for that simple, natural, admitted meaning, and I find it full of the strangest complexities and incoherences; one which cannot be set before simple people, without the most extraordinary devices to make it intelligible; devices which utterly fail, by the admission of those who resort to them.'—*Ibid.* pp. 13, 14.

He throws aside our idea of infinity as in itself a low absurd and mean idea; it is 'full of complexities and incoherences;' he sees in the representations of it that we make to our minds only 'extraordinary devices;' as if the whole were a mere Chinese trick and puzzle. Undoubtedly the idea of infinity is a dim and indistinct idea, and we find in pursuing it apparent complexities and incoherences. But will any sane person deny on proper reflection, that the idea of infinity is a true, a lawful, and a grand idea of our intellectual nature? Undoubtedly 'we heap hundreds of thousands of years upon hundreds of thousands, and yet are no nearer to eternity;' but is infinite number a fictitious and mean idea? And because this idea of infinity falls short and owns its deficiency, is it not, as far as it goes, true knowledge, true perception? Do we apprehend no truth whatever, in any way whatever, in any degree whatever, when we have the idea of infinity in our minds? Are the ideas of infinity and nothing identical? Is it absurd to speak of an idea of infinity at all? Certainly this is not the case. All are conscious of the possession of a truth, a majestic truth, in this idea, though we feel ourselves but on the threshold of it, and cannot by possibility grasp that of which it tells us the existence. If Mr. Maurice, however, will not acknowledge any truth in our idea of infinity at all, it is no wonder that he should deny that our idea of time is any exponent of eternity; for our idea of time can only be such an exponent as involving the idea of infinity.

Upon this radical mistake rises the objection of Mr. Maurice to the term 'endless,' or 'never ending,' as applied to a future life.

'Here we have your meaning of Eternal and Everlasting. You are not really pleading for either of the words which our translators have used. You are measuring both by a compound "endless" or "never ending" which they have not used at all. Now thus it seems to me you bring us under the conditions of Time in the most mischievous way. The "measures of duration" which you try to escape, by speaking of an absolute duration, may be used—are used in Scripture—to raise us above notions of Time.

"I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last;" "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever;" "which is, and was, and is to come," are forms of speech which do not chain us to a beginning or an end, to yesterday or to-day, to the past, to the present, or the future; but teach us of One who is living in these "measures of duration," and is not confined by them. But mere negative words, such as "endless," "never ending," start from a ground of Time; when I predicate them of God, I make him a mere negation of Time; I conceive of Him just as the Magians did, as "Time without Bounds."—*Maurice's Letter*, pp. 7, 8.

The argument in this passage, as far as we can make it out, supposes that time is essentially limited in our idea of it; from which it follows that if we think of it as endless, we are entertaining 'a negation of time.' If this is *not* his supposition, we cannot conceive what he means by saying that 'endless time,' that 'time without bounds' is a negation of time! Is an infinite quantity of brick or stone, a negation of brick or stone? Is an infinite quantity of time a negation of time? If this *is* his supposition, we need not say how erroneous it is.

We have appealed to the idea of the infinite in our minds, as the true and intended guide in forming our notion of eternity, and referred Mr. Maurice's mistaken conclusion, on the subject before us, to his mistaken estimate of this idea. We do not mean to say, however, that this idea is of itself at all an adequate exponent of eternity. There is undoubtedly a great defect in an image of eternity which represents it as, however infinite, consisting of successive spaces of time. And this defect, though it cannot be remedied,—for we cannot think of time except under the mode of succession,—ought to be remembered in applying our idea of infinity to eternal duration. But this defect in the idea does not exclude it altogether as an exponent to us of eternity, but only qualify it. The *elements* of infinite duration have to be disposed in a different way from that in which we find the elements of present time to be; but the infinity *itself* of that duration is still truly represented to our minds by our idea of that time as infinite. And upon this basis the definition of eternity accepted in the middle ages was formed—*Interminabilis vite tota simul et perfecta possessio*. It is the definition given by Boëtius, and adopted by Aquinas. Here first comes the idea of pure endlessness, infinity of duration. That is the leading and primary idea; eternity is *vita interminabilis*. But inasmuch as an infinite duration, going on, as present time goes, by a succession of moments, each in turn leaving the other behind; inasmuch as the arrangement of past, present, and future is obviously unsuitable to eternity, this point is next looked to; it is added that the contents of the 'interminable life' have the mode not of succession but of simultaneity, and that the whole of infinite duration is possessed at once—*tota simul*.

When Mr. Maurice, then, demands that eternity should be regarded, not as successive duration, but as a 'fixed state,' 'a state subject to no change or succession,' he is right; but why should he demand this characteristic, as he does, *in opposition to the other*? Why should the changelessness of the eternal state supersede its endlessness? He says, 'The word αἰών, *aiōn*, specially serves this purpose. Like our own word "Period," it does not convey so much the impression of a line as of a circle; it does not suggest perpetual progress, but fixedness and completeness. The word αἰώνιος, or *aiōnios*, derived from this, seems to have been divinely contrived to raise us out of our time-notions—to suggest the thought of One who is the 'same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.' All this may be so. But why should a particular mode in which infinite duration exists, exclude that duration's infinity; and the duration, because it is *tota simul*, not be 'interminabilis.' It is evident that we can form no conception of such a state of being; but in the natural order of our thoughts, the idea of eternity as infinite comes first; the fixedness is only a characteristic of such infinity, to distinguish it from an infinity of earthly duration. Earthly time is in idea infinite, but it is an infinity of passing moments; this is unsuitable to the heavenly state, and therefore we pronounce the latter to be a fixed and permanent infinity; but it still is infinity. Mr. Maurice appeals to S. Augustine's description of eternity, as *semper stans*, and contrasted in that respect to the succession of past, present, and future in this life; but the *semper stans* of Augustine, like the *tota simul* of Boëtius, supposes the endlessness of eternity, and does not exclude it. He might, had he thought it worth while, have claimed, with greater right, the authority of Cudworth, who appears to deny the possibility of infinity in material things, and so to condemn the common idea of infinity altogether as spurious; though he nowhere pushes his extravagant principles, on this question, to a definite conclusion.

We have endeavoured to point out, and show the error of, the ground on which Mr. Maurice appears to have founded his interpretation of the word 'eternal.' If we are wrong, however, in our conjecture as to what that ground is, we can only—claiming some indulgence for a misapprehension not unpardonable in a criticism upon a writer whose depth is certainly out of proportion with his perspicuity—fall back upon our first objection, that, upon whatever ground this interpretation may be raised, it is one which deprives the word 'eternal' of all meaning which the human mind can embrace or entertain. This is a fatal objection; but a simple negation of all meaning is, however bad a consequence in the case of a word evidently intended in Scripture to produce the most forcible impression

upon us—far from being the worst consequence of such an interpretation. Such a negation of meaning would, practically speaking, issue in a meaning but too definite and positive; and this interpretation would no sooner pass from the minds of philosophers and theologians, to those of common men, than it would become a simple doctrine of the limitation of future punishment. It has hardly escaped this further stage in Mr. Maurice's own hands; and still less would it do so, under the treatment which the mass would give it. Imagine a doctrine of eternal punishment pervading the world at large, which asserted that eternal did *not* mean 'endless,' or 'everlasting'; what is the immediate meaning which *would* be given to the word? The difficulty would be solved, you may depend upon it, with sufficient ease, and the popular mind would suffer no long suspense. Men would of course say,—If eternity is not infinite, it is finite. Nor would such a result be in our opinion less valid as logic, than it would be as plain common sense. Your very denial of endlessness is an appeal to our notions of time: but if you appeal to our notions of time, and reject time infinite, as applied to eternity, there can only remain time finite.

Let those then who at all doubt the effects of such a doctrine in society, give Mr. Maurice the benefit of their doubt; but it would be doing great injustice to our own convictions, if we owned to any doubt at all on this subject. We can hardly dwell upon the effects of any general spread of such a doctrine, even in simple thought, without alarm. The release from the notion of eternal punishment would be felt by the great mass, as a relief from the sense of moral obligation, and, relying on the certainty that all would be sure to be right at last, men would run the risk of the intermediate punishment, whatever it might be, and plunge into self-indulgence without hesitation. It may be said, that men do this now under the belief in eternal punishments: they do—and there is no limit to the powers of imagination by which men can suppress the reasonable certainty of the future, and make the present everything. But the belief in eternal punishment is the true and rational concomitant of the sense of moral obligation. Destroy the punishment, and you destroy the sin: limit it, and you make sin a light thing. Moreover, the belief in eternal punishment, however suppressed, leaves a blank and dark ultimate prospect before the sinner's mind; but this prospect is removed by the limitation of punishment; and in the place of a cloudy termination of the view, which the sinner at any rate had rather have removed, and which therefore must so far operate as a stimulus to that change of life which alone can remove it, he has a bright

ultimate termination any how, whether he changes his way of life, or whether he does not: and, therefore, he loses a stimulus to change, which even the most careless must in some way feel. For even those, to whom eternal punishment is thus a mere negation and suppressed idea, had rather have a bright termination than this suppressed bad one before them. Conscious of his own religious convictions, and aspirations after holiness for its own sake, Mr. Maurice may not see these consequences involved in his doctrine; but the practical working of it, were it to gain ground, would soon force them upon his observation. A general relaxation of moral ties, a proclamation of liberty and security, the audacity of sins which had before been abashed, carelessness where there had been hesitation, obstinacy where there had been faltering, and defiance where there had been fear, would show a world in which the sanctions of morality and religion had been loosened, and in which vice had lost a controlling power, and got rid of an antagonist and a memento. Whether or not the form and manner of its act could have been improved, the Council of King's College has done a substantial duty to the Church and the nation, in suppressing at once a teaching that immediately interfered with the very foundation of religion and morals. This is not a question of this or that particular doctrine, however important; but it is a question, whether we are to have religion at all amongst us, supported by its proper sanctions, and endowed with its legitimate stimulants and motives. To have stood by and done nothing in such a case as this, would have been a betrayal of their trust, an abandonment of a charge which the Church has committed to them, and for the execution of which they are responsible to that Church. The religious feeling of the country at large would not have allowed such indifference, and just clamour would have compelled them at last to do what their own consciences had neglected.

Meantime, we are not judging Mr. Maurice himself, but only his teaching. We know this teaching has a very different character to his mind, from that which it has to ours; and that he regards himself simply as in possession of a very deep truth of religious philosophy, viz. that eternity is pure existence, or some such truth as that. He disowns these consequences, and pictures to himself all the developments which we have given to his principle, as so much irrelevant alarmist misapprehension. We are glad he does so: we should be sorry to think that he thought all these consequences true. So far as he is personally concerned, we are content to think of his truth exactly in the light in which he regards it, separating it from all the consequences which we have attached to it. But in this case, he will allow

us to say, that it is not without real pain that we see a sincere, zealous, and able man losing his just influence and destroying his usefulness out of deference to a mere subtlety and a crotchet as impalpable as the air. We know immediately he will tell us,—it is not a subtlety, but a vital truth—a truth intimately connected with practice; that he could not live for a day as a Christian without it; and that his whole moral and religious convictions would collapse, if he had not this truth about pure existence—or whatever it may be—supporting him. We know he will maintain the urgent necessity of preaching this great practical truth to peasants and labourers, to ploughmen and artisans, to men, women and children, in towns and villages, in fields and market-places; that he is convinced that these masses of uninformed and imperfect minds are crying out for this especial truth, are hungry and desperate for it, and that woe to him if he does not go forth to satisfy this forlorn, desolate and consuming void within them. We know he will say all this, with the most entire sincerity. But will he take it ill if we remind him, that many men of sincerity, equal to his own, have thought particular truths of great importance at one part of their lives, which they have not at another; and that what once rested on an all-absorbing necessity, has come down to the rank of very secondary, if not very ambiguous truth? In the excitement of philosophical thought, we mistake the proportions of the great scheme of truth; we are led on by a favourite idea which becomes at every moment more necessary, more dominant, more fundamental, till it gains a complete throne and mastery. And such ideas often become stereotyped, and their dominion lasts for some time. But time, experience, fresh reading, new acquaintances, and other things, introduce us to new aspects of truth; the deep lines of a favourite idea wear insensibly away. We become aware that we can do without it: and the large and true foundations of religion take gradual hold of our minds, to the subordination of what was narrow, partial, and fictitious. It is possible that Mr. Maurice may some day not think the deep and subtle truth which he cherishes at present of such overwhelming consequence and weight. He may one day come to reflect, that the great idea of time, with which the Author of nature has endowed us, is, after all, our intended and proper guide to a notion of eternity; and that, however reason may demand its qualification, we shall not gain by endeavouring to get entirely out of its reach, in picturing to ourselves the life beyond the grave. He may come to consider, that in this life we must be content with such helps as are provided for us, in forming our conceptions of spiritual things; and that it is better to have a lower representation of truth, than none at all. If

such thoughts as these should ever at any future day approve themselves to him, we shall rejoice at the recovery of a person to utility and just influence, who could only have lost them by the pardonable causes of a mistaken zeal, and an unmanageable profundity.

We cannot, however, conclude this article without a slight notice of one particular claim put forward by Mr. Maurice in this controversy. For the *truth* of the interpretation of the word 'eternal' which he has put forward, Mr. Maurice appeals to certain grounds of metaphysics, and to Scripture thus metaphysically interpreted; but his *liberty* as a Church of England teacher, to inculcate this doctrine, he rests upon the ground that the formularies of the English Church nowhere condemn that sense of the word 'eternal' which he adopts, or impose that sense of the word which he opposes; that they use the word without marking the particular sense which is to be given to it, and therefore are to be understood as leaving it open to any person to attach this or the other meaning to it as he pleases, and to teach the doctrine of an 'eternal' state of reward and punishment in his own sense of that word.

'I therefore pledged myself implicitly in my Essays, I pledge myself explicitly now, that I will not, God being my helper, give up my liberty as a member of the Church of England by accepting any *new* Formulary on this subject, or *new* explanation of the Formularies which I have accepted. To these I adhere, in what I believe to be their literal natural sense.'—*Letter of Mr. Maurice in Dr. Jelf's Pamphlet*, p. 21.

'The general notion which you encourage—that the King's College Council may demand of its professors an assent to a number of *et ceteras* not included in the Formularies to which, as churchmen and clergymen, they have set their hand—is one for which I own I was not prepared. It will alarm, I believe, many persons who differ very widely with me. I do not see how it can fail to alarm every man who attaches any sacredness to his oaths or his subscriptions.

'On this point I must insist very strongly. I said in a former letter that I accepted the words of our Formularies and of the Scriptures in what seemed to me their literal and simple sense, but that I would accept no new interpretation of them. In noticing this remark, you have availed yourself, of course unintentionally, of the equivocal force of the adjective "new." You say, "I wish for no new Articles nor any new interpretations of our Formularies," meaning that your interpretation is the old one. But I submit that everything is *new* to the subscriber of a Formulary which is not contained in that Formulary at the time he subscribes it, however old or familiar it may be.'—*Mr. Maurice's Answer to Dr. Jelf*, p. 3.

The ground advanced here is a general ground, that whatever the formularies of the Church do not expressly and by word enjoin, is to be considered as open; and that a man is bound by nothing but that which has been *nominatim* and specifically put before him for his assent.

But such a ground, we must say, appears to us obviously untenable, contrary to common sense and common equity, and fatal to any Church that should allow or connive at it. It is obvious that when a Church constructs formularies, and lays down articles of faith, it cannot possibly stop at every word to assign the exact meaning in which it is used. To do so, were it possible, would be to defeat the very object for which alone it could be done,—that, viz. of accuracy and clearness; to bury the whole formulary underneath an accumulation of definition and a load of words, which would simply perplex, harass, and overwhelm any reader. The articles, as they stand now, are not easy reading; but were they constructed on the explanatory principle just mentioned, the case would be desperate—no reader of human powers could extricate himself out of such a labyrinth of language as would surround him: once in, he could never emerge to light again, by any rational clue, but simply by cutting the knot in the Gordian way, and creating a meaning of his own. But in truth such explanation would be impossible. The compilers of formularies could not interpose to explain words which admitted of no explanation; words of which the meaning has been taken for granted in all ages, and to which all mankind have instinctively annexed one and one only idea, and that one which cannot be defined and analysed. How could one possibly expect that when, in the course of constructing the formularies of the English Church, the compilers came across the word 'eternal,' they should affix a parenthesis to explain what the word 'eternal' meant? What had they to say about it? What could it mean but that which all mankind has always supposed it to mean? Nobody wanted an explanation; nobody could give one, if it was wanted; and nobody could understand one if it was given.

But if it is impossible that the Church should stop to explain every word of her formularies as she constructed them, what is the immediate inference from such a state of the case? Clearly that we are bound to something more than the express and specific terms as such,—the pure naked words of such formularies; viz. to the natural, commonly received, established meaning in which such terms were used; the meaning in which the Church has ever understood them, and in which therefore she imposes them. The impossibility of explanation demands as its correlative this attention and deference to those established and received meanings; allowance must be made for insuperable obstacles; and the necessities of the *imponens* turn to obligations in the subscriber. And though in smaller and secondary matters, where no strong intention of the Church can be supposed, and in doubtful matters where its intention cannot be certified to,

every reasonable latitude must be allowed to subscribers, and the authoritativeness of received meanings not be made a minute, frivolous, and burdensome one; in important and vital articles of Christian teaching the established and received meanings of terms must be considered binding. The intention of the Church must be considered to be represented by the meaning which has been always given in the Church to the term; and the subscriber is bound by the intention of the Church.

To say then, as Mr. Maurice does, that because the meaning of the word 'eternal' is not laid down in our formularies, its meaning is to be considered open, and that the most contradictory to the received one is to be allowed, and its inculcation by teachers in the Church not hindered, is to treat the Church in a way which is alike repugnant to common sense and common equity:—to common sense, because the explanation of such words is not to be expected; to common equity, because it is taking unfair advantage of such an absence of explanation. It is to approach the formularies of a Church in a spirit in which the merest lawyer would not approach a legal document, such as a contract or a will. In every document certain received meanings of terms must be taken for granted; nor are men allowed for an instant, in the interpretation of such documents, to assign some ingenious reason why the received sense of any of the terms employed is incorrect, and on that ground refuse to take the term in the received sense. Were such a system of interpretation allowed in secular matters, there would be an end at once to all good faith and stability in the dealings of man and man. And why should we treat the Church with less tenderness than we treat the world? A fair claim has generally been made for some generosity to the Church, as no ordinary bargainer; but this is to deprive her even of rigid justice. It is to approach the formularies of the Church in a temper of ultra-legality; in the way in which a narrow lawyer applies himself to a hostile legal document, which he is determined to reduce to the very lowest and most necessary meaning in which it can be understood, and to get rid of that even if he can. We cannot but wonder that a man of Mr. Maurice's ordinary generosity should have adopted such a ground: that he should approach the formularies of the Church to which he belongs with the determination to defer to nothing but the absolute naked terms to which he cannot deny he has subscribed; and that, if the Church has not laid down expressly a certain meaning of a certain term, to suppose that he has a right to take advantage of the omission, though the whole world knows that the Church, in using the term, had a certain meaning and no other.

On such a system of interpretation as this, there is not the

simplest and plainest article in the creed that might not be explained away. Let us take the very first article in the Apostles' creed—'I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth.' Here is expressed the elementary article of religion, that God is the Creator of the world. But a questioner may say, 'What does that term "Maker" or "Creator" mean? the Church does not express in what sense she uses this term. I shall therefore take the liberty of understanding this term to mean, not creating absolutely, but creating out of a certain primary unformed matter. For though I grant that the fair sense of the word create is to create out of nothing, its sense is still open, because it is not determined what *nothing* is. I shall therefore suppose, that by nothing is meant primary unformed matter or chaos; and that when the Church says that God created the world, or made it out of nothing, she leaves it open whether He made it out of nothing in the popular sense of the word, or out of nothing in the sense of unformed matter. I shall therefore maintain, as consistent with this article of the Apostles' creed, the eternity of matter; which I do not believe was made by God, but has co-existed always with Him.'

Are we trifling with Mr. Maurice and the reader in supposing such an argument? By no means. The specimen of interpretation of language here given is no invention of our own. Plato called all matter τὸ μὴ ὄν, or nothing; the later Platonists confined this term to the primary formless matter of which the world was made; still that which ordinary men would consider *something*, was called by this name. And this disguise of something, under the term 'nothing,' has been carried on by modern philosophers, who were thus enabled, under the outside of an article of the Christian creed, to hold a platonic origin of the world, and to believe in 'God as the maker of heaven and earth,' and the eternity of matter at the same time. We quote from Mosheim:—

'Among modern philosophers, Robert Fludd, and many others, who have admired and endeavoured to propagate Plato's sentiments, have chosen to imitate the fashion of the Platonists, and to call matter nothing; which they seem to do for this reason among others, that it may not be known how far their doctrine respecting the origin of nature differs from that universally received in the Christian Church. For though they make use of Christian expressions in speaking of the commencement of the universe, and like ourselves say that all things were produced out of nothing, yet they do not attach the same meaning as we do to the words, and by the word nothing they only intend a rude and shapeless kind of matter, which they will have to be a second principle of all things. These unfair interpretations have been well exposed among others by Peter

Gassendi, whose words are worth quoting—"As respects creation," says he, "must not be understood a production of something out of nothing, in the same sense as the Mosaic creation of the universe is commonly intended by divines. For though Fludd makes use of both the words and the narrative of Moses, yet he uses all these in a symbolical manner. By the word *creation*, therefore, he understands in the first place the production or generation of anything which is said to be made out of obscurity, or matter, which by him is called nothing."—*Mosheim's Dissertation*, annexed to *Cudworth*, c. 5.

One would have thought beforehand that the meaning of the word '*nothing*' was sufficiently clear, and afforded but little room for division of opinion. It is a word which has very decidedly its received and established meaning. Yet here we see another and more recondite sense assigned to the word, and upon the basis of that new signification, a doctrine of creation founded, which introduces, underneath the unchanged language of the Apostles' creed, a pagan deity—a being who divides with primordial matter the empire of the universe. Dualism, Manicheanism, and the basest religions, that strike at the very root of the true doctrine of a God, insinuate themselves upon the strength of a certain meaning of the term *creation*, different from its popular and received meaning. But would such an idea of the Deity be allowed to be taught in our lecture-rooms and pulpits? Or would not the orthodox feeling of the Christian body at once reject it, and maintain the received meaning of the word '*create*,' however unexpressed, as one which was supposed by the Church in framing the article, and only not expressed, because no other meaning was contemplated as capable of being held by Christians? And has not the word '*eternal*' its thoroughly received and popular sense, as much as the word '*create*' has?

Again, the Church has no expressed doctrine on the subject of inspiration. This is a most important and serious subject—the more so, because we cannot introduce it merely as an illustration of a principle, as we did the preceding instance, being quite aware that it is a question which is at this moment exciting deep thought, and which may before long come out in controversial shape. We are not going to discuss it thus incidentally at the end of an article; but we may at the same time be allowed to state what will not be disputed; and that is quite enough for our present purpose as regards the general question of subscription.

The Church implies, then, but makes no explicit assertion of the inspiration of Scripture. It is supposed that Scripture is inspired, because infallibility can only come from inspiration, and Scripture is infallible; any article of belief that can be proved

from or shown to be contained in it, being necessarily true. But because no doctrine of inspiration is formally laid down, is any Church teacher at liberty to maintain any doctrine of inspiration he pleases,—even the most ultra German one, which virtually denies all inspiration? However unexpressed as a doctrine, the belief in the full inspiration of Scripture is one which lies underneath the whole Christian creed, and could not be removed, without bringing the whole creed down with it. Thus Laud speaks:—

‘Every rational science requires some principles quite without its own limits, which are not found in that science, but presupposed. Thus rhetoric presupposes grammar, and music arithmetic. Therefore it is most reasonable, that theology should be allowed to have some principles also, which she proves not, but presupposes. . . .

‘The assurance we have of the penmen of the Scriptures, the holy prophets and apostles, is as great as can be had of any human authors of like antiquity. For it is as morally evident to any pagan, that S. Matthew and S. Paul wrote the Gospel and Epistles which bear their names, as that Cicero or Seneca wrote theirs. But that the apostles were divinely inspired while they wrote them, this hath ever been a matter of faith in the Church, and was so even while the apostles themselves lived, and was never a matter of evidence and knowledge, at least as knowledge is opposed to faith. Nor could it at any time then be more demonstratively proved than now. . . .

‘The assent which we yield to this main principle of divinity, “that the Scripture is the word of God,” is grounded upon no compelling or demonstrative ratiocination, but relies upon the strength of faith more than any other principle whatsoever. For all other necessary points of divinity may by undeniable discourse be inferred out of Scripture itself once admitted; but this concerning the authority of Scripture not possibly: but must rather be proved by revelation, which is not now to be expected; or presupposed and granted as manifest in itself, like the principle of natural knowledge; or by tradition of the Church both former and present, with all other rational helps, preceding or accompanying the internal light in Scripture itself.’—*Laud's Conference with Fisher* (*Anglo-Catholic Library*), p. 118, *et seq.*

It is evident, then, that there is a doctrine or idea of inspiration, which, however unexpressed, is a true and a most vital part of our creed, and to which subscription is implied, when the formularies of the Church are subscribed to. And a test of there being such an idea is this, that contradiction to it could certainly not be formally and authoritatively allowed, without creating such scandal as would issue either in a withdrawal of the liberty, or a disruption of the Church—such a disruption as would show quite plainly that the Church at large has a belief on this subject, which it thinks essential.

On the whole, it is abundantly clear to us that no religious communion that had a definite creed at all, could hold together upon such a principle of subscription as that which Mr. Maurice,

in his inference from the absence in our Articles of any particular interpretation of the word 'eternal,' has put forward. All human society requires for its maintenance and necessary order the bond of certain mutual understandings and implicit pledges; and if men begin to think themselves bound by nothing but by ink and paper, by seals and signatures, the cement of the whole fabric is loosened, and the materials part asunder. And religious communion requires the same substratum. No religious body can be kept together by statements and definitions solely: there must be something beyond these in which union is required: you may define and define, but something is left after all which is undefined; and that may be unimportant, and therefore open, or it may be most vital and fundamental, and therefore binding. The sound reason and common sense of the Christian world must ultimately settle which the open and which the binding part of this unexpressed belief is, and the faith of the Church must discern what is necessary to it, and what is not. But some agreement beyond that which statements express, is essential to a Christian body, and must, when the occasion arises, be asserted and imposed on the teachers of that body.

Since writing the above article, a second edition of the *Essays* has appeared, with a new Preface, and a new concluding chapter on the subject of the word 'Eternal.' The new portion contains no argument which had not appeared in the old, and leaves the controversy where it was. We will only notice two points.

Dr. Jelf has in his Letter accounted, in a way which we think quite satisfactory, for the omission in the Articles of 1562, of the xliid. of the Articles of 1552, against those who deny the eternity of future punishments. It appears that this was one of a set of erroneous opinions held by the sect of Anabaptists, which in 1552 was of sufficient importance to make such special notice of its errors expedient, but in 1562 had sunk into insignificance; in consequence of which such notice was no longer expedient. Mr. Maurice, in the new concluding chapter, admits the reasonableness of this explanation, but draws from it the opposite inference to that which Dr. Jelf has drawn, and that which, we think, most people would draw. Dr. Jelf naturally gathers from the explanation, that the omission of the article is a proof only of the altered condition of the Anabaptists, and not of an altered belief on the question itself. Mr. Maurice gathers from it that the compilers of the Articles had changed their minds from thinking it necessary to impose a certain opinion on this subject, to thinking the subject an open one. 'Here is an omission,' he says, 'a carefully considered omission

'in a document for future times, of that which had been too hastily admitted to meet an emergency of that time. The omission was made by persons who were probably strong in the belief that the punishment of wicked men is endless, but who did not dare to enforce that opinion upon others.' (P. 461.) The former appears to us the inference which common sense suggests. The latter inference is in the teeth of the facts of the case, which point to the decay of the sect exclusively, and to no change in the minds of the compilers of our Articles, as the reason of the omission. It would, if true, moreover, carry along with it the inference that the doctrine of the resurrection from the dead is considered by the Church an open one; the article on the resurrection and that on eternity having been inserted and omitted under exactly the same circumstances.

The second point we notice only for the sake of drawing a very obvious distinction. Mr. Maurice has, both in the old and the new portion of the Essays, but more pointedly in the new, condemned the philosophy of Locke, as a materialist philosophy. We extracted in our article a description from Locke of the idea of infinity. We beg to say here, that we extracted it simply as appearing to us a true, forcible, and copious description of that idea, and not *because* it was Locke's description of it. So long as any philosopher restricts himself to describing faithfully any idea in, or any part of, our minds, we may make use of his assistance without committing ourselves to any general reliance on his system. Such an extract does not entail upon us, then, any share of the controversy respecting the philosophy of Locke, though we may be permitted to say that we think the judgment upon him as simply a 'materialist,' a harsh one.

NOTICES.

WE think it was Mr. Wilson Evans' *Scripture Biography* which set the fashion of making S. Mark the Evangelist the same as John Mark of the Acts. Mr. Evans has treated their supposed identity in a pretty and sentimental tone: Mr. Ruskin more recently has made it the subject of an ingenious symbolical theory. We observe that Mr. Purchas, in his '*Book of Feasts*,' (Masters,) a collection of Sermons on the Saints' Days, adopts this view, apparently unconscious that the great balance of evidence and authority is in favour of the existence of two Marks. At any rate, the matter is so doubtful, that we think no homily on S. Mark's day should be primarily employed on a subject so questionable as 'the Saint's fall,' &c. Apart from this blemish, we think Mr. Purchas' volume a creditable one; though the several series by Mr. Paget, Bishop Armstrong, Dr. Newman, and others, might be considered a sufficient recent contribution to this particular subject.

Mr. Isaac Williams's '*Set of Fifty-eight Sermons for the Sundays, and a few Festivals of the Year*,' (Rivingtons,) will probably exceed in popularity all this respected writer's previous and very popular works. The sermons are neatness and simplicity itself. They aim each at a single lesson, and a single thought, always the leading idea of the services of the day. They are short, condensed, pointed, plain, and practical:—can sermons have stronger recommendations? It is said—of course we do not vouch for the fact—that many of our Clergy do not compose their own sermons. Far are we from recommending what the world is pleased to call the idle practice of borrowing sermons; but the parish will have little to complain of which for a year gets this sort and cycle of instruction.

'*Landmarks of History:—Middle Ages*,' (Mozley,) is a worthy supplement to the writer's '*Kings of England*.' The two volumes deserve to be what they are fast becoming, text-books in our schools. Their accuracy, completeness, and condensed form deserve all praise: while an occasional glimpse of character-drawing, bright but transient, reveals higher powers in the writer, for which we trust that a larger canvass and single subject may be in reserve.

Mr. Comper's '*Lectures on the Church*,' (Lendrum,) we consider one of the few good fruits of the Papal Aggression fury. The author, the incumbent of Nairn, made, or availed himself of, the occasion to put together for the benefit, not only of his own flock, but of his presbyterian neighbours, a syllabus on the distinctive doctrines of the Scottish Church. The result

is a manual, complete, compact, and serviceable, not only for its own immediate purpose, but wherever a temperate and concise vindication of Church principles is required.

'Short Sermons at the Celebration of the Lord's Supper,' (Deighton,) is one of the many proofs which their author, Mr. Harvey Goodwin, affords of his desire, and we understand a successful desire, to do something for the younger members of the University. We do not say that Mr. Goodwin always, perhaps ever, rises to the full conception of the eucharistical mystery: but his pleading for weekly communion and his general earnestness are in the right direction.

We really wish that we could honestly and honourably recommend a 'Companion to Confession, and a Companion to Holy Communion,' by a Layman, (Lumley.) We are quite aware of the needs of our Church in this direction, nor are we disposed to question the loyalty of one who has evidently given much study, and expended much thought and earnestness on this compilation; nor are we disposed to say that even in its present form this manual does not contain much that is profitable and edifying. The devotions are taken from the Sarum Enchiridion, or Manual of Private Devotions, *i.e.* from the unreformed old English offices. The result is, that in the office for Confession, the priest is recommended to absolve his penitents in this form:—'I, by the authority of the same God and Lord Jesus Christ, and of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul, committed to me, absolve thee, &c.' (P. 22.) Under these circumstances, it would be entirely superfluous to specify our objections to the use of this volume. We think it simply impossible to recommend it with an honest recognition of the Prayer Book of our Church as it is. And, which is the least important aspect of the matter, we must say that in this, as in a previous work, the writer's taste for translating into the most literal English the old offices, produces a dialect which we prefer rather to give a specimen of than to characterise. 'O Holy Christ! enthroned in Heaven, Melody of Regal Glory, before Whom ever standeth for Thy Divinity praising Thee, the Dignity of Angels, have mercy!'—P. 107.

We welcome a series now publishing under the general title, 'Readings for the Sundays and Holy Days of the Christian Year,' (Whitaker.) The tracts for Advent and Christmas are before us. The plan is simple enough, and its use is in its simplicity; an extract, practical, doctrinal, or explanatory, from a recognised English writer, is attached to each Lesson, Epistle, and Gospel. The selection is made with judgment, and always with a practical aim, and with eminent carefulness to make edification more prominent than curious research. A tessellated, and occasionally jarring effect is produced by the difference in style and language of the writers who succeed each other. Such a result is of course unavoidable, when the extracts range from Sandys to Heber; but this fault may be excused for a more than counterbalancing harmony in result.

The same publisher assures us that his 'Church Hymnal' has been 'submitted to various tests,' and that 'communications on it have been

received from a very large number of clergymen.' The value of these facts we are unable to appreciate; because, to submit a thing to a test is no proof that it bears it well, nor can we understand what is asserted in favour of a book, from the circumstance that a great many persons have written letters about it. For ourselves, we may say that the 'Church Hymnal' by no means fulfils our idea of what its ambitious title claims.

'The Autobiography of a Five-Pound Note,' (Clarke,) is the first of a series of cheap books for Railway Reading, planned with a good purpose, to 'combine with sound principles, taste, sprightliness, humour, and command of diction.' What the authoress possesses in the first qualification, we are disposed to give her all credit for; but in the other requisites which she specifies, we are bound to say that her aspirations at present exceed her acquisitions. A duller volume we never had the ill luck to stumble over.

Another complete volume of the 'Magazine for the Young,' (Mozley,) reminds us to congratulate the compilers of the best, cheapest, and we hope most successful, of these Church pioneers, on the steady growth of a periodical, the labours concerned in which can only be understood by those experienced in the responsibilities of this kind of literature.

'Passages from Missionary Life,' by Archdeacon Merriman, (Bell.) Unaffected in style, full in matter, and most interesting in details; we should say that no better antidote than this work exists, to the coarse slanders of a recent writer in one of our quarterly contemporaries, who suggested that our Colonial Bishops spent most of their time in lounging in England. On the whole, perhaps, a walk of five hundred miles through a South African desert and bush, with scant fare and no lodging,—Bishop Gray's daily life,—is one way of doing the Church's work, and has its value. To libel all shades of religious earnestness, from the calm solitude of a South Devonshire Vicarage, or the voluptuous ease of the Baths of Lucca, is another.

Bonnechose's 'History of France' (Routledge) fills up a blank in our ordinary text-books. It fills it up not only with completeness, but elegance.

We may excuse the affected title of 'Work: Plenty to do, and how to do it,' (Cradock,) and we may pass over points of disagreement both as regards the subjects, and the way in which they are treated, for the evident signs of earnestness which it displays.

Dr.—now Bishop—'Colenso's Village Sermons,' (Bell,) attracted a good deal of adverse and unnecessary criticism on their appearance; not so much, we are bound to think, upon the strength of expressions, of which one at least struck us as hasty, as because the writer, with more chivalry than discretion, dedicated them to Mr. F. Maurice. On the eve of his consecration, Dr. Colenso published a letter to the Primate in vindication, which, indeed, was not wanted, of his full acceptance of the doctrines of the Gospel. The Archbishop gracefully enough expressed his complete acquiescence in Dr. Colenso's defence, at the same time administering, not before it was wanted, a significant snubbing to the *Record*.

We have to announce the completion of two valuable serials. 1. 'Sermons for the Christian Seasons,' (J. H. Parker,) of which the enterprising publisher projects a second series; and 2. Mr. Wm. Jackson's 'Stories and Catechisings on the Collects,' (Mozley.) These collections, and we may say the same of Mr. Parker's 'Plain Commentary on the Gospel of S. Matthew,' have already gained so firm a hold on general confidence, that we think not so much of attracting, as of continuing, attention to them.

We are glad to welcome a new and vigorous contemporary, in the 'South African Church Magazine,' (Capetown: Robertson.) It is a sign of growth in the promising Church and Mission of the Cape, of no slight significance.

Mr. Matthew Arnold's 'Poems' (Longman) we propose to submit to a longer examination than would find its place in this department. Of other poetry we acknowledge, 1. 'The Hero's Child,' by Miss, or Mrs., Debenham, (Hughes.) 2. 'Poems,' by James Payn, (Macmillan.) 3. Salem Redeemed,' by Mr. Edmund Peel. One characteristic, we fear the predominant one, of recent verse, pervades all these volumes; they are utterly unreadable.

'Doctrines de l'Eglise Anglicane sur les Sacraments, &c.' (J. H. Parker,) is, we believe, Mr. Meyrick's excellent idea. A short tract, embodying the Catholic doctrine of the Church of England on Orders, Sacraments, and Sacramentals. It is designed for distribution by foreign travellers: and perhaps its circulation would tend to dissipate the unhappy misconceptions of the English Church, to which the proceedings of Miss Cunningham and her friends so frequently give occasion.

Mr. Boone has sustained—or shall we say revived?—an old reputation, in his recent 'Volume of Sermons,' (J. W. Parker.) They are specimens of a school of homiletics which has not been lately in favour: but which has its specialties of value. In style Mr. Boone is elaborate and careful, artificial perhaps; but his Sermons are distinct compositions throughout, and modelled on a plan and with an object intellectually fixed and followed. We thought the Appendix on Modern Unbelief unequal to the promise which its subject held out.

Murray's 'Railway Reading' keeps up its character for variety and interest. Of its two recent publications, a grim and ghastly Monograph of 'The Guillotine,' by Mr. Croker, is hardly a Christmas book: but it is replete with curious information. It settles what, indeed, had long ceased to be a moot point—the antiquity of the machine: and it dispels the legend of poetical as well as distributive justice, which made Guillotine Perillus like the victim of his own ingenuity in engines of death. The 'Beauties of Byron in Prose and Verse,'—the principle of selection adopted, might, if the subject were worth it, attract criticism,—is the last number which has been forwarded to us.

Mr. J. C. Robertson's 'History of the Christian Church' (Murray) reaches us too late in the quarter to permit us to do more than express a prejudice, produced by a very cursory perusal, in its favour.

Of Mr. Cowie's 'Hulsean Lectures' (Rivingtons) we may say exactly the same: the preacher's high and well-deserved reputation predisposes us in their favour.

'Hints on Clerical Reading,' by Mr. John Jebb, (Batty,) is from the pen of one who has earned a right to speak on the subject. Appended, we find some remarks by the editor of a weekly newspaper, in which Mr. Jebb printed his advice. This writer does not display evidence of the same qualifications: he tells us that the article 'the' ought to be pronounced 'thuh' before a consonant.

'Conversations on the Choral Service,' (Harrison,) is a reprint of some early papers which were published in the 'Parish Choir.' They form an admirable and available armory of answers to objectors. Among testimonies we wonder that the compiler has not fallen in with that striking anonymous work published some twenty years ago, 'Apology for Cathedral Service:' the author of which is quite unknown—at least to us.

Having said something recently on the subject of Church Penitentiaries, we cannot do better than extract, by way of Christmas memorandum of our duties, the conclusion of a recent tract by Mr. Carter of Clewer, in which he summarily gives an outline of what is now doing:—

'As the principles and objects of the House of Mercy may not be known to all whom this appeal may reach, the following details are added, to show briefly the main differences which distinguish it from the Penitentiaries hitherto established for the reformation of fallen women.

'1. The work is carried on by a body of Sisters, devoting themselves to it as a religious service, for Christ's sake, and from love of souls. The Sisters dwell in the same house with the penitents, and are engaged continually in instructing, training, and watching over them, whether in their employments, or in recreation, or at meals, and by night equally as by day.

'All possible care has been taken to preserve the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England by vesting the charge of all spiritual matters in clergymen, who, together with the Sisters, are responsible to the Bishop of the Diocese, as Visitor.

'Provision has also been made for the better maintenance and stability of the House, by associating together a select body of benefactors, as a Council, to aid the Sisterhood from without, and who have undertaken, together with other duties, the care of the property and regulation of the expenditure.

'2. The period of the penitents' remaining in the house is not fixed. Each case depends on its own circumstances; but the average period is from a year and a half to two years; the principle acted upon being that all of whose restoration there is reasonable hope, be permitted to remain till they seem fitted to bear the trials and temptations of the world.

'3. Penitents who continue to conduct themselves well, are encouraged to regard the House of Mercy as their home, where even after their return to the world, they may, in case of difficulty, still look for sympathy and aid.

'When it is considered how large a proportion of the inmates of Penitentiaries are orphans or homeless, how many from physical weakness, or other incapacity, are wholly unfitted for ordinary service, and how imminent the danger of relapse to former sin must under such circumstances often be, the importance of having such a refuge in case of pressing need, is evident.

'4. The Chapel of the House of Mercy is private; the Sisters, and the penitents under their care, forming the entire congregation, with the exception of such friends as may occasionally join them in their devotions.

'5. The House of Mercy is situated in the country; gardens and fields adjoin the house, affording facility not only for healthful recreation, but for such employments as gardening, the care of animals, dairy work, &c. &c.

'The experience now of about four years has more and more strengthened our conviction, that the mode of dealing, above sketched out, is the only effectual one to meet the exigencies of the case. It may seem to be setting in motion an over-large array of means for the relief of so despised and outcast a class. But it is impossible, without much experience, to conceive the thoroughly darkened and disordered state of soul which is superinduced by the long, long neglect, or unbridled indulgence of years. And the call is the more deeply touching, because, in the vast majority of cases, such a state arises not from any wilful choice of sin, but from a tangled tissue of predisposing causes deserving far more of pity than of reprobation. Fearfully exposed is the present state of our poor, and intensely active the snares which are ever around them for their destruction: The very weakness in which God has formed woman, the better to win man's loving care, and the trustfulness and dependence which were intended to excite high honour and zeal for her protection, become, by a train of unnatural circumstances, the fatal openings for her ruin and degradation. Themselves deceived, they become thenceforth the reckless deceivers of others; the tempted, by a righteous law of retribution, become the tempters in their turn; a great multitude, ever increasing, because, after the final step, there is no possibility of return; despair, hunger and scorn forcing each one to become the centre of ever-spreading pollution. What a sad and shameful scene London presents, as the gloom of night comes down upon her streets! As constantly as each morning pours forth the streams of life peopling the vast city by day, so evening after evening, from each hiding-place of shame, issues forth a fresh population, re-peopling and possessing every haunt, and meeting all who must needs still leave their homes, at every turn. In the rescue of but one such lost soul, what an amount of misery and sin is spared, and what blessing is shed not only within herself, but among all connected, or to be connected, with her, the Day of Judgment alone can reveal. And surely among the most tender passages of the blessed Gospel there are none more touching than those in which our Lord charges us to win and receive back fallen woman, as if her utter hopelessness were the most potent plea, her weakness the irresistible claim on all hearts, even as her fall is the most destructive source of unholiness and

' woe to family,' as well as individual life; the surest hindrance to His work of redemption.

' The more deeply ruinous the fall, the wider its baneful effects, the more is every means and appliance urgently required for the recovery. There is no difficulty in gathering in almost any number of these fallen ones, desiring, yea, yearning to be restored; the real difficulty, and one which the Church ought surely to meet at any cost, is to provide homes wherein the surest and amplest means of restoration can be supplied. What is done should be done in the most effectual way, lest much labour be spent in vain. Therefore would we do our best for these lost souls, even as our Lord spared not His very life for ourselves; and would shed around them a new atmosphere of purity, of love, and unceasing ministrations of the Word of God, of sacraments, and prayers, if by any means, through the grace of God, we may save some. And now in the confidence of growing experience, and with every cause for thankfulness in our present progress, we urge this appeal, and we trust that it will not seem a great thing to press earnestly for money, while we see daily before us those who are offering not money only, but all earthly prospects, yea, and their own selves also, for love of Him Who came to seek and to save the lost sheep of His fold.'

It is satisfactory to be able to announce that besides these Houses of Refuge already open, and full to overflowing in London, it is proposed to establish a large institution, combining another House of Immediate Reception, and a Home or House of Penitence after the Clewer type.

A 'Prospectus' has reached us of a work which has occupied a diligent and laborious clergyman, Mr. Wells Whitford, for many years, 'A Greek Concordance to the Holy Bible,' (J. W. Parker.) The author thus describes it:—

' The principle is simply that adopted in all other Indexes of words or phrases: first, an alphabetical succession of *all words* occurring in the Sacred Text, (in which point, also, this work differs from all former Scripture Concordances,) a grammatical succession of each one of their *inflections*, with a classified arrangement of the *second* and *third* words, or *more*, (if found in phrases together more than *twice*,) with the *main* word; and, secondly, the reference—which in no instance is omitted—made, not at the *beginning* of each line, but, as in every other Index, at the *end* of every passage.

' The result, not less surprising than important, is that, while increased, it is believed, materially, in utility, it will be, notwithstanding, so reduced in bulk, as to compress the essence, undiluted, of three cumbrous folios, into one moderate imperial octavo volume, at a price (to place it within reach of Students in Theology) the lowest possible.'

From all that we can learn, the assistance of those engaged in sacred studies would be well bestowed in aiding this important publication.

A simple and effective Tract on Cholera, for parish distribution,—how to avoid it,—has been printed by Mr. J. H. Parker. It condenses the marrow

of direct information on the subject: and a good-sized packet may be had at a trifling price.

We have received the little work, 'Rosaries: compiled for the use of English Churchmen,' with a new publisher's name. An extract from one of our own articles is ostentatiously recalled to our recollection, which we presume the writer of the preface thinks inconsistent with any strictures we may have passed on his work. On this we have to remark—1. That one, and that not an immaterial, word in the quotation from our pages is altered: we said, 'our petitions may *often* be better suited,' &c. The present writer changes this into 'may *after all* be better suited.' 2. Our article states that the *principle* of the Rosary may be so and so defended. What we object to in the compiler of the manual, 'Rosaries,' is, not that he applies the principle of rosaries, but asks us to use the very thing itself; *ex. grat.* the Devotions to the Sacred Heart. These, he suggests, should be used in our churches. Now, one of two things is certain: either that the compiler of this work knows the general, popular, and practical effects of the Devotions to the Sacred Heart, and how it becomes—say in a whole country, like Spain—a substitute, or occasional substitute, for what we venture to think are the reasonable, edifying, and ancient prayers of the Church; or, he knows nothing about the practical effects of this particular *cultus*. If, like ourselves, the present writer is familiar with its consequences, we desire no controversy with him; a person who, with his eyes open, asks to introduce such a devotion among ourselves, we shall not dispute with. But if he has only a literary acquaintance with the matter, we must say that he ought to have paused before he committed this work to the press.

'A Clergyman's Scriptural Reasons for not co-operating with the Bible Society; in a Letter to Lord Shaftesbury,' (Masters,) is an ingenious argument, fairly put.

Blackader's 'English Bible, divided into Paragraphs, with Maps and Notes,' is very far in advance of those miserable Family Bibles, with heretical commentaries, which used to be hawked about in serial instalments, and too often formed the tradesman's and cottager's divinity library. As far as we have examined this publication, which is very neat, the notes are really illustrative, and seldom offensive. In tone, it generally reflects Dr. Kitto's publications.

'Sir Ælfric,' (Whitaker,) is a well-meaning collection of tales and allegories. One of them thus commences:—'I was lying by the side of a pretty little stream, that ran out of a broad, open river.' This, of course, was in fairy land; for in this nether world, ruled by the laws of gravitation, 'pretty little streams' run into, not out of, 'broad open rivers.'

It is with extreme pain that we ask attention to a 'Statement and Correspondence between the Lord Primate of Ireland, and the Rev. George Williams,' (J. W. Parker,) which reaches us at the last moment before publication. Public opinion has expressed itself with sufficient distinctness on the Circular of the Four Archbishops; from the majority of their

Graces, we fear that an attempt to claim a more than synodical authority, and to interfere with the just exercise and expression of opinion on the part of the Clergy, is not inconsistent. But that the Archbishop of Armagh should have permitted himself to be made use of in this matter, is a subject of sincere regret to all who have valued his Grace's liberality. In the correspondence with Mr. Williams, there is the exhibition of a temper and tone which is painful to have to characterize. We therefore decline the task. Amidst this distress, the extreme folly of one Mr. Green furnishes a ludicrous element, in a transaction in which, apart from Mr. Williams's share in it, it would be hard to discover any redeeming feature. Meanwhile, let us not forget what is the original point in dispute; whether a pledge and bargain made in the name of England shall, or shall not, be kept. We are thankful to Lord Shaftesbury for some manful sincerity in this matter. He said distinctly at Islington, that if the bargain and promise was made, it ought to be broken for Gospel purposes.

We cannot permit the present Number of the *Christian Remembrancer* to reach our subscribers without recording our sympathies with that grief which we are certain must possess them, in common with the whole Church, at the intelligence of the removal of Dr. Mill, Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Cambridge. Living long enough for fame, Dr. Mill has been taken away when his faithfulness and services could be least spared. He carries with him more, and more enduring, than literary honours. Severe to himself, and of a simplicity of manners which well recalled the scholars of other days, Dr. Mill possessed to a singular degree the art of winning confidence. He was, if any, a guileless man: of strong and ardent affections, and, possessed with burning sympathies, in what seemed reserve of manner, he was only checking a natural activity or even vehemence of character. Though far advanced in acquirements above our sciolism, he was most free and courteous in communicating, even to strangers, from the exuberance of his learning. He could afford to disdain compromise, whose whole life exhibited a perfect consistency in teaching. He was one of whose steadfast loyalty to the Church none ever ventured to entertain a suspicion: and that Church which he defended with his learning, advanced by his practical works, and illustrated by his life, loses one who will, however, take his permanent station in her list of great theologians. Dr. Mill's mind was eminently scholarly and theological: his very diction, under which ran a deep current of rich but subdued eloquence, showed a systematic and disciplined intellect; and his great, though fragmentary, works on the Pantheistic theory, will be alone a sufficient vindication of his fame. For ourselves, some tribute to the memory of the deceased will not be out of place, for, often as we consulted him, we never asked for information in vain. It is some melancholy satisfaction to ourselves to recall, that, full as he was of works, he was always ready and willing to assist others; and to the readers of the *Christian Remembrancer* it is right to say this, recalling the circumstance, that our very last Number was enriched by a contribution from Dr. Mill's learning and kindness.